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1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Without doubt, information and knowledge have to be considered core aspects of any
modern society in the world (Powell and Snellman, 2004). Today, a substantial part
of the population belongs to what has been labeled as the creative class. According to
Florida (2004, p. 123) this class consists of “scientists, engineers, architects, designers,
educators, artists, musicians, and entertainers, (...) the creative professions of business
and finance, law, health care, and related fields, in which knowledge workers engage
in complex problem solving.” During their work, members of this creative class create
new ideas, new technologies, or new contents, which consist to a large extent of new
information and new knowledge. Obviously, this large pool of information has to be
administered and made accessible in some way. In an organizational setting this is
commonly achieved through information systems (IS), which are intended to provide
useful information either to the members of the organization, or to its clients. Ideally this
information is used by the organization to be more efficient, more effective, or both. As
computers have become more widely used in organizations, these have mainly been used
to automate IS. So, while IS do not necessarily entail technology (Ward and Peppard,
2002), many of today’s IS are actually computer-based. These computer-based systems
promise (for specific tasks) to be superior to manual IS because ideally a “computer can
process data (the basic facts) speedily and accurately, and provide information when
and where required, which is complete and at the correct level of detail, so that it is
useful for some purpose” (Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003, p. 4).
While the intention behind these computer-based enterprise IS is simply the provision
of useful information, their form is highly diverse and furthermore continuously under-
going profound changes. During the early years of organizational IS, software has been
largely used for data-intense, repetitive functions such as payroll or accounting (Heinzl,
1996). However, it quickly became obvious that IS can be put to productive use in
other areas, too. Accordingly, during the 1970s hundreds of specific solutions emerged
that have either been specialized in certain industries or in certain business functions
(Campbell-Kelly, 2003). The use of IS in an organizational setting has become wide
spread during this time. In the 1980s the perception of IS as purely supporting other
(core) business functions changed, and the important role that a well-structured and
well-planned application of these systems can play for the strategy of an organization
has become evident (Porter and Millar, 1985). However, what exactly constitutes a
well-structured and well-planned application of these systems has been, and to a large
extend still is, highly elusive. The difficulty to relate the volume of pure technology
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investments to an increased organizational performance has been widely recognized as
IT productivity paradox (Brynjolfsson, 1993; Dedrick et al., 2003). One of the underly-
ing reasons for this fact can be found in the enormous complexity of these systems. As
most of the highly specialized solutions of the 1970s have been developed by different
organizations independently from each other, the integration of these systems became an
effort almost as complex as the systems themselves (Mertens, 2005)1. Therefore, during
the 1980s the trend to integrate various functionalities within one system emerged. This
trend manifested especially in the emergence of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
systems and in a consolidation of the IS development industry (Campbell-Kelly, 2003).
The first development is especially important for this work, since ERP systems promise
to achieve exactly the demanded integration of business functions within one system:
Enterprise systems appear to be a dream come true. These commercial
software packages promise the seamless integration of all the information
flowing through a company - financial and accounting information, human
resource information, supply chain information, customer information. For
managers who have struggled, at great expense and with great frustration,
with incompatible information systems and inconsistent operating practices,
the promise of an off-the-shelf solution to the problem of business integration
is enticing. It comes as no surprise, then, that companies have been beating
paths to the doors of enterprise-system developers (Davenport, 1998, p. 121).
These integrated systems are commonly assumed to have four main advantages. With-
out going into more detail, it has been argued that they offer an advanced quality and
efficiency of internal business processes; that costs for hardware, software, and IT staff
can be substantially reduced; that the ability to access cross-functional information al-
lows managers to make better decisions quicker; and that these systems break down
departmental borders and thus achieve the goal of an integrated enterprise (O’Brien
and Marakas, 2006). Evidently, these advantages made ERP systems a huge success
and the organizations that develop the systems therefore also have been highly success-
ful. A direct result of this is the above mentioned consolidation in the IS industry. Only
a couple of large organizations have the resources to develop these large and complex
systems, and therefore IS development “remains in the hands of a few ’global players’”
(Dreiling et al., 2005, p. 2). This perception is reinforced by the so-far prevalent advice
that organizations should focus on the system(s) of one single vendor, and should avoid
mixing and matching systems developed by different vendors (Mertens, 2005). Further-
more, customers of these systems have even been advised, in case that they necessarily
have to tamper with the system at all, to rather keep their modifications within the
standard, predefined configuration options (Brehm et al., 2000) - otherwise severe ad-
verse consequences for the whole organization might be the result as both the system
and the organization develop further (e.g. Stedman, 2000).
1 This book fits well into the here described timeframe, as it has been first published in 1969. It is
now in it’s 15th (!) edition.
2
3However, during recent years a profound change has happened in the enterprise IS
development industry. Whereas the dominant paradigm of the 1990s and early 2000s
has been briefly sketched above, recently the large vendors of these systems started to
promote their systems with the ability to integrate third party solutions (Greenbaum,
2003). This argument runs counter to the so-far discussion of integration between dif-
ferent vendors’ systems as one of the key challenges that organizations adopting an
enterprise IS are facing (Bingi et al., 1999). From a practical perspective, this develop-
ment is clearly observable in the industry, yet it is still largely neglected in the field of
IS research. A higher degree of inter-organizational division of labor in the process of
IS development has been repeatedly demanded at least since the NATO conference on
software engineering held in 1968 (see especially the essay of McIlroy, 1969). However,
so far there has been no theoretically well-founded treatment of this topic - current
work is either highly technical or purely anecdotal (e.g. Van de Ven, 2005). This is
neglecting the enormous impact that the modularization of products has on organiza-
tional structures, a phenomenon well documented in other industries (e.g. Baldwin and
Clark, 2000). For this reason, recently the demand emerged to analyze the IS devel-
opment industry, especially its inter-organizational structure, from an organizational or
managerial perspective, rather than from a purely technical one (Currie and Parikh,
2006).
1.2 Research Objectives
The overarching research objective of this work is therefore to address the change in
industry structure that is currently happening in the IS development field. There are
multiple ways how such an endeavor can be approached. The obvious way would be to
analyze the industry itself from a macro-level perspective. However, while this way has
been approached (e.g. in Arndt and Dibbern, 2006b), it has been decided for this study
to not follow it any further. Rather, it is argued that the best way to analyze the industry
is through analyzing the organizations of which the industry consists. This promises to
yield significant results not only for the theoretical understanding of the industry, but
furthermore to assist practitioners in the field in their daily operations. Thus, while the
overarching goal is to contribute to a better understanding of the industry, the way this
goal is aimed at is through the analysis of the different organizations that constitute this
industry2.
2 As the discussion in Section 2.1.2.3 shows, organizational structure and industry structure are indeed
moving towards each other. The main reason for this is given in the fact that organizational structures
of the post-industrialized age are no longer confined within a single organization. Rather, these
organizations are only part of an industry network, which offers integrated products or services
(Miles et al., 2005; Laubacher et al., 2003). Thus, whenever organizational structure is discussed in
this work, the term refers to the structure of different organizations within such an industry network.
A further elaboration on the potential change perspectives from an industry and an organizational
level and a brief rationale for choosing one and not the other is given in Section 2.1.3.
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In order to achieve this goal, first a discussion of fundamental factors has to be con-
ducted. This entails an establishing of a clear understanding of the IS industry. This
is especially important here, as an inter-organizational division of labor has been de-
manded for so long and has not materialized in this context (McIlroy, 1969; Glass,
1998). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that IS development is subject to
specific idiosyncrasies that have so far prevented the emergence of sophisticated inter-
organizational structures. Among these idiosyncrasies are especially the facts that IS
can be considered an information as well as an intellectual good. What exactly this
means for the industry is discussed as a preliminary step towards an attempt to answer
the above described broad research objective. Parallel to these IS idiosyncrasies, de-
tails on the current development in industry structure are discussed. Based on concepts
taken from general systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1950; Simon, 1962), a reflection on
the development processes of modular products in various other industries3 is conducted
(Galvin and Morkel, 2001; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). As part of this preparatory discus-
sion it becomes obvious that the partner networks4 in various industries generally evolve
around large, well established organizations. As this structure seems to well correspond
with that found in the IS development industry (Farhoomand, 2006), the distinction
between these two types of organizations is also used throughout the present study.
In this general context, this study can be broken down into three fundamental re-
search objectives. The first issue that has to be clarified is answering the question of
why organizations developing enterprise IS are adopting this cooperative growth strategy.
Considering the above mentioned differentiation between the two types of organizations,
the first research question can be broken down further into two parts. First, it has to be
answered why the existing, large IS vendors abandon their strategy of exclusive organic
growth through adding more functionality to their systems, and instead adopt one of
growing through integration of third-party solutions. Second, the question of why com-
plementers attach their solution(s) to the large vendors has to be answered. Thus, the
first broad category of research objectives entails the establishing of a clear understand-
ing about the goals that both the large vendors and the smaller complementers have
for participating in such an inter-organizational network. Again following the idea of a
reference discipline, the literature on strategic networks in other industries is discussed
in order to gain this understanding. This literature review supports the perception that
accessing resources is a key driver in establishing such networks (Hagedoorn, 1993).
Thus, a detailed discussion of the resource-based view (RBV) as the underlying theory
of most of the works in this area is conducted (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt,
1984; Barney, 1991). From this theoretical discussion, a set of strategic resources is de-
3 Such a reliance on reference disciplines has been common in IS research. However, it has also been
noted that such a reference discipline should only be used to guide the research and that ideas
transferred should always be critically tested before they are applied in the IS context (Keen, 1980).
Thus, also the discussion of idiosyncrasies of the IS development industry.
4 See Section 2.1.2.3 for a more detailed discussion on and a clear definition for inter-organizational
networks.
4
5rived that are deemed most relevant for justifying the participants’ decision to cooperate
through such networks. Each of these resource categories is then further discussed with
regard to the two organizational roles in the network. The result of this discussion are
propositions on why organizations adopt the cooperative growth strategy.
Analyzing this first research objective promises to be relevant for both theory and
practice. From a theoretical perspective, a deeper understanding of the idiosyncrasies of
IS development at an organizational level are highly relevant. As has be argued above,
today there is no clear understanding of the specific effects of these idiosyncrasies, an
evident shortcoming of the field. Especially the differences from IS development to other
product development disciplines promises to yield significant insights into the inter-
organizational IS development process. As the IS development industry is one of the
growth motors for industrialized economies (Dedrick et al., 2003; Powell and Snellman,
2004), academic research in this field can be expected to give answers to questions about
its fundamental functioning. These answers also promise to be relevant for organizations
in this industry. For both the established system vendors and their partners, a clear
understanding of why they pursue this strategy is a necessary first step for a successful
transition from the monolithic structure of the past to the emerging networked structure.
Furthermore, knowing what partners are expected to bring into the network is also
imperative for managing the network, which leads over to the second thread of research.
The second research objective is to address the question how organizations manage
the relationships to other network participants. This approach slightly deviates from the
traditional cost-benefit analysis, which then leads to a certain decision concerning the
question as to participate in the network or not. Rather than analyzing the decision
to participate, this study addresses how to manage the network after the decision to
participate has been made. The rationale behind this choice of research objective is to
gain a deeper understanding of the presently emerging networks, and how they can be
managed in a way that reduces frictions that could potentially offset the above discussed
benefits (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). That this threat is very substantial has
been well covered in the literature, in which for example Gulati et al. (2000, p. 203)
discuss the fact that “networks also have a potential dark side and may lock firms into
unproductive relationships.” Thus, the deliberate management of the network once it
has been established, is a key factor to prevent this type of relationship and thus foster
the emergence of a more effective and efficient structure in the IS development industry.
Gulati and Singh (1998) analyze this dark side further, and argue that the inherent
frictions of networks or alliances stem from two sources - issues that are the result of
the partners’ behavior and issues that are the result of inherent complexities of such
an organizationally modular approach. Again, these issues have been theoretically well
addressed in other fields. Especially for the first type of issues, the concepts of bounded
rationality and opportunistic behavior, as well as theories that build on these are dis-
cussed. The second type of issues has also been addressed in theories on organizational
inter-dependencies and their coordination. Thus, similar to the preparation of the first
research question, a discussion of approaches on how to manage such relationships is
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conducted. The result of this theoretical discussion are three mechanisms that promise
to play a role in managing the network relationships in a friction-reducing manner.
Consequently, these are again cast in propositions on how organizations manage their
network relationships.
The result of the second thread of research is thus again relevant for both theory
and practice. It can be argued that from both the behavioral and the complexity per-
spective, the development of an enterprise IS is an endeavor that is very difficult to
be realized through an inter-organizational network. From a theoretical viewpoint it is
thus interesting to discover how such an inherently complex endeavor can nevertheless
be organized through an inter-organizational structure. From a practical viewpoint the
issue of managing such a network is also highly relevant. As frictions can be expected
to substantially reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall network, reducing
them has to be seen as the key activity of managing the network. Identifying various
ways and means how this can be achieved is is a valuable contribution of theoretical
research to the practical issue of how to manage such a network.
Finally, the last thread of research objectives connects the two preceding ones. As it
has been argued, certain partners bring certain resources into the network. As different
categories of resources can be identified, it can also be expected that different categories
of partners exist. Similarly, different management mechanisms employed in the network
have been identified. Linking those two, the final research thread tries to give an answer
to the question whether differences in partner categories exist, whether these are managed
through different mechanisms, and whether there is a fit between the two. Answering
this question seems especially important for practitioners, who are legitimately trying
to realize the full potential of the network they manage. Through giving them an idea
of what measures might be appropriate in which context, IS research is accomplishing
at least a first step in answering this question. In this regard the here proposed research
goes far beyond what has been discussed in the existing literature.
1.3 Research Design
Research design has been defined by Kerlinger and Lee (2000, p. 449) as “the plan and
structure of investigation, conceived so as to obtain answers to the research question.”
It is therefore of prime importance to address the research design that this study follows
as early as possible. However, as Kerlinger and Lee (2000) themselves note, this entails
significant difficulties, as it is hard to clearly and unambiguously define what the plan
and the structure of a research effort are. As a consequence, classifications of research
design have blossomed, so that today it is almost impossible to find an unambiguous
label for the research design which is followed. At this point in time it suffices to argue
that a research design is to the largest extent determined by the research questions that
are intended to be answered and by the control that the researcher has over the events
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7that he5 is studying (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000; Yin, 2003). As the discussion on the
research objectives above has indicated, the two main research questions are why the
IS development organizations are adopting a networked strategy, and how these orga-
nizations manage this changed situation. Furthermore, as the objects of investigation
are actual organizations and their behavior, control over the events has to be consid-
ered minimal. Following the classification of Yin (2003) this indicates that case study
research promises to be the most appropriate research design for this study6.
Following the definition of Yin (2003), this research design is characterized by two
distinct features. First, the boundaries between the studied phenomenon and its con-
text are not clear. Closely related to this is the second feature that a multitude of both
variables of interest and available data covering these variables exist. Both features are
clearly given in the above described context of IS development. Obviously various stake-
holders and influencing factors are involved in this industry, and it is by no means clear
which belong to the studied phenomenon and which are context. Thus, the case study
approach indeed seems to be the appropriate research design. Obviously, this research
design comes in multiple variations, so that Section 3.2 discusses various dimensions
through which the chosen research design can be specified in more detail. Perhaps the
most important dimension to discuss is the scope of the case. In the view of Yin (2003)
case studies can be classified along the two dimensions of whether the study encompasses
one or more cases, and whether there is one or more units of analysis within the cases.
As it has been described above, the unit of analysis has been deliberately chosen to be
the organizations that act in the IS development industry. Thus, each case is considered
to consist of only one unit of analysis, making it a holistic case approach7.
Another critical issue promises to be, first, how many cases should be considered
and, second, the choice of case(s). Today, it is common sense in the community that
multiple cases should be conducted if possible Patton (2002); Stake (2006); Yin (2003).
As no good justification could be found for conducting a single case study, this work
follows this advice. Explaining the second issue of what cases should be selected, the
structure of the emerging IS development industry is of prime importance. As it has been
argued, the IS development networks promise to emerge through the nesting of smaller
companies around the existing solutions of leading organizations in this industry. Thus,
this research addresses both the leading IS development organizations and the smaller
partner around them. The first case is one of the leading companies. This organization
5 It should be noted that only the male gender is used in this text. It is intended to also represent the
female.
6 This decision is further elaborated on in Section 3.1.
7 One might argue in this context that also the industry can be considered the case and the organiza-
tions the units of analysis, which would make the design that of a single, embedded case. Finding
a clear-cut argument for one of the two is difficult. However, as the studied organizations are all
interacting in complex, and also very diverse contexts, it is argued that each organization should be
treated as its own case, rather than treating the entire industry as the case and the organizations
that are embedded in the industry as the units of analysis.
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is well established in the global IS markets, it has thousands of customers in more
than one hundred countries worldwide and generates multi-billion dollar revenues per
year. Based on this starting point multiple other organizations that are part of the
first case company’s network are analyzed. The second case is also addressing a leading
IS development organization. This case company again is achieving multi-billion dollar
revenues on a global scale. Thus, both the drivers for participating in the network and
how the network is managed in this second case promise to be similar to those of the
first case company. Once it has been shown that this case is sufficiently similar to the
first case, a range of other cases is addressed that all promise to be different from the
first two cases in that they all address partners of Case Company A that are not well
established, global IS development firms. In contrast, these partners are all addressing
specific niche markets and thus have much smaller revenues with less customers and also
much less employees. Thus, these cases promise to be different in both the reasons for
participating and the type of management employed in the network.
1.4 Study Organization
After this brief introduction to the topic and the proposed research design, the following
chapter develops a conceptual framework on which this work is based. In order to do
this, first a discussion of IS development is conducted. This discussion is intended to
clarify the context in which this work is set, and to establish a common understanding
of the terms that are often used differently in different contexts. Also, modularity of
products, organizations, and industries is discussed as a founding pillar of this study.
A key argument here is, that both are highly inter-related and that organizational and
industry structure is so far a much lesser researched topic in the IS field. Therefore,
this study addresses this issue especially with a discussion of organizational networks,
which are have been identified as the prevalent structure in the IS development industry.
Through which perspective this is done is then discussed in the final section of the
fundamental part.
From the discussion on organizational networks, it becomes evident that indeed the
two questions on why organizations participate in networks and how these networks are
managed are prevalent in the literature. Addressing the first question has been con-
ducted especially through the resource-based view on organizations and its derivatives.
Based on this theoretical lens, resource considerations are made that lead to the propo-
sition of why organizations participate in these networks. Similarly, the question how
such networks are managed is addressed from a theoretical standpoint first. Based on
this discussion again propositions are put forth how such a structure can be managed.
These propositions are intended to guide and structure the research approach, a key
requirement for qualitative case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Katz, 1953; Yin, 2003).
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9The third chapter then addresses the research methodology in more detail. As has
already been mentioned the proposed design is that of a case study. In this chapter,
first this approach is contrasted with other research designs such as experiments or
surveys. A continuum of these designs is given and it is argued further why the case
approach is appropriate. Subsequently, more details of the approach are discussed. As
is already implicit in the research questions, this study is inherently exploratory, rather
than confirmatory. What exactly the differences are and how these influence this study
is discussed in Chapter 3. Also discussed is the difference between qualitative and
quantitative research, and why the former is chosen for this study. Further, the study
follows a variance theoretical approach, rather than a process one. The final aspect that
is addressed in this chapter is the process of data collection in the case companies.
In Chapter 4 the actual case study is conducted. This chapter follows a three-staged
approach. On the most basic level, following the metaphor of replication case studies
as follow-up experiments, each case is analyzed with disregard of the others. In general
these case discussions follow the three proposed research objectives. First, a brief discus-
sion of the case company is conducted. This discussion especially focuses on (historic)
developments of the company’s network participation. The second part then addresses
reasons why the case company joined the network. Then each single case analysis then
addresses the question how the network is managed by this company. Especially for the
first two cases then an effort is made to integrate these two discussions into an answer
for the third research objective. Once all single cases have been analyzed individually, a
cross-case analysis is conducted for the large, well established two first case companies
as well as for the other companies. The goal of this analysis is to develop ideas of simi-
larities in-between these two types of organizations in the network. Then, the final step
is to integrate these two perspectives into a holistic picture of the entire network.
The study closes with a brief summary of the main findings and an outlook into future
research. This outlook is sub-divided into two main parts. First, it is discussed how a
similarly structured scientific study could proceed from the foundation that has been laid
in this work. Second, it is discussed which lessons have been learned that might benefit
practitioners, and also which links could be found for studies form other sub-disciplines
of IS research.
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2 Theoretical Conceptions
It is the goal of this chapter to develop a theoretical framework in order to structure
and guide the following empirical research. In order to achieve this goal, the chapter
is subdivided into three main sections. The first part develops the foundations neces-
sary for an understanding of the topic of this study. It delimitates its context within
the very broad field of IS development (Bacharach, 1989) and further argues why the
addressing of the proposed research questions is important (Currie and Parikh, 2006).
Based on this discussion, the ideas of general systems theory are introduced. These are
subsequently applied first to product development, then to organizational and especially
industry structures, and both are finally related to the IS development industry. The
preliminary result of this section is the understanding that inter-organizational product
development is more complex in IS than the same process in other industries. However
the same underlying rationales guide the trends in this industry. The fundamental part
also discusses various perspectives through which the change within the IS development
industry can be analyzed. A teleological perspective is selected for the more detailed
analysis within the following two sections.
The second section of this chapter focuses on the first research question why firms join
inter-organizational networks. In order to answer this question, first a brief discussion
of organizational structures in general is conducted. In this context, it is argued that
an organizational structure can be understood as a certain division of labor and its ac-
companying coordination mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1979b). From an industry level, the
main distinction between an inter-organizational and an intra-organizational structure is
therefore, that in the first the division of labor reaches across organizational boundaries,
while for the latter, division of labor is achieved within the boundaries of one organiza-
tion. One of the predominantly used theoretical frameworks for answering the question
of when one structure promises to be superior to the other is the resource-based view
(RBV, Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). In this framework, all
assets1 that have some influence on a firm’s processes can be considered as resources. In
this context, inter-organizational structures emerge if some of these assets are sourced
from a third party. A key aspect of the RBV is that especially these resources are
sourced form third parties, which are difficult to obtain. Thus, one of the conclusions
of this section is that organizations join inter-organizational networks especially when
they are in need of resources that they do not posses and that are difficult to obtain
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). As the discussion
of resource considerations in the IS discipline is still at an early stage (Wade and Hul-
1 The idea of a resource is indeed held very general. See Section 2.2.1.1 for a definition, and also a
critique of this fact.
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land, 2004), the strategic management field is consulted. Based on this discussion, a
set of broad resource categories is developed that promise to be driving organizations
into participating in organizational networks. These resources are then discussed within
the specific scope of IS development, and here also from the perspective of large, global
IS development organizations as well as from the perspective of their niche partners.
The result of this discussion is a set of propositions2 why it is beneficial for large and
small software developers to participate in the inter-organizational network as it has
been conceived in the first part of this chapter.
The third part of this chapter then covers the second research question and addresses
issues concerning the management of the emergent inter-organizational structure in the
IS development industry. The deliberate management of such an inter-organizational
network is important, as frictions in the cooperation can potentially offset the above
discussed benefits of this approach. As has been mentioned in the introduction, these
management issues largely stem from two related sources. Concerns about the behavior
of organizations that participate in the network and concerns about the complexity of
integrating the externally obtained resources. The first aspect has been widely covered
in organizational and economic theories. Especially the hazardous implications of the
combination of bounded rationality with opportunistic behavior for inter-organizational
relationships has been addressed in transaction cost theory (e.g. Williamson, 1985),
in agency theory (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989a), and in the theory of incomplete contracts
and property rights (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). After discussing the underlying
assumptions in more detail, these theories are thus introduced in considerable detail. The
result of this discussion is a broad understanding how such relationships can be managed
in order to ensure a smooth cooperation despite these behavioral issues. The second
aspect of complex inter-dependencies between organizations has also been addressed in
various theoretical approaches. These approaches are therefore also introduced. On this
basis, a discussion of various coordination mechanisms that can be used to manage such
complex relationships is conducted. Interestingly, the discussed mechanisms to counter
behavioral and complexity issues are very closely related to each other. Subsequently,
the potential of these mechanisms is discussed especially in the IS development context.
Similar to the first research objective, this discussion results in broad propositions how
inter-organizational relationships in the IS development context are managed. These
propositions are then used to structure the further empirical research conducted in the
following chapters.
2 The fact that this term is chosen for the here developed relationships is based on the work of
Bacharach (1989). He argues that, “while both propositions and hypotheses are merely statements
about relationships, propositions are the more abstract and all-encompassing of the two” (p. 500).
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2.1 Foundations of Inter-Organizational IS Development
Networks
As this section is intended to establish a common understanding of the context of this
work, the first part is a brief discussion of what exactly is understood under the term
IS development. This drills down from very general concepts for both IS themselves and
their development, towards a definition of manageable complexity. It furthermore covers
idiosyncrasies of IS, which are one of the key motivators to study inter-organizational
networks especially in the IS development industry and are consequently of prime impor-
tance throughout this entire work. After this, the idea of modularity in IS development
is introduced. This is done first through a rather theoretical discussion of general sys-
tems theory. This section introduces the main ideas from this theory, which can be
considered to be very of fundamental value for this work3 Based on these concepts the
actual setting is prepared. It is argued that a modular product design entails various
advantages over a monolithic product design (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Consequently,
IS are also designed along this principle. However, in order to reap the full benefits of
such an approach, it is desirable to design industry structures along the same lines as the
goods that the organizations in this industry produce (Conway, 1968). Consequently, a
modularized, inter-organizational IS development industry is proposed. Despite the fact
that this demand has been raised now for almost forty years (see McIlroy, 1969, for an
early example), it is argued that the above mentioned idiosyncrasies of IS development
render such an inter-organizational approach even more difficult in this industry than in
others.
Yet, recent technological developments, especially the emergence of the concept of
Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA), promise to reduce the impact of these special
properties and thus open a window of opportunity to make such an inter-organizational
structure in the IS development industry possible. However, this industry is still far
from the level of inter-organizational division of labor that can be found in other engi-
neering disciplines. Since this industry change is not yet thoroughly understood, various
potential perspectives can be employed in order to gain a deeper understanding of this
development. Two of these perspectives are discussed in the final section of this introduc-
tory part, and one of them is adopted to guide the further research approach. Through
this perspective, the fundamental research questions that have already been introduced
are discussed in due depth throughout the following two sections of this chapter.
2.1.1 Information Systems and Their Development
It is the goal of this section to clearly define the scope of the present work. This definition
is subdivided into three distinct aspects. First, a brief introduction to the IS discipline
in general is given. The goal of this discussion is a clear understanding of what an
3 This perception is also mirrored in the IS literature, where O’Brien and Marakas (2006) for example
argue that general systems theory should be a pillar for all activities related to IS development.
13
14 2.1 Foundations of Inter-Organizational IS Development Networks
enterprise IS actually is. Second, the development of these enterprise IS is discussed.
This includes a distinction of the degree of detail that is chosen for this study, as well as
a brief history of software and IS development. Finally, idiosyncrasies of IS development
in comparison to other product development disciplines are discussed. Here especially
the fact that IS are information and intellectual goods is of prime importance. These
fundamental issues are referenced frequently throughout the remainder of this study,
so their clear definition is imperative at this early stage of the discussion of theoretical
backgrounds.
2.1.1.1 Fundamentals of Information Systems
Before defining IS development a clear understanding has to be established what exactly
constitutes an information system. Frequently, the term is used interchangeably with
information technology (IT), which is however, obstructive to the deeper understanding
of the differences and relations between the two concepts (Ward and Peppard, 2002).
Therefore, this work is based on the layered definition given by Avison and Fitzgerald
(2003). As has been mentioned in the introduction, on the most basic layer, an IS used
in an organizational setting is defined as any system providing useful information to
various stakeholders of the organization, which includes for example the members or
the clients of the organization. Ideally this information is used by the organization to
be more efficient, more effective, or both. This definition in itself does not yet contain
any technological aspects of IS, which reinforces the perception of Ward and Peppard
(2002, p. 3), “that information systems existed in organizations long before the advent of
information technology and, even today, there are still many information systems present
in organizations with technology nowhere in sight.” Following Avison and Fitzgerald
(2003) on their way to a narrower definition of IS, the next step is that of a formalized
IS. A formalized IS is contrasted to informal ones, such as rumors, gossip, or gut feelings,
which might also be sources of (more or less) valid information. However, their informal
nature makes a concise study of them almost impossible, and definitely beyond the scope
of the discipline of IS research. The final reduction of IS narrows the definition down to
those IS that are addressed in this work: That of a computer-based IS4. These promise
(for specific tasks) to be superior to manual IS because ideally a “computer can process
data (the basic facts) speedily and accurately, and provide information when and where
required, which is complete and at the correct level of detail, so that it is useful for some
purpose” (Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003, p. 4). This reliance on computers for IS is also
echoed in the narrow definition by Ward and Peppard (2002, p. 3): In his perception, IS
are “the means by which people and organizations, utilizing technology, gather, process,
store, use and disseminate information.”
4 By virtue of their computer-based nature these have to be formalized IS.
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Consequently, information systems should not and cannot be considered equal to
the technology they are based upon. Therefore, IS are often more narrowly defined as
consisting of the software (i.e. the computer programs) and excluding the hardware
(i.e. the computer machinery). However, as Sommerville (2004) notes, this definition
is also not correct. Software is usually equated with one single computer program or
application, while a system consists of multiple interconnected applications that are fur-
thermore used by different individuals to achieve a common goal of an organization.
Consequently, IS cannot be considered without their environment (Checkland and Hol-
well, 1998). Rather, they have to be considered to be composed of people using the
system, the domain knowledge on task in which these people are supported through the
system, and the technology on which the system is based (Heinrich, 1996). As a holistic
treatment of the entire process from development over deployment to successful use can-
not be realistically addressed within the scope of a single study without loosing focus
(DeLone and McLean, 1992), this work especially addresses the development process
of these systems. The focus is therefore on parts of the technology and task aspects.
The user perspective is largely excluded. The technology aspect is especially limited to
the software that is used in an organization. Other aspects, like computer hardware,
telecommunication infrastructure, and the like are not considered. The task aspect is
limited to the (mostly business- or process-related) knowledge embedded in the system.
This embedded, domain knowledge is expected to largely stem from business or legal
disciplines, but also includes other fields, depending on the area of application (Check-
land and Holwell, 1998). To give an example, the logic whether a booking is compliant
with certain accounting practices is considered part of an IS, as it is the software that
actually alerts the accountant that a booking is not compliant. However, neither the ac-
tual computer that the accountant uses, nor the necessary training that the accountant
receives in order to use the system is included.
2.1.1.2 Fundamentals of IS Development
Since the focus of this work is especially on the development of these systems, this term
is subsequently defined. Avison and Fitzgerald (2003, p. 19) define IS development as
“the way in which information systems are conceived, analyzed, designed, and imple-
mented.” Sometimes this discipline is also referred to as systems engineering, which
is defined by Sommerville (2004, p. 25) as “the activity of specifying, designing, im-
plementing, validating, deploying, and maintaining socio-technical systems.” Obviously
these definitions are again very broad in that they encompass both the hardware and the
deployment of the system at the customer, aspects that have been deliberately excluded
above. Thus, also for IS development, a narrower definition promises to disambiguate
the field of inquiry of this work. The definition chosen to achieve this goal is closely
related to that of software engineering. However, there is no clear understanding of the
scope of this discipline in the literature. Avison and Fitzgerald (2003) for example argue
that, although software engineering is a part of the IS development process, it does not
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encompass such activities as understanding of the problem, understanding the needs of
the user, or deciding whether a system is needed after all. Contrary to this, for Som-
merville (2004, p. 7) this discipline refers to “all aspects of software production,” also
including especially those capabilities mentioned above. Recognizing the fact that there
is no ultimately valid definition of the term, IS development is defined here as including
all the skills necessary to (further) develop5 either the technical base, or the embedded
knowledge of a system. Again this scope is limited through largely excluding the user
perspective. Augmenting the above given example, a change in the legal environment
of accounting that entails a change in the used software is considered to be part of IS
development. A change in organizational responsibility that entails the organizational
relocation of using a software from one department to another without changing the
actual system is not part of IS as it is understood here.
Another important issue when delineating the scope of IS development for this study,
is the level of detail on which IS development is considered. As Iivari et al. (2000)
note, the field of IS development is characterized by a multiplicity of different methods,
principles, techniques, and tools, which makes it almost impossible to only get a general
idea of all of them. As will become clearer throughout the rest of this fundamental part,
it is not the intention of this work to add another method, tool, or principle to this
methodology jungle. Rather, it is the stated goal to contribute to a better understanding
of the structure of the IS development industry, and here especially the trend towards
an inter-organizational structure that has been initiated by the wide-spread adoption of
SOA that has already been discussed briefly above. With that scope in mind, it can be
safely stated that this work addresses issues that Iivari et al. (2000) subsume under the
heading IS development paradigm. These very general paradigms guide the assumptions
which translate into more concrete methods or tools at lower levels of the hierarchy of IS
development paradigms6, approaches, methodologies, and techniques proposed by Iivari
et al. (2000) and illustrated in Figure 2.1.
In this context, the topic of this study can be considered a paradigm shift. Until
recently, the dominating paradigms in IS development have been whether they have
been developed in a generic or a bespoke way. The first type of systems are defined by
Sommerville (2004, p. 5) as “stand-alone systems that are produced by a development
organization and sold on the open market to any customer who is able to buy them,”
the latter as “systems which are commissioned by a particular customer,” and which
are developed “especially for that customer.” To gain a better understanding of the
backgrounds, the relation between these two types of systems is subsequently illuminated
through a brief discussion of the history of IS development.
5 Especially the notion of enhancing the system as part of IS development has to be emphasized here.
The line between IS as a product in comparison to a service is blurred in this context (Cusumano,
2004).
6 It is also important to state that this “highest level of abstraction is that which connects research
on [IS development] to alternative (...) research communities” (Iivari et al., 2000, p. 186) - namely
that of organizational science and strategic management in this case.
16
17
Figure 2.1: The ISD Paradigms, Approaches, Methodologies, and Techniques Hierarchy.
Source: Adapted from Iivari et al. (2000, p. 189).
When the first computers were sold to corporations during the 1950s, there was hardly
any market for commercial software - the term software itself had not even been coined
until 1959 (Campbell-Kelly, 1995). In this environment, there were three distinct ways
of acquiring the needed computer programs: They were bundled with the hardware;
they were exchanged freely through communities of interest; or they were developed
in-house by hired computer staff (Campbell-Kelly, 1995). In this context, a demand for
custom programs emerged - programs that were not supplied by the hardware vendor,
that could not be acquired through a community of interest, and that could not - or were
not intended to - be produced in-house. This market opportunity has been seized by
software contractors, companies that supply exactly these computer programs. In 1965,
there were about forty to fifty large, and an uncountable number of small contractors
that developed individually designed software for their customers (Campbell-Kelly, 1995;
Haigh, 2002).
However, this individually designed nature of the computer programs changed - albeit
slowly - during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. A reason for this can be found in the
rapid development of hardware technology as opposed to the rather slow development in
software productivity (often referred to as the software crises). Campbell-Kelly (1995)
points out that during the 1960s, computer performance has increased by two orders
of magnitude, while software productivity has only increased by a factor of two to
three. Consequently, there has been a growing gap between the available capacities of
computers, and what was needed by custom made software running on them. Thus, it
has become less feasible for companies to develop each piece of software they use from
scratch, either by themselves or through software contractors. This, in combination with
the fact that under growing pressure of the U.S. Justice Department, IBM decided in
1969 to unbundled its hardware from its software (Costello and Gomes-Casseres, 1992;
Cusumano, 2004; Haigh, 2002), has persuaded several software contractors to convert
their existing software into pre-packaged, standardized software solutions that could not
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only by used by one, but by many different customers (Campbell-Kelly, 1995). Despite
the fact that in 1970 still an overwhelming majority of software spending has been
dedicated to software contracting, the development towards the use of standardized
software packages that started in this time could not be stopped. It culminated in
today’s dominance of these standardized enterprise IS, which has already been touched
upon in the introduction.
The underlying fundamentals that lead to this distinction between generic and bespoke
systems are well recognized in the literature. Markus and Robey (1988) for example dis-
cuss the difference between technological and organizational imperatives. The first refers
to a situation in which technology is perceived as “exogenous force which determines
or strongly constrains the behavior of individuals and organizations” (p. 585). This
describes neatly the idea behind generic systems, in which organizations have to adapt
to the systems they use. The latter refers to a situation in which an organization has
“almost unlimited choice over technological options and almost unlimited control over
the consequences” (p. 587). This again very well illustrates the idea behind bespoke
systems, in which systems are even individually designed in order to fit to the organi-
zation using them. However, just as Markus and Robey (1988) argue for an emergent
perspective, in which organizations and technology engage in complex interaction with
uncertain outcome, Sommerville (2004, p. 6) recognizes that “the line between these
types of [systems] is becoming increasingly blurred.” He bases this perception on the
fact that, especially large, standardized systems can be extensively modified to include
customer-specific business- or process-knowledge. Exactly this change in paradigm for
IS development is the key aspect of this study. However, on the one hand, measuring
up to other engineering disciplines requires more than just the ability to modify large
systems. On the other hand, IS possess certain idiosyncrasies, which make it difficult
for their development industry to realize the benefits that are proposed to come along
with such an approach. Which these idiosyncrasies are, is discussed subsequently.
2.1.1.3 Idiosyncrasies of IS and Their Development
IS as Information Goods. The first idiosyncrasy of IS is the fact that they are infor-
mation goods. Under this term, Shapiro and Varian (1999b, p. 3) subsume “essentially
anything that can be digitalized - encoded as a stream of bits.” Obviously, the software
and the knowledge embedded in this software belong into this category. Therefore, a
discussion of the properties of these goods promises to yield significant insights for the
IS development industry. Usually, the distinct properties of information goods are dis-
tinguished as to whether they originate from the product itself, or from the interaction
of a number of related products (Shapiro and Varian, 1999b).
Concerning the first group, there are various characteristics that differentiate an infor-
mation good from a non-information good (which are mostly tangible ones). Obviously
these characteristics are not a binary either-or distinction between the two types of
products. Rather, information goods tend to display significantly more or less of each
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property than non-information goods. Within each group of goods there are also subtle
nuances. Not all information goods display the same degree of each property. The first,
and probably most important, aspect that stems from the nature of information goods
is the so-called first-copy effect. Shapiro and Varian (1999b, p. 3, emphasis in original)
summarize this effect with their statement that “information is costly to produce but
cheap to reproduce.” With other words, once the book is written, the music recorded, or
the software coded it is easy - and cheap - to print another book, press another CD, or
download the software again. Consequently, information goods are subject to economies
of scale to a larger extent than non-information goods.
The second, closely related, effect is that information goods possess the property of
non-rivalry. This indicates that the product is not exhausted through consumption.
Thus, an essentially infinite number of consumers can benefit from using the good with-
out diminishing the benefits of the other consumers. So, for example a book can be
easily shared among different readers, or a CD can be used by various listeners, without
the fact that the second reader or listener has any adverse effects either for himself or
for the first person. The concept of non-rivalry is of special importance in combination
with the first-copy effect. Especially in the context of electronic media, a copy can be
made almost for free, even for end-customers. Thus, these customers can easily copy
their CD and share it their friends. Since these then do not have to buy the CD, the
revenues of the recording company are reduced. This aspect is commonly referred to
as non-excludability of information goods. This indicates that it is difficult to prevent
people from using an information good7. Especially in the field of electronic media, this
has enormous consequences - ranging from intense research in technical copy protection
to the use of legal prosecution of software piracy.
The final, and in the context of IS development probably most important, aspect
of information goods is that they have to be considered as experience goods. The
fundamental idea of these goods has been first raised by Nelson (1970), who argues that
there are essentially two distinct means to evaluate the quality of a product. The first is
search, which refers to inspecting the good before purchasing it. The second is experience,
which refers to inspecting the good after purchasing it. The consideration of which way
to go obviously depends on the costs of inspecting before purchasing in comparison to
the costs of purchasing. For very cheap products, experience is the appropriate way: “To
evaluate brands of canned tuna fish, for example, the consumer would almost certainly
purchase brands of tuna fish for consumption” (Nelson, 1970, p. 312). In a similar vein,
Shapiro and Varian (1999b, p. 5) give the example of a newspaper as an experience
good: “How do you know whether today’s Wall Street Journal is worth 75 cents until
7 Products that possess the property of non-rivalry and non-excludability are referred to as public
goods in economic theory. The theoretical foundation for the concept of public goods has been laid
by Samuelson in two short essays in 1954 and 1955. A common example for a public good is a
lighthouse. An additional ship watching the lighthouse does not have any deteriorating effects on the
other ships and it is almost impossible to prevent a ship from watching the lighthouse (Rutherford,
1992; Eatwell, 1987).
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you’ve read it? Answer: you don’t.” However, even for expensive goods, the costs of
experience might be lower than those of search. Nelson (1970) gives the example of
appliances, the quality of which is difficult to assess for a customer by inspection. Thus,
in this context, experience is the better way of quality assessment. The same holds true
for complex IS, for which quality is a multi-facetted concept of for example as-is utility
and future maintainability (Boehm et al., 1978). Thus, for those systems, it is close to
impossible to assess the real value of the good without purchasing (experiencing) it8.
Besides these aspects that stem inherently from the information good itself, there
is also an important implication resulting from the interaction between these goods.
Commonly information goods are subject to so-called network externalities. This concept
refers to the idea that a product becomes more valuable through the fact that it is used
more often. The simplest form of network externalities are direct network externalities.
Here the added value stems directly from the installed base of products. These direct
network externalities are for example the basis for Metcalfe’s Law, which states that the
total value of a network roughly equals the square of the number of compatible devices
in the network. This can be explained through the simple example of fax machines. The
first fax machine does not have any value, whom are you supposed to send a fax, if you
are the owner of the only machine? However, if someone buys a second machine, this
second machine does not only add value for the owner of it, but also significantly for the
owner of the first one. The third machine again adds value to all three owners, and so on,
and so forth. Thus, the larger the network, the more value is added by adding another
member. Besides these direct effects, there are also indirect network externalities. These
are the result of products complementary to a certain platform. Through adding more
complementary products for a specific platform, this platform becomes more valuable.
So through this indirect influence, a network of products emerges, although the single
products are not directly connected to each other. Consequently, even without direct
connection the products influence each other. To bring another example, the fact that
your neighbors own a video recorder does not make your video recorder function any
better than before. However, the fact that your neighbors’ owning of a video recorder
attracts a video rental store to your neighborhood increases the value of your video
recorder enormously9.
Therefore, through network externalities - no matter whether direct or indirect ones
- a positive feedback loop is initiated. Positive feedback loops are a general concept that
refers to the fact that the growth of something is subject to the size of it. Applied in the
context of network externalities, a large installed base of a certain product makes this
product even more attractive. So, once a certain product has reached a substantial mar-
ket share, this market share itself is reason enough for customers to decide for exactly
this product. Obviously there is a downside of this effect, namely that without reaching
8 Sometimes it is difficult to correctly assess the value of an IS even after it has been purchased. See
the discussion on the productivity paradox in Section 2.1.2.4
9 This paragraph is largely based on Shapiro and Varian (1999b)
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a substantial market share there is no way that a product can become a commercial
success. This is also the reason why organizations that operate in information industries
are keenly concerned with developing a dominant market position (Shapiro and Varian,
1999a; Liebowitz and Margolis, 2001), ideally as that company that provides the plat-
form which is complemented by other products (Morris and Ferguson, 1993; Gawer and
Cusumano, 2002).
IS as Intellectual Technology. The second idiosyncrasy of IS is the fact that IS have
to be considered an intellectual rather than an industrial technology (Lee, 1999). The
main difference between these two types of technologies is the constraint that physical
characteristics have on their application. So, while industrial technologies are limited by
their physical appearance to fulfill a certain requirement, intellectual technologies are
exactly not constraint by physical aspects, but only by the imagination of their users,
they can be used “in virtually unlimited ways to solve problems or organize information”
(Curley and Pyburn, 1982, p. 33). Thus, both technologies differ in the point in time,
when their functionalities are defined. While industrial technologies have a well-defined
set of functionalities from the moment their design is completed and they are produced,
this is not true for intellectual technologies (Curley and Pyburn, 1982). Rather they
can be programmed, or dynamically adapted, to the requirements of their users. In the
words of Lee (1999, p. 8) they “can be innovated endlessly, depending on its interaction
with the intellect of the human beings who implement and use it.”
Also, there are manifold occasions when this adaptation of IS is desirable. An example
would be the fact that IS are dependent on the strategy of the organization that uses
them.10 While it is not the intention of this work to either give a complete list of reasons
why IS should be changed or to give a comprehensive overview over strategic IS plan-
ning, it is important to mention that this IS planning is not a singular event. Rather,
as Ward and Peppard (2002, p. 135) state it, once “a strategy process is instituted,
it should become a continuously evolving process, where the strategies and plans are
refreshed regularly and even frequently, according to external forces, business needs and
opportunities, the planning timetable, culture of the organization, and the benefits de-
livered by implementation of the strategy.” Thus, IS have to be considered a technology
that is in constant flux. What has been state-of-the-art today is outdated tomorrow, a
perception even further reinforced by the enormous pace of change in technology upon
which the here discussed computer-based IS are based.
Taken together the intellectual, information nature of IS makes them a highly specific
field of inquiry that necessitates a cautionary stance when comparison it with reference
disciplines (Keen, 1980). Nevertheless, subsequently principles from product develop-
ment are discussed as a fundamental pillar for this work. This discussion is based on
10 This is discussed in the literature under the label of strategic alignment between IS and business.
Without going into more details of this issue here, the reader is referred to Henderson and Venka-
traman (1993) and Earl (1993) as the standard works on the topic.
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general systems theory, which is the basis for many of the introduced principles, and
is thus briefly introduced in the next section. Then the general ideas of modularity in
product development are discussed. Based on this discussion, it is then argued that
an inter-organizational industry structure promises to be the most efficient approach
to realizing these ideas. However, as it has been argued that a comparison with refer-
ence disciplines is difficult, a close analysis shows that indeed, the here described two
aspects of IS - the facts that they are information goods and intellectual technologies -
have a severely deteriorating impact on the application of general product development
principles to the IS context. Especially the attempt to realize IS development through
an inter-organizationally structured industry seems to be highly difficult because of the
co-existence of these two idiosyncrasies. This explains why the paradigm to develop IS
- albeit technically modularized - within one large enterprise has been dominating the
industry throughout the last three or perhaps even four decades.
2.1.2 Inter-Organizational Networks
After having discussed what is understood under IS, how they are developed, and what
their idiosyncrasies are, the following sections address the structure of these systems, the
organizations that develop them, and the industry that these organizations constitute.
First, the foundations are laid through a discussion of properties of hierarchical, loosely
coupled systems in general. The underlying ideas of general systems theory are then
transferred to product design in general and specifically to IS development. As a next
step, it is argued that modularized products promote the adoption of modularized (net-
worked) organizational and industry structures. Thus, various different aspects of these
structures are illuminated in due depth. Finally, the above discussed idiosyncrasies
of IS development are reintroduced and it is argued that so far an adoption of these
inter-organizationally modularized industry structure has been difficult if not impossi-
ble. However, it is also argued that recent technical changes could have the potential to
facilitate this adoption.
2.1.2.1 General Systems Theory
The concept of general systems theory is based on the perception of von Bertalanffy
(1950, p. 135) that “similar fundamental conceptions appear in all branches of science,
irrespective of whether inanimate things, living organisms, or social phenomena are the
objects of study.” He therefore argues that these similarities should be studied across the
different disciplines and suggested to call the field appropriately general system theory.
As a motivation for this endeavor he mentions the understanding of the “vague, muddled
and metaphysical” notion of systems that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”
(von Bertalanffy, 1950, both p. 142). With the same motivation, Simon (1962) further
elaborates on this issue. He analyzes the internal setup of complex systems, which
he defines as those “made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple
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way11.” The central argument of Simon (1962) is that such complex systems are often
hierarchical in nature. In his perception, a hierarchical system is one that is composed of
a set of interrelated subsystems; each of these subsystems is, in turn, composed of other
subsystems, and so on, until finally a lowest level of elementary subsystem is reached.
Obviously, these elementary subsystems are somewhat arbitrarily chosen12. However,
such a distinction has to be made at some point, in order to actually apply the ideas of
general systems theory in a meaningful way.
Such a hierarchical system is considered to be advantageous over non-hierarchical sys-
tems because it also possesses the property of being loosely coupled. Coupling is often
used “synonymous with worlds like connection, link, or interdependence, yet each of
these latter terms misses a crucial nuance” (Weick, 1976, p. 3). The crucial nuance
that Weick (1976) mentions is made more explicit by Orton and Weick (1990). In their
discussion on loosely coupled systems, they propagate their perception that there are
two different interpretations of loose coupling. One is the unidimensional interpretation,
which is also basis of the critique by Weick (1976). Here, the degree of looseness (or
tightness) is seen as an extreme on the continuum between distinctiveness and respon-
siveness. If subsystems of a given system are characterized as being distinctive, their
connections, links, or interdependencies are of very low intensity. In contrast, if subsys-
tems of a given system are characterized as being responsive, their connections, links, or
interdependencies are of very high intensity. Thus, the more intense these connections,
links, or interdependencies are, the tighter a system is coupled. Contrary to this, the
dialectical interpretation sees loose coupling as the coexistence of responsiveness and
distinctiveness. In this interpretation, parts of loosely coupled systems strive for dis-
tinctiveness, while at the same time retaining responsiveness to the other parts. Figure
2.2 illustrates this two-dimensional, dialectical perspective. It is furthermore explained
by Orton and Weick as follows:
If there is neither responsiveness nor distinctiveness, the system is not really
a system, and it can be defined as a noncoupled system. If there is respon-
siveness without distinctiveness, the system is tightly coupled. If there is
distinctiveness without responsiveness, the system is decoupled. If there is
both distinctiveness and responsiveness, the system is loosely coupled (Orton
and Weick, 1990, p. 205, emphasis in original).
11 This albeit vague definition is also mirrored in the work of von Bertalanffy (1950, p. 140): “We can
isolate processes occurring in the living organism and describe them in terms and laws of physio-
chemistry. This is done, with enormous success, in modern biophysics and biochemistry. But when
it comes to the properly ’vital’ features, it is found that they are essentially problems of organiza-
tion, orderliness, and regulation, resulting from the interaction of an enormous number of highly
complicated physio-chemical events.”
12 von Bertalanffy (1950, p. 141) also recognizes this arbitrary choice of elementary level: “You cannot
resolve the individuals within a (...) social unit into cells and finally into physio-chemical processes.
Very well, take the individuals as units, and eventually you will get a system which is not physics
but is of the same form as exact physical science.”
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Figure 2.2: A Dialectical Perspective on Systems Coupling.
Source: Based on Orton and Weick (1990, p. 205).
Simon (1962) also discusses advantages of these loosely coupled systems in comparison
to tightly coupled, integrated systems. Foremost, since dysfunctions are usually confined
to one of the subsystems and do not affect the other subsystems, these systems promise
to be more stable. Simon (1962) very well illustrates this with the example of the two
watchmakers Hora and Tempus. The first relies on stable subassemblies for the watches
he makes, the second attempts to assemble his watches in one pass. Even if it is assumed
that Hora’s approach entails more effort for producing these stable subassemblies, the
fact that he can safely pause and resume his work pays off manifold in the example of
Simon (1962) in which both watch makers are so jumpy that they drop their current
workpiece if they get interrupted.
Furthermore, since complex, hierarchical systems can be built upon existing subsys-
tems, their development promises to be possible at a faster pace than if systems were
not hierarchical in nature and had thus to be developed from scratch each time. The
most illustrative example that Simon (1962) offers for this aspect is that of empire build-
ing13. He argues that Alexander the Great built his empire through the assembling of
smaller nations. The existence of stable political systems was therefore a prerequisite for
his success, and “where this condition was not fulfilled, as on the Sycthian and Indian
frontiers, Alexander found empire building a slippery business” (Simon, 1962, p. 473).
The final advantage of hierarchical systems is based on limited cognitive capabilities
of man. Every complex system easily surpasses the ability of any single individual to
understand it. Therefore breaking the system into subsystems allows the studying of one
13 Remember that general systems theory is termed general, because it can be applied in all different
settings!
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of these at a time. Therefore, only through this structure is it possible “to understand,
to describe, and even to ’see’ such systems14” (Simon, 1962, p. 477). As the discussion
has shown, all these advantages arise naturally for all systems that have the properties of
being hierarchical and loosely coupled - hence the name general systems theory. Consid-
ering these advantages, engineers of all disciplines have therefore deliberately attempted
to copy these properties when designing complex man-made systems. This approach is
termed modularity and discussed in the following section.
2.1.2.2 Modular Product Design
As it has been mentioned, the principle of modularity describes a close resemblance
of artificial product design with the principle of loose coupling between hierarchical
subsystems in general systems theory. This becomes very obvious when considering
one of the most prominent definitions of modularity. Baldwin and Clark (1997, p. 85)
define the concept as “building a complex product or process from smaller subsystems
that can be designed independently yet function together as a whole.” The principal of
modularity is not new. Actually it has been applied ever since complex products are
developed. Therefore a multitude of examples for products exist that are designed along
this principle. One commonly cited is the automotive industry in the early 20th century.
An increasing complexity of the products forced car manufactures to switch to modular
product design. It is even argued by Womack et al. (1990, p. 26 ff) in their highly
influential book The Machine that Changed the World that this development has to be
seen as the key factor for mass production in the automotive industry: “The key to mass
production wasn’t (...) the assembly line. Rather, it was the complete and consistent
interchangeability of parts and the simplicity of attaching them to each other.”
This interchangeability of parts15 can be achieved through the adherence to a pre-
defined modular product architecture. Ulrich (1995) defines a product architecture as
consisting of three parts: (1) functional requirements; (2) the mapping of functional
requirements to components; and (3) the specification of interfaces for interacting com-
ponents. Such an architecture is characterized as being modular if two conditions are
fulfilled. First, functional requirements have to be mapped one-to-one on components.
Second, component interfaces have to be loosely coupled. An interface between compo-
nents in turn is defined as being coupled, “if a change made to one component requires
a change to the other component in order for the overall product to work correctly”
(Ulrich, 1995, p. 423). A loosely coupled interface is consequently one, in which changes
14 As Simon (1962) notes it is by no means clear what is cause and what effect in the relation between
man’s ability to see hierarchical systems and their prevalence in nature. It might be possible that
many natural systems are not hierarchical in nature, but that these systems escape our attention
because we are unable to see them. If this would be the case, not the hierarchical nature of systems
would facilitate our understanding of those systems, but our understanding of hierarchical systems
would explain their prevalence in nature.
15 Subsequently, the terms parts, modules, components, subassemblies, and subsystems are used inter-
changeably for each other.
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in one component can be made without necessitating changes in other components16.
Only through such a modular product architecture as defined here, mixing and match-
ing of components becomes possible. This in turn allows for a realization of the above
mentioned advantages of hierarchical, loosely coupled systems in the context of product
development (Schilling, 2000).
Another case in point for this kind of development is offered by Baldwin and Clark
(2000) and their discussion of the first modular design of a computer (focusing on the
hardware). “In the large systems era of the 1960s and 1970s, when mainframes were
the norm, computers were built from the ground up with proprietary hardware and
architectures and unique components” (Costello and Gomes-Casseres, 1992, p. 2) - a
truly monolithic system with all the associated disadvantages: “The support of older
applications and systems was becoming a problem of nightmarish proportions. For
users, taking advantage of new technology meant writing off investments in old systems
and software, and moving all their data to new formats and locations” (Baldwin and
Clark, 2000, p. 169). As customers were becoming more and more unhappy with this
situation, IBM addressed the problem with the introduction of System/360 - commonly
considered to be the first modular designed line of computers (Bresnahan, 1998). All
members of this line of computers were able to use common peripheral infrastructure,
and thus enabled customers to selectively upgrade their computer without abandoning
their entire existing equipment. The move to modular product design paid off for IBM:
By 1970 IBM had a market share of 70 percent in the computer business (Costello
and Gomes-Casseres, 1992). Interestingly, the design of the operating system for the
System/360 line of computers proved to be a great example for a non-modular design
(Langlois, 2002). As Frederick Brooks, the project manager responsible for developing
this operating system notes, the key concept behind the project has been that every
programmer should be able to see all the materials. This cumulated into 150 pages of
daily change notification that every individual was supposed to read (Brooks, 1982, p.
77). These experiences resulted in the famous Brooks’ Law :
Adding manpower to a late software project makes it later (Brooks, 1982, p.
25).
16 Note again the close resemblance to the dialectical understanding of loose coupling. The components
are responsive to each other in that they conjointly fulfill a certain set of requirements which could
not be fulfilled if one of the components would be missing. However, at the same time the components
are distinctive in that not necessarily all of them have to be changed after one is changed.
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Once a certain size of project is reached, losses through coordination overhead out-
weigh the gains of division of labor17. Furthermore, some tasks simply cannot be divided
among several individuals, thus render any addition of manpower useless18. This again
emphasizes the importance of a clearly defined, modular product architecture. Through
such an architecture it is possible to address these problems early on, and they can
consequently be resolved within the planning phase of such a project. However, as it is
explicitly discussed throughout the remainder of this section, it is difficult to apply the
concept of modularity to IS development.
Modularity has traditionally been embraced by software developers early on (see for
example the seminal article of Parnas, 1972) and is currently state-of-the-art, especially
in object-oriented methodologies (Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003). However, modularity
in the IS context proves to be more difficult than in pure software development. The
main reason for this is the above described intellectual nature of IS. As changes to IS
strategy are common, this also changes the functional requirements of the IS. This is
likely to conflict with both defining characteristics of a modular product design given
by Ulrich (1995). First, a clear one-to-one mapping is no longer possible, if functional
requirements change. Second, interfaces between components of an IS are probably no
longer de-coupled. The difficulty that is resulting from this lies in the fact that the ar-
chitecture of an industrial product is the outcome of “architectural decisions (...) made
during the early phases of the innovation process” (Ulrich, 1995, p. 419). However, as
the architecture is exactly the result of this innovative process, the architecture to be
applied in the innovative process itself cannot be predefined (von Hippel, 1990). Conse-
quently, as using IS has been characterized as a continuous process of innovation (Lee,
1999), defining a modular IS crucially depends on an higher-level authority that com-
municates changes either in the functionalities or the interfaces to all involved parties,
and furthermore also acts as settling authority for conflicts.
As long as this authority is involved, IS development can be conducted in a modular
fashion. This is well reflected in the literature on benefits of reusing standardized soft-
ware components. Reports of cost savings in the millions of dollars are not uncommon
(Poulin et al., 1993). Albeit the inherent weakness of measuring software productivity
through lines of code (LOC), several studies use this measure to show the effects of
software reuse. One such research effort reports an increase in productivity from 500
to 800 LOC without reuse to 800 to 3200 LOC with reuse in a given timeframe (Mat-
sumoto, 1989). Furthermore, there are reports of reducing the required development
time of software projects by up to 44 percent through reuse of software (Henry and
Faller, 1995). There are also studies that report a significant improvement in the num-
17 This very well reflects the two research objective: First, how should tasks be divided among the
various stakeholders. Second, how can the various organizationally dispersed tasks be managed in
order to reduce these overhead losses? This question is addressed subsequently in Sections 2.2 and
2.3.
18 Brooks (1982, p. 17) comments on this fact as follows: “The bearing of a child takes nine moths, no
matter how many women are assigned.”
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ber of defects per LOC ratio (Coomer Jr. et al., 1990). Finally, two case studies that
summarize and offer a perspective from practice on the topic of reuse of software can be
found in Apte et al. (1990) and Banker and Kauffman (1991). However, while the soft-
ware itself is designed modular and more or less standardized components are reused,
this division of labor between organizations has not yet reached levels comparable to
other engineering disciplines. Barnes and Bollinger (1991, p. 15) even argue that “most
reuse producers (vendors) and reuse consumers (buyers) differ from their commercial
counterparts primarily in that the transfer of products between them takes place within
a single company or project, rather than across company or organizational boundaries.”
As the subsequent section shows, this inter-organizational division of labor within an
industry is, however, a key necessity for realizing the full potential of a modular product
development approach.
2.1.2.3 Modular Inter-Organizational Industry Structures
The advantages that result from the modular architecture of systems are not limited to
product architectures. Rather, as it has been discussed in the section covering general
systems theory, all types of modular systems enjoy these advantages. So, while a modular
product design is in itself considered advantageous, it is usually only the first step in an
ongoing development. As Conway (1968) argues, “organizations which design systems
(...) are constrained to produce designs which are copies of (...) these organizations.”
Consequently, once a relatively stable product architecture has been established that is
modular in a sense that it de-couples the various components that the system is composed
of, it has been observed that the organizational structure also follows this design pattern
(Hoetker, 2006; Schilling and Steensma, 2001). This is assumed to happen first within a
single company and as a final consequence, across the boundaries of different companies
in an industry. These companies in such an industry are assumed to be vertically
disaggregated and focused on single, well-defined components of the industry’s products
(Staudenmayer et al., 2005). Contrary to the perception of Langlois (2002) that the
application of modularity to an organizational level is new, organizational and especially
industry structure always followed product design in this way. Galvin and Morkel (2001,
p. 31) very well illustrate this through the example of the world bicycle industry. As they
argue, in this industry modularity on the product level is well established, “with most
components having defined interfaces for over 50 years.” If the above made prediction
holds true this should result in bicycle industry that is vertically highly disaggregated.
This is exactly what has been observed:
Each segment of the industry tends to exhibit high levels of independence and
there are very few examples of firms operating in multiple segments of the
industry simultaneously. For example, Shimano is the largest and most well-
known firm in the bicycle industry. It manufactures approximately 80 per
cent of the world’s supply of brakes, gears, drive-train components and other
28
29
mechanical parts (Friedland, 1993). However, it does not operate in any of
the other bicycle industry segments. Giant and China Bicycle Company are
the two largest frame manufacturers, though neither manufacture anything
beyond frames (though some components are supplied via OEM contracts
for labelling, such as Giant saddles) (Galvin and Morkel, 2001, p. 42).
Despite the fact that the bicycle industry can be described as being very far developed
with regard to the modularization of its organizational structure, there are other indus-
tries in which similar trends are observable. Dahmus et al. (2001) for example discuss
electronical tools, Langlois and Robertson (1992) present the setting of high-fidelity and
stereo components, and Staudenmayer et al. (2005) mainly focus on electronical high-
tech devices. As the last industry setting seems to be most prominently discussed in
the literature, in the following this study especially focuses on the discussion of the
computer hardware industry as an example. There are two reasons for this. First, this
industry has also been used as an example during the previous section. Second, the
widespread presence of this industry in the literature guarantees that information is
readily available.
In the preceding section, the history of IBM and the design of computer hardware have
been sketched up to the 1970s, when the emergence of the modular designed System/360
earned IBM a dominant position in this industry. This story very well illustrates the
advantages that a modular product design entails. However, an even bigger success story
of computers began during the early 1980s, when IBM introduced the architecture for
its personal computer (PC). This small computer intended for everyone’s personal use
(hence the name), has been based on pre-defined components, developed by other (non-
IBM) organizations. The main impetus behind this development has been the fact that
IBM controlled the Basic Input-Output System (BIOS) code, which it assumed would
be the crucial part of the overall system - a clear misconception, as in 1983 Compaq
was able to legally clone IBM’s BIOS code (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). However,
as this was not foreseeable, IBM decided to keep the architecture’s interfaces open,
and readily contracted different partners in order to develop components for this newly
designed IBM PC. Among these partners have been the prominent examples of Intel
for the micro-processor or Microsoft for the operating system, but also other, smaller
companies for memory, hard drives, and all other types of peripherals (Baldwin and
Clark, 2000). Thus, similar to the trends that have been observed in the bicycle industry
during the last fifty years, the successful modularization on the product level entailed a
development towards a modular industry structure:
IBM’s decision to allow the PC system interfaces to remain open spurred the
production, commercialization, and adoption of PCs all over the world. As
the PC became ubiquitous, a fundamental transformation occurred in the
computer industry: Previously vertically integrated companies (e.g. IBM,
DEC, Univac, Wang) started to lose leadership to specialist providers of
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hardware and software components - among them Intel, Microsoft, and Mo-
torola. Integrated PC makers like IBM and Apple still existed, but suppliers
started to gain more and more power to dictate their conditions to their
business environment (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, p. 19 ff).
This change in the overall industry structure was so dramatically that “in 1996, 90%
of the firms and 70% of the market value of all computer companies were in industry
subclassifications that, practically speaking, did not exist in 1966” (Baldwin and Clark,
2000, p. 222). The dominance of IBM was broken, and today Microsoft and Intel
are the largest firms in the PC market - hence the term Wintel for the Windows (the
operating system of Microsoft) and Intel duopoly that set standards in the PC industry
(Yoffie et al., 2004). This change in industry structure is well illustrated by comparing
Figures 2.3 and 2.4, reproduced from Grove (1996). The first figure illustrates the
computer industry around 1980, when companies - IBM being the dominating one -
offered integrated computer solutions, ranging from the chip production to sales and
distribution of the computers. Contrary to this picture, the second figure illustrates
the computer industry around 1995, when specialized companies offered solutions for
specific parts of the supply chain.
Figure 2.3: The Old Vertical Computer Industry - Circa 1980.
Source: Adapted from Grove (1996, p. 40).
A potential rationale behind this change in industry structure is discussed by Farrell
et al. (1998). He argues that the differentiation between closed and open organization
are key for understanding this change. In the first, customers can only buy a complete
system from a single organization. This single organization is responsible for supplying
all necessary components for the entire system. Contrary to this, in the latter structure
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Figure 2.4: The New Horizontal Computer Industry - Circa 1995.
Source: Adapted from Grove (1996, p. 42).
customers can choose between different components from different sources. Thus, there
is a certain degree of competition on the component level rather than only on the sys-
tem level. In the terminology of Farrell et al. (1998) the first structure is beneficial for
those companies that follow a jack-off-all-trades strategy: none of their components is
outstanding, but all are good and therefore, in a closed setting, the overall system is the
best one available. This has been the dominant paradigm of the early days of computer
hardware, when IBM was following such a strategy. The latter structure in contrast is
better suited for those companies that follow a narrow specialist strategy19. In this strat-
egy a company focuses on a single, well-defined component and through this focusing
on core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) - those things organizations do espe-
cially well - the overall system benefits from the involved organizations’ learning curve
effects, which indicate that organizations are able to reduce the costs and/or increase
the quality of their products with accumulated output (Hirschmann, 1964; Ghemawat,
1985).
This explains why the adoption of modular product architectures has repeatedly led
to modular industry structures - also termed networked structures. The argumentation
that for example Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) put forth for this relation between prod-
uct and industry design is similar to that laid out above. Since modular product design
is explicitly followed to minimize the interconnections between components, and - as for
example the discussion on Brooks’ Law above has hinted upon - small groups tend to
be more effective than large ones, there is no reason to amalgamate large organizations
into tightly integrated hierarchical structures that work on multiple, though indepen-
19 The final type of strategy that is proposed by Farrell et al. (1998) is that of a clear winner - an
organization that is best in all the necessary components. However, this structure seems unrealistic
in almost all contexts and is thus not further discussed here.
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dent components. A modularized network of independent organizations that each work
on a specific component, and therefore fulfill the property of a one-to-one mapping of
functions to components (Ulrich, 1995), promises to be more flexible (Sanchez, 1995)
and thus guarantee a better ability of such organizations to react to a dynamic and
highly competitive environment - exactly the advantages that have been proposed for
hierarchical, loosely coupled systems.
This ability to adapt organizational structures to a changed environment and thus
achieving a fit between the two has been identified by Miles and Snow (1984) as a pre-
requisite for organizational success. Since organizations are constantly interacting with
their environment (Katz and Kahn, 1966), this environment also to a large extent deter-
mines how an organization is structured, and how this structure changes. Analyzing the
history of organizational structures, Miles and Snow (1984) identify four major shifts20
during the last two centuries. The first of these shifts occurred during the middle of the
19th century. Before the 1840s almost all businesses were operating through families or
small partnerships. Chandler (1977) explains organizational structure first of all through
the size of organizations. This size of organizations is in turn influenced by the techno-
logical base in transportation and production. As long as transportation and production
relied on human or animal power, the output of single organizations was small enough
to be handled in such small entities. The discovery of coal as a cheap and abundant
source of energy - both for production and transportation - changed this. As Chandler
(1977, p. 94) framed it, “the (...) first railroad boom provided a basic impetus to the
rise of the large-scale construction firm and the modern investment banking house,” and
therefore paved the way for the emergence of modern industrial organizations. These
early corporations were all characterized by a large and centralized structure. They
were vertically integrated and followed a functional organizational form. Through this,
they were able to realize an efficient exploitation of emerging mass production and dis-
tribution technologies. Thus, this structure offered a high fit with the upcoming new
technologies, and therefore this structure was prevalent during the late 19th century.
However, this structure also is highly inflexible when it comes to adding new prod-
ucts or addressing new markets. Therefore, organizations adopting this structure were
becoming more and more constrained by their central authority. Furthermore, these
centralized functional organization heavily relied on constant growth, so that the reces-
sion following World War I posed a severe threat to them. The answer to these problems
that pioneering organizations of this time, like General Motors and DuPont, gave was
that of a multidivisional structure. “In this type of structure, autonomous divisions
continued to integrate production and distribution by coordinating flows from suppliers
to consumers in different, clearly defined markets” (Chandler, 1977, p. 457). These
20 Three of these shifts happen within an organization, while the last is exactly the transition to an
inter-organizational network structure. As the IS development industry came into existence only a
couple of decades ago, it is argued that essentially this last step is most relevant in this context.
However, for the sake of completeness the other two shifts are also briefly explained below. However,
the focus of this section is on the emerging inter-organizational network structures.
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autonomous divisions were guided by an executive management group that - supported
by staff committees on the major business functions - decided on policies and strate-
gies. Once the strategy of diversification into multiple fields has been adopted by the
majority of corporations during the 1920s and 1930s, the organizational structure of a
general office with multiple autonomous divisions became the prevalent structure of large
corporations. The reason for this can again be found in the fit of the structure with
the environment: “It provided a more flexible and efficient organizational alternative
(...) than (...) the consolidation of the operations of constituent companies into a single
centralized functionally departmentalized structure” (Chandler, 1977, p. 463).
The third shift occurred when organizations tried to combine the two organizational
structures discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Organizations trying to achieve the
efficiencies of the functional structure without forsaking the effectiveness of multidivi-
sional structure adopted both in parallel. The resulting structure is that of a matrix in
which “the normal, hierarchical groupings of an organization (usually functional) can
be represented by the columns, and the lateral, coordinating ones (often of project,
product or business area) by the rows” of this matrix (Knight, 1976, p. 113). This
shift towards the presumedly new matrix structure is highly disputed in the literature.
Kingdon (1973, p. 5) argues that “it is obvious to anyone who has worked in even the
most stringent hierarchy, or bureaucracy, that any organization is really a matrix or
mixed model with multiple-channel communication.” The matrix is thus only a legit-
imization of already existing structures. Galbraith (1971, p. 37) argues along the same
lines, when he states that there exists a “wide range of alternatives between a pure
functional organization and a pure product organization with the matrix being half-way
between.” Chandler (1977) doubts whether there exists a third shift in organizational
structure at all. However, no matter whether the matrix structure is labeled as third
shift or not, it has to be argued that this structure has not been very successful. As
it necessarily creates a situation of dual authority relationships, it infringes important
principles of management (Koontz and O’Donnell, 1964). Both, the principle of unity
of command and the principle of parity of authority and responsibility are not followed
(Pitts and Daniels, 1984). Consequently, the matrix structure in practice proved to be
almost unmanageable21 (Chi and Nystrom, 1998; Bartlett and Goshal, 1990).
This leads to the fourth shift in organizational structure, from an integrated matrix
towards a networked paradigm (Bartlett and Goshal, 1993). In its broadest meaning an
organizational network can be defined as a number of actors (of that network), which
21 Others argue that the advancement of the divisional organization can essentially be found in the
concept of Business Process Reengineering (this passage is largely based on the critique of the concept
in Kieser, 1996). In this concept, the focus is even more on objects (e.g. products), and the business
functions (e.g. purchasing) are only supporting the (process) flow of these objects through the
organization. However, it is also argued that this focus on objects cannot be continued ad infinitum.
These structures soon promise to be just as unmanageable as the here described matrix structure.
The result is thus close to the same.
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are connected through various ties to each other22. In this context, both actors and ties
can be of diverse nature. Common examples for actors are (ordered from a macro- to
a micro-level) organizations, groups, or individuals. The ties connecting these actors
vary according to the chosen level of actors. On an organizational level it might be
volume of trade or communication among the organizations. If an individual level is
chosen, it might be degree of friendship or physical proximity (Borgatti and Foster,
2003). Consequently, research in organizational networks has blossomed during the last
couple of decades - Borgatti and Foster (2003) even recognize an exponential growth.
With such a broad definition for organizational networks, these are conceivable both
across and within organizations. Following Snow et al. (1992), the main distinction
between those two modes of operation is the fact that “the internal-network firm owns
most or all of the assets associated with a particular business” (p. 11), while in an inter-
organizational network, “assets are owned by several firms” (p. 13). The distinction
between the two types of networks is illustrated in Figure 2.5. In this figure, circles
depict legally independent organizations, while triangles stand for subunits within an
organization.
Figure 2.5: Intra- vs. Inter-Organizational Networks.
Source: Based on Snow et al. (1992, p. 12).
While the intra-organizational network does not represent the conceived structure of
the IS development industry, the inter-organizational network seems to closely resemble
this structure23. This inter-organizational network consists, contrary to the organiza-
tional structures during the last two centuries sketched above, of organizations that do
not incorporate all of the necessary business functions. Rather, organizations specialize
in certain, well-defined fields of operation in which they excel, while at the same time
22 This definition of an organizational network is very broad. It also “includes a wide array of joint
ventures, strategic alliances, business groups, franchises, research consortia, relational contracts, and
outsourcing agreements” (Podolny and Page, 1998, p. 59). Subsequently the term network is used
synonymous with these terms.
23 However, there is a large and growing body of literature on intra-organizational networks, which is
in part also useful for shedding more light on the IS development network. Therefore, despite the
fact that the focus of this work is clearly on an inter-organizational network, literature of the second
type is also included wherever appropriate.
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staying legally independent. Because for any given product or service that is produced
or provided, several of these fields of operation are needed, organizations have to in-
teract with each other. Through this interaction, several specialized organizations are
integrated into larger entities that together can meaningfully address certain products or
services. Such an organizational network can be defined as follows: “An organizational
network describes the coordinated cooperation between several legally independent and
formally autonomous organizations24”. As the network can be considered a progressional
step in the development of organizational structures, the main distinguishing aspect of
this type from preceding ones is therefore the vertical disaggregation of the ownership
structure in the network (Miles and Snow, 1986). Also, as the structure that is addressed
in this networked paradigm is traversing organizational boundaries, it is misleading to
speak of an organizational structure. Rather, this structure is more addressing how an
industry is organized, thus also closing the loop between addressing an industry change
through the organizations involved in this industry.
This vertically disaggregated, inter-organizational nature of networks also has severe
ramifications for this organizational/industry structure. First of all, when “properly
constructed, the (...) network organization will display the technical expertise of the
functional form, the market focus of the divisional form, and the efficient use of re-
sources characteristic of the matrix” (Miles and Snow, 1984, p. 27). At the same time
the network organization reintroduce the principles of unity of command and parity of
authority and responsibility. Because the single organizations in the network are legally
independent, the head of each organization is the single point of command for this orga-
nization. Because organizations specializing in only certain well-defined areas tend to be
much smaller than the vertical integrated behemoths of the past century, this unity of
command can be enforced without extensive hierarchies, thus not diluting the principle.
Furthermore, parity of authority and responsibility is also guaranteed. This is the fact
because the heads of the organizations are not only fully responsible for their organi-
zations, but they also have far reaching authority in them. Therefore the networked
structure promises to overcome the most severe drawbacks of the matrix organization.
Other authors also recognize implications of this distinction between inter- and intra-
organizational networks. Sydow (1999) for example develops a framework that is based
on the distinction between hierarchical and heterarchical networks. A hierarchical net-
work refers to one that is characterized by authority relationships that are traditionally
found within one organization. The term heterarchy goes back to Gunnar Hedlund
(Hedlund, 1986; Hedlund and Rolander, 1990), who - in a nutshell - defines it in the
context of a multinational corporation as an organizational structure with many differ-
ent centers of excellence. In this structure each of these centers is playing a decisive role
24 This quote is translated from German: “Ein Unternehmensnetzwerk beschreibt die koordinierte
Zusammenarbeit zwischen mehreren rechtlich selbststa¨ndigen und formal unabha¨ngigen Unter-
nehmen” (Siebert, 1999, p. 9).
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for the entire corporation; each is enjoying a high degree of autonomy; and the complex
whole is governed through normative control rather than coercion or bureaucracy. This
very closely mirrors the ideas of an intra-organizational network25.
Another aspect that distinguishes different types of networks is how the participants of
such a network are interconnected with each other. This dimension has to be considered
to be of prime importance for this work. As Van de Ven et al. (p. 20 1979, emphasis
in original) note, “the simplest form of [a network] is the pairwise relationship between
two organizations.” However, this simplest form of a network is considered more a
building-block for more complex types, and thus serves more as a starting point for a
closer examination of more complex organizational structures. In the literature there
are essentially two distinct modes of organizational structure in a network. The first
structure is that of a completely intermeshed network. This structure is called “all-
channel network” by Evan (1966, p. 185), “inter-agency network” by Van de Ven et al.
(1979, p. 21), or “coalition” by Provan (1983, p. 83). In this type of network all members
are in some way connected to each other. The second organizational structure is that
of a central organization with dyadic connections to other member organization of the
network. This structure is termed “the wheel” by Evan (1966, p. 185), “interagency
set” by Van de Ven et al. (1979, p. 20), or “federation” by Provan (1983, p. 82). The
central organization is often referred to as the hub (Jarillo, 1988; Kerwood, 1995), the
focal-agency (Van de Ven et al., 1979, p. 20) or -organization (Evan, 1966, p. 185), or the
broker or core firm (Snow et al., 1992, p. 12). For sake of clarity, this work subsequently
uses the term hub for the central organization, the term spoke for the complementing
organizations, and consequently the term hub-and-spoke network when describing the
entire network. These distinct structures are illustrated in Figure 2.6.
Out of these two complex structures that of a hub-and-spoke network closely relates
to the above discussed structure that is currently emerging in the IS development indus-
try. As is discussed in further detail in the following section, the network is proposed
to emerge around existing strong vendors and their systems. This point is also well
supported in the literature on organizational networks. As Snow et al. (1992, p. 13)
argue, “often, a set of [organizations] is nestled around a large “core” firm.” This is
especially true if the network is developing information goods. In this context, it can
be argued that the hub is developing the platform, which includes in the here focused
example the general functionalities of a standardized enterprise IS. This platform is then
complemented by the spokes, which are supposed to develop specific niche functionali-
ties. As has been discussed above, the concept of network externalities indicates that
the platform of a central vendor becomes more valuable if more complementary products
25 Hedlund (1986); Hedlund and Rolander (1990) assumes that the different centers are subsidiaries
of one organization. Otherwise, the statements on autonomy and bureaucracy would be fruitless.
However, as Sydow (1999) has shown, the work of Hedlund (1986); Hedlund and Rolander (1990)
is also very useful for studying inter-organizational networks. This is therefore one example of a
study on intra-organizational networks used to gain a deeper understanding of inter-organizational
networks.
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Figure 2.6: Organizational Structures in a Network.
Source: Based on Evan (1966, p. 185) and Van de Ven et al. (1979, p. 21).
exist (Shapiro and Varian, 1999b), and thus the role of the central platform architect
is highly attractive in this context (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Morris and Ferguson,
1993). This dimension can be considered one of the most important aspects of the or-
ganizational structure described here, as it will guide the further research substantially.
As it has been already mentioned in the introduction, this distinction between hubs and
spokes is assumed to be the differentiating factor between the various players in the IS
development network. Consequently, the analysis of both reasons for participating as
well as approaches to managing within the network that are the key research objectives
of this study always distinguish between the role of a hub and that of a spoke in the
network.
A very important aspect of this distinction is highlighted by Sydow (1999). As he
notes, strategic networks typically encompass a larger, leading organization, which de-
fines “the to be addressed market, the thereto used strategies and technologies, as well
as the definition of the network structures, which includes boundary spanning business
processes26” (p. 286 ff). This encompasses that this larger, central organization has a
peculiar interest in its partners’ well-being, and thus is expected to assume a certain
degree of responsibility for them. As Snow et al. (1992, p. 14) argue in the case of such
a network, “in bad times, however, the “parent” firm may have to protect the health
26 This quote is translated from German: “Die fokale Unternehmung definiert mehr als die anderen
am Netzwerk beteiligten den zu bearbeitenden Markt, die dazu heranzuziehenden Strategien und
Technologien sowie die Ausgestaltung der Netzwerkorganisation, einschliesslich der u¨ber die Grenzen
der eigenen Unternehmung hinausreichenden Gescha¨ftsprozesse.”
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of smaller “family members”.” Sydow and Windeler (1998, p. 266) argue in this con-
text that with regard to the loyalty, trust, and social embeddedness that is evolving in
inter-organizational networks over time, these closely resemble intra-organizational ones.
Galunic and Eisenhardt found in their study on the network in a multi-divisional firm,
that besides an economic logic, a social one was also of prime importance in reassigning
strategic direction to divisions:
Indeed, the picture that emerged was one of corporate actors simultane-
ously and continuously juggling these logics, immersed in both an economic,
business-minded reality and a communal, familial world. In the long run,
both logics are needed to explain the evolution of this corporation. But, in
the short run, juggling the two logics, as managers made judgements about
how compelling each logic was for the (...) decision at hand, defined the
day-to-day reality (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001, p. 1233 ff).
The network is thus exactly not characterized by the arm’s length relations that pre-
vail in pure market relations. Rather, it can be considered an organizational structure
in-between the extreme poles of markets and hierarchies (Thorelli, 1986; Williamson,
1985), or even as an alternative structure independent of them (Powell, 1990). Regard-
less of the perspective, the network is thus characterized by a certain degree of stability.
Consequently, Sydow (1999) incorporates this dimension into his framework. The re-
sulting two-dimensional matrix is illustrated in Figure 2.7. In this figure Sydow (1999)
also sketches four exemplary network types - a regional network, a project network, a
virtual enterprise, and a strategic network - which all have distinct characteristics on
the two mentioned dimensions.
Figure 2.7: A Typology of Inter-Organizational Networks.
Source: Adapted from Sydow (1999, p. 287).
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In this framework, the proposed network for the IS development industry can be char-
acterized as being an intermediate form between hierarchy and heterarchy. On the one
hand the constituent organizations are legally independent and thus the overall structure
tends to fall into the category of heterarchy. On the other hand, since the central vendor
is considered to be of magnitudes larger than most of its partners, it is also supposed to
have considerable (albeit indirect) authority over the partners, which indicates a hierar-
chical nature of the network. On the second dimension, the IS development network is
proposed to be relatively stable. It is not uncommon for complex IS to be intended to
be used for years if not decades (Warren, 1999). As the maintenance of these systems
crucially depends on the knowledge of those that developed the system, all participants
of such a network have considerable incentives to keep members alive27.
Consequently, the IS development network can be classified as a strategic network in
the sense of Sydow (1999). The fact that these types of networks are most prominent in
the automobile and microelectronics industries reinforces the above conducted discussion
on modular products leading to modular industry structures. This emerging industry
structure has been predicted to be the prevalent one in the post-industrialized era. The
works of Laubacher et al. (2003), or Miles et al. (2005) develop visions of how such a
networked economy can be realized at the more dynamic or more stable end of the
spectrum. However, the following discussion uncovers the fact that the IS development
industry has - albeit embracing modular structures in their products now for decades
(Parnas, 1972) - escaped the organizational change on an industry level that is observable
in so many other industries. The following section uses the above discussed idiosyncrasies
in order to establish a clearer understanding of the main reasons for this fact. It then
addresses the upcoming of Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) as contributing to a
potential solution for the problems that inter-organizationally structured IS development
industry is currently facing.
2.1.2.4 Towards a Modular Inter-Organizational IS Industry
The reason for the missing inter-organizational cooperation in developing complex IS
can be found in the above discussed idiosyncrasies of this process. In principle, such an
inter-organizational development process would be feasible, since “the software indus-
try is analogous to other industries because most software today is built from smaller
software objects. The software industry differs, however, in that it lacks the ability to
confidently swap components in and out of systems” (Voas, 1998, p. 53). Why this
27 This stability is also mentioned as a key factor in the discussion of the computer (hardware) industry
in Silicon Valley, which is also highly dependent on “a network of long-term partnerships with
specialized suppliers” (Saxenian, 1996, p. 146). The stability on an organizational level is also
mirrored on an individual level. Albeit annual employee turnover rates were as high as 59 percent
for small firms (Saxenian, 1996), about 80 percent of electronical engineers that quit their jobs found
a new job within the network of firms at Silicon Valley (Angel, 1989).
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fact has so far prevented the emergence of a sophisticated inter-organizationally struc-
tured IS development industry has essentially two highly interrelated reasons. These are
discussed subsequently.
First, it has been and still is very expensive to integrate different parts of an IS that are
developed by different organizations. The reason for this lies in the intellectual nature
of these systems, as it has been discussed in Section 2.1.1.3. As has been stated there,
changes to a system are very common. This fact makes a clear - and stable - definition
of functional requirements, the subsequent mapping of these requirements to compo-
nents, and furthermore, the mapping of components to organizations that develop them
difficult if not impossible - this at least if there is no central authority that coordinates
these tasks. This is well reflected in the fact that today, companies spend enormous
resources on integrating their IS that have been developed by independent organizations
without a clearly articulated and enforced architecture how these systems are supposed
to inter-operate with each other. Serain and Craig (2002, p. 1) report that, on average,
40 percent of a company’s information processing budget represent integration costs
between these types of systems. Companies and the research community agree that
the time and effort needed for the integration of company-wide (standardized) IS, like
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) or Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
systems, are already (or still) unsatisfactory extensive if these are not developed in a
well concerted way (Lee et al., 2003). Many companies still have large numbers of IS
that do not work with standard interfaces. Often, these systems are rather connected
through individually designed interfaces in a point-to-point fashion. These systems are
difficult to understand and therefore difficult to maintain. This unpredictability of inter-
connections between systems is also the reason why the metaphor of spaghetti systems
came up for this type of IS landscapes (Serain and Craig, 2002). In this context it is
also worthwhile to mention that other typical business decisions, such as mergers and
acquisitions, or the cooperation with partners inside and outside the boundaries of the
company continue to driver integration costs up. Consequently, it is expected that in
the future integration costs will rather grow than decline (Keller, 2002).
The other point is related to the fact that essentially IS are experience goods. The
quality of these goods cannot be easily assessed without buying or using them. As has
been discussed in Section 2.1.1.3, the easiest way to assess whether an IS component
fulfills the requirements is to actually use (i.e. experience) the component. Thus, it is
almost impossible to ex ante determine the success of a certain IS component. IS success
- albeit being frequently studied - has been an elusive concept (DeLone and McLean,
1992). What exactly constitutes a successful IS has not been clearly defined. One of
the obvious reasons for this lies in the complex interaction of people, business tasks, and
technology that is one of the most basic characteristics of IS. This is also mirrored in such
concepts as information orientation. This concept bases IS success - defined as “effective
information use to improve business performance” - on the three abilities to manage the
technology, the information itself, and the behavior of the people (Marchand et al., 2000,
2001). However, even when focusing on business performance, the assessment of impact
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is difficult. The so-called IT productivity paradox (Brynjolfsson, 1993) for example
discusses the fact that for a long time, spending on technology has not been found to
have a clearly measurable impact on productivity. The Nobel Laureate Robert Solow
aptly summarized this with his now famous statement that “we see the computer age
everywhere except in the productivity statistics” (cited in Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1998, p.
51). While more recent research thus addressed the opening of the black box between IT
spending and firm performance and argues for a multi-staged process of how IT creates
business value (Dehning and Richardson, 2002; Soh and Markus, 1995; Melville et al.,
2004), the bottom line of the discussion is the fact that there is considerable difficulty to
assess the impact that a dollar spent on IS has on the business performance even after
the dollar has been spent (Dedrick et al., 2003).
Now, it can be argued, that taken together these two idiosyncrasies of IS development -
the intellectual nature and the fact that IS are experience goods - have so-far prevented
the emergence of a component subindustry for IS development: Since the quality of
the components that constitute such a system cannot be assessed correctly in advance
and swapping a component if it proves to be of inferior quality is very expensive, the
economically most efficient way to develop such a system is using all components from
one supplier. This situation in which all components are supplied by a single vendor
is characteristic for the early days of ERP systems (Lee et al., 2003). It also closely
resembles the jack-off-all-trades strategy through IBM dominated the computer industry
during the 1960s and 1970s28. However, as the subsequent introduction to Service-
Oriented Architectures (SOA) reveals, integration costs can be substantially reduced
(Stal, 2002). Therefore, a mixing and matching of components developed by different
companies becomes feasible, and thus the window of opportunity for the IS development
industry to embrace not only a modularized product architecture, but also a modularized
industrial architecture has opened a bit further (Greenbaum, 2003). The impact that
this change in the IS development process has for the entire industry as “a potentially
interesting opportunity to build continuously changing Information Systems” should not
be underestimated (Bello et al., 2002, p. 439).
This development is similar to design of the first modular computer which was initiated
by the fact that “in 1959 and 1960, important customers were telling IBM’s sales force
and top management in no uncertain terms just how unhappy they were with the growing
costs of incompatibility” (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, p. 170). Today, most large IS
vendors adopt SOA principles, exactly to allow for a better reuse of their own existing
system components and meet customer requirements for more flexible and adaptable
systems. In this context it is important to note that large IS vendors initially used
SOA principles in order to get a better grip on their own, highly complex systems.
Consequently, it is no surprise that most of the Web Services that are the basic building
blocks of such a structure are not created from scratch, but rather carved out from
28 See also Figures 2.3 and 2.4 for an illustration of the change that the computer industry in general
has been subject to, after the swapping of components became feasible in this area.
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existing applications (Holland, 2002). They thus primarily establish flexible interfaces
for existing enterprise systems. However, at the same time these SOA principles are also
often seen as a means to reduce the integration effort between systems developed by
different organizations (Stal, 2002). Thus, the can be considered as key to the emergence
of the here envisioned inter-organizationally structured IS development industry.
This is achieved through two distinct means. The first is the fact that SOA is based
on a certain technology, Web Services, which is defined through standardized exchange
protocols in the industry. Whereas before the emergence of SOA and Web Services,
integration has been achieved through individually designed, often proprietary proto-
cols, recently a decisive convergence towards a list of de facto standards can be recog-
nized (Kreger, 2003). Such standards are for example SOAP (ambiguities concerning
the meaning of this acronym have led to the abandoning of a meaning altogether) as
communication protocol, the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) for service
description, or Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) for the epony-
mous tasks. Since specifications for these standards are available freely on the Internet,
most have a dominant role in their specific domain. Pulier and Taylor (2006, p. 27) have
for example argued that SOAP should be considered as the “lingua franca of web ser-
vices, the (...) structure on which all web services messages are built.” The importance
of these standards cannot be underestimated and is also acknowledge here. However, as
the focus of this work is exactly not technical, the further discussion of each technical
standard is not pursued here. For this work, it suffices to state that through the adoption
of SOA a higher degree of standardization is induced in the IS development industry.
This standardization is assumed to be a key for the emergence of the inter-organizational
structure (see also Section 2.3.3).
The other aspect how Web Services can contribute to reducing integration effort is
through their self-describing interfaces. Using Web Services commonly involves three
different roles29: A service requester is looking for a specific functionality; a service
provider is providing this functionality; and a service repository is acting as a central
facility in which information about providers and requesters is stored. For a specific
Web Service invocation, the typical interaction mode among the three parties can be
described as follows: The service requester is searching for a Web Service that is fitting
to its requirements in the service repository. The repository provides descriptions of
fitting Web Services that are offered by service providers, who previously published
those descriptions in the service repository. After the description has been retrieved,
the service requester binds the service provider by invoking the service. Since interfaces
are defined only when the service is actually searched for, through this approach the
problem with changing functionalities and interfaces in a dynamic IS context can be
largely avoided. This is illustrated in Figure 2.8.
29 These roles not necessarily have to represent actual entities. It is very well conceivable that all roles
are fulfilled by the same organization, even running on the same computer.
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Figure 2.8: Interaction of Service Requester, Repository, and Provider.
Source: Adapted from Messerschmitt and Szyperski (2003, p. 262).
Furthermore, SOA is not limited to the use of any current technology, but rather
describes the entire architecture of the software system, emphasizing principles such as
the division of systems into small-grained, functional components. Consequently, SOA
promises to substantially reduce integration efforts, and thus facilitate the adoption of a
truly modularized IS development approach - both on a product and an industry level.
Sprott (2000, p. 67) for example argues that this adoption of SOA “creates opportu-
nities for (...) third parties to create clone or extension components providing specific
support for functionality that has either general or niche applicability.” However, while
the principles of inter-organizational, modularized IS development are well represented
in the literature, empirical evidence is scant. Messerschmitt and Szyperski (2003) am-
ply discuss real world examples for their theses on the software development industry.
However, when it comes to component based development, they only give a hypothet-
ical example. Similarly, Van de Ven (2005, p. 373) argues that “running in packs is
often more successful than going it alone to develop knowledge-intensive technologies.”
However, he also does not provide any empirical evidence. Further, Sprott (2000, p.
67) argues that “the emergence of markets surrounding the core applications, where
third-party developers create extension and even clone components provides a wealth
of additional functionality.” Again, without giving evidence of such a market. Finally,
Papazoglou and Georgakopoulos (2003, p. 27) discuss “open service marketplaces” in
considerable detail. However, again without giving real-world examples.
Therefore, in this context the present study deliberately not addresses technical issues.
Rather organizational aspect of this profound change that the IS development industry is
currently undergoing are analyzed. As has already been implicitly assumed throughout
the so-far conducted discussion, there are various perspectives on this change process.
It has especially been argued that indeed the change that is currently happening is
impacting both the entire industry and the organizations that constitute this industry. In
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the following section, the perception that both levels of change are inseparably connected
with each other is corroborated with a discussion of different perspectives on change and
how they are nested in each other.
2.1.3 Perspectives on Change
This study is inherently addressing the change that the IS development industry is
currently undergoing. Throughout the above conducted discussions a clear distinction
between the industry and the organizational level has often been difficult. In order to
shed more light on this difficult distinction, in the following potential perspectives on
change are discussed. In this context it is argued that the processes that are happening
on the industry and those that are happening on the organizational level should not be
considered separately of each other. In order to attempt to understand the change that
is happening, both levels should be kept in mind; albeit only one has been chosen to
guide this research.
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) have established a taxonomy of organizational change
processes which consists of four distinct motors that drive change. As they argue, these
motors can be considered elementary building blocks of organizational change, and “that
all specific theories of organizational change and development can be built from one or
more of the four basic types” (p. 511). Albeit the fact that Van de Ven and Poole (1995)
explicitly base their discussion on change within an organization, they also argue for an
applicability of the concept for “the development of an industry” (p. 534). Especially
in this context of change processes in an industry, it is important to note that processes
of change are often “multilayered and complex. Attempts to explain this process with
a single motor run the risk of oversimplification and selective attention to one aspect
of the change process at the expense of others” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, p. 526).
Multiple motors that drive a change process are often interlinked through what Van de
Ven and Poole (1995) call nesting. In this concept, one motor is treated as acting within
another one. This concept seems to be highly appropriate in the context of change
within an industry that is affecting the organizations that form this industry. As it is
argued below, the change in the industry can be analyzed through one perspective, while
the organizations are driven by a different, nested motor.
Thus, the so-far described change process can be explained through using two of the
motors discussed by Van de Ven and Poole (1995). On an industry level, a dialectical
change can be observed. Within this general context of dialectical change on an industry
level, the various organizations of this industry are proposed to deliberately follow their
own agenda. This purposeful action towards a certain goal can be clearly identified as a
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teleological motor. Consequently, these two distinct drivers of change are subsequently
discussed in the context of IS development. It is important to note, that this selection
is a deliberate choice30.
2.1.3.1 Dialectical Change - An Industry Perspective
In the general meaning of the concept, dialectical theory assumes that an entity (which
might for example be an organization or an industry) that is subject to change exists in
a complex environment with different conflicting and opposing forces (termed thesis and
anti-thesis in dialectics) that each try to pull the entity into a specific direction (Van
de Ven and Poole, 1995). Within this environment stability is achieved by a balance
of power between these different forces. This concept of dialectical change is widely
applied to explain change within organizations (Benson, 1977). However, considering
the context of this study, the entity that is changed is the IS development industry itself
rather than a single organization. The generality of the concept of dialectical change,
however, allows for such a different scope (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995).
In this context it is a central assumption in dialectical theory that both paradigms
engage in conflict. Through this conflict, the old paradigm is replaced - but not entirely
- by the new one; rather those parts of the old paradigm that proved to be inferior to
the corresponding parts of the new paradigm are replaced. Consequently, those parts
that proved to be superior to the corresponding parts of the new paradigm are retained.
The emerging paradigm is thus neither the old paradigm, nor the new paradigm, but
a synthesis of the two. This synthesis is supposed to be superior to both preceding
paradigms (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995).
Applying this concept to the history of IS development as it has been discussed in
Section 2.1.1.2, can contribute substantially to explain what happened throughout recent
years in IS development. In the industry of IS development, the custom made nature of IS
that has been dominant during the early days of the industry can be considered the thesis.
Then, during the late 1960s and early 1970s standardized IS emerged as antithesis. Both
approaches have distinct advantages and disadvantages that both influence the decision
of a potential buyer towards one solution or the other. The today existing balance of
standardized and custom made software - which is obviously highly skewed towards the
standardized solution - can be considered the outcome of this dialectical struggle. In
this context it has been argued that the current trend in the industry goes towards the
30 Obviously, other perspectives on the change in the IS development industry are also conceivable. For
example, especially focusing on the group of smaller partners in the network, it can be argued that
they compete for scarce projects (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). In order to successfully acquire these
projects, the smaller organizations try to deliberately differentiate themselves from their competitors
(Porter, 1996). Depending on how goods they are in aligning their strategy to the environment,
they either survive or perish. This very well mirrors the evolutionary motor, as discussed by Van de
Ven and Poole (1995). Another potential perspective would be to analyze the entire live-cycle of a
partnership, from its start-up phase to its termination. Thus, all four perspectives given by Van de
Ven and Poole (1995) could be fruitfully employed in the here described context.
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individual assembling of standardized components. The components are developed in
a standardized fashion, thus realizing the advantages of the antithesis. But they are
assembled in an individual way, thus realizing the benefits of the thesis. Thus, the new
paradigm can indeed be considered a synthesis of the two preceding approaches (Arndt
and Dibbern, 2006b).
Consequently, dialectical theory offers valuable insight into the process of changing
the software development industry, which warrants a further discussion of the topic.
In this context, Benson (1977) mentions three aspects of dialectical change that are of
prime relevance. First, he describes dialectical change as total. Because change results
from existing structures, these structures have to be considered when analyzing change.
Structures that emerged through prior change processes are the result of structures that
lay even further in the past. Because of this, new emerging structures are intertwined
with past structures through a multitude of complex connections. These connections are
not always coherent, and are by no means completely understood. Therefore, dialecti-
cal change analysis, although focused on unique autonomous phenomena, should never
loose sight of the complex whole of the environment. As has been mentioned above,
the development towards integrated systems during the last couple of decades plays a
dominating role in the context of this study. The large system vendors are proposed to
become the hubs of the emerging network, and thus play a pivotal role in the context
of this study. They both provide the platform that interconnects the different solutions
of the partners and also to some degree act as an authority within the network (Gawer
and Cusumano, 2002).
The second aspect of dialectical change, as described by Benson (1977), is contra-
diction. The creation of new ideas as a basis of change results in the upcoming of
inconsistencies, ruptures, and incompatibilities with traditional concepts. These con-
tradictions form the basis of dialectical change. New concepts arise that challenge old
ideas. They might have emerged from partially autonomous organizations as responses
to a changed environment, or as new ideas that appear in society. These contradictions
are also one of the key motivating factors for this study. Obviously, the above described
new industry structure is contradicting what has been prevalent in the industry before.
Therefore, the questions of why this new structure is adopted and how organizations
manage within the new structure are addressed.
Finally, Benson (1977) argues that dialectical change is rooted firmly in the context of
this change. Therefore, the change process has to be regarded from a perspective that
takes into account the goals and interests of different existing stakeholders and their
power to defend and enforce their interests. This is closely aligned with the perception
of nested motors of change. While the overall industry structure is influenced by a
dialectical change, the industry members all follow distinct agendas. These are described
subsequently as teleological in nature.
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2.1.3.2 Teleological Change - An Organizational Perspective
As it has been argued, while the dialectical perspective can be useful to explain the
underlying reasons why the entire IS development industry is changing, it is of little
help in understanding the individual organizations that constitute the industry. As
this is the main goal of this study, the guiding perspective is a teleological one. This
perspective of the change processes in the IS development industry is - contrary to the
preceding one - not addressing this change through analyzing the entire industry, but
rather through analyzing the individual organizations as driving force of this change.
As Van de Ven and Poole (1995) argue, this type of change is characterized by three
distinct factors.
First, an entity exists that is deliberately pursuing an envisioned goal or end-state. As
the discussion on inter-organizational networks above has shown, the distinctive feature
of these networks is the fact that independent organizations voluntarily cooperate with
each other. Thus, since these organizations are not driven into the network by coercion,
they can be considered to deliberately pursue a strategy that includes their participation
in such a network. It is important to note at this point that this does not indicate
why organizations participate in the network. This question is addressed in the first
research question. At this point in time, it suffices to state that organizations make an
independent decision to follow a strategy that is intended to make them either hubs or
spokes in the network.
Furthermore, Van de Ven and Poole (1995) argue that the entity that is pursuing the
end-state is engaged in some kind of sense and decision making about its environment and
a process of determining the desired end-state as a goal. These processes can be engaged
in before or after actions are taken, they can be explicit or implicit, the important fact is
that there is some type of conscious choice about this. This requirement of an identifiable
process of sense making, decision making and goal setting can be easily fulfilled in the
organizational setting here depicted. As Daft and Weick (1984) argue, all organizations
can be considered interpretation systems in a sense that they permanently engage in
the three-staged process of scanning their environment, giving meaning to the obtained
data, and acting on the basis of this meaning. Obviously, all organizations differ in
how they engage in this process, however, the three basic stages are present in every
organization (Daft and Weick, 1984).
The final factor given by Van de Ven and Poole (1995, p. 525) is that “a set of re-
quirements and constraints exist to attain the goal, and the activities and developmental
transitions undertaken by the entity contribute to meeting these requirements and con-
straints.” Obviously, the competitive situation in the IS market has severe consequences
for organizations acting in this market. The necessity to develop an information system
that not only fulfills the technical and functional requirements of the users, but is also
accepted in the marketplace has been mentioned as one of the key factors that inhibit
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a more dramatic change from traditional IS development towards an IS development
network. Consequently, all actors within the market, including the large organizations,
are constrained when it comes to attaining the goals they have set for themselves.
In summary it can be stated that the application of the teleological change perspective
in this context is highly appropriate. However, as it has been mentioned above and as
Machamer (1977) also argues, teleology in itself is not an explanation why a certain end-
state is envisioned as beneficial for an organization. Rather, teleology only assumes that
this envisioned end-state exists, the explanation of why exactly this end-state is aimed
at has to originate from a different body of theory. Thus, the next section explicitly
discusses theories that address the question why the organizations in the IS development
industry form these inter-organizational networks. First a discussion of the concept of an
organization itself is conducted. What has so far been implicitly assumed is more clearly
spelled out. In this context, it is argued that a strategic perspective promises to be most
insightful in this context. As the most promising theory form this area, the concept of
the resource-based view is introduced (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984),
and subsequently used to distill reasons for pursuing the networked strategy for both,
the central vendor and its partners.
2.2 Explaining the Emergence of Inter-Organizational
Networks
In his fundamental discussion on what exactly constitutes an organization, Mintzberg
(1979b) argues that each organization is indeed a balancing of two conflicting goals. The
first is the division of labor that becomes necessary once an organization’s size exceeds
that of a one-man business. As two or more people conjointly work towards a specific
goal, there has to be consensus on who is doing what. This consensus is the second
aspect of organizations, that of coordination, which can be defined simply as “managing
dependencies between activities” (Malone and Crowstone, 1994, p. 90). With these two
underlying concepts in mind, “the structure of an organization can be defined simply
as the sum total of the ways in which it divides its labor into distinct task and then
achieves coordination between them” (Mintzberg, 1979b, p. 2). In this context, it has
been acknowledged that the division of labor should follow the principles put forth in the
discussion on general systems theory (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972; Scott, 1961). That is,
a certain task is best divided into several subtasks in a way that the interdependencies
among the subtasks are minimized. However, as Mintzberg (1979b, p. 119 ff) notes,
the fact that the division of labor “should be based on (...) interdependencies does
not solve the designer’s problem. It only raises the difficult question of what those
interdependencies are.”
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Therefore, there has to be another, more fundamental rationale that determines which
subtasks are grouped together. This study follows a strategic31 approach to this prob-
lem. In the organizational context of this study, a corporate strategy can be defined
as “the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its objectives,
purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for achieving those goals”
Andrews (1987). Simply speaking, strategy is a way to combine means and ends. Thus,
a corporate strategy serves the main purpose to identify ways and means to give this
corporation an improved competitive situation.
In this context, it can be argued that strategic literature follows one of two distinct
paradigms when it comes to explaining promising or successful competitive situations,
either focusing on the ends or the means of an organization (Rumelt et al., 1991). The
first thread commonly attributes success to industry structure. The probably most
influential work in this thread is that of Porter (1980), which is based on the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organization (Manson, 1949; Bain, 1959).
Different characteristics of industries - such as the bargaining power of suppliers and
customers, the threat of substitutes and new entrants, or the competition within the
industry - make a market more or less attractive. Organizations can realize rents only
through exploiting privileged market positions. Contrary to this, the second thread
argues that success should be explained by aspects internal to the firm. Especially
the resource-based view is based on the argument that the competitive situation of an
organization is linked with this organization’s unique resources. It therefore complements
theories on industry structure. As Penrose (1959, p. 75) notes: “It is the heterogeneity,
and not the homogeneity, of the productive services available or potentially available
from its resources that gives each firm its unique character.” Therefore, the unique
resource situation of an organization needs to be considered when discussing when and
how organizations succeed or fail. Teece et al. (1997, p. 514) illustrate the difference
of these two approaches by defining the sequential steps of the strategy formulation
process. From an industry view the steps are the following: “(1) pick an industry (based
on its ’structural attractiveness’); (2) choose an entry strategy based on conjectures
about competitors’ rational strategies; (3) if not already possessed, acquire or otherwise
obtain the requisite assets to compete in the market.” Contrary to this, the same process
from a resource-based view looks as follows: “(1) identify your firm’s unique resources;
(2) decide in which markets those resources can earn the highest rents; and (3) decide
whether the rents from those assets are most effectively utilized by (a) integrating into
related market(s), (b) selling the relevant intermediate output to related firms, or (c)
selling the assets themselves to a firm in related businesses.”
31 Strategy is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary in a general (political) sense as “the science
and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group
of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war” or as “the science and
art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions.”
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Since the focus of this work is the industry of IS development, a discussion on ba-
sis of an industry perspective cannot be expected to be exceptionally fruitful. Rather
then discussing the industry in general, a more detailed analysis of the different resource
endowments of the organizations that constitute this industry seems to be appropri-
ate to assess why inter-organizational networks are formed (Currie and Parikh, 2006).
This has been readily acknowledged in the literature on network formation, in which
this paradigm is prevalent (Oliver and Ebers, 1998; Oliver, 2001; Kogut, 1988; Gulati,
1998; Ireland et al., 2002). Consequently, the subsequent discussion first introduces the
theoretical underpinning of this perspective - the resource-based view. Furthermore,
several enhancements that the original concept has spawned are also discussed. This
addresses first a finer grained perspective on what resources are, and also an explicitly
inter-organizational reflection on resources. This discussion is intended to define and
clarify the theory used, it is not yet related to the IS development context. This relation
is attempted in the following section, in which both an IS and a strategic management
perspective on important resources are given. These different perspectives yield three
broad categories of resources that are then discussed with special consideration of the
IS development context. As it has been argued above, the IS development network is
proposed to be of a hub-and-spoke structure. This discussion is therefore following this
structure in that it is addressing what resources are brought into the network by these
two types of participants. Through this, more light is shed on the first research objective,
to answer the question what drives these organizations into adopting this cooperative
growth strategy.
2.2.1 Theoretical Perspectives on Organizational Structure
2.2.1.1 The Resource-Based View
As has been already discussed in the introduction to this section, this theory32 is based
on the perception that different firms vary in the resources that they have at their
disposal in order to reach a certain goal, and that this specific resource situation can
explain certain characteristics of the firm that possesses them. While this seems at
first glance to be a decisive break with the prevalent industry structure paradigm, a
closer consideration reveals that this is not true. Wernerfelt (1984, p. 171)33 argues
that resources and products of a firm are essentially “two sides of the same coin.” While
32 There is conciderable disagreement whether the resource-based view is actually a theory or not.
Conner (1991, p. 143) argues “that the resource-based approach is reaching for a theory of the firm.”
Contrary to this, Priem and Butler (2001, p. 36) state that “the RBV does not presently appear
to meet the empirical content criterion required of theoretical systems.” While both viewpoints are
defendable, Barney (2001) and his perception that the resource based view is valuable and powerful
instrument, whether it is a theory or not, is followed in this work.
33 In 1994 the 1984 article won the prize as one of the most influential papers published in the Strategic
Management Journal (Wernerfelt, 1995; Priem and Butler, 2001). This supports the above made
argument that the concept is very valuable.
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industry structure approaches address the product-market side of this coin, the resource-
based view explicitly addresses the other. While this idea has first been raised by Penrose
in 1959, it received little or almost no attention until the early 1980s.
At that time a body of literature emerged that is concerned with explaining how
different resources can contribute to a firm’s success. Mahoney and Pandian (1992,
p. 369) argue that “the resource-based approach focuses on the key success factors of
individual firm behavior to achieve firm-specific advantages.” These key success factors
can be considered to be what has been labeled as the resources of the firm. This already
hints towards the very broad definition34 of what actually a resource is. Wernerfelt
defines a resource as follows:
By a resource is meant anything which could be thought of as a strength or
weakness of a given firm. More formally, a firm’s resources at a given time
could be defined as those (tangible and intangible) assets which are tied
semipermanently to the firm (see Caves, 1980). Examples of resources are:
brand names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled per-
sonnel, trade contracts, machinery, efficient procedures, capital, etc. (Wern-
erfelt, 1984, p. 172).
The main question that is now addressed by the resource-based view is therefore,
“under what circumstances will a resource lead to high returns over longer periods of
time?”35 (Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 172). The resource-based view, as devised in Barney
(1991) answers this question based on two distinct traits of resources. First, it is assumed
that resources can be heterogeneously distributed within an industry or any group of
firms. Second, it is assumed that these resources can be only imperfectly mobile, i.e.
that it is difficult to either imitate or substitute them. On this basis, Barney (1991)
defines a framework for assessing the potential of a resource to be a source of sustained
(i.e. long lasting) competitive advantage that is based on four questions36:
34 The fact that resources are defined in such a broad way has raised considerable criticism (see below).
However, as it has been mentioned in the introduction, the goal of this research is rather exploratory.
In this context the broad nature of the concept promises to be beneficial, as it allows for the unre-
stricted discovery of significant variables that has been demanded of exploratory studies (Kerlinger
and Lee, 2000).
35 In this context, various terms exist for the here described concept. Resources, assets, or competencies
for example are used synonymous in this work. Selznick (1957) has been among the first to use the last
term. He labels those competencies that yield a sustained competitive advantage as being distinctive.
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) pick up the idea of competencies and call them core competencies.
According to Wernerfelt (1995, p. 171) Prahalad and Hamel (1990) have been “single-handedly
responsible for diffusion of the resource-based view into practice.” A perception well supported by
the fact that on Monday, January, 21st 2008 the article by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) has been cited
692 times in the EBSCO Host database, while the original article by Wernerfelt (1984), published
six years earlier, received only 17 citations!
36 Following the first letters of the attributes, these are also called VRIN attributes (Eisenhardt and
Martin, 2000).
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• Is a resource valuable?
Only if the resource that a firm possesses gives the firm the ability to increase
either effectiveness, efficiency, or both, this resource qualifies for being a source
of sustained competitive advantage. Resources that a firm possesses that are not
valuable do not lead to a situation of a competitive advantage for that firm, they
might even result in a competitive disadvantage.
• Is a resource rare?
Only those resources that are heterogeneously distributed among firms qualify for
leading to a sustained competitive advantage. In case that a resource is valu-
able, but homogeneously distributed among actual or potential competitors, the
situation a firm is in is called a competitive parity.
• Is a resource inimitable?
A resource can only lead to a sustained competitive advantage, if this resource
cannot be obtained by competitors. A resource that is not possessed by competi-
tors, but can be imitated with time gives the firm that possesses it a temporary
competitive advantage: “The observation that valuable and rare organizational
resources can be a source of competitive advantage is another way of describing
first-mover advantages accruing to firms with resource advantages” (Barney, 1991,
p. 107).
• Is a resource non-substitutable?
This point is closely related to the inimitability of resources. In case that a specific
resource that cannot be obtained (imitated), it might be possible to substitute
this resource by another (similar or different) one that essentially lead to the same
results. Barney (1991) gives the example of a highly qualified top-management
team of one firm. While it is obviously impossible for a competitor to obtain
exactly this team, this competitor might assemble a similar top-management team
that is equally efficient. An example for substituting a resource by a different one
is also given by Barney (1991): One firm has a clear vision of its future installed by
its charismatic leader, the other by a systematic strategic planning process. The
planning process in this example is a different, though substituting resource for
the charismatic leader. Only those resources that are not only valuable, rare, and
inimitable, but also non-substitutable qualify for leading to a sustained competitive
advantage37.
37 Note that sustained does not mean forever in this context. As Barney (1991, p. 103) argues: “That
a competitive advantage is sustained does not imply that it will “last forever.” It only suggests that
it will not be competed away through the duplication efforts of other firms. Unanticipated changes
in the economic structure of an industry may make what was, at one time, a source of sustained
competitive advantage, no longer valuable for a firm, and thus not a source of any competitive
advantage.”
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Since imitability and substitutability are closely connected in a sense that both enable
the competition to acquire an equivalent resource, these two terms are often subsumed
under the term of resource mobility. The fundamental concepts of the resource-based
view can therefore be illustrated in a decision tree as shown in Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9: A Resource-Based Model of Competitive Advantage.
Source: Mata et al. (1995, p. 494).
The next question that has to be answered is how firms come to possess these distinct
resources and why they cannot be imitated or substituted by competitors?38 Dierickx
and Cool (1989) argue that, since these resources - which they call strategic assets - can-
not be easily acquired, they have to be built by the organization. Usually, this building
of assets is achieved through accumulating them over a longer period of time. That is,
organizations have to follow certain policies for an extended timeframe to develop a stock
of these assets. Since, the “imitability of an asset stock is related to the characteristics
of the process by which it may be accumulated,” these characteristics are also relevant
for preventing competitors from accumulating the same stock of assets (Dierickx and
Cool, 1989, p. 1507). Dierickx and Cool (1989) refine this basic idea and discuss five
key characteristics that can influence firms in their endeavor to attain these resources.
First, time compression diseconomies refer to the fact that acquiring a certain asset or
resource simply takes time. Especially intangible resources cannot be obtained through
a forced program. Setting up a sophisticated research and development unit for example
takes time and cannot be rushed, not even through high investments. Second, asset
mass efficiencies describe the fact that assets are subject to reinforcing feedback loops.
38 This distinction between attaining and sustaining a competitive advantage is hardly found explicitly
in the literature on the resource-based view. Exception are Peteraf (1993) and, borrowing from her,
Wade and Hulland (2004, p. 115 ff) who characterize resources as leading to ex ante or ex post
“limits to competition.”
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That is, once a certain critical mass of an asset has been accumulated it becomes easier
to accumulate more of that asset. Again, research and development is a good example.
A firm that is engaged in basic research often finds it easier to acquire certain applied
knowledge. Third, interconnectedness of asset stock means that one asset depends upon,
one or more, other asset stock(s). A firm that for example has an extensive service
network is more apt to take up customers’ recommendations and thus being perceived
as being responsive to their needs. Fourth, asset erosion refers to the converse of time
compression diseconomies. Just as it takes time to build up an asset stock, time can
also erode this asset if no efforts are made to maintain it. The fact that technological
progress quickly makes research and development knowledge obsolete, is an example
for asset erosion. Fifth, the fact that asset accumulation is neither deterministic nor
continuous is called causal ambiguity. It is impossible to per-determine with absolute
certainty whether a certain investment will lead to a valuable asset or not. Again, vast
sums of research and development spent in, for example, the pharmaceutical industry
that only rarely lead to blockbuster products are a good example.
Barney (1991) elaborates on these ideas, and argues that three reasons are responsible
for turning a resource into a sustainable competitive advantage: First, the resource
has been acquired under unique historical conditions, which cannot be reproduced by
competitors. Second, referring to causal ambiguity, the “link between the resources
controlled by a firm and a firm’s sustained competitive advantage is not understood or
understood only very imperfectly” (p. 109). Finally, the resources might stem from
socially complex phenomena, which are “beyond the ability of firms to systematically
manage and influence” (p. 110).
In summary, the resource-based view offers a good perspective for understanding which
of a firm’s internal resources can lead to a sustained competitive advantage. However,
the concept has also received considerable criticism. Black and Boal (1994, p. 132) for
example argue that in the original (as it has been here described) concept, resources are
inherently treated as “singular distinct items.” That is, either a resource is available to
a firm or not. There is no distinct treatment of the inherent dynamics that resources
are subject to39. This criticism has been addressed as part of the concept of dynamic
capabilities, which is subsequently introduced.
2.2.1.2 Dynamic Capabilities
Dynamic capabilities are termed dynamic as they are those capabilities that are deployed
in order to manipulate other resources. Thus, they address exactly the problem of
missing dynamic interaction between resources that has been mentioned above. This
distinction between resources and capabilities is well illustrated for example by Helfat
and Peteraf, who contrast a capability from a resource as follows:
39 There are other points of criticism as well. As they reference both the resource-based view and the
concept of dynamic capabilities, they are discussed in the following section.
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A resource refers to an asset or input to production (tangible or intangible)
that an organization owns, controls, or has access to on a semi-permanent
basis. An organizational capability refers to the ability of an organization
to perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organizational resources, for
the purpose of achieving a particular end result (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003, p.
999).
Although there are subtle nuances in the definitions of other authors, this distinction
between resources as more or less basic input factors and capabilities as the ability to
use these resources can be recognized in many definitions. Amit and Schoemaker (1993,
p. 35) for example differentiate between resources “as stocks of available factors that
are owned or controlled by the firm” and capabilities as “a firm’s capacity to deploy re-
sources, usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end.”
Similarly, Miller and Shamsie (1996, p. 523) distinguishes between discrete resources,
that “stand alone and have value more or less independent of their organizational con-
texts” and systemic resources, that “have value because their components are part of
a network or system.” Winter (2003, p. 991) defines capabilities as “a high level rou-
tine (...) for producing significant outputs of a particular type.” Finally, Teece et al.
(1997), whose work can be considered one of the most influential on the topic, differ-
entiate resources and capabilities even further. While factors of production are those
input factors that are readily available on the market, resources in their terminology
are only those that are difficult if not impossible to imitate by competitors. Similarly,
competences refer to the ability to align factors of production and resources in a way
that are meaningful for the organization’s business. Dynamic capabilities in turn refer
to the ability to change these competences in order to react to changed environmental
conditions. This focus on evolving processes within a firm has considerable advantages
over the ’pure’ resource-based view as well as over the enhanced version with resources
and capabilities. As Teece et al. (1997, p. 529) frame it: “The approach has the benefit
of indicating that competitive advantage is not just a function of how one plays the
game [capabilities]; it is also a function of the ’assets’ one has to play with [resources],
and how these assets can be deployed and redeployed in a changing market [dynamic
capabilities].”
In this context Teece et al. (1997) argue that especially these dynamic capabilities are
sources of sustained competitive advantage for an organization. The reason for this can
be easily explained. Up to this point there have been different terms for resources, one
of them being assets. However, while this term has been used - rather careless one has
to say - as a synonym for resources so far, it has to be stated that an asset is defined
as the result of capitalization process in accounting. With other words, it is part of
an organization’s balance sheet. Contrary to this, Teece et al. implicitly argue that
capabilities are exactly not part of a balance sheet:
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Indeed, firm capabilities need to be understood not in terms of balance sheet
items, but mainly in terms of the organizational structures and managerial
processes which support productive activity. By construction, the firm’s
balance sheet contains items that can be valued, at least at original market
prices (cost). It is necessarily the case, therefore, that the balance sheet is a
poor shadow of a firm’s distinctive competences (Teece et al., 1997, p. 517).
Therefore, dynamic capabilities commonly not appear on the balance sheet of a com-
pany. As Hall (1993) has argued, these factors that not appear on the balance sheet are
especially important for the future potential of the corresponding company, as they are
not easily exchanged. Consequently, these dynamic capabilities as described here are
exactly what are providing a company with a potentially sustained competitive advan-
tage. Therefore, they have to be built within the organization, which closes the loop
with the above made observation that sources of sustained competitive advantage have
to be built through an often long-lasting internal process.
However, while this approach seems to be an intuitively clear enhancement to the
resource-based view, it has - similar to the pure RBV - also attracted considerable crit-
icism. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 1107), albeit defending the concept of dynamic
capabilities, summarize the criticism very pointedly in their statement that “dynamic ca-
pabilities are often described in vague terms such as ’routines to learn routines’ that have
been criticized as being tautologic, endlessly recursive, and nonoperational.” Picking up
the last issue, Priem and Butler (2001, p. 33) argue that anything can be considered as
a capability or resource in terms of the here described concepts. Often already existing
research is forced into the corset of the resource-based view, simply by labeling the inde-
pendent variables as resources and the dependent variable as competitive advantage40.
Addressing the second concern, Collis (1994) states that dynamic capabilities have
to be considered a multi-order concept. That is, one can always find a capability that
alters other capabilities. This capability is then a source of sustained competitive advan-
tage, until someone finds a higher-order capability which in turn alters the lower-order
capability. “It is from here that we advance into the realm of what might be called
meta-capabilities. The capability that wins tomorrow is the capability to develop the
capability to develop the capability that innovates faster (or better), and so on.” Some
researchers (Zollo and Winter, 2002, e.g.) already use the work of Collis (1994) on
higher-order dynamic capabilities without awareness of the issued warnings. Schreyo¨gg
and Kliesch (2005) develop a similar concept of second order observations, and argue
that this concept is closely related to double loop learning, as it has been devised by
Argyris and Scho¨n (1978). However, they also do not dwell on the difficulties of an
infinite recursion embedded in this concept.
40 As it has been argued above, this could also be considered an advantage for exploratory studies. As
anything can be considered a resource, the goal “to discover significant variables” can be followed
unobscured by formal definitions (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000, p. 586).
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The problem of dynamic capabilities being tautological is again addressed by Priem
and Butler (2001). They argue that the RBV in general suffers from an In Search
of Excellence Problem41. That is, it is always possible to identify valuable resources
ex post. Obviously, explaining the success of those firms that possess these valuable
resources with the possessing of exactly these resources is tautological.
However, this criticism of the concept of dynamic capabilities is not universally shared
in the scientific community. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 1116) for example ar-
gue that “dynamic capabilities are not tautological, vague, and endlessly recursive (...).
Rather, they consist of many well-known processes such as alliancing, product devel-
opment, and strategic decision making that have been studied extensively in their own
right, apart from RBV. Their value of competitive advantage lies in their ability to al-
ter the resource base: create, integrate, recombine, and release resources.” With other
words, there is no need for second- or even higher-order dynamic capabilities. Rather,
the ability to dynamically alter the resources that a company possesses is consistent
across different contexts. This research promises to yield interesting insights for this dis-
pute. In the context of IS development, it can be argued that the resources themselves
are dynamically shifting42. Consequently, organizational routines for applying these dy-
namic resources would in themselves be dynamic capabilities. Therefore, the ability to
manage alliancing across organizational boundaries should be a higher-level capability
in IS development compared to traditional industries. If this ability proves to be very
similar in IS compared to other industries, this would indicate that indeed only one level
of dynamic capabilities is needed.
This last paragraph already hinted upon another point of criticism for the resource-
based view/dynamic capabilities concept. While the latter extension covers the inter-
action of resources or capabilities within an organization, interactions across organiza-
tional boundaries have so-far not been considered. This has impaired some to criticize
the concept in that “the resource based perspective is solely occupied with analysis of
the individual firm’s bundle of resources (in terms of their ability to contribute to com-
petitive advantage), and has next to nothing to say about inter-firm relations” (Foss,
1999, p. 2). Thus, “ideas of how resources within a firm interact with things both inside
and/or outside the firm to create sustainable competitive advantage” are needed (Black
and Boal, 1994, p. 133). Interaction with the environment is implicitly included in the
resources-based view, as resources that lead to a sustained competitive advantage are
exactly those whose value is incorrectly assessed by the environment of the organiza-
tion that possess them (Barney, 1986), or that are not tradable at all (Dierickx and
Cool, 1989). Therefore, possessing these difficult or impossible to trade resources is key
41 Named after the book by Peters andWaterman (1982), in which the authors research highly successful
organizations and identified eight common themes that are, according to the authors, responsible for
the enduring success of the studied companies. Obviously, from a scientific perspective it is difficult
to determine whether these eight factors are really causing the success of the companies, and have
therefore the potential to be causing organizational success also in the future.
42 See the discussion on continuous innovation in IS development in Section 2.1.1.3.
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for being an attractive network partner (Das and Teng, 2000). However, key to the
attractiveness for network participation is not only what resources a potential partner
possesses, but also how these resources align with those of the other network partners -
the topic of the following discussion on inter-organizational resources.
2.2.1.3 Specificities of Inter-Organizational Resources
While the theory so far is without doubt necessary for understanding interactions be-
tween companies, its power to explain the formation of inter-organizational networks
is limited. Considering such a network from an internal resource-based viewpoint, the
main reason that firms have to engage in such relations is to acquire resources which they
currently do not possess (Van de Ven, 1976; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). At
the same time, firms engaged in such a network have to ensure that their partner(s) do
not obtain the resources they bring into the partnership (Das and Teng, 2000; Duschek,
2004). The situation is one that is aptly described by Hamel (1991, p. 84) as a learning
race: “Failure to ’out-learn’ one’s partner could render a firm first dependent and then
redundant within the partnership, and competitively vulnerable outside it.” On this
basis, warnings have also been uttered against what is perceived to be a too intense
partnering for example by Reich and Mankin (1986) or Hamel et al. (1989).
However, the statement that this acquisition of resources through learning in a network
is necessary, because “for some skills, what Itami (1987) terms ’invisible assets,’ the cost
of internal development may be almost infinite” (Hamel, 1991, p. 99) falls somewhat
short of the resource-based theory. As has been discussed above, the sources of sustained
competitive advantage are neither imitable, nor substitutable, as it can be argued not
even through joint learning in a network. Sustained competitive advantages have been
defined as those advantages that can “not be competed away through the duplication
efforts of other firms” (Barney, 1991, p. 103). That this perception is not unrealistic is
confirmed by Das and Teng (2000, p. 40) when they state that “many resources, such
as the tacit knowledge of firms, lose much of their value if moved from their current
organizational context and other resources used in conjunction.”
Thus, resources that are shared in an inter-organizational network should - contrary
to the perception of Hamel (1991) - not be internalized, but rather utilized without
internalization (Grunwald and Kieser, 2007). This different focus is aptly described by
Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) in their differentiation between knowledge-acquiring and
knowledge-accessing networks. Describing the shortcomings of the first and advantages
of the latter, they argue that “this emphasis on learning - the acquisition of knowledge -
fails to recognize the central attribute of the network as an organizational mode that can
reconcile the benefits of knowledge specialization with those of flexible integration” (p.
62). Since, as Demsetz (1991) notes, successfully interacting within a multi-firm context
always requires the dependence on others, the (internal) resource-based view is obviously
not capable of explaining the underlying processes of this cooperation. This, however,
already leads over to the next thread of this study - namely how organizational networks
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can be successfully managed in order to allow the participants to utilize the resources of
others without acquiring them. Through such a management the relationships within the
network themselves might become sources of sustained competitive advantage. However,
before discussing these issues, first a better understanding of the alignment between
resources of the different involved companies is required.
This question of alignment is going beyond considering inter-organizational networks
as learning races in a resource-based reflection. Different approaches have been discussed
that are intended to explain the fact that many networks rely on combining resources
of multiple partners Duschek (2004). This combining of resources without trying to
integrate the resources that the partners bring into the relationship is inconceivable
in the context of a purely internal resource-based perspective on a network. However,
entrepreneurial multi-firm networks are today considered to be “essential to a company’s
survival and growth” (Miles et al., 2005; Parise and Casher, 2003, p. 25). In this
context, Das and Teng (2000) argue for a classification of resource combination based
on two dimensions. The distinctive first dimension is whether resources are similar or
dissimilar. The second dimension distinguishes whether resources are actually utilized
in the relationship, that is whether they are performing or nonperforming. The resulting
two-by-two matrix (Figure 2.10) gives an overview of the four potential types of resource
alignments, which are described subsequently.
Figure 2.10: A Typology of Inter-Partner Resource Alignments.
Source: Das and Teng (2000, p. 49).
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• Supplementary
The resources that are brought into the inter-organizational network by the dif-
ferent partners are similar and performing. An example for this type of resource
alignment might be a joint funding of a common undertaking, or bringing in re-
search and development resources to conjointly address a project of mutual inter-
est. “A supplementary alignment can provide (...) market power, entry deterrence,
and economies of scale and scope in such areas as R&D activities, production, and
marketing” (Das and Teng, 2000, p. 49).
• Complementary
The combination of complementary resources in such a network is the most com-
monly given reason for participating in such organizational networks. The partners
in such a relationship all offer distinct resources that the other partners do not pos-
sess. Therefore the combination of these resources allows the network to jointly
achieve a common goal that would be out of reach for every partner trying to
achieve this goal by himself.
• Surplus
In this setting, the partners provide the network with similar resources that are
not fully utilized. While commonly, this would be considered a disadvantageous
type of network, Das and Teng (2000, p. 50) argue for a more balanced view on
these resources: “As such, surplus is often not a positive resource alignment, as
useful resources are not being utilized to their full potential. On the other hand,
though, partner firms may deliberately have some surplus in a [network], in order
to provide themselves with some cushion against unforeseen adverse conditions.”43
• Wasteful
Finally, resources that are brought into a network are not utilized because they are
not compatible with the network’s needs are wasteful. These resources are simply
incompatible with the network.
43 This cushion is often called organizational slack and defined as follows: “Slack consists in payments
to members of the coalition in excess of what is required to maintain the organization” (Cyert
and March, 1992, p. 42). While this organizational slack stands in sharp contrast to the efficient,
lean enterprise that seems to be the current ideal of management literature (Womack and Jones,
1996), it is important to state that Cyert and March (1992) by no means define organizational
slack as something negative. Two aspects have to be mentioned: “When the environment becomes
less favorable, organizational slack represents a cushion” and “slack provides a source of funds for
innovations that would not be approved in the face of scarcity but that have strong subunit support.”
(Cyert and March, 1992, p. 43 / 189). Other authors also contradict the notion of a lean (i.e. one
without slack) organization as an efficient one. Karl Weick and his colleagues for example use
organizational slack as part of their discussion on avoiding failures in organizations (Weick et al.,
1999; Weick and Sutcliff, 2001)
60
61
As this discussion has shown, the utilization and not the integration of resources should
be considered as the driving force behind network formation. Also, various types of
resource alignments between organizations exist that would make a voluntary association
of these companies within one network beneficial. The next step in this discussion is a
deeper analysis that is substantiating what types of resources an organization actually
has to possess44 in order to be attractive for participating in such a network. This
analysis is conducted first from a pure IS perspective. As this limitation proves to be
not very fruitful, the analysis is augmented to the disciplines of organizational science
and strategic management.
2.2.2 Perspectives on Inter-Organizational Capabilities
After having discussed the underlying foundations of a resource based perspective, this
section aims at developing a more precise set of resources or capabilities that companies
acting in such an inter-organizationally structured industry are supposed to possess. The
accessing of these capabilities is in turn supposed to be the driving force for partnering
with this company, and thus for the emergence of the network in the IS development
industry. In order to achieve this goal, first capabilities specifically discussed in the
IS literature are discussed. However, as knowledge in this field is limited, also a more
general discussion of capabilities as driving forces behind network decisions is conducted
from the perspective of strategic management and organizational science.
2.2.2.1 The IS Perspective
The resource-based view has been readily applied in the IS context. Especially the work
of Mata et al. (1995) is an example of analyzing IS resources through this perspective.
They suggest four types of resources that could be a source for sustained competitive
advantage in the IS context: access to capital needed to develop and apply an IS;
proprietary technology that can be kept secret or protected otherwise; technical skills
needed to build and operate a system; or managerial skills that are needed to integrate
the system with the business goals of the company. According to Mata et al. (1995), out
of these four only the last type of resources can be truly considered a source for sustained
competitive advantage. Assuming that a company has a good business case, access to
capital is rarely an issue today. IS technology is difficult to patent, and even if it can be
patented, “workforce mobility, reverse engineering, and formal and informal technical
communication all act to reduce the secrecy surrounding proprietary technology” (Mata
et al., 1995, p. 497). These factors also act counter to the sustainability of competitive
advantage that is derived from technical skills. Especially technical consultants and
44 These resources by definition have to be internal to that organization. However, as the organization
is becoming attractive for other organizations, the inter-organizational resource alignment plays an
important role. This duality of internal resource consideration and external resource alignment is
also discussed as inducements and opportunities for network formation by Ahuja (2000).
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contractors offer these skills for anyone able to pay for them. Thus, only the ability to
successfully integrate a system into the overall business environment can be a source of
sustained competitive advantage45.
This perception that managerial skills are crucial is well supported in the IS litera-
ture. In their comprehensive literature review, Wade and Hulland (2004) argue for the
sustainability of resources such as the management of external and internal relation-
ships, the market responsiveness, or the ability of IS planning and change management.
They also argue that factors like IS infrastructure or technical skills only rarely lead to
a sustained competitive advantage. However, in their discussion a profound weakness
of IS literature becomes obvious. The field is entirely dedicated to the companies that
are using these systems. Those companies that develop them are completely out of
the scope of IS literature. Again, the work of Wade and Hulland (2004, p. 115) well
illustrates this fact. The treatment of the factor IS development is limited to the state-
ment that “IS development includes capabilities associated with managing a systems
development life-cycle that is capable of supporting competitive advantage (Bharadwaj,
2000; Marchand et al., 2000; Ross et al., 1996), and should therefore lead to superior firm
performance.” Out of the cited works in Wade and Hulland (2004), all also cover user
organizations: Bharadwaj (2000) analyze IT leaders that have been identified by the
journal Information Week on the basis of figures like IT budget or IT staff size; Jarven-
paa and Leidner (1998) study a newspaper group in Mexico; Zaheer and Zaheer (1997)
focus on financial institutions that are engaged in foreign exchange trading; Marchand
et al. (2000) also focus on banks; finally, Ross et al. (1996) do not have a clear industry
focus, however they discuss cases from various backgrounds - none of them IS devel-
opment. The applicability of these studies to the here described context is even more
reduced as none of them covers explicitly the inter-organizational interplay of resources
owned by different organizations. The concepts of management of external relationships
and market responsiveness discussed in Wade and Hulland (2004) are somewhat hinting
into this direction, yet they are not well founded enough to be further analyzed as the
driving forces behind the change in the IS development industry.
Approaching the IS literature more from the technical side of its spectrum is also
of no help. Albeit the fact that inter-organizational software development - under the
label of component based software development (CBSD) - has been widely discussed
as a potential solution to the problem of inefficient IS development, both in a tech-
nical and an organizational sense, there is no empirical evidence for such a structure.
Messerschmitt and Szyperski (2003), Van de Ven (2005), Sprott (2000), and Papazoglou
and Georgakopoulos (2003) have already been cited as examples for this shortcoming
in Section 2.1.2.4. There are various others: Hong and Lerch (2002, p. 24) argue that
“current markets of software components are still in their infancy.” Similarly, Jain et al.
45 This is also well reflected in the discussion on the three-fold nature of IS in Section 2.1.1.1. There
the interplay between task, technology, and people has been described as the distinguishing factor of
IS. It is also at the heart of the concept of IS alignment, that has been mentioned in Section 2.1.1.3.
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(2003, p. 60) state that “CBSD is in its infancy.” Sugumaran and Storey (2003, p.
14) recognize that “the reuse repository contains the predefined objects (components)
of an application domain.” However, there is no further explanation who exactly is sup-
posed to develop these components. Similarly, Hopkins (2000, p. 28) mentions several
premises for a successful CBSD approach. The first being, “that there exist components
to reuse. There must be a ready supply of well-built, applicable components that can be
discovered, licensed, and easily used.” He realizes that there are several issues that slow
down the development of a marketplace, yet he states that “it is logical to conclude a
market for components would develop” (p. 30). However, there are no research efforts
that address exactly this problem, namely to analyze the development of a modular
subindustry structure for IS components development. Even standard textbooks on the
topic are not filling this gap. Szyperski et al. (2002, p. 18) phrases it as follows: “How
can markets be created? A full answer to this question is far beyond the scope of this
book.” Yet, an answer to this question seems to be exactly what is missing currently.
This answer might also rebut Glass (1998, p. 59), who commented on modularized IS
development with the not too optimistic words: “All too often our field pins its hopes
on some breakthrough technology that, in the end, turns out to be BS46.”
Thus, the topic that this study is addressing a weak spot in the IS literature in a
twofold sense. Coming more from an organizational perspective, the field has readily
acknowledge the importance of IS for inter-organizational cooperation. However, taking
these issues into the domain of IS development on a deeper than superficial level has
so far not happened. There is no empirical analysis of inter-organizational cooperation
in the field of IS development. Technically this emerging structure has already been
anticipated. Many of the more technically oriented studies develop sophisticated ways
and means for inter-organizational, modular IS development - just to stop right before
analyzing the practical feasibility of such an approach. This study is attempting to close
this gap, and thus in part fulfilling the demand of Currie and Parikh (2006, p. 524) “that,
rather than restricting our analysis to the technical imperatives of Web services, a more
fruitful approach is to relate our discussion to the strategic management literature.” The
next section therefore discusses reasons why organizations enter into inter-organizational
networks from a general strategic managerial perspective. At the end of this chapter,
these are then further elaborated on under special consideration of the IS development
context and finally translated into propositions on factors that drive large IS vendors
into such structures, which in turn are empirically tested in the following chapters.
46 Please note here, that this work explicitly does not assume that IS components are traded over an
anonymous market. Rather, IS are developed through networks of associated organizations. See
Section 2.1.2.
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2.2.2.2 The Strategic Management Perspective
It has already been argued that the most appropriate theoretical lens for studying the
formation of inter-organizational networks in a specific industry is the resource-based
view and its derivatives (Oliver and Ebers, 1998). The discussion on these theoretical
backgrounds has in part already implied that the resources that are apt to make an
organization an interesting network partner are those that are a source of sustained
competitive advantage for those firms (Das and Teng, 2000). Therefore, these resources
have to be valuable, heterogeneously distributed, and imperfectly mobile (Barney, 1991;
Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984). In the inter-organizational context the
resources that different partners bring into the network have furthermore to fit to each
other in that they have to be complementary, supplementary, or surplus to each other
(Das and Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). As the discussion above has
also indicated it can be expected that especially dynamic capabilities are likely to fall
into this category (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 2001; Teece
et al., 1997). However, the literature from a strict IS background does not provide a
comprehensive list of potential capabilities that fit into this framework - perhaps expect
the broad statement that it is more likely for managerial than for technical capabilities
to be a source of sustained competitive advantage, and that financial leeway is usually
not a source of sustained competitive advantage (Mata et al., 1995; Miller and Shamsie,
1996). As the literature in the field of strategic management has amply addressed this
issue, it is here used as a reference discipline to develop more concrete propositions in
the IS development context (Keen, 1980).
In this context it is important to recall the perspective of this part of the study.
It is addressing the first research objective to understand what kinds of resources the
various participants possess or lack in order to make the joining of such a network
attractive (Ahuja, 2000). Therefore, the subsequently developed capabilities are those
that the different partners bring into the network. In this context, Stuart (2000, p.
793) “argue[s] that because networks are formed to achieve access to partner-specific
resources, the benefit gained from a portfolio of network relationships is determined in
part by attributes of the partner firms that make up the portfolio.” As the organizational
network as it has been discussed in Section 2.1.2.3 can be considered a hub-and-spoke
network, the obvious differentiation between different participants in this network is that
between hubs and spokes. In other words, the research question might be re-phrased as
what types of resources do hubs possess and spokes lack, and what types of resources
do spokes possess and hubs lack that makes the formation of such a network potentially
successful for both? The network is in this regard only potentially successful, as the other
part of network success has to be considered the management of the inter-organizational
linkages, which is discussed in the next section (Powell et al., 1996; Dyer and Singh,
1998).
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A promising first step in this process of identifying relevant motives for the involved
parties is the highly influential47 review written by Hagedoorn (1993). In this review of
more than thirty of the most relevant works on the topic and the subsequent analysis
of more than 4,000 alliances, it is concluded that out of the large number of poten-
tial motives for network formation, essentially three basic categories can be distilled:
Innovation-, technology-, and market-related motives. In the following, these are briefly
described, befor the next section discusses them in more detail and with special consid-
eration of the context of a networked IS development industry.
As the first factor in this list, innovation aspects have been found to be of prime
importance of network formation (Freeman, 1991; Hagedoorn, 1995). Here especially,
the hub-and-spoke structure of networks has been found to be very beneficial for an
increased rate of innovation. Miles et al. (2005, p. 46) aptly summarized this percep-
tion, when they state that “large firms need the technology developed by small firms,
and small firms need the financial muscle and distribution power of the large firms.”
Powell et al. (1996) support this view with their study in the biotechnology industry.
Biotech firms, which are often small start-ups, act as sources of innovations for large,
established pharmaceutical companies. These two types of organizations have estab-
lished a successful and enduring relationship of mutual benefit: “Biotech firms have not
supplanted pharmaceutical companies, and large pharmaceuticals have not absorbed the
biotechnology field” (Powell, 1998, p. 233). The fact that this type of relationship is
transferable into other industries has been acknowledged by Powell et al.:
These conditions are not limited to biotechnology. In fields as diverse as
ceramics and software, much of the relevant know-how is neither located
inside an organization nor readily available for purchase. When the sources
of knowledge are disparate and the pathways to technological development
unchartered, we would expect the emergence of networks of learning (p. 143
Powell et al., 1996, emphasis added).
Stuart (2000) supports this idea with his in depth analysis of the semiconductor indus-
try. Here, innovativeness of partner firms has also been found to be one of the drivers
of network success. The second factor out of this list, the access to technology, has
often been given as the prime motive for network formation. The rationale behind this
argument is multifaceted. First, as the discussion on modular product architectures in
Section 2.1.2.2 has indicated, increased complexity of modern technologies necessitates
the specialization on core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). As products (or
services) have become so complex that a single organization cannot address the entire
scope of their production (or provisioning), the consolidation of complementary, supple-
mentary, or surplus resources becomes a necessity. In this context, it has been shown
that especially in highly competitive markets, such as IS development, gaining access
47 On Monday, January 21st, 2008 the paper has been cited well over 200 times in the EBSCO Host
database.
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to third party technologies has been found to be a crucial factor for network formation
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). The discussion on the concept of platform archi-
tecture in Section 2.1.2 has also already hinted upon the reason why the hub-and-spoke
structure promises to be most efficient for this type of system development. The de-
velopment of the platform is a very extensive task, which requires the definition of the
entire architecture and the provisioning of the core functionality. Consequently, this task
is best addressed by the large hub. Contrary to this, highly specialized functionalities
that are often confined to certain well defined fields can be better addressed by smaller,
also highly specialized entities - the spokes.
Furthermore, these spokes also able to address markets that the hub could not address
on its own. Therefore, these inter-organizational networks can be used by their partic-
ipants to generate additional revenues through gaining access to new markets (Ohmae,
1989). This point has been repeatedly been brought forward in the literature. Hagedoorn
(1993) for example mentions the telecommunications industry, in which until recently
national markets have been protected by domestic monopolies. Accessing these mar-
kets has thus only been feasible through partnering with these domestic organizations.
Similarly, Stuart (2000) analyzes the semiconductor industry, in which accessing mar-
kets that are often based on proprietary technologies is only possible through partnering
with the organization controlling this technology. The idea that accessing foreign (coun-
try) markets is best achieved through networks has also been discussed by Glaister and
Buckley (1996, p. 314). In their study of UK-based partners of international networks
they found that networks “are seen primarily as a means of gaining a significant presence
in a new market, enabling faster entry to the market and achieving greater international
market penetration.” Finally, Spekman et al. (1998, p. 749) in their review of more
than twenty studies on network formation found that networks “focus on accessing and
creating markets.” Here again the hub-and-spoke structure promises to be beneficial.
The hub generates momentum through the experiences made in various markets, while
the spokes are dedicated to channel this momentum into the specific market that they
have specific access to.
So, the discussion of inter-organizational networks from a strategic management per-
spective has been more fruitful in that it serves as a basis for the here developed three
distinct factors that have been found to be of prime importance for network formation.
However, these factors are so far very general and thus only partially applicable to the
IS development context. This weakness of such a general approach to this issue has also
been well reflected in the literature. Stuart for example argues that
of course, the most important domains for determining competitive success
will vary considerable across contexts. In consumer products industries such
as packaged foods and over-the-counter medicines, key resources and skills
may be, respectively, brand names and consumer marketing capabilities. In
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contrast, in high-technology industries they are likely to be state-of-the-art
manufacturing facilities and a leading R&D organization (Stuart, 2000, p.
793).
Thus, the subsequent section is attempting to fill these three broad categories of
motives for network formation with content from the IS development context. Based
on this discussion, propositions are developed for each of the three categories. These
propositions are reflecting the so-far conducted theoretical considerations on exactly
what factors are of prime relevance for the formation of the IS development network.
The following chapters are then dedicated to empirically testing these propositions.
2.2.3 Proposed Benefits of Inter-Organizational IS Development Networks
In order to answer the first research question of why IS development companies are
adopting a cooperative growth strategy through inter-organizational networks, it has
been argued that firms are only inclined to enter into these networks if they are in one way
or another able to create value for the participants (Teng, 2003). Three broad categories
of resource or capabilities have been identified as potential sources of value. These
benefits are subsequently discussed in the special light of the IS development context.
Obviously, these categories are not completely independent of each other. Rather, each
factor seems to be influencing the others and thus a clear-cut differentiation is not
(yet) possible48. The theoretical argument discussed above has been, that developing IS
through an inter-organizational network can be beneficial as it allows for an integration
of resources that are available to the hubs but not the spokes and vice versa. At the
outset, different degrees and areas of innovativeness of hubs and spokes are discussed as
a potential source of benefits of the networked paradigm. It is then argued, that parallel
to this difference in innovativeness, the integration can be beneficial if hubs and spokes
develop solutions that are either complementary or supplementary to those developed
by the other. Thus, the second part gives a discussion of the different technological bases
that hubs and spokes have. This difference is the reason for another broad category of
benefits. The final section then addresses the difference in market-impact and -access
that hubs and spokes have and how this translates into a potentially beneficial conjoint
approach.
2.2.3.1 Innovation Benefits
The first mentioned aspect has been a difference in the innovativeness of hub and spoke
companies. In this context, innovation has to be considered one of the most important
productive resources in society. It is identified as one - if not the - main source of
48 As it has been argued, this is an exploratory study. This type of research in fact has the explicit
goal “to discover significant variables (...), to discover relations among variables, and to lay the
groundwork for later, more systematic and rigorous testing of hypotheses” Kerlinger and Lee (2000,
p. 586).
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competitive advantage, not only of organizations but also of entire national economies
(Florida, 2004). But what exactly constitutes an innovation? Garcia and Calantone
(2002, p. 112) define an innovation as “an iterative process initiated by the perception of
a new market and/or service opportunity for a technology-based invention which leads
to development, production, and marketing tasks striving for the commercial success
of this invention.” This definition includes two very important aspects of innovation.
First, the fact that a new invention is developed, and second, that this invention is
commercially exploited49. The requirement of commercial exploitation turns inventions
into innovations. An invention that never leaves the laboratory cannot be classified as
an innovation in this context.
It has been discussed as one of the idiosyncrasies of IS, that they are subject to con-
tinuous innovations. Thus, the impact of innovation on a discipline like IS is enormous
(Denning, 2004), especially since in a competitive and dynamic situation product inno-
vation is crucial for the survival of organizations (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). At the
same time, it has been found that those organizations that emphasize innovations as core
part of their strategy are also more inclined to enter into inter-organizational networks
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Thus, the innovativeness of the IS development
industry can be considered a driving force behind the emergence of a network structure
in this context. However, while it is evident that innovation is crucial in a dynamic
environment such as IS development, at first glance, there seems to be no reason to
assume that innovation that is occurring across organizational boundaries is any better
than that within a single organization. Yet, as the discussion above has shown, many
networks are explicitly crafted as research and development networks (see for example
Powell et al., 1996; Powell, 1998, for the field of biotechnology). This is especially true
in dynamic environments: “Innovation-focused alliances are regularly created to share
research and development resources, particularly in fast-moving industries such as (...)
computer software” (Miles et al., 2005, p. 27).
In this context the finding of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) is highly important, that
there is no clear causal relationship between the structure of an industry and the inno-
vative activities within this industry. However, they also note that the innovativeness
of an industry “is not a case of a single firm making a single decision (e.g. the total
volume of R & D expenditure), but rather a case in which several firms make a complex
of decisions” (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 267). Consequently, the organizational
hub-and-spoke structure of the industry has to be broken down into a hub-and-spoke
structure of innovations in order to warrant the perception that this structure is more
innovative than the integrated on of the past. In the context of a modularized product
setting, Henderson and Clark (1990) argue for a consideration of innovations on both a
component-level, but also on an architectural level. While the first are confined within
49 This definition for innovation is going back to Schumpeter (1926, p. 100), who defines economic
development in general as the “implementation of new combinations.” (This quote is translated
from German: “Form und Inhalt der Entwicklung in unserem Sinn ist dann gegeben durch die
Definition: Durchsetzung neuer Kombinationen.”
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the boundaries of one module and do not affect others, the latter are affecting only the
overall structure of the system without necessarily affecting the internal workings of a
module. Obviously both kinds of innovation can occur at the same time, overthrow-
ing the system’s general architecture and the inner workings of its parts, Henderson and
Clark (1990) label these innovations as radical. Figure 2.11 illustrates the different types
of innovations50.
Figure 2.11: A Framework for Defining Innovations.
Source: Adapted from Henderson and Clark (1990).
In this context, it can be assumed that it is the responsibility of the spokes to engage
in innovations on the top half of this matrix. The implicit perception that has so-far
guided the discussion on different benefits for hubs and spokes has been the fact that
organizations are better able to excel in closely defined areas of expertise than if they have
to engage in very diverse endeavors (see Section 2.1.2.3). Therefore, the ongoing modular
innovativeness of spokes improves the overall system through improving its components.
The reason, why the spokes are assumed to be better able to innovate their components
can be seen in the different size of these two types of organizations in the network.
Powell (1998) for example argues that in biotechnology big pharmaceutical companies
are often financing small biotech companies, mostly even start-ups or university spin-
offs. As it has been argued in Section 2.1.2.4, the emerging network in IS development
50 Please be advised of the cautioning note of Henderson and Clark (1990, p. 13) that “the distinctions
between radical, incremental, and architectural innovations are matters of degree. The intention here
is not to defend the boundaries of a particular definition (...). The matrix in [Figure 2.11] is designed
to suggest that a given innovation may be less radical or more architectural, not to suggest that the
world can be neatly divided into four quadrants.”
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is largely following along the same lines. It is based on existing systems of large vendors
that are selectively and deliberately expanded by solutions developed by smaller, highly
specialized partners. Answering the question why this structure is especially suited to
pursue innovation goals, it can be argued that this setup is combining the advantages of
both large vendors and small complementers. The reason why smaller firms are able to
innovate at a higher pace can be seen in the entrepreneurial potential of these smaller
complementers that large vendors can tap into51.
Entrepreneurship and innovation are closely intertwined. Drucker (1994, p. 27) ar-
gues that “innovation is the specific instrument of entrepreneurship.” In a similar vein,
Baumol (2002) states that entrepreneurship is a necessary prerequisite for innovation52.
This perception is based on the definition that Baumol (2002, p. 57) gives for an en-
trepreneur, namely that of a “bold and imaginative deviator from established business
patterns and practices, who constantly seeks the opportunity to introduce new products
and new procedures, to invade new markets, and to create new organizational forms.”
However, as Baumol (2002) also argues, there is no inevitable connection between en-
trepreneurial spirit and innovation. As entrepreneurs are profit-seeking individuals, it
can be expected that they - if facing adverse conditions in an industry - turn their atten-
tion to other fields in which circumstances are better. Another option is that potential
entrepreneurs simply suppress their striving for independence and work as regular em-
ployees in a regular company. Among these adverse conditions is exactly the lack of
well defined responsibilities, clear accountability, and maximum degrees of freedom to
execute that have been described in Section 2.1.2.3 as part of large organizations. In
contrast, these are supposed to be present in the smaller organizations in the IS devel-
51 This, at first glance, seems to contradict common knowledge on the relationship between innovative-
ness and size of organizations given in one of the most influential books on the topic: “The size of
an organization has consistently been found to be positively related to its innovativeness” (Rogers,
2003, p. 409). However, the term innovation is slightly missleading in this quote, as it refers to
the adoption of innovations. The development of innovations, on the contrary, is easier in smaller
structures, as the example of skunkworks shows: “Evidence that the usual bureaucratic structure
of an organization is not very conductive to creating technological innovation is provided by the
important role of skunkworks, the small and often subversive units within a larger organization that
are created in order to pioneer the development of a technological innovation. A skunkworks is an
especially enriched environment that is intended to help a small group of individuals design a new
idea by escaping routine organizational procedures. The R&D workers in a skunkworks are usually
highly selected, given special resources, and work on a crash basis to create an innovation” (Rogers,
2003, p. 149). In the present context, it can thus be assumed that the spokes act as a type of
“external skunkworks.”
52 The work of Baumol (2002) on innovation as driving force for economic growth closely mirrors
other aspects of this study. The following three (of his five) prerequisites for a successful economic
development are of prime relevance: “Oligopolistic competition among large, high-tech business
firms, with innovation as a prime competitive weapon, ensuring continued innovative activities and,
very plausibly, their growth” (p. 4); “productive entrepreneurship encouraged by incentives for
entrepreneurs to devote themselves to productive innovation” (p. 5); and “technology selling and
trading, in other words, firms’ voluntary pursuit of opportunities for profitable dissemination of
innovations” (p. 5, emphasis in original).
70
71
opment network. Thus, this organizational form promises to stimulate entrepreneurial
spirit to maximum performance. This perception is also shared by Miles et al. (2005),
who argue that creating value through innovation, is best achieved by tapping into the
entrepreneurial potential of a network of self-managed firms53.
Interestingly, the increased innovativeness is also mentioned by Gawer and Cusumano
(2002, p. 45) as one of the key arguments for embracing the concept of platform archi-
tecture: “Many more innovations could emerge from a computer industry organized in
layers of specialized firms that created products able to interact through “open” inter-
faces.” In their case study of Intel, they describe how this company explicitly supports
small start-ups - which are called rabbits by Intel - through their venture capital arm in
order to stimulate innovation. Intel also reserves the right to support multiple start-ups
in one specific field. The increased level of competition even further stimulates innova-
tiveness of the complementers. Thus, from a resource-based view54, it can be argued
that the innovative entrepreneurial spirit that prevails in the smaller complementing or-
ganizations is caused to a considerable extent by the environment in these organizations.
This especially since IS development is a very people centric industry, in which not many
tasks can be automated (Pfeffer, 1994). Also, the relation of how the environment is
influencing the innovativeness of an organization is subject to severe causal ambiguity.
Therefore, the large hubs are unable to imitate or substitute this environment, and
thus have to leverage the increased innovativeness of their smaller partners through the
reliance on inter-organizational networks.
In the context of IS development, another point can be assumed to be especially
distinct, since it promises to solve one of the critical pain-points of current systems de-
velopers. Referring to ERP systems, Bingi et al. (1999, p. 8) argue that these systems
are “so complex and vast that it takes several years and millions of dollars to roll [them]
out.” Obviously, it is a crucial factor for a fast-paced industry that works on developing
more and even more innovations at ever increasing speed to put these innovations to
a productive use at the customer. A goal that is not always achieved satisfactory - as
the current discussion on legacy systems shows. These systems are commonly referred
to as those that are used for a very long time - often much longer than has initially
been anticipated. Because of business or technical restrictions these systems often have
not been designed to accommodate far reaching changes. Furthermore, due to func-
tionality that is added to the system, its complexity is constantly increasing, so that
53 The innovativeness especially in developing high-tech is, however, also restrained by the institutional
environment. Only if “firms have legal rights to make, use, or sell technologies,” innovativeness can
bloom (Ziedonis, 2004). With other words, only if the property rights to the technology are clearly
resolved, unconstrained innovativeness will happen. These issues are addressed in the following
section on managerial issues in the network.
54 The notion that this proposition is motivated solely from the resource-based view is not correct. As
the main proponent of Transaction Cost Theory, Williamson (1985) explicitly mentions innovation
as a limit of what large, integrated firms can achieve. He furthermore argues for a hybrid mode -
such as an organizational network - for “joining large and small firms in the innovation process” (p.
158).
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maintenance costs are ever increasing, too (Seacord et al., 2003). However, the inherent
business knowledge in these systems makes them indispensable, so that organizations
often deliberately accept these high maintenance costs, or other adverse effect like ob-
solete hardware, or a large backlog in change requests, rather than switching to another
system (Warren, 1999).
The so-far discussion in this section has shown that the capability of fast-paced inno-
vations is crucial in the IS development field. As has been noted, constant innovation is
one of the defining characteristics of IS development. It has also been noted that a faster
development is also at the heart of modular product development (see Section 2.1.2.2).
Thus, one of the crucial reasons for adopting an inter-organizational IS development
process is the fact that the systems can be deployed faster in this fashion (Takeuchi
and Nonaka, 1986). This aspect is addressed in Brooks (1982) and his discussion of
very large software development projects. As has been identified there, the ability to
reduce the time to market of software projects crucially depends on the partitioning of
the project into subtasks. While this issue has been a prime inhibitor for such a develop-
ment style in past projects, this is exactly addressed by SOA (see Section 2.1.2.4). The
main system is provided by the large vendor and additional components are supplied
by smaller partners. As the involved parties are able to work on their specific solution
(main system or additional component) in parallel, those IS that are designed through
such a cooperative network promise to develop faster than those designed in a monolithic
fashion. This reduction of the time to market for the additional components is especially
distinct, when the main system has already been introduced55.
This perception is based to a large extent on the discussion of the advantages of loosely
coupled systems (see Section 2.1.2.1). Monolithic systems have to be replaced in an all-
or-nothing approach. Due to its high degree of internal integration, it is impossible to
simply update or replace parts of the system. This is also one of the prime reasons why
so many legacy systems are still used today. There is simply no one willing to tackle
the costs and risks of replacing an entire system, one that is successfully running for
decades besides that. Contrary to this, a modular IS can be acquired and assembled,
or updated and replaced in a step-wise fashion (Kumar and van Hillegersberg, 2000).
Since interfaces are dynamically created, components can be added or replaced without
significant impact on the rest of the system. Thus, innovations that have been devel-
oped by complementers (see above) do not have to be held back until an update to the
overall system can be made (Sanchez and Mahoney, 2001, p. 161). Furthermore, teams
of specialists can work independently of each other on these loosely coupled projects,
and thus apply their distinct competencies where they are needed most. This results
in multiple smaller update projects that can be executed in parallel whenever neces-
sary. Therefore the following proposition relating to the hubs objective to leverage the
(modular) innovative potential of spokes is suggested:
55 As the resource-based discussion above has shown, it has to be assumed that the initial deployment
of the platform is still a rather large, complex, and therefore long-term project.
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Proposition IH. Large IS producers (hubs) are partnering with smaller soft-
ware producers (spokes) in order to gain access to their capability both to
develop and to deploy modular innovations.
In contrast to the spokes, whose responsibility has been defined as the upper half
of the matrix illustrated in Figure 2.11, it can be assumed that it is the responsibility
of the hubs to engage in innovations on the bottom half of the matrix56. For this
reason, which are similar to those mentioned as technical benefits for providing the
system, it can be assumed that these architectural innovations are best addressed by
the hubs. This especially since these innovations are, contrary to those of the spokes,
not confined to narrowly circumscribed components. Therefore, these also require the
holistic view on the entire system - this time even going explicitly beyond the boundaries
of what is developed by the hub. In this context, it is argued that especially hub
organizations have this holistic perspective on the entire system. This perspective is
- according to the resource-based view - again difficult to build (e.g. through mass
efficiencies or interconnectedness of the involved knowledge). Consequently, the second
proposition of this part of the study is addressing the objective of the spokes to utilize
the (architectural) innovative potential of the spokes:
Proposition IS. Small software producers (spokes) are partnering with large
IS producers (hubs) in order to gain access to their capability both to develop
and to deploy architectural innovations.
However, as it has been discussed as an idiosyncrasy of IS development (see Section
2.1.1.3), constant innovation is occurring parallel at the architectural and the component
level. Thus, the overall situation of the IS development industry can be characterized as
being subject to radical innovation. However, the specificity of this radical innovation in
its here described context is its inter-organizational nature. Rather than being confined
to a single organization, innovations depend on each other in order to realize their full
potential. Historically, many periods of fast-paced technical progress can be explained
through such a process of collective innovation across the boundaries of single firms. The
discussion by Allen (1983) on the nineteenth-century steel industry in England can be
considered one early example. However there are also more recent ones. For example,
Tushman and Anderson (1986) discuss the cement, microcomputer and glass industries
and Powell (1998) again focuses on biotechnology. All these studies conclude that in-
terfirm cooperation - often through informal ties between specialists in the industry -
contributes to an accelerated overall development of the industry.
56 Obviously hubs also constantly have to innovate the basic functionalities that their existing system
provides. For examples legislative changes require a constant updating of the modules that represent
the core business functions in the enterprise IS. Thus, they are also engaged in incremental innovation
to a considerable extent.
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This has been the discussion on different types of innovativeness as a key capability
of hubs and spokes in the inter-organizationally structured IS development industry.
Parallel to this innovativeness, other aspects have been identified as being of prime
importance for the emergence of such a structure. The next section addresses access to
different technologies as one of them.
2.2.3.2 Technology Benefits
The argument that an increased specialization leads to a higher quality of the produced
system stems right from the heart of the resource-based view. However, before under-
standing why such a network of specialized IS development organizations is supposed
to be able to produce higher-quality solutions, it is important to discuss what exactly
constitutes a high quality IS. As it has already been hinted upon at various instances,
the assessment of IS quality is difficult. Therefore, a brief delimitation of the scope of
this discussion is appropriate. Obviously, the spending (of a client organization) on IS
is in no way different from spending in any other field, the goal of it being an increased
performance of this client organization. Thus, one could argue that a high quality IS
is one that has an immediate (preferably positive) effect on the adopting organization’s
productivity. However, as it has been discussed in Section 2.1.2.4, research on the IT
productivity paradox has doubted the direct relation between spending in IT (in general,
not limited to IS!) and firm productivity (Brynjolfsson, 1993). The recent attempt to
open this black box between IT spending and firm performance is also well-known in
IS literature. In this context, DeLone and McLean (1992, p. 61) state that “the infor-
mation system creates information which is communicated to the recipient who is then
influenced (or not!) by the information.” Since this work focuses on the development
of IS, the later stages of the use and the ultimate impact of these systems cannot be
considered anymore. The focus of IS quality is depicted through the shaded area in
Figure 2.1257.
In this context DeLone and McLean (1992) understand service quality as the quality
of the services that the IS department is delivering to the end-users. As this factor is
only very indirectly related with a standardized enterprise IS that is developed by an
external party, this dimension is not further considered here. In contrast, system quality
encompasses such factors as reliability or efficiency of the system, but also accuracy or
currency of the data used in the system. Information quality in contrast refers for exam-
ple to the importance, relevance, or usefulness of the provided information. Referring
to the distinction between the software of an IS and the knowledge embedded in that
software (see Section 2.1.1.1), it can be argued that the first dimension largely covers the
57 See DeLone and McLean (1992, p. 87) for the original IS Success Model.
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Figure 2.12: The Updated IS Success Model.
Source: Based on DeLone and McLean (2003, p. 24).
quality of the software while the second covers the quality of the embedded knowledge58.
The difference between these two concepts is one that Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 11)
labels as efficiency vs. effectiveness. The first refers to an internal assessment mea-
suring how well something is done; the latter is an external assessment measuring how
well demands are met. These two aspects are also recognized as fundamental building
blocks of software quality. Gillies (1992, p. 7) states that the two core questions that
determine whether a software is of high quality are: “Is it a good solution?” and “Does
it address the right problem?” The impact that a modular IS development industry that
is consisting of various highly specialized companies can have on those two aspects is
discussed subsequently.
Especially when considering errors in software, it becomes obvious that the quality
of the software is crucially dependent on the expertise of the developer responsible for
it. O’Brien and Marakas (2006, p. 414) report that “independent audits have found
errors in as many as 30 percent of the spreadsheet models” that have been developed
by users. While often these errors have minor effects, O’Brien and Marakas (2006, p.
414) also discuss the example of a multi-million dollar loss due to one of these errors.
Furthermore, it has to be noted that errors are not confined to user-developed solutions.
Experienced programmers produce code which contains errors in three to seven percent
of all lines of this code. Even with professional debugging procedures this ratio can
58 The above made assessment that these two factors are in the (sole) responsibility of the IS developer(s)
is not entirely true. Especially the information quality of a running system is to a large extent
dependent on the users of the system. See for example the concept of information orientation as
discussed in Marchand et al. (2000, 2001).
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be reduced to no less than one or two errors per thousand lines of code (O’Brien and
Marakas, 2006, p. 414). What is even more important is that the errors made by
professional programmers are often not the prevalent technical errors made by users
when developing spreadsheets. Rather, logical errors are made, because programmers
are lacking the non-technical business know-how necessary to implement highly specific
solutions59. In contrast to technical errors, these logical errors are often much harder to
detect. Since they also do not result from technical inability, as most of the errors made
by users, but rather from missing know-how of the specific problem, consequences from
these kinds of errors are potentially much more severe.
However, the above conducted discussion of differences in errors per line of code writ-
ten by a regular user, an experienced programmer, and those controlled through sophis-
ticated debugging procedures already indicates that errors in the code do not have to
be accepted without possible countermeasures. First, sophisticated quality management
principles can be applied in the software development process60 (Wieczorek and Meyer-
hoff, 2001). However, albeit these quality management tools can result in reduced error
proneness of developed software, the measures are far from perfect. Especially when it
come to the above discussed errors in the logic of a piece of software even highly sophis-
ticated instruments cannot easily detect them. The reason for this can again be seen
in the fact that IS are an intellectual rather than an industrial technology (see Section
2.1.1.3). Since intellectual technologies are exactly not constraint by physical aspects,
but only by the imagination of their users, they can be used “in virtually unlimited
ways to solve problems or organize information” (Curley and Pyburn, 1982, p. 33).
However, due to the fact that there are unlimited ways to use an intellectual technology
in combination with the missing physical specificities that would allow for an objective
measurement of results, an assessment of the quality of the system is very difficult. For
an industrial technology, say a machine that produces a certain workpiece, assessing its
quality is rather easy. It can be measured how fast, how accurate, or how reliable a
workpiece is produced. For logical errors in an intellectual technology this easy assess-
ment is not possible. This fact is even intensified as these intellectual technologies are
subject to frequent change (see Section 2.1.1.3).
Therefore, software development often relies on a concept taken from another disci-
pline that is producing intellectual outputs - academic research. Since research is similar
to software development in that it is very complex and involves highly specialized knowl-
59 This again refers to the differentiation between efficiency and effectiveness (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978, p. 11). So the technically ingenuous user of a spreadsheet software is knowing very well what
he is trying to achieve. However, he does not know how to achieve it correctly. Contrary to this,
the professional programmers knows very well how to implement a certain functionality. However,
he does not know what exactly the functionality is. In this context the fact that developers are users
and users are developers is often cited as on of the advantages of open source software.
60 A good example for one of those principles is also the concept of six sigma that has been developed
in the automobile industry and is currently transferred into IS development (Biehl, 2004; Tayntor,
2002).
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edge, the best way to assess the quality of it, is through the opinions of other experts
in the specific field. Thus, before accepting a scientific paper for publication or spon-
soring a scientific project, the opinion of other researchers is obtained by the publishing
or funding entity. Only if these assessments certify the quality of the proposal, it is
accepted for publication or funding. This concept is commonly labeled as peer review.
Similar to the academic concept, peer review in the software development requires one
expert programmer to check the code written by another. Thus, a logical error made
by the first programmer can be detected through the critical assessment of the second.
Especially when it comes to logical errors, this still is the best method for error detection
in the software development process61 (Paulk, 2001; Williams et al., 2000). The fact that
error fixing is becoming more expensive the further a project has proceeded62 is also the
reason why many modern programming methodologies rely on active peer review during
the early phases of the development process. Thus, one of the pillars of extreme program-
ming is pair programming, the fact that code is developed not by a single programmer
but at least two of them (Beck and Andres, 2004; Williams et al., 2000).
As this discussion on the assessment of the quality of software has shown, the best way
to develop a high quality IS (component) is through the involvement of multiple, highly
focused experts early on. However, in order to achieve this goal the involved experts have
to be both able and willing to contribute to the project (Feller and Fitzgerald, 2000).
This is especially true for the development of highly specialized solutions. It is now the
crucial argument of this section, that both aspects are more pronounced in the highly
specialized complementing organizations of an IS development network than in the large
central vendor. This has two reasons. First, the fact that these complementers focus -
and focused in the past - on highly specific niche markets makes it easier for them to
stay abreast of the developments in this field. Going back to the concepts of time com-
pression diseconomies, interconnectedness of assets stocks, and causal ambiguity from
the resource-based view it has to be argued that the skills necessary to compete in these
well defined fields cannot be easily obtained from neither other spokes, not the hub.
Thus, for such a specific field, knowledge-accessing networks in the sense of Grant and
Baden-Fuller (2004) are the best way to utilize these resources. Furthermore, the smaller
size of these partner organizations is also expected to be lead to more intense exchange
relations between employees of the complementers. This results in an increased willing-
ness to dwell on details of each others’ code in order to eliminate errors63. Therefore,
61 This is also reflected in the discussion on the quality of open source software. Proponents of open
source software argue that it tends to be of higher quality (at least for the large projects) because
so many people can access the source code and thus find errors. Raymond (1999) comments on
this with his famous quote: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” Glass (2003) however,
counters this argument with the observation that more than two to four peers reviewing the code do
not result in better quality.
62 Davis (1995) reports that fixing an error that is detected in the finished software is forty times more
expensive than one that is detected during the conceptual design phase of a software project.
63 North (1991) for example notes that opportunistic behavior prevails only if there is a large number
of individuals involved.
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one of the hub’s objectives for adopting a strategy of cooperative growth through inter-
organizational networks is the accessing of these superior components that are developed
by spokes. With consideration of the alignment of the resources it is furthermore argued
that these components can be either supplementing (e.g. offering a similar, yet superior
functionality) or complementing (offering a different functionality). This is reflected in
the first proposition on technological benefits:
Proposition TH . Large IS producers (hubs) are partnering with smaller soft-
ware producers (spokes) in order to gain access to narrowly specialized soft-
ware components that either supplement or complement their own solutions.
However, as it has been argued above, the participants in the IS Development network
are independent organizations that voluntarily join the network. Thus, while the above
given proposition argues why the large hubs join or even foster such a network, it does
not offer any insights on the question why the smaller spokes do so. A first attempt to
answer this question has to take into account the current situation of the IS development
industry. As it has been noted in the introduction to this work, two highly interrelated
trends have been dominating this industry during the last decades: The first trend has
been the emergence of the ERP systems that include more and more functionality. As
a logical consequence of these newly developed systems, an immense tendency towards
highly consolidated structures has been observable in the industry (Campbell-Kelly,
2003). This last trend has been so strong, that currently IS development is in the hand
of only a few global players (Farhoomand, 2006).
This availability of an integrated IS has to be considered the key technological resource
of the hub organizations. Similar to the ability to develop high quality, niche solutions of
the spokes, this ability has been built through several of the mechanisms that have been
described in the theoretical discussion above. Thus, copying it would involve foremost
the availability of such an integrated system, which has been developed by the current
incumbents over decades. From a resource-based view, developing such a system is far
from easy. It requires time and a certain aggregation of assets, foremost knowledge.
Furthermore, since the system is an internally highly intertwined software, these assets
have to build upon each other. Finally, it is questionable whether all these assets together
enable an aspiring system architect64 to really construct such a platform, or whether
the emergence of the current players has happened due to, for example, specific historic
circumstances. Taken together, all these aspects neatly describe what Dierickx and Cool
(1989) and Barney (1991) offer as antecedents for sustained competitive advantage65.
Thus, the fact that the hubs already have developed such an integrated system that
64 Gawer and Cusumano (2002) strikingly call them platform wannabes.
65 This should not be taken as an argument that currently dominating players in the IS development
industry will dominate forever. This has already been discussed on the basis of the following quote
taken from Barney (1991, p. 103): “That a competitive advantage is sustained does not imply that
it will “last forever.” It only suggests that it will not be competed away through the duplication
efforts of other firms. Unanticipated changes in the economic structure of an industry may make
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readily available includes most of the basic functionality that a customer needs promises
to be the key driver for participation in the network by spokes. Thus, the second
proposition in the area of technological benefits is the following:
Proposition TS. Small software producers (spokes) are partnering with large
IS producers (hubs) in order to gain access to their broadly established tech-
nology base.
The here discussed benefit category that drive the organizations in the IS develop-
ment industry towards adopting a networked structure has emerged inherently from the
fact that the hubs and the spokes of this network have access to different types of tech-
nologies, either those already existent, or those currently under development. However,
considerable benefits emerge from a third aspect in this relationship. The following
section addresses the access to specific customer markets as the final broad category of
benefits.
2.2.3.3 Market Benefits
The final, and again closely related, aspect that is promising to be a prime reason for
both hubs and spokes to participate in such an inter-organizational network is the abil-
ity to address novel markets. The existing enterprise IS have been developed out of the
striving for a “seamless integration of all the information flowing through a company”
(Davenport, 1998, p. 121) and their deployment is therefore a large, highly complex,
and long-term project (Bingi et al., 1999). This indicates that two assumptions have to
be made about the organizations that use these systems: They have to show consider-
able intensity and complexity in their information flows, and they need the resources
(financial and other) to tackle such a large project (Bingi et al., 1999). Both aspects are
present mainly in large, often globally acting corporations, which have therefore been
the traditional market for large IS vendors (Piturro, 1999). However, recently the mar-
ket became more and more saturated - most large corporations either already possess
various enterprise IS, or deliberately decided against implementing one (von Everdingen
et al., 2000; Farhoomand, 2006). Therefore, the vendors of these systems have to address
new markets in order to sustain the growth rates they achieved in the past.
what was, at one time, a source of sustained competitive advantage, no longer valuable for a firm, and
thus not a source of any competitive advantage.” In the computer industry in general, such changes
have been repeatedly observed, the most prominent being the shift from mainframe computers to
personal computers that dispossessed IBM of its dominating market position (Baldwin and Clark,
2000). However, in the context of this work it can be argued that the emergence of SOA is not such
a radical innovation Henderson and Clark (1990), mainly because most of the used Web Services are
not created from scratch, but rather carved out from existing applications (Holland, 2002), which
are those of the dominating players.
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The platform architecture that is currently emerging promises to be ideal for this ad-
dressing of new markets. As has already been discussed, first at a general level as part of
the hub-and-spoke architecture, and then again in the preceding section on technological
benefits, in this architecture the general functionality is embedded in the platform, while
specialized functionalities are provided by complementers (Morris and Ferguson, 1993).
Since, as it has been argued above, the smaller complementers can be more efficient in
developing their well-defined solution, they do not necessarily need the number of sales
that the large vendor would require to recover the costs of developing such a solution
(this is already discussed above as a result of the ability to more effectively produce com-
ponents). Consequently, complementers can address narrower markets than the large
vendor would be able to66. Organizations that have special needs, and have therefore up
to not been in the focus of (standardized) IS developers, can now utilize the combination
of general functionalities of the platform and specialized functionalities provided by indi-
vidual solutions. This type of development is right at the heart of the dialectical blurring
of the line between thesis and antithesis of individually tailored and standardized sys-
tems (Sommerville, 2004, p. 6) that has been one of the key motivators for this work (see
Sections 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.3.1). The platform takes advantage of the mass-marketability of
a standardized system, while the specialized components take advantage of the individ-
ualized solution quality of bespoke systems (Sprott, 2000). Together, both are a highly
attractive solution for customers that have so far not been addressed by (standardized)
IS. Considering the fact that large IS vendors are selling their systems to diverse cus-
tomers worldwide, there are still ample opportunities to improve the systems’ adequacy
for specific customer requirements. Soh et al. (2000) give three types of potential misfits
that very well illustrate this room for improvement: Country-specific and company- or
industry-specific misfits. These are addressed subsequently.
Under the label of country-specific misfits especially cultural aspects are of prime
importance Soh et al. (2000). Liang et al. (2004) for example argue that, although the
world wide ERP market is dominated by a hand full of global players, these do not hold
a significant market share in China. The reason for this lies mainly in the fact that stan-
dardized IS do not meet the country specific requirements of this region. Consequently,
66 Obviously, market access is important for all players in the IS development industry. While needing
customers is a necessity for all firms in all industries, this is especially true for those in IS development,
as IS are inherently information goods, which are subject to the first-copy effect (see Section 2.1.1.3).
Thus, developing a component of an IS - which consists of the software and the know-how embedded
in it (see Section 2.1.1.1) - involves high start-up costs. Once the embedded knowledge is available
and/or the software is written, reusing it is much cheaper - almost zero for the written code, but
also significantly lower for the available knowledge (Cusumano, 2004). Therefore, companies in the
IS business need a considerable number of sales for their component to break even. Messerschmitt
and Szypersik (2000, p. 50) argue, that “a rule of thumb is that a reusable piece of software needs
to be used at least three times to break even.” However, as it has been argued above, smaller, more
focused IS developers are able to be more efficient in developing their solutions. Thus, these highly
focused and efficient niche players also need a lower number of sales. It has to be mentioned that
this is still definitely more than one sale, which would make the system an individually tailored one.
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the Chinese market is largely in the hand of Chinese companies. In order to overcome
this handicap, Liang et al. (2004, p. 71) “emphasize the need for localizing strategies,
even for the global ERP leaders.” Wang et al. (2006) also elaborate on the Asian con-
text and conclude that besides culture, also other nation-specific aspects such as legal
or procedural differences are important. This is also addressed by Martinsons (2004)
who argues that, especially in China, the differences between state-owned enterprises
and private ventures have an enormous impact on the requirements of enterprise IS. So,
while the Chinese market is probably attractive enough to eventually convince global
IS developers that local adaptations are a worthwhile endeavor, there are also various
smaller regional markets, especially where the administration is federally organized, in
which such a regional adaptation is not promising enough for the large hub organization.
The other aspect that large IS vendors hope to address through the adoption of
modularized development is that of company- and industry-specific misfits. One of
the prime examples for this type of misfits are the specific needs of small and medium-
sized enterprises67 (SMEs). The traditionally all-or-nothing approach of IS deployment
has discouraged many smaller enterprise to implement one of these systems. Often
these enterprises are in a special situation termed resource poverty by Welsh and White
(1981). That is, they possess just enough resources to run the day-to-day operations
and any unsuccessful deployment of a significant share of these resources would lead
to catastrophic results. Considering the already discussed efforts in time and money
required for an enterprise IS implementation project, many smaller organizations simply
shy from devoting substantial resources to a project which allows them to gain access to
a set of functionalities which they, at least to a large extent, cannot even fully utilize due
to general under-computerization of SMEs (Iacovou et al., 1995). Rather than deploying
a quality system, they choose to implement low-cost systems, which often also do not
meet their requirements and therefore tend to make matters even worse (Thong, 2001).
Thus, large enterprise IS vendors have only recently been able to break into this new
market to some extent (von Everdingen et al., 2000). The main reason for this can
be seen in the adoption of a modularized IS development approach, which allows for
the addition of third-party components specifically tailored to SMEs (Kumar and van
Hillegersberg, 2000). Especially important for this discussion is the finding of recent
studies that the SME market is far from homogeneous. Rather, medium-size companies
are more similar to larger ones than to very small ones - at least when it comes to
adopting large enterprise IS (Laukkanen et al., 2005). So, for very small organizations
large enterprise IS like ERP are - even if they are modularized - still oversized. However,
especially medium-size enterprises now have to opportunity to pick those parts of the
system that they really need - and leave the rest.
67 The market of SMEs is address exemplarily, because it is a potentially very big market and thus is
currently in the focus of research on this topic. Other ones, like government agencies (Fuggetta, 2003),
exist and have already been mentioned. However, due to the small number of potential customers in
these segments there is much less coverage in the literature.
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Obviously both aspects closely interact with each other. It can be assumed that most
customers do not deploy the platform in its entirety, but rather choose those components
that best match their needs. Wherever these components are not available from the
platform vendor, customers can either purchase them from independent third parties,
or they can develop them themselves. This flexibility for customers is assumed to be a
key factor in cultivating new markets that have not been addressed so far - either due
to their special needs, or because the organization did not possess enough resources to
handle a project of such size.
Furthermore, it has to be noted that especially in the context of IS markets, the
relationship between supplier and customer is of prime importance68. Somers and Nelson
(2004, p. 260) for example argue that, “as a better fit between the software vendor and
user-organization is positively associated with packaged software implementation success
(...), vendor-customer partnerships are important to successful ERP projects.” Butler
(1999) goes even one step further and argues that users of these systems should form
a strategic relationship with their developers in order to benefit from seamless future
interaction. The reason for this can again be seen in the fact that IS are experience
goods (see Section 2.1.1.3). As the customer to a considerable extent depends on the
recommendations of the developer, a good relationship between them is imperative for
success. As these relationships require considerable time to emerge (Kumar et al., 1998),
as they are causal ambiguous and socially complex in that they depend on the people
involved in the relationship, these also classify for being a key resource of spokes that the
hub attempts to access. Therefore, the following proposition summarizes this market
objective from the hubs’ perspective:
Proposition MH . Large IS producers (hubs) are partnering with smaller
software producers (spokes) in order to extend their market reach through
accessing their narrowly specialized markets.
While the similarity between technological and market benefits has been undeniable
for the hubs’ perspective, this similarity is even more distinct for the spokes’ perspective.
As it has been argued throughout this study, the integration of different systems (com-
ponents) is a key requirement for modern IS (Mertens, 2005). Especially the seamless
integration of the entire information flows within an organization has been the differen-
tiating factor that made ERP systems such a success story during the last two decades
(Davenport, 1998). Thus, it can be argued that the solutions provided by the spokes
in the IS development network have to be seamlessly integrated into the system land-
scape of a client organization, which is currently dominated by the large ERP systems.
As it has been argued above, the smaller spokes do exactly not possess the resources
68 This should not be mistaken for Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems, which help
organizations to improve the relationship they have with their customers. Rather, the emphasis here
is the relationship between the organization that is developing the system and the organization that
is using it.
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necessary to develop such a large and complex system. Thus, in the oligopolistic in-
dustry of IS development, which is characterized by few large players dominating the
market (Farhoomand, 2006), the market entry of spokes crucially depends on the inter-
operability of their solution with the existing large systems developed by the hubs.
This dependence on market entry has also another aspect, that of maintaining an
existing system. Since most of these systems are intended to be used for years if not
decades (Warren, 1999, p. 1), maintenance of the system is a crucial part of the software
lifecycle: “A number of surveys over the past 15 years have also shown that for most
software, software maintenance occupies anything between 40% and 90% of total life
cycle cost” (Bennet, 1996, p. 674). Software maintenance is very important due to the
continuous innovation that IS are subject to (see Section 2.1.2.2). Especially since much
“vital business knowledge (...) is embedded in many old systems” (Warren, 1999, p.
ix), so that their replacement would be even more costly than their maintenance. This
also indicates that maintaining such a system is an ongoing process. However, this also
denotes that this ongoing process would stop if the organization that has been develop-
ing the system ceases to exist. As such a developing organization is dissolved when a
company becomes insolvent, and most of the knowledge embedded in this organization
is therefore lost, many customers avoid buying systems (components) from small com-
panies, since it is assumed that these are especially vulnerable. Thus, the fact that a
hub organization, with their successful history and sheer size, partners with a smaller
software vendor can be assumed to increase - in the eye of the customer - the reliability
of this smaller software vendor. These aspects promise to be a key objective for the
spokes to participate in such an IS development network:
Proposition MS. Small software producers (spokes) are partnering with large
IS producers (hubs) in order to extend their market reach through accessing
their broadly established markets.
This future orientation also hints upon the first proposed benefit for an inter-organiza-
tionally networked structure in the IS development industry. Both technology- and
market-benefits are largely based on resources that the different participants in the net-
work possess. However, as has been discussed under the heading of dynamic capabilities,
it is especially important how these resources can be adapted over time. While efficiently
and effectively developed systems guarantee a high degree of as-is utility, many system
quality models also incorporate a future oriented dimension. Most of these models that
measure system quality are hierarchical. That is, they possess a set of quality categories,
which in turn consist of several subcategories, and so on69. Among the most well es-
tablished hierarchical system quality models is that of Boehm et al. (1978), who argue
for a quality assessment on the basis of the two high-level dimensions of how useful
the system currently is, and how well it is able to accommodate to future changes. As
has been mentioned, it is an idiosyncrasy of IS that they are undergoing a continuous
69 This is true for most complex systems, see Section 2.1.2.1.
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adaptation process. Thus, innovating the components that constitute such a system is
an inherent necessity of IS. This ability of the networked IS development industry to
constantly innovate the system has been addressed before.
2.2.4 Summary
The preceding theoretical discussion has evolved around the first research objective of
why IS developing organizations are adopting a cooperative growth strategy. As the
underlying theoretical perspective on this issue has been that of the resource-based
view, it has been argued that especially those resources or capabilities of organizations
are of prime importance that are difficult for others to imitate. The discussion has thus
focused on benefits of the inter-organizational approach in the IS development industry
and has yielded the insight that three broad categories of benefits promise to be relevant
in this context. As the proposed structure for this industry is that of a hub-and-spoke
network, these three categories of benefits have been discussed with regard to the two
roles that can be found in this type of network.
First, innovativeness has been considered a key capability. Large IS producers partner
because they can leverage the innovativeness of smaller partners in specific, well-defined
areas. Small organizations partner, because they in turn can leverage the ability of the
large hubs to innovate the entire architecture. Second, from a technological perspective
it has been argued that large software developers partner with small ones, because these
possess the ability to develop superior software components in narrowly defined areas
of expertise. Contrary to this, the ability to access the existing technology base of the
large organizations has been proposed to be key for the smaller partners. Finally, from
a market perspective, hubs partner with spokes, because these possess superior skills
in addressing specific niche markets. Again contrary to this, small spokes partner with
hubs because these have a large installed base that represents a large potential market
for the spokes. However, it has also been mentioned at various instances that - at least
in the context of IS development - these categories are not mutually exclusive. Rather,
each category seems to influence the other two in some way or another. To exactly define
these inter-relationships is thus a further, implicit goal of this study. A comparison of
these propositions is illustrated in Table 2.1.
While these benefits are motivating IS development organizations to participate in
industry networks, the realization of these benefits is by no means an automatism.
Rather, it is dependent on a deliberate management of the relations between partici-
pating organizations in the network. Therefore, after a brief summary of the benefits
of inter-organizational networks in the IS development industry, the next part of this
chapter therefore discusses difficulties that arise from the inter-organizational IS develop-
ment process, their underlying assumptions, theoretical foundations, but also proposed
remedies. Again, this discussion focuses on both hubs and spokes, which are conjointly
responsible for the success of the overall network (Das and Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1996; Lavie, 2006; Powell et al., 1996).
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Capability / Resource Hub Perspective Spoke Perspective
Category
Innovation Accessing the capability Accessing the capability
to develop and deploy to develop and deploy
modular innovations. architectural innovations.
Technology Accessing narrowly Accessing a broadly
specialized technologies, established technology
either complementary or base.
supplementary.
Market Expanding market reach Expanding market reach
through accessing narrowly through accessing broadly
specialized markets. established markets.
Table 2.1: A Comparison of the Benefits of Hubs and Spokes.
Source: Own Assertion.
2.3 Explaining the Management of Inter-Organizational
Networks
The last section has been discussing the (inter-organizational) division of labor, with
special focus on what resources or capabilities should be located at which organiza-
tion in order to make them first of all attractive for participating in such an inter-
organizational network, but also preparing the network to be an attractive structure for
the IS development industry. As the introductory discussion on fundamental functions
of organizational structure (in Section 2.2) has shown, once such a inter-organizational
division of labor is achieved (i.e. a network has emerged) all participants have to in-
teract in conjointly managing the new structure in some way (Malone and Crowstone,
1994; Mintzberg, 1979b) in order to realize these potential benefits. As this management
is obviously a costly endeavor, a closer analysis of these costs is necessary in order to
ensure that they do not offset the above discussed benefits that can be realized through
joining a network. Thus, this section focuses on the second research objective, to ana-
lyze how such a network can and should be managed. In order to answer this question,
first an analysis what exactly causes this need for active management is conducted. As
it has been convincingly argued, management of such a network is facing two distinct
difficulties: those that emerge from the partners’ behavior and those that emerge from
the inherent complexities of the separation of task70 (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati,
1998).
70 Obviously, these two types of issues are highly inter-connected. Nevertheless, the underlying foun-
dations for each set of issues are different. For this reason, it has been decided to address these
underlying foundations in separate sections.
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The first of these two issues is mainly based on the interaction of two (or more) eco-
nomically and legally independent entities. As behavioral uncertainty is supposed to be
pervasive in such relationships between organizations, these merit careful management.
In order to distill potential management practices for networks, the first part of this sec-
tion introduces behavioral assumptions that are fundamental for all kinds of interactions
between independent organizations. Based on these assumptions, then fundamental the-
ories that have been used to better understand this type of relationship are introduced.
This understanding of theoretical implications is proposed to be imperative for distilling
the issues that organizations in this context face, and furthermore to develop counter
measures that allow these organizations to successfully manage these relationships with
the minimal effort possible.
Besides these difficulties that stem mainly from behavioral issues, there are also those
challenges that arise from the inherent complexities of an inter-organizational network,
which are not related to behavioral issues. As the participating partners conjointly de-
velop one integrative system, the different parts of the system have to interact with each
other71. Since these interdependencies between the different components result in inter-
organizational interdependencies, their management constitutes a key challenge in the
network. Again, this coordination between various interdependent entities has received
considerable attention in the field of organizational science. Therefore this discussion
highlights various approaches on how these interdependencies within the network can
be managed.
Interestingly, the proposed management approaches for both types of issues seem to
be closely mirroring each other. Thus, in a final step, potential ways and means on how
to address these issues are developed from this theoretical elaboration. The final part
of this section also relates these proposed management mechanisms explicitly to the IS
development context. Here again groundwork has already been laid in the vast body of
literature on the topic. Thus, these underpinnings of how to manage these behavioral
and inter-dependence issues are discussed in due depth and, similar to the proceeding
of the last section, again rough propositions are formulated that are used to guide the
empirical part of this study.
2.3.1 Behavioral Issues in Inter-Organizational Networks
The discussion of this first broad category of management concerns is to a large extent
focusing on behavioral issues in inter-firm relationships. It is based on the underly-
ing assumptions of conflicting goals and the willingness to implement them against the
partners’ will in combination with the inability of partners to detect this kind of be-
havior. The combination of these two assumptions leads to serious difficulties in the
relationship. Consequently, as a first step these underlying assumptions are briefly in-
71 Please refer to the dialectical perspective of loose coupling in Section 2.1.2.1. From this perspective,
subsystems of loosely coupled systems are characterized by the coexistence of distinctiveness and
responsiveness.
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troduced. There are several theories that are based on these assumptions, which are
then discussed in due depth. The first of these theories, transaction cost economics,
explicitly analyzes causes of costs that incur when transactions are carried out through
different inter-organizational governance structures. These causes are also assumed to
be of prime importance for the context of this study. Similar, agency theory addresses
relations between a principal that delegates work and an agent that executes it. Stem-
ming from the separation of ownership and control in modern organizations, this theory
has been augmented to various, among them also inter-organizational contexts. Building
on this, the perspective of property rights addresses these issues through emphasizing
the perspective of a group (such as a firm on an individual level, but also a network on
an organizational one) as a coalition of independent resource owners that temporarily
cooperate. This view is complemented through the discussion of incomplete contracts
that are used to explain long-term relations in such groups. Similar to the approach
of the last section, these discussions so far do not relate to the specific IS development
context. Rather, this section is intended to discuss the underlying theories in their pure
form. The connections with the research context are then introduced in the last part of
this chapter.
2.3.1.1 Underlying Assumptions of Behavioral Issues
Before discussing the proposed theories, a brief introduction to the history or background
of these theories is appropriate. They all can be classified as belonging to the group of
so-called theories of the firm. These theories72 address questions like “why do firms
exist?” or, in this context probably more important, “what factors determine the scope
and size of the firm?” (Seth and Thomas, 1994, p. 166). The various theories from this
field have developed in highly diverse directions. Yet, the underlying origin of theories
addressing these questions is usually given as neoclassic economies.
The main focus of neoclassical economic concepts is on explaining market prices.
Consequently, the level of analysis is an industry rather than the individual firms that
constitute this industry. The firms are perceived as pure production function through
which input factors - such as labor and capital - are transformed into output factors - such
as different goods and services - through some underlying technology. Consequently, the
firm itself is treated as a black box - its inner workings are of no concern for neoclassical
theories of the firm. This also implies that firms are perceived to be speaking with one
voice, there is no internal conflict on how a firm is supposed to act, a firm is thus equal
72 The notion of theories of the firm already indicates that “there are a multitude of theories of the
firm, and this naturally invites one to ask whether there is any way of distinguishing between the
various theories” (Sawyer, 1979, p. 5). Especially the facts that theories often do not serve the same
purpose, and that theories often relate to particular situations foredoom any attempt to conduct a
exhaustive taxonomy of the theories of the firm. Why the here discussed theories have been selected
is explained below.
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to an individual. Furthermore, the neoclassical firm is assumed to interact in a perfectly
transparent world (Richter and Bindseil, 1995). A firm is perceived to be an economic
man, who
is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment
which, if not absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and volu-
minous. He is assumed also to have a well-organized and stable system of
preferences, and a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, for
the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these
will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale
(Simon, 1955, p. 99).
The goal of profit maximization of firms is largely based on these two assumptions,
which can be traced back to the intention of neoclassical theories of the firm to predict
rather than explain. As Machlup (1967, p. 9) notes: “In this causal connection, the
firm is only a theoretical link, a mental construct helping to explain how one gets from
the cause to the effect. This is altogether different from explaining the behavior of a
firm.” However, this predictive nature has caused some severe criticism. Cyert and
March (1992, p. 8) for example, summarize this criticism very bluntly when they state
that “to some economists it has seemed implausible that a theory of an organization
can ignore the fact that it is one.” Thus, since explaining the inner working of firms
can be considered a key motive for various scientific disciplines, opening this black box
has received considerable attention. As a first step, a two-dimensional framework of
underlying assumptions has been established that explains differences between actual
behavior and that proposed for economic man (Williamson, 1985).
The first dimension is that of rationality. As has been argued above, neoclassical the-
ories assume that firms are objectively rational73 in following their clearly defined goals.
However, in reality severe obstructions exist, that render this assumption inappropriate
for a realistic treatment of any organizational behavior. Due to various reasons such
as incompleteness of knowledge of the current situation, difficulties to anticipate future
implications of actions, or the vast scope of behavior possibilities that are available at
any point in time, Simon (1957, p. 67) argues that “it is obviously impossible for the
individual to know all his alternatives or all their consequences.” Rather than being
objectively rational, organizations are therefore assumed to be boundedly rational. This
concept can be summarized with “the observation that rational actors are significantly
constrained by limitations of information and calculation. Because of those limitations,
explicit and timely calculations of optimality are costly or impossible” (Cyert and March,
1992, p. 214). Or, to put it even shorter, firms’ managers are “intendedly rational but
only limited so” (Simon, 1965, p. XXIV).
73 The definition of objective rationality used here is taken from Simon (1957, p. 76, emphasis in
original): “A decision may be called “objectively” rational if in fact it is the correct behavior for
maximizing given values in a given situation.”
88
89
The second dimension is that of self-interest orientation. While neoclassical theories
assume that organizations are aggressively pursuing their self-interests, they do this
within the scope of what they are rightfully entitled to. Diamond (1971, p. 31) describes
this behavior in neoclassical theories, when he states that actors are “playing a game
with fixed rules which they obey. They do not buy more than they can pay for, they do
not embezzle funds, they do not rob banks.” Contrary to this, the subsequently discussed
theories address the issue of opportunistic behavior. Following Williamson (1985, p. 47)
opportunism adds the notion of guile to the concept of self-interest seeking. That is,
“opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially
to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” others
in order to gain an (unfair) advantage at the expense of others.
Figure 2.13: The Interplay of Opportunism and Bounded Rationality.
Source: Based on Williamson (1985, p. 67).
As Figure 2.13 shows, only the presence of both bounded rationality and opportunism
results in severe behavioral difficulties when negotiating inter-organizational relation-
ships. In case that both are absent, each party knows the situation of the other party
perfectly well. Furthermore, both parties have no intentions to take unfair advantage
of each other. Williamson (1985, p. 67) refers to this situation as “contractual utopia.”
In case that opportunism exists, but rationality is unbounded, it is possible to write a
comprehensive contract that includes all current and future contingencies. This in effect
makes any opportunistic behavior impossible. In case that rationality is bounded, but no
opportunism exists, both parties could simply agree on a general clause that each party
provides full information and engages to conjointly maximize profits, which are fairly
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apportioned. As only this situation in which bounded rationality is paired with oppor-
tunistic behavior leads to problematic contracting, the subsequently discussed theories
all address these issues. As these assumptions are still very broad, a further delimitation
of the selected theories is based on the requirement of the theories to address issues on
a firm-level through analyzing the mutual interactions that these firms are involved in.
Following Knudsen (1995), essentially three theories are fulfilling these requirements.
First, transaction cost economics especially address issues like the size and the bound-
aries of firms (Williamson, 1975, 1985). The underlying assumption of this theory is that,
just like there is a cost of a hierarchical organization, “there is a cost of using the price
mechanism” (Coase, 1937, p. 390). Firms in this theory are perceived to be no more
than an answer to the failure of the ideal of a perfectly transparent market (which is
the underlying assumption of neoclassical approaches). Consequently, the size of the
firm is determined through a trade-off between costs of market exchanges and costs of
hierarchical organization: “A firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an
extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market” (Coase, 1937, p. 395). How-
ever, as Williamson (1985, p. 4) argues, “unless the factors responsible for transaction
cost differences could be identified, the reason for organizing some transactions one way
and other transactions another would necessarily remain obscure.” Thus, Williamson
(1985) identifies four potential (inter-)organizational structures and three factors that
influence this structure. What exactly these are and how they relate to each other is
discussed in the subsequent section on transaction cost theory.
Second, agency theory is historically based on the separation of ownership and control
in modern enterprises. In the resulting relationship, the owner - called the principal -
delegates some authority to the manager - called the agent. In this situation, it has to
be assumed that the agent has divergent goals from those of the principal and that he
might act opportunistic to pursue them. Due to bounded rationality of the principal,
uncertainty exists in the relationship. Overcoming this uncertainty is resulting in costly
frictions. Overcoming or at least reducing them is at the focus of this theory. While
the theory originated in intra-organizational separation of ownership and control, the
ideas from it have been generalized to the “ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one
party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work,”
and is therefore applicable in different settings, such as inter-organizational networks
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 58). How this reduction of frictions can be achieved is discussed
in the section on this theory.
Closely related to the agency theory, yet illuminating different aspects (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976, p. 308), another very important theory in this context is what Knudsen
(1995, p. 193) refers to as “the nexus of contract view.” Building on the work of
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) it is argued that a firm cannot be seen as owning all its
inputs. Rather, the constituents of a firm engage in a contractual relationship with each
other only as long as it is beneficial for them. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) therefore
consider each constituent as an independent resource owner, who contributes this specific
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resource to the firm. The firm can be interpreted as a team of the members. The reason
why a firm exists at all can therefore be found in the fact that this team approach is
the most efficient solution to a problem of social cooperation (Knudsen, 1995; Seth and
Thomas, 1994). Crucial to this approach is the fact that (due to bounded rationality),
long-lasting contracts cannot be comprehensive. Rather they are incomplete in that they
specify that an employer has some authority over an employee, and that the employee
is accepting this authority. Again, while this theory originates in intra-organizational
relations between different stakeholders of a firm, it is easily and fruitfully extended to
the inter-organizational context described here (Oliver, 2001; Anand and Khanna, 2000).
Exactly why this kind of contracting is beneficial for the entire relationship and how this
long-lasting relationship can be realized is discussed in this last section.
2.3.1.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Behavioral Issues
Transaction Cost Theory. The first theory that is discussed as fundamental concept
for this work is transaction cost economics. Transaction costs can be closer described
through a comparison of economic and mechanical systems: “The economic counterpart
of friction is transaction costs: do the parties to the exchange operate harmoniously,
or are there frequent misunderstandings and conflicts that lead to delays, breakdowns,
and other malfunctions?” (Williamson, 1981, p. 552). It is now the central argu-
ment of transaction cost economics that (inter-)organizational governance structures74
are designed in order to minimize these transaction costs, just like mechanical systems
are usually designed in order to minimize frictions. This entails two very important
points: First, there have to be different, distinguishable organizational structures that
can emerge as an answer to the first factors. Second, there have to be different, distin-
guishable characteristic factors within a transaction that determine the organizational
structure. Each of these aspects is subsequently introduced.
Williamson (1985) lists four distinct organizational structures that can emerge as a
result of different degrees of transaction costs, reaching from standardized, simple ones
to highly specific structures. The most simple, standardized structure for a contractual
relationship is a market structure. This structure is perceived to be ideal for short-term,
spot markets in which the involved parties are not financially and otherwise dependent
on a long term relationship (Williamson, 1996, p. 95). This tends to be the case for
non-specific, commodity types of exchanged goods. As Ring and Van de Ven (1992,
p. 485) note, “the conditions associated with these transactions are ’sharp in;’ that is,
they are accompanied by a clear-cut, complete, and monetized agreement. They are also
’sharp out,’ i.e. the seller’s debt of performance and the buyer’s debt of payment are
unambiguous.”
74 In the following the term organizational structure refers to (inter-)organizational governance structure
in the sense of Williamson.
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In case that this high degree of independence is not achievable or not desirable,
Williamson (1985) argues for a trilateral organizational structure. In this structure, a
dynamic change of the partners is not desirable. This structure is characterized through
less flexibility and a lower degree of independence than the market structure. Once
parties have entered into a contract, “there are strong incentives to see the contract
through to completion” (Williamson, 1985, p. 74). However, in a longer lasting re-
lationship opportunistic actors have to be prevented from taking unfair advantage of
the other party. In the case of a trilateral structure, participants rely on “third party
assistance (arbitration) in resolving disputes and evaluating performance” (Williamson,
1985, p. 75, emphasis in original). Another, even more specific, structure can be found
if the dependence of the involved parties is even higher. As this dependence results in
a self-regulating power of contract renewal (Williamson, 1975), opportunism is curbed
through a situation of “mutual reliance” (Williamson, 1985, p. 190). Therefore, in
this structure no third party is involved and the participants thus have an inherent
motivation not to cheat each other. Thus, the structure is termed bilateral structure.
The final alternative described by Williamson (1985) is termed unified organizational
structure. If specificities between the parties become so high, that assets are usefully
applicable only for this very transaction there is no reason for an inter-firm separation
of these assets. Since there are no economies of scale for single use assets, supplying
them through internal or external sources promises to be of no difference. Thus, the
superior ability to adapt a relationship if it is realized under unified ownership results in
considerable “advantages of vertical integration” (Williamson, 1985, p. 78). Assuming
that alignment of incentives for internal groups75 can be realized, vertical integration
commonly appears in situations characterized by such a high degree of idiosyncrasy.
Obviously, these organizational structures closely resemble those discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.2.3. Research on organizational networks has been influenced by transaction
cost economics76. This raises the second important point of transaction cost theory, an
analysis of which factors of a transaction can be analyzed in order to gain a deeper under-
standing of the organizational structure that is supposed to emerge for this transaction.
Williamson (1985) discusses three factors that can be used to analyze a transaction.
The first, which is also deemed to be the one that is “most important, and most dis-
tinguishes transaction cost economics from other treatments of economic organization”
by Williamson (1985, p. 52), is asset specificity. This is defined as durable invest-
ments that “are specialized to a particular transaction” (Williamson, 1981, p. 555).
With other words, investments are made idiosyncratically to a particular relation with a
specific partner. In case that this partner changes, severe adverse (mostly financial) con-
75 Following the perspective of a firm as a nexus of contracts, this not necessarily has to be the case.
See below.
76 However, there is considerable dispute on whether organizational structures can be classified in a
continuum. Powell (1990) for example argues explicitly that networks do not fall in-between markets
and hierarchies, but rather are a third option, distinct from both.
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sequences have to be borne by the participating parties. Following Williamson (1985),
there are four different types of investments that can lead to substantially specific assets
in a certain relationship:
• Site Specificity.
Investments in immobile assets that are made in order to capitalize on geographic
proximity are often highly specific. If a supplier places his plant next to a client’s
site, realizing advantages from this setup is only possible with exactly this client.
If the client changes, all advantages from this geographic setup are lost.
• Physical Asset Specificity.
Even if assets are mobile they can be so specialized to a certain relation that they
cannot be reused with other partners. An example for physical asset specificity
might be a specific machine that serves a single purpose, or specific tools that are
especially designed following a client’s proprietary specifications.
• Human Asset Specificity
Also investment in human resource development can be considerably specific.
These investments can be either implicit, such as learning-by-doing, or explicit,
such as training courses for specific tasks. It is however, important that developed
skills are only applicable within a certain contractual relationship. So, for example
training of general skills like typewriting does not increase human asset specificity
(Williamson, 1985, p. 242).
• Dedicated Assets
Contrary to the above discussed investments, dedicated assets result from the
investments into general production capacity. However, there has to be an impetus
for this investment through a specific customer. So, simply increasing productive
capacity in order to gain a larger market share is not a dedicated asset. However,
the same increase in productive capacity that is only realized due to a request from
a specific customer can be considered a dedicated asset.
While there have been some additions to this list - Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994)
for example add procedural specificity, and Malone et al. (1987) argues for a dimension
of time specificity - these four factors have largely been found to suffice (Joskow, 1988).
Taking together all the necessary investments for a contractual relationship, a degree of
asset specificity can be compounded for this relationship. It is a crucial idea of transac-
tion cost economics that this degree of asset specificity has a far-reaching impact on the
organizational structure of the relationship. The higher the degree of asset specificity,
the higher the involved adverse consequences if the relationship does not work out as
expected. Therefore, more specific organizational structures, which also allow for more
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control in the relationship, are appropriate in this context. Summarizing the discus-
sion on how asset specificity influences organizational structure, can best be done with
Williamson (1985, p. 78): “Market contracting gives way to bilateral contracting, which
in turn is supplanted by unified contracting (internal organization) as asset specificity
progressively deepens.”
The second important aspect is the uncertainty involved in a relation. A deeper
discussion of uncertainty is not conducted at this point for two, closely related reasons.
First, this dimension is discussed subsequently as the crucial part of agency theory77.
Second, Williamson (1985) does not further dwell on it besides stating that uncertainty
is assumed to exist to a certain degree and that more uncertainty is assumed to lead to
more specific structures78.
The final dimension that influences the structure of a relationship is the frequency
with which transactions occur. The reoccurrence of an unspecific transaction does not
have any implications for the relationship between the involved parties. As (Williamson,
1996, p. 61) states it, “where no such specialized investments are incurred, the initial
winning bidder realizes no advantage over nonwinners. Although it may continue to sup-
ply for a long period of time, this is only because, in effect, it is continuously meeting
competitive bids from qualified rivals.” However, if the specific investments are nec-
essary, “the relationship between buyer and supplier is quickly thereafter transformed
into one of bilateral monopoly” (Williamson, 1979, p. 241, emphasis in original). This
in turn requires an enduring relationship between the involved parties, one that “might
be provided if long-term contracts were negotiated, [and] such contracts are necessarily
incomplete79” (Williamson, 1979, p. 241). Thus, the frequency of transactions in a
77 The difference between the two theories is not clearly defined. Even Williamson (1996, p. 171) posed
the question, “terminology aside, in what ways do agency theory and transaction-cost economics
differ?” One of the differences that is mentioned by Williamson is the focus on individuals by
agency theory and on transactions by transaction cost theory. However, as the subsequent discussion
shows, this differentiation factor is becoming more and more blurred. This is also acknowledge by
Williamson (1996, p. 172 ff), who states that, “real differences notwithstanding, these have been
shrinking as each approach has come to work on issues previously dealt with by the other.” The
main differentiation that is used here, is based on the fact that transaction cost theory focuses to a
large extent on asset specificity, whereas agency theory focuses on uncertainty, a point that is also
recognized by (Williamson, 1996, p. 179).
78 There is also some criticism to this point. Goshal and Moran (1996) for example argue that the
idea of curbing uncertainty that results from opportunistic behavior of others through integration
within a hierarchical governance might be counterproductive. Imposing more and more control over
partners that are perceived to be opportunistic might cripple voluntary compliance, thus resulting
in a self-fulfilling prophecy.
79 As this quote shows, there is, similarly to the relation to agency theory, also no clear cut separation
between the concepts of transaction cost theory and incomplete contracts. Here again, the focus
of transaction cost theory on asset specificity and the focus of incomplete contracts on ensuring
long-lasting relationships is used to differentiate between the concepts.
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relationship, and therefore implicitly also its duration, is explicitly addressed in the dis-
cussion on incomplete contracts and the related concept of property rights that follows
after that on agency theory.
Taken together these three dimensions influence the emerging governance structure of
a contractual relationship. If asset specificity and uncertainty are high and the frequency
with which transaction occurs is low, more specific governance structures can be, and
should be, realized in order to minimize transaction costs. The relation between these
different modes of governance and the above discussed dimensions of asset specificity
and frequency of transactions are illustrated in Figure 2.14.
Figure 2.14: Efficient Governance Structures.
Source: Based on Williamson (1985, p. 79).
Agency Theory. The second theory - agency theory - is in its general form traced
back to the fundamental work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Their definition of the
underlying idea of a principal-agent relationship is still valid today. They define “an
agency relationship as a contract80 under which one or more persons (the principal(s))
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which in-
volves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling,
1976, p. 308). This very well illustrates the origins of agency theory in the separation
of ownership and control within a company - which is an issue entirely on an individual
level (Berle and Means, 1932). However, later the concepts of agency theory have been
80 Note that Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) recognize the relation with contractual theories (see
below) when they state that agency theory “literature has developed independently of the property
rights literature even though the problems with which it is concerned are similar; the approaches are
in fact highly complementary to each other.” This supports the notion that different theories of the
firm should be used in conjunction to gain a holistic perspective on a certain problem (Eisenhardt,
1989a). An approach also followed in this work.
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generalized from individuals to parties and therefore, “the agency structure is applicable
in a variety of settings, ranging from macrolevel issues (...) to microlevel dyad phenom-
ena” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 58). Even in this enlarged scope, the basic rationale behind
principal-agent theory is aptly summarized by Jensen and Meckling81:
If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason
to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the
principal. (...) However, it is generally impossible for the principal or the
agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from
the principals viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the
agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as
well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between
the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare
of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308).
These combination of the three factors mentioned (monitoring and bonding costs,
residual losses) are commonly defined as agency costs. The first category of monitoring
costs refers to those costs that the principal has to pay in order to observe the agent’s
behavior. The second category of costs are those that the agent has to pay in order
to show that he has no intention to behave opportunistic82. The last cost category,
residual losses, refers to the fact that complete conflict resolution is not possible at a
reasonable cost, and that therefore some loss is accepted even though monitoring and
bonding efforts are made. However, the pure existence and classification of these agency
costs is not enough to yield an understanding of the complex sources of uncertainty in
such a relationship. Therefore, a deeper analysis of why these costs incur is necessary
in order to develop appropriate countermeasures. Important for this discussion is the
combination of uncertainty with opportunistic behavior from a point in time before the
actual contract is closed, over the duration of the contract, to a point in time when the
contractual relationship is already terminated.
Before actually signing a contract with an agent, a principal has ex ante uncertainty
about the skills of the agent or the characteristics of the agent’s product. This un-
certainty is also referred to as hidden knowledge or hidden information (Laffont and
Martimort, 2002). The fact that the agent is in this phase striving for successfully en-
tering into a relationship with the principal, gives him an incentive to pretend to have
superior skills or a superior product than it is actually the case. The moment the prin-
cipal realizes the true skills or characteristics of the agent or his product, he has already
81 This definition very well illustrates the underlying assumptions of opportunistic behavior (not acting
in the best interest of the other party) and bounded rationality (impossible at zero cost to ensure
the making of optimal decisions).
82 Recently it has been convincingly argued that the two concept can be considered “the mirror image”
of each other, differing only “in the assumption of which party moves first” (Sanders and Boivie,
2004, p. 169)
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entered into the relationship. A direct consequence of this behavior is adverse selection
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). Using, among others, the example of the market for used cars, Ak-
erlof (1970) illustrates this problem very well. It can be realistically assumed that the
seller of a used car (the agent) does have information about the quality of the car he is
selling that the buyer (the principal) does not have. With this assumption in mind, low
quality and high quality cars could be sold for the same price: Since the buyer cannot
distinguish between high and low quality cars, the sellers of the latter can (unjustly)
raise the price of their cars, while the sellers of the former have to (unjustly) lower their
price. Therefore, owners of low quality cars have a higher incentive to sell their cars
than owners of high quality cars. Under these conditions “it is quite possible to have
the bad driving out the not-so-bad driving out the medium driving out the not-so-good
driving out the good in such a sequence of events that no market exists at all” (Akerlof,
1970, p. 490).
During the duration of the relationship between principal and agent, the principal has
ex interim uncertainty about the agent’s behavior. Therefore, this uncertainty is also
referred to as hidden action (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). The outcome of the actions
performed by the agent on behalf of the principal is for sure correlated to the agent’s
efforts. But it can also be assumed that it is subject to some coincidence. Thus, the
principal is uncertain about the causality between the agent’s action and the outcome.
Therefore, the agent has an incentive not to put too much effort into his work and later
blame the environmental conditions for the failure. In the literature this is also referred
to as moral hazard83. Eisenhardt (1989a, p. 61) mentions a scientist working on personal
projects on company time as a perfect example of moral hazard: This scientist has the
opportunity to pursue his personal goals at the expense of his employer, because “the
research is so complex that corporate management cannot detect what the scientist is
actually doing.”
Finally, with ex post uncertainty, the agent knows more about the real results of his
action than the principal does. This uncertainty is also called nonverifiability (Laffont
and Martimort, 2002). Since his rewards can be expected to be linked to the outcomes
of his actions, the agent has an incentive to be dishonest. In complex environments,
the agent is hoping that the principal never correctly assesses the real results, or that
warranties or other legal liabilities that might result from a faulty performance on the
agent’s side are already void. An example for this type of relation might be the one
between a doctor and his patient. Since the patient does not have the medical knowledge
83 An agent that is subject to a moral hazard is shirking. See below.
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necessary to assess the proposed therapy, and since he cannot evaluate how his illness
might have developed if he had consulted a different doctor, or none at all, there is no
way to correctly assess the quality of the therapy84.
Since the here discussed problems in a principal-agent relationship are all resulting
from the co-existence of uncertainty with opportunistic behavior, there are two broad
categories of remedies for the problems:
One is to discover the agent’s behavior by investing in information systems
such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures, boards of directors, and ad-
ditional layers of management. Such investments reveal the agent’s behavior
to the principal, and the situation reverts to the complete information case.
(...) The other option is to contract on the outcomes of the agent’s behavior.
Such an outcome-based contract motivates behavior by co-alignment of the
agent’s preferences with those of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 61).
As agency theory has been assumed to mainly address the problem of uncertainty,
the first of these two proposed remedies is considered to be most relevant. However,
the issue of designing a contract in such a way that incentives between principal and
agent are aligned is also considered to be of prime importance. Therefore, the following
section discusses how relationships can be designed in order to ensure such an alignment
of incentives, which makes long-lasting relationships possible.
Incomplete Contracts and Property Rights. Similar to the perception of agency
theory, that an agent often does not behave in line with what would be best for his
principal, Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 777) argue that a firm has “no power of fiat,
no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from market
contracting.” Analyzing the firm as a specific form of team-work - in which different
resources are used which cannot be clearly separated in the final product and which do
not belong to the same party - it is argued that the main problem lies in monitoring each
of the participants85 (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p. 779). This is the fact because the
participants86 do not receive output according to their actual input, but rather according
84 Another aspect of ex post uncertainty is introduced by governmental regulations. “As the rule-maker,
can and does frequently revoke rights: It decrees that, henceforth, it will not be legal for individuals
to use their property, or enter into contracts, in ways heretofore sanctioned” (Jensen and Meckling,
1978, p. 33). This change effectively results in ex post uncertainty when either dealing directly or
indirectly (e.g. through the legal framework used in contracts) with the government.
85 This closely mirrors ideas from agency theory. In fact sometimes contractual theories are subsumed
as part of agency theory (e.g. in Seth and Thomas, 1994). However, the different foci of the two
theories, as they are defined for this work, warrant the separation conducted by others (e.g. Knudsen,
1995).
86 Also note that the nexus of contracts view as postulated by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) assumes
that participants, parties, or constituents of a firm are individual employees. However, similar to the
developments in agency theory, there are no objections to extending the scope of this theory to an
inter-organizational level. In fact this is commonly done in more recent literature on the topic, such
as Hart (1988), Oliver (2001), or Anand and Khanna (2000).
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to the group performance. They therefore have an incentive to not contribute as much as
they could - a problem commonly referred to as shirking or free-riding. In this context,
it is argued by Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 783), that the classical capitalist firm is
the most effective way to organize this type of value creating activities. This classical
capitalist firm is defined through six characteristic points:
• Joint input production through
• several input owners with
• one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs,
• who has rights to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of contracts with
other input owners,
• who hold the residual claim87, and
• who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status.
The relationship between this central entity and the other members of the firm is one
designed purely due to efficiency reasons in team production. There is no authority
or fiat in this relation; rather it is characterized by continuous bilateral renegotiation
between the involved parties. This arrangement is deemed efficient, simply because one
party specializes on monitoring the others. The problem of monitoring the monitor is
resolved through the fact that this monitoring entity has the residual claims of the entire
organization and thus an incentive to maximize overall output. All the other parties are
independent resource owners88, which are bound to the monitor through contractual
relations.
This perspective on why a firm exists, results in its perception as a nexus of short
term, spot market like relationship. However, as it has been discussed throughout this
work, this short term, spot market like relationship is not appropriate for all kinds of
exchange. This essentially has two main reasons. The first is the fact that the short term
nature of the contracts precludes firms to take advantage of longer lasting relationships
with employees, which is often desirable. Both Demsetz (1988) and Alchian (1998) later
on revoked this short term view and acknowledged the longer perspective. As Demsetz
notes,
87 Residual claims are defined as “the difference between stochastic inflows of resources and promised
payments to agents” by Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 328).
88 Considering a firm as a bundle of resources can also be considered a parallel to to the strategic
management theories discussed above. The different foci of these theories also clearly support the
structure chosen for this work. The focus of strategic theories is on what types of resources a firm
should posses in order to be attractive for a network. Contrary to this, the focus of the here discussed
theories is more on the management of the relationship. Thus, both theories are discussed separately
from each other to gain a holistic picture of the IS development industry.
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continuing association of the same persons makes it easier for firm-specific
and person-specific information to be accumulated (...). Knowledge about
the objectives and organization of the firm is learned “cheaply” through con-
tinuing association, and so is knowledge about the capabilities and limitations
of the persons involved in this association (Demsetz, 1988, p. 160).
However, arranging for a relationship that has a very long timeframe - not uncom-
monly measured in decades - is extremely difficult, due to the bounded rationality of
the involved parties that has been introduced as one of the underlying assumptions of
the here discussed theories89. As Holmstrom and Tirole (1989, p. 71) argue, “it is not
possible to sign a contract today that will be effective in all contingencies tomorrow.”
This perception leads to the idea of incomplete contracts in which not all future contin-
gencies have to be specified, but which allow for some flexibility and adaptability in the
relationship.
In order to achieve this flexibility in the relationship the contract that is entered into
“contains gaps or missing provisions” (Hart, 1988, p. 123), which allow the parties to
interpret the contract as environmental conditions change90. This can be interpreted as
giving the parties involved in the relationship some authority over each other91. Again
on an individual level, this has also been recognized by Simon (1957, p. 116), who argues
- well in line with the theory of incomplete contracts - that “the employment contract
results in the creation of a continuing authority relationship between the organization
and the employee.” He restricts this continuing authority when postulating that “there
is a limit, however, to this proposition. There is an area of acceptance within which
the individual will behave “organizationally.” When the organizational demands fall
outside this area, personal motives reassert themselves, and the organization, to that
extent, ceases to exist” (p. 204).
The term area of acceptance92 is central to the theory of incomplete contracts and very
contrary to the original ideas of Alchian and Demsetz (1972). Through embedding this
concept into contracts, it is possible to realize long lasting and very dynamic relationships
between different stakeholders. The idea of incomplete contracts is also going beyond
89 As Hart (1988, p. 121) notes: “In a world where it was costless to think about, plan for, and
write down provisions for future events, parties engaged in a trade would write a “comprehensive”
contract which specifies precisely what each of their obligations is in every conceivable state of the
world. Under these conditions, there would never be any reason for the parties to modify or update
their contract since everything would be anticipated and planned for in advance. Nor would any
disputes ever occur since an outsider (for instance, a court) could (costlessly) determine whether one
of the parties has been in breach of contract and impose an appropriate penalty.”
90 There are considerable difficulties in defining an incomplete contract. As Tirole (1999, p. 743) note:
“For all its importance, there is unfortunately no clear definition of “incomplete contracting” in the
literature. While one recognizes one when one sees it, incomplete contracts are not members of a
well-circumscribed family.”
91 Usually this authority is restricted to the central agent. However, the other way is also conceivable
- especially if highly specific knowledge resides with the other parties.
92 Simon (1957) adopted the term from Barnard (1938, p. 169), who called it “zone of indifference.”
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the above discussed ideas from agency theory to reduce uncertainty through increased
monitoring or bonding. If a contract is considered as incomplete, it has to align incentives
of the involved parties in order to successfully realize a long-term relationship. As (Hart,
1988, p. 123) framed it, “if the contract the parties write is incomplete, there must be
some mechanism by which the gaps are filled in as time passes.” Hart (1988) discusses
residual rights of control, for which in his argument ownership (i.e. property rights) of
assets is a prerequisite. In his discussion on the effects of property rights on investment
decisions in a collaborative business endeavor, he argues that for efficiency reasons, it is
not sufficient “to assign the various parts of the return scheme to the different managers
(...), but also to allocate ownership and control rights to support this assignment” (p.
133). This is in line with the perception of Tirole (1999), who sees property rights as a
necessity for successful investments in organizational development efforts.
2.3.1.3 Implications for Network Management
The present discussion on behavioral issues has built a foundation for understanding
the second research objective of how relationships within such an inter-organizational
network are supposed to be managed. In this context, it has been argued that es-
sentially the co-existence of the two underlying assumptions of opportunistic behavior
and bounded rationality is responsible for behavioral issues in the relationships. These
two assumptions have been addressed in various theories that can be utilized to better
understand the relationships between interacting organizations.
First, the discussion on transaction cost economics has hinted upon the fact that
those transactions which require investments that are specifically to a certain relation-
ship are rather unsuited for market- (or even network-) transactions. Thus, it can be
argued that designing transactions in a way that requires these kinds of investments
should be avoided. Rather, standardized exchange relationships promise to be a poten-
tial mechanism to reduce transaction costs and thus to shift the organizational structure
from an integrated approach of the past towards that of an inter-organizational net-
work. This approach somewhat deviates from traditional transaction cost theory, which
is largely normative93 and unidirectional in a sense that they prescribe managers how
to react to the transaction cost situation in a certain given environment: “Firms that
follow its [transaction cost theory’s] prescriptions and align organizational form with
transaction dimensions will economize on transaction costs, which in turn should trans-
late into performing better than those who do not” (Geyskens et al., 2006, p. 523).
Both the normative and the unidirectional nature of transaction cost theory’s findings
93 Theories can be defined as being either normative or positive. The first distinction between the two
is usually assigned to the philosopher David Hume, who argued that statements could either address
what is. These positive statements do not contain any indication of approval or disapproval and
can be falsified. Contrary to this, statements can be normative, when they address what ought to
be. These statements always contain a certain underlying value. Also, these statements cannot be
ultimately disproven.
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have been criticized in the literature. It has already been mentioned that Goshal and
Moran (1996) attack the normative nature of this theory. In their view, following its
prescriptions could lead to ever increasing opportunism as a result of more integrated
organizational structures that were ultimately introduced to reduce this opportunism.
However, as Goshal and Moran (1996, p. 15) also note, “all positive theories of social
science are also normative theories, whether intended or not.” Therefore, the main point
of critique of transaction cost economics for this study is not the normative nature of
the concept, but rather its unidirectionality.
Common knowledge assumes that organizations are supposed to design their orga-
nizational structure following the transaction costs that result from different types of
transactions they are involved in. However, especially this viewpoint is attacked in a
concept termed relational view. Dyer (1996) argues that firms are not imprisoned in
the structure that best fits their current transactions. Rather, an organizational struc-
ture can be deliberately chosen, as long as transactions are designed accordingly. The
obvious levers that an organization can use for adjusting transaction costs are those
rooted in the traditional concept, here especially addressing asset specificity. So when
attempting to shift an organizational structure more into a market direction, feasible
measures would be those that lead to a reduction of asset specificity. When attempting
to shift the transactional governance into the opposite direction of a more integrative
approach, obviously opposed measures should be taken. In this context, especially stan-
dardization is a prime mechanism to reduce asset specificity: “Standards may facilitate
market transactions by making it easier to obtain information on the goods exchanged
or on the opposite party, thus reducing transaction costs” (Brunsson, 2000, p. 30)94.
However, there are also different aspects to transaction costs: “While transaction costs
may increase with asset specificity, they will also vary independently of asset specificity”
(Dyer, 1997, p. 539). Especially the other two dimensions of uncertainty and frequency
of transactions developed by Williamson (1985) are also addressed by Dyer and Singh
(1998). Thus, it can be concluded from the theoretical discussion of agency theory that
uncertainty has to be reduced in order to reduce potential frictions in the networked
organizational structure. As Eisenhardt (1989a) has convincingly argued, crafting mech-
anisms that increase the information that the involved parties have over each other is a
possible lever to reduce agency costs in the network. Only if the participants in the net-
work have as close as possible to correct knowledge about their partners’ intentions, their
behavior, and the outcomes of their work, smooth cooperation in the network can be
ensured. Thus, creating mechanisms that allow for a transparent and open management
of relationships is a necessity in the network.
94 Brunsson (2000, p. 30) also mentions what has been considered highly important for this work -
that “the absence of common standards may even prevent markets from arising.” This is exactly
what has been argued as being the state of the IS development industry before the emergence of
SOA. Interactions between components have been possible only if a point-to-point connection has
been established. Since the involved interfaces have not been standardized, the components of one
system have all been developed by one organization.
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Finally, relationships can be deliberately managed in such a way to decrease the like-
lihood of frequently changing partners. The idea that relationships should be guided
by an incomplete contract, which allows for future accommodations to changed environ-
ments has been discussed as part of the last theoretical perspective of this section. This
has also been addressed in the relational view. As Dyer (1997) notes, upfront invest-
ments for establishing a good relationship between network participants might be higher
than those for writing an extensive legal contract. However, as these investments “can
control opportunism over an indefinite time horizon” (p. 548, emphasis in original) they
are especially suited for realizing long-lasting relationships. This long-lasting nature of
relationships has been explicitly demanded by both Demsetz (1988) and Alchian (1998)
in order to ensure a smooth cooperation between the involved parties. That these good
relationships between organizations are best realized through close personal interactions
between the involved individuals of the various participating organizations has been
described for example by Hamel et al. (1989).
These three broad categories of mechanisms are assumed to be used in order to suc-
cessfully manage an IS developing network that is facing considerable behavioral issues.
However, as it has been argued, these behavioral issues are only one reason why such
network relationships merit careful management. The other reason is seen in the inher-
ent complexity to integrate components developed by various independent organizations
within the network. These complexity issues can arise independently of behavioral is-
sues whenever complex interactions in-between various entities are required. So, before
dwelling more on the details of how behavioral issues can be countered in the network,
first these complexity issues are discussed. In a subsequent step, the here touched upon
mechanisms for reducing behavioral issues are then discussed in detail and also compared
with those that are proposed for the complexity issues.
2.3.2 Complexity Issues in Inter-Organizational Networks
Besides those issues that stem largely from the behavioral uncertainties of partners in the
network, there are also those issues that stem from the inherent complexities within the
network (and to a lesser extent from behavioral uncertainty). These complexities largely
exist because of interdependencies within a group of organizations that is conjointly
developing a comprehensive system. To gain a clearer understanding of the nature
of these interdependencies, again theoretical concepts are introduced that discuss its
underpinnings in an organizational context. As Victor and Blackburn (1987) argue,
there are essentially two distinct, yet related perspectives on the issue. The first of
these perspectives is the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This
discussion also entails details about the concept of power, which is proposed to be the
counterpart of dependence. This theory well aligns with the flow of this study for two
reasons. First, it resumes the above conducted discussion on resources endowments
of participating organizations, in that it considers these resources as a key source of
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power. Second, it connects behavioral concerns with coordination concerns in that it
uses behavioral uncertainties to emphasize the importance of dependencies in inter-
organizational relationships.
As the following discussion on resource dependency theory shows, inter-organizational
power (and thus dependence) has to be considered as a reciprocal relationship. This leads
over to the discussion of a second perspective on organizational inter -dependencies. In
this context, Thompson (1967) analyzes multiple resource exchanges between entities
and classifies these resource flows into three distinct groups. Similar to other works in
this area (e.g. McCann and Ferry, 1979) he argues that depending on the complexity
of these resource flows, interdependencies are becoming more or less intense, and thus
cause a varying degree of necessary coordination effort. Both approaches are still widely
used in more recent literature (e.g. Malone and Crowstone, 1994; Gulati and Singh,
1998) and are thus introduced as fundamental theories for this study. However, the
degree of interdependence is - albeit an important one - only a first step in the discus-
sion of organizational coordination. Building on this degree of interdependence, various
typologies of coordination instruments have been proposed in the literature (e.g. March
and Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). These are discussed subse-
quently in order to establish a clearer understanding how these (more or less) complex
interdependencies can be managed. As these are discussed, it becomes obvious that they
closely mirror those mechanisms that already have been discussed as addressing behav-
ioral issues. Thus, this section closes with applying both typologies to the IS context
and developing propositions how the emerging network in this industry can be managed.
2.3.2.1 Theories on Organizational (Inter-)Dependence
Referring to the name of the theory, resource dependency theory is closely related to
the resource-based theories that have been discussed in Section 2.2.1.1. Extending the
perspective on organizations that have to gain access to some of the resources they use
from third parties, resource dependency theory addresses various aspects of this resource
acquiring process (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Since organizations can be considered
open systems (Katz and Kahn, 1966) they have to interact with other organizations to
obtain some of the resources they need for survival. However, these other organizations
tend not to be very reliable95. Pfeffer and Salancik describe the difficulties that arise
from the dependence on others and the uncertainty concerning their reliability as follows:
The fact that organizations are dependent for survival and success on their
environment does not, in itself, make their existence problematic. If stable
supplies were assured from the sources of needed resources, there would be
95 Please note that this does not indicate that the other organizations have to behave opportunistic.
This aspect of unreliability has been covered in the preceding section. Rather, in the here discussed
context, organizations areassumed to be unreliable because they interact in a complex way which
requires intense coordination as it is discussed below.
104
105
no problem. If the resources needed by the organization were continually
available, even if outside their control, there would be no problem. Problems
arise not merely because organizations are dependent on their environment,
but because this environment is not dependable (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978,
p. 3).
As the name implies, the issue of dependence is playing a pivotal role in the here
discussed theory. However, before addressing this issue, it is reasonable to first discuss
the underlying principles of politics and power. As the following two definitions show,
both concepts are highly interrelated, which explains that a discussion of one of the
concept can only be successfully conducted in conjunction with the other. Politics in
an organizational context can be defined as “the structure and process of the uses of
authority and power to affect definitions of goals, directions, and major parameters of
the organizational economy” (Wamsley and Zald, 1973, p. 18). Since power is part
of the definition of politics, this concept also has to be defined. This is done “here as
the potential (or capability) of an actor to influence the behavior of another actor in
a particular issue area” (Tushman, 1977, p. 207)96. In the strictly intra-organizational
understanding of these concepts, political processes take place between “differentially
powerful subgroups [of an organization] as they vie for scarce resources and cooperate
on tasks which require mutual coordination” (Tushman, 1977, p. 210). While this
definition of power and politics is inherently intra-organizational97 there is also a broader
understanding of power in-between organizations.
This understanding is on the one hand based on the perception of politics as the
process of allocating scarce resources within and in-between organizations (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1974; Tushman, 1977; Pettigrew, 1975). On the other hand, it is based on
the reciprocity of social relations, especially on the fact that “the power of A over B is
equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A” (Emerson, 1962, p. 33). This
definition indicates that power does not necessarily show in interactions between A and
B. Rather, it is a latent concept that only emerges when A demands something of B which
runs counter to B’s desires. Furthermore, power in the definition of Emerson (1962) can
be considered the opposite of dependence. If A has power over B, B is dependent on
A. However, it is important to note that in the definition by Emerson (1962), power of
A over B does not by necessity has to be neutralized or cancelled out by power of B
over A. For example in the case given by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 53), in which
one organization is buying the entire output of another organization and nothing else,
both organizations clearly depend on each other. One on its sole supplier, the other
96 This definition goes back to the definition of power by Max Weber (1964, p. 38): “Macht be-
deutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben
durchzusetzen.” (Power means every opportunity to enforce one’s will within a social relationship,
even against resistance). Definitions by other prolific authors differ only marginally from this one
(see for example Dahl, 1957; Emerson, 1962; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974)
97 See for example also Zald (1970) for some excellent works on the issue of intra-organizational power.
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on its sole customer. Rather than removing power from this relationship, the power is
balanced. In the extreme example above, “it might even be meaningful to talk about the
parties being controlled by the relationship itself” (Emerson, 1962, p. 34). Therefore,
real power of one organization over another results from imbalance, or asymmetry in
the relation, which “derives from its discretionary control over resources needed by that
other and the other’s dependence on the resource and lack of countervailing resources
or access to alternative sources” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 53).
When applying these concepts to an inter-organizational context, cooperating firms
are to some extent dependent on the scarce resources that they supply each other with.
Obviously, in such a context of different organizations, each possessing and being respon-
sible for its own distinct set of resources, compromise, accommodation, and bargaining
between these play an important role. Since these different organizations are all legally
and - in part - economically independent, they all might have different perceptions how
to reach a common goal, or how to share scant resources. Thus, conflict emerges between
the different groups. In this context, it has been argued that the power one organization
has over another (and thus the dependence of the second organization) is influenced
by three factors: Resource importance, discretion over resource allocation and use, and
concentration of resource control98 (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 47 ff). The first
factor indicates that some resources are more important than others. Only those that
are critical for a client’s survival are a source of power for the supplier. The second
factor addresses the capacity to decide on the use of the resource. Legal requirements
for example might prevent an organization to freely decide on how to put the resource
to use. Such a restricted resource is no real source of power. Finally, resource control
needs to be concentrated in a few hands. If a client can easily find a substitute for a
certain resource, it also cannot be considered as a source of power.
In this context, the main argument is that “organizational success in the resource
dependence perspective is defined as organizations maximizing their power” (Ulrich and
Barney, 1984, p. 472). Since organizations are competing for scarce resources, which they
need for survival, power can be maximized essentially in three ways, which correspond
to the above given underlying factors that influence the power base. An organization
can reduce the importance that a single resource has for its operations. Furthermore,
an organization can use discretion over resources through two ways: Either it strives for
attaining control over resources that others depend upon, thus maximizing the power it
has over others, or it strives for attaining resources that it depends upon, thus minimiz-
ing the power others have over the organization. An organization can also increase its
power through strengthening its dominance in exchange relationships, and thus improv-
ing the control it has over resources others supply it with (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978,
p. 113). The most promising approach that Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) mention for
98 The close relation between the resource-based view and resource dependency theory can be seen
from the close match of these factors to the the VRIN attributes of the resource-based view (Medcof,
2001).
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these three strategies is organizational growth - either through mergers and acquisitions
or organically. Diversification growth refers to growth in a business in which the focal
organization is neither involved, nor with which it has direct relations. Through such a
diversification strategy, an organization is able to reduce the dependence on other orga-
nizations. Vertical Growth, i.e. in up- or downstream positions in the supply chain, is
supposed to increase the discretion an organization has over critical resources. Finally,
horizontal growth, that is expansion in the field of business the organization is already
operating in, is an appropriate way to improve the bargaining position vis-a`-vis suppliers
and customers99.
These three factors have also been elaborated on by other authors. McCann and Ferry
(1979) for example argue for a six dimensional classification of interdependencies. The
first dimension is the number of different resources that are exchanged between the enti-
ties; second, the degree of interdependence varies with the amount of a certain resource
exchanged; third, the frequency with which resources are exchanged is an important
determinating factor for dependency; fourth, the amount of time that passes before the
missing resource has a significant impact on the organization plays a role in the degree
of dependence; fifth, the value of a resource is important100; finally, the direction of the
resource flow is crucial.
While the first five of these dimensions seem to be a more detailed analysis of resource
importance, the last point adds another perspective. Thus, it has to be stated that the
structure of interdependence between organizations is highly important. In this context,
the mostly applied classification of interdependencies is that of Thompson (1967), which
today still is the standard when it comes to classifying interdependencies, not only in
intra- but also in inter-organizational settings (e.g. Malone and Crowstone, 1994; Gulati
and Singh, 1998; Van de Ven et al., 1976). Thompson (1967) distinguishes between
three types of (task) interdependencies, with the more complex ones building upon
simpler ones. The first, and most simple, type of interdependence is labeled pooled
interdependence. It indicates that involved parties either contribute their task output
to, or take their task input from a shared pool of resources. The interdependence in this
setting is relatively low, coordination and communication efforts are almost nonexistent.
As long as the resource is not exhausted, any party can be removed, or replaced from
99 Since - at least from a resource dependence viewpoint - all organizations necessarily have to follow
this strategy, Emerson (1962) argues that the entire system is developing towards a power balance.
This has also been addressed by Galbraith (1997, p. 113) through the concept of countervailing
power: “Power on one side of a market creates both the need for, and the prospect of reward to, the
exercise of countervailing power from the other side.” At the heart of this concept is the idea that
a concentration of power at one end of a relation tends to induce power concentration on the other
end, too.
100McCann and Ferry (1979, p. 114) subsume the following four factors under resource value: “(a) the
cost of substituting a different resource; (b) the cost of locating another supplier or user; (c) the
qualitative importance of the resource for achieving desired work outcomes; (d) the percentage of
the time unit needs were satisfied in the past by this unit.”
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the setting without any significant influence on the overall system. An example of this
type of interdependence would be teachers who use common facilities but teach their
students independent of each other (Mintzberg, 1979b).
The second type of interdependence is sequential interdependence. In this setting, the
output of one party’s task is at the same time the input for the task of another party.
Obviously, this is a more intense type of interdependence, in which coordination and
communication has to be higher than in pooled interdependence. In order to guarantee
a smooth flow of resources, the involved parties have to reach a consensus when and how
the resource delivery is supposed to happen. In case that a preceding task encounters
any problems, the later stages are severely impacted. A typical example for this type of
interdependence would be the assembly line. Those workers that attach the wheels to
the car have to wait for those that attach the axis, which in turn have to wait for the
delivery of the chassis.
The final type of interdependency is reciprocal interdependency. This parallels sequen-
tial interdependency in that the task output of one party is the task input of another
party. However, the output of this second party is then again the input of the first.
So, the involved parties interact in an ongoing loop, until finally some desired end state
of the resource is reached, and the interaction ceases. This type of interaction can be
considered the most intense. In contrast to sequential coupling, in case of any difficulty
at any stage of the process, all parties, even those active before the actual problematic
task, are affected. Most complex processes involve reciprocal coupling at some stage.
Thompson (1967, p. 55) mentions the operation and maintenance of an airline as an ex-
ample: “The production of the maintenance unit is the input for operations, in the form
of a serviceable aircraft; and the product (or by-product) of operations is an input for
maintenance, in the form of an aircraft needing maintenance.” The different structures
of these types of interdependency are illustrated in Figure 2.15.
As has already been implied above, coordination effort increases from pooled, over se-
quential, to reciprocal interdependence, and thus “we will say that they are more costly
to coordinate, noting that measurement of such costs is far from perfect” Thompson
(1967). However, coordination costs are not a fixed sum that depends on the intensity
of interdependencies. Rather, a higher degree of interdependence calls for different co-
ordination mechanisms that tend to be more costly. Exactly what types of coordination
mechanisms are available to organizations, how costly they are, and how they relate to
the three distinct forms of interdependence is discussed subsequently.
2.3.2.2 Approaches to Coordination of (Inter-)Dependence
As coordination is one of the two essential building blocks for larger organizations, it
has been widely studied throughout the history of organizational science. One of the
most influential discussions on ways and means for coordination is the work of March
and Simon (1958). They argue convincingly that there are essentially two types of
coordination: coordination by plan and coordination by feedback. The first refers to the
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Figure 2.15: Pooled, Sequential, and Reciprocal Interdependencies.
Source: Based on Mintzberg (1979b, p. 23).
idea that coordination is achieved through a pre-established plan, while in the latter
case, coordination is achieved through transmission of new information in a changed
environment. Which of these two types of coordination is appropriate in a given situation
depends on the stability of this situation: “The more stable and predictable the situation,
the greater the reliance on coordination by plan; the more variable and unpredictable
the situation, the greater the reliance on coordination by feedback” (March and Simon,
1958, p. 160). In this context, March and Simon (1958) further argue that coordination
by plan is more desirable, as it is less costly, and thus organizations strive for increasing
stability in their environment. They propose two distinct means for achieving this
goal101. The first is standardization. If the exchange relationship between two entities is
highly standardized, the need for intense feedback coordination with the supplier of this
101Actually, March and Simon (1958) propose three devices: standardization, use of interchangeable
parts, and use of buffer inventories. However, as the use of interchangeable parts can be assumed
to be closely related to standardization (see for example the discussion on the bicycle industry in
Section 2.1.2.3) these two are subsumed under the heading of standardization.
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input can be substantially reduced. This fact has been found to be especially important
for information goods (Gheihs et al., 2002; Weitzel, 2004). The second is the use of
buffering inventories. If in case of a disturbance of its partners, an entity can proceed
(at least for a certain time) without feeling the effects of this disturbance, the need for
feedback coordination is less distinct.
In this context it is also interesting to note the close relation between the ideas on
coordination of March and Simon (1958) and those on interdependence of McCann
and Ferry (1979). Emery (1969) argues that a reduction of the necessary amount of
coordination between two entities should first be based on reducing the number, amount,
and direction of interchanged resources. All these aspects have also been raised by
McCann and Ferry (1979) as drivers for interdependence. However, when this is not
possible, standardization and buffering should be used. These two approaches address
the remaining three aspects of dependency that have been discussed by McCann and
Ferry (1979). Through standardization, for example the costs of substitution or the costs
of locating another supplier, as important parts of the value of an interchanged resource
can be significantly reduced. Similar, through buffering, both the necessary frequency
in an exchange relationship, as well as the amount of time that passes before a missing
resource has a significant impact can be reduced.
The above-mentioned distinction between coordination by plan and coordination by
feedback has also been adopted by Van de Ven et al. (1976, p. 323), who argue that the
first actually refers to impersonal coordination: “Coordination by [plan] is a clear con-
struct exemplified by such integration mechanisms as the use of pre-established plans,
schedules, forecasts, formalized rules, policies and procedures, and standardized infor-
mation and communication systems. The common element of each of these exemplary
mechanisms is that a codified blueprint of action is impersonally specified.” In contrast
to this, coordination by feedback involves personal relationships between individuals ei-
ther on a one-on-one basis, or within a group. This distinction between personal and
impersonal coordination is also addressed by Mintzberg (1979b). He argues for a classi-
fication in three distinct types of coordination: Mutual Adjustment, Direct Supervision,
and Standardization. The first two refer to personal coordination. Mutual adjustment
is coordination through the (in part informal) communication between peers. In con-
trast, direct supervision is coordination through one appointed responsible individual.
It “achieves coordination by having one individual take responsibility for the work of
others, issuing instructions to them and monitoring their actions” (Mintzberg, 1979b, p.
4, emphasis added). Standardization has already been discussed and refers to more im-
personal, formalized coordination. Mintzberg (1979b) argues that standardization can
be achieved on three layers: Standardization of processes, of outputs, or of skills. These
different approaches are illustrated in Figure 2.16.
It is now one of the main arguments of Mintzberg (1979b, p. 7), that “as organi-
zational work becomes more complicated, the favored means of coordination seems to
shift (...) from mutual adjustment to direct supervision to standardization, preferably
of work processes, otherwise of outputs, or else of skills, finally reverting back to mu-
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Figure 2.16: The Five Coordination Mechanisms.
Source: Based on Mintzberg (1979b, p. 4).
tual adjustment.” Mintzberg (1979b) illustrates this development with the example of
a growing organization. An organization that only consists of a handful of people can
be easily coordinated by mutual adjustment, the members simply agree to who is doing
what, when, and how. However, as soon as the organization grows beyond a certain
size, this coordination mechanism is no longer viable. Rather, a supervisor is introduced
whose responsibility it is to coordinate the growing group through issuing commands to
and monitoring of the group members. However, as the span of control of individuals
is limited, the coordination of the growing group soon overburdens the supervisor, he is
simply unable to coordinate the behavior of too many organizational members. Rather
than coordinating them on a continuous basis, he sets certain standardized rules that
guide the behavior of the individual members of the organization. However, in case that
the organization becomes even more complex, and especially if the constituents of this
organization specialize in very narrow fields of expertise, the coordination mechanism
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of choice is again mutual adjustment: “Sophisticated problem solvers facing extremely
complicated situations must communicate informally if they are to accomplish their
work” (Mintzberg, 1979b, p. 8). While Mintzberg (1979b) has focused on the size of
the organization, Van de Ven et al. (1976) show that essentially the same holds true for
an increasing degree of interdependence between organizational tasks. This continuum
is illustrated in Figure 2.17.
Figure 2.17: The Coordination Mechanisms: A Rough Continuum of Complexity.
Source: Based on Mintzberg (1979b, p. 7).
However, the insights drawn from the preceding discussion of coordination are limited
with regard to one aspect: They have focused on coordination within one organization.
However, as the present work explicitly addresses issues in inter-organizational processes,
this background has to be considered in the discussion of approaches to coordination of
interdependencies. Discussing the issue of inter-organizational coordination Smith et al.
(1995, p. 11) note that this coordination does not differ that much from the coordina-
tion of intra-organizational relationships, and that consequently “macro researchers can
probably learn much about cooperation from past and current studies at the micro level.”
Consequently, Van de Ven (1976, p. 33) also studies inter-organizational relations and
finds, similar to intra-organizational ones, that standardization is the preferred coordi-
nation mechanism, but that personal coordination indeed becomes necessary, whenever
the standardization approach is not feasible: “An immediate response to the problem [of
increased interaction] is to increase the frequency of communications between agencies
through personal contacts and committee meetings. But personal contacts and commit-
tee meetings absorb much time and effort and are inefficient mechanisms for coordinating
activities that can be standardized.” This parallel existence of formalized and informal
and personal and impersonal relationships has been later affirmed, albeit with the note
of caution that personal relationships might be formal or informal (Van de Ven et al.,
1979). Van de Ven and Walker (1984, p. 598) also emphasizes the importance of the
informal, personal type of coordination mechanism “not only because of its pervasive-
ness, but also because it often represents the embryonic stage in the development of
[inter-organizational relationships].”
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This distinction is upheld to some extent throughout the following decades. In their
meta-analysis of 32 empirical studies published between 1987 and 1994 Sobrero and
Schrader (1998, p. 607) for example find support for their “distinction between con-
tractual and procedural coordination mechanisms as two separate and complementary
dimensions for the structuring of inter-firm relationships.” As Sobrero and Schrader
(1998) note, procedural coordination refers to the structuring of day-to-day relations
between involved organizations’ employees. Thus, albeit some formal structure is pos-
sible and necessary in these relations, the main focus lies on the actual behavior of the
individuals, and inherently personal issue. Hamel et al. (1989, p. 136) also recognize
this, when they bluntly state that “top management puts together strategic alliances
and sets the legal parameters for exchange. But what actually gets traded is determined
by day-to-day interactions of engineers, marketers, and product developers.” In contrast
to the latter part of this statement, the first obviously refers to contractual coordination.
In this view, the differentiation of Sobrero and Schrader (1998) is interesting, as it goes
beyond the mere distinction between formal and informal or personal and impersonal
relations. The (main) goal of contractual coordination is the structuring of what is ex-
changed in the relation between the involved parties. In this regard, it is closely related
to the division of labor that has been discussed in the previous section. The demand
for a conjoint analysis of both aspects put forth by Sobrero and Schrader (1998), is thus
a further support of the broad research approach followed in this study that addresses
both the reasons for partnering in the IS development industry as well as mechanisms
for realizing it.
2.3.2.3 Implications for Network Management
This discussion on coordinating inter-organizational dependencies has shed more light on
the second research objective to understand how such an inter-organizational network
is supposed to be managed in the IS development context. It has complemented the
preceding discussion in that it has shown that difficulties in the management of such
relationships can emerge from the complexity of the relationship in itself - and not
necessarily only from behavioral issues. This discussion has also contributed to this
research objective in that it has developed a broad classification of three mechanisms
that promise to help organizations in this context to effectively manage their network
relationships.
First, it has been argued that coordination can be achieved through standardization.
If participants in an inter-organizational network can agree upon certain standards for
processes, products, or skills, coordination can be achieved through these standards in
an impersonal way. Through this mechanism the coordination costs for the participating
organizations can be substantially reduced. Furthermore, the reliance on such standards
can also increase the stability of environment within which the organizations interact
to a significant degree, which is also a desirable goal. Albeit this standard-setting in
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the first place requires a considerable effort, this investments promises to allow for an
on-going coordination. Therefore, reliance on standards is often perceived to be the ideal
coordination mechanism.
Second, supervision can be a mechanism for coordination. This involves one entity that
takes on responsibility for the others. In the inter-organizational context, supervision is
difficult to achieve as the organizations participating in the network are assumed to be
legally and economically independent of each others102. Thus, one party instructing the
others is exactly not possible. However, in the definition of Mintzberg (1979b), super-
vision not only involves instruction, but also monitoring of the other parties. Through
this monitoring the network can be made more transparent, which promises to be key
in coordinating the inter-organizational network. In contrast to standardization, mon-
itoring requires continuous investments. Therefore, it is perceived to be a less ideal
coordination mechanism, yet one that is necessary if the task to be coordinated becomes
more complex.
Finally, in parallel to these two coordination mechanisms, an appropriate way for
achieving coordination can be through mutual adjustment. Especially in very complex
settings, only individual communication (which in part also will be informal) can ensure
that the involved parties can cooperate in a smooth way. As this mutual adjustment
involves considerable effort by all the involved parties it is perceived to be even more
costly than monitoring. However, here again, for some tasks this investment seems to
be inevitable.
As the discussion above has shown, it is assumed that managing complex inter-
organizational relations can best be achieved through these three mechanisms. As it
has also been argued, IS development is an inherently complex endeavor, which in-
volves a certain degree of reciprocal dependencies. Following Thompson (1967), it thus
also involves sequential and pooled interdependencies. As Mintzberg (1979b) has ar-
gued, highly complex interactions are best coordinated by mutual adjustment, while
less complex interactions are best coordinated through direct supervision or through
standardization. As IS development includes all three aspects, all three types of co-
ordination mentioned by Mintzberg (1979b) promise to be fruitfully applicable in this
context. Interestingly, these three mechanisms are also very close to those that have
been proposed as counter-measures for behavioral issues. There, the reduction of asset
specificity through the use of standards has been proposed as key for reducing transac-
tion costs. Also, the use of monitoring devices in order to increase the transparency in
the network has been proposed as key for minimizing agency costs. Finally, incomplete
contracts, which require a certain adjustment to relationships as environments change
over time, have been proposed as a requirement for realizing the benefits of long last-
ing relationships. As these three aspects have been emerging from both the behavioral
102Especially in the context of incomplete contracts this has been a key requirement.
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and the complexity perspective, they are subsequently discussed and proposed as dom-
inating management mechanisms especially in the context of the inter-organizationally
networked IS development industry.
2.3.3 Proposed Inter-Organizational Management Mechanisms
Giving an answer to the second research question, how organizations manage their re-
lationships with other network participants, has so far been approached on the basis of
behavioral and complexity issues in such a network. These two threads of theoretical
arguments have led to proposition of three close to identical broad categories of man-
agement mechanisms: standardization, monitoring, and personal relationships. These
three categories of mechanisms are promising to contribute to a smoother cooperation
in the inter-organizational network in such a way that potential frictions do not offset
the proposed benefits that have been developed in the preceding section. It is therefore
the goal of the present section to discuss the broad categories especially in the light of
the IS development context.
In contrast to the propositions that have been developed for answering the first re-
search question, the here discussed proposed management mechanisms are not differenti-
ated between the hubs and the spokes in an inter-organizational network. An underlying
rationale for this decision can again be found in the concept of the relational view. In
their work, Dyer and Singh (1998) explicitly argue that investments into relationships
by all involved entities are necessary to ensure a smooth cooperation. Obviously, the
hub organizations nevertheless are expected to invest more into these relationship man-
agement mechanisms - this, however, simply due to the fact that because of their size
and their central role in the network they are expected to have many times more rela-
tionships than smaller spokes (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995). If this assumption
can be help up will be shown by the empirical data.
2.3.3.1 Management through Standardization
As it has been argued above, standardization promises to address both behavioral and
complexity issues (Brunsson, 2000). According to transaction cost theory, in a non-
specific (i.e. standardized) exchange relationship the thread of opportunistic behavior
is curbed (Williamson, 1979). The same has been brought forward by scholars of coor-
dination theory. The reliance on standards reduces the need for on-going coordination
significantly, as coordination is achieved before the actual work is done (March and Si-
mon, 1958; Mintzberg, 1979b). Therefore, standardization is also perceived to be the
least costly coordination approach. Consequently, standardization is also considered
highly important in the context of inter-organizational IS development. How standard-
ization can influence the relationship between the various participants in this specific
organizational network is discussed subsequently.
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As Mintzberg (1979b) argues, coordination through this mechanism is based on the
standardization of outputs, of processes, or of skills. It can be assumed that all three
aspects are actively pursued in the IS development network. So, outputs of partners (i.e.
the software they are developing) can be standardized through the reliance on technical
standards, which in part have already been briefly touched upon in the context of the
concept of Service-Oriented Architecture. The fact that the wide-spread adoption of
SOA principles leads to a certain degree of standardization within the IS development
industry has already been discussed in Section 2.1.2.4. As it has also been noted there, it
is exactly not the focus of this work to give another discussion on the technical perspec-
tives of SOA. Consequently, these are not covered in-depth in this section. However, the
impact that SOA has on the industry is of such magnitude that it has to be mentioned
in order to gain a better understanding of the management of the inter-organizational
relationships. As it has also been mentioned in Section 2.1.2.4, SOA does not refer to
a single technology, but rather to a definition of an integrated architecture for complex
IS. This integration is achieved largely through Web Services, which are interconnected
through a stack of standards, such as those that have been mentioned in Section 2.1.2.4.
An exemplary, and thus necessarily partial, overview over this Web Services stack is
given in Figure 2.18.
Figure 2.18: A View on the Web Service Stack.
Source: Adapted from Barros et al. (2005, p. 1).
In this context, it is especially crucial to note that the above described Web Service
Stack is not developed by an IS development company. Rather, it is developed by
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C103). This organization is operated by various
member organizations which have in part dedicated full-time staff to conjointly work
with the interested public in order to develop standards as those described here104. In
the W3C there is also a work group on “Web Services Architecture,” which is responsible
103The information on the W3C is based on the organization’s web site: www.w3.org. It has been last
accessed on Monday, May 14th 2007.
104This is essentially a very common approach to define standards. See Hallstro¨m (2000) for a discussion
of such standard setting bodies.
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for the definition of the general Web Service Stack. This work group bases its work on
that of other - similar - work groups, which are for example responsible for defining
the SOAP protocol, or XML105 specifications. This already indicates that the work of
this organization is an important underpinning of the change in the IS development
industry. However, at the same time it also indicates that it is easily within the scope of
a book in its own right to study only one of these specifications. As it has been argued,
discussing these technological backgrounds is therefore clearly beyond the scope of this
study. However, what is within the scope of this study is the recognition that the wide
adoption of standardized Web Service technologies is one of the fundamental pillars for
the organizational change that is discussed here (Kreger, 2003).
Parallel to this standardization of outputs, skills can be standardized. This approach
is obviously closely related to the preceding one, as the standardization of outputs (for
example in the sense of SOA compliant software) requires certain skills. Thus, only
through the availability of these skills in the network, the above discussed standard-
ization of outputs can be successful. Kieser (1989) argues in this context, that one of
the possible explanations for the emergence of guilds in the medieval ages is the stan-
dardization of first outputs and then procedures. This standardization of skills is today
even more important - particularly in the highly specialized field of IS development
(Rada, 1999). Consequently, the participating organizations have considerable incen-
tives to acquire standardized skills in contrast to proprietary ones, especially because
these standardized skills are actively promoted by such organizations as for example the
W3C Ahrne et al. (2000). However, it should also be noted that acquiring the standard-
ized skills promises to be much less challenging than acquiring proprietary skills. This
especially because the educational system can adjust to the requirements of standardized
skills much more easily than to that of proprietary ones.
The final aspect in which standardization can be used in order to minimize coordi-
nation expenses are processes. Especially the processes which regulate the relationships
between the involved parties in the network can be standardized. This standardization
of processes has been well addressed in the field of virtual team research. Research in this
field indicates that “in particular, formal processes must be developed” for successful
cooperation in virtual teams (Lurey and Raisinghani, 2001, p. 532). “Through the use
of well defined processes and semantically rich media that clarify, extend and constrain
meaning,” a loose coupling between virtual team members can be achieved (Ramesh
and Dennis, 2005, p. 1). Again referring to the findings of Smith et al. (1995), that
the mechanisms for intra-organizational relationship management are at least in some
aspects similar to inter-organizational ones, it is thus argued that relationships in the
IS development network can be managed at low cost through the use of standardized
processes that guide the relationships between these organizations. This is well reflected
in the fact that inter-organizational supply chains are also found to be influenced by the
105The Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a standardized language for the hierarchical structuring
of data in text files.
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availability of standardized processes (Simatupang et al., 2002; Subramani, 2004). All
these standardization mechanisms promise to significantly reduce the coordination ex-
penses of organizations interacting in the network. This is summarized by the following
proposition:
Proposition Std. Both large IS producers (hubs) and smaller software pro-
ducers (spokes) invest into standardized products, skills, and processes in
order to manage their relationship(s)106.
As it has been discussed above, other, more costly, management mechanisms are also
utilized in the IS development network. These are therefore subsequently discussed.
First, management through (formal) monitoring is discussed in the following section.
The last aspect, standardized processes, already leads over to this next proposed man-
agement mechanism. As the relationships within the IS development network promise
to be mainly based on the exchange of information (this because IS are inherently infor-
mation goods), the use of formalized information sharing (monitoring) processes107 plays
a pivotal role. It is recognized that standardization of information sharing routines is
important. Therefore, this dimension is discussed in detail in the following section.
2.3.3.2 Management through Monitoring
Parallel to standardization, monitoring promises to be the second management mecha-
nism used in the IS development network. From a behavioral perspective, monitoring
increases the information that the involved organizations have over each other, and
therefore reduces the uncertain, yet possible opportunistic behavior. Form a complexity
standpoint, this relationship is less distinct. However, it has to be noted that moni-
toring is seen as a substantial part of supervision. In the context of the networked IS
development industry supervision in the original meaning of the concept, that is taking
responsibility for the work of others, issuing instructions to them, and monitoring their
actions, is not feasible (Mintzberg, 1979b). This especially as the legal and economic
independence of the involved organizations has been given as one of the prerequisites
for realizing the proposed benefits of this approach (see Section 2.2.3). Yet monitoring
as partial supervision promises to be successfully applicable in the inter-organizational
IS development context. Thus, this mechanism again helps to counter both uncertainty
that arise due to behavioral and complexity issues within the network.
106It is acknowledge that this proposition is at this point in time still left very open-ended. This is
intentionally so, as the goal of this exploratory study is in part to determine more exactly what
type of standardizations are used by the network participants to manage their relations. As any
preliminary constraint to this proposition could potentially exclude some of these mechanisms, the
entire scope of standards as proposed by Mintzberg (1979b) are included.
107Emery (1969, p. 35) recognized the necessity to standardize information sharing systems early on,
when he stated that “an informal system is a fickle crutch. It contains too many unreliable and
“noisy” channels for the organization to depend on it as an avowed policy. An information source
should therefore be formalized whenever possible.”
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This distinction between uncertainty due to behavior and complexity has been well
researched in the literature on this topic. Milliken (1987) argues that uncertainty is not a
uni-dimensional concept, but that different aspects of uncertainty should be considered.
Sufcliffe and Zaheer (1998, p. 3) for example discuss different sources of uncertainty:
Uncertainty stemming from the behavior of either competitors or suppliers and what
they call “primary uncertainty [which] appears to subsume technological uncertainty, or
the uncertainty arising from changes in technology due to new inventions or discover-
ies.” This differentiation seems to be very close to the distinction between behavioral
and complexity reasons for uncertainty. The latter type of uncertainty is, in contrast to
behavioral uncertainty, actually negatively associated with vertical integration. Thus,
their study supports an earlier one conducted by Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986, p.
358) that “integration is affected negatively by the frequency of technological change.”
Recent research on transaction cost economics has also shown the distinction between
behavioral and technological uncertainty. While the first promotes hierarchical integra-
tion, the latter leads to market governance (Geyskens et al., 2006). The rationale for
this difference can be found in a strategic approach to vertical integration. Harrigan
(1984, p. 638) argues that “effective vertical integration strategies need to reflect (...)
corporate level strategy requirements.” Thus, organizations tend to vertically disin-
tegrate in order to realize a high degree of strategic flexibility (Sanchez, 1993), if no
strategic objectives contradict this approach108. Among the most salient strategic fac-
tors that stimulate an integration are “the need to protect product quality, proprietary
knowledge, or manufacturing integrity” (Harrigan, 1985, p. 406).
Thus, in the (technologically) uncertain IS development environment, organizations
are theoretically inclined to vertically integrate because they feel the pressing need to
achieve exactly these strategic objectives such as developing high-quality systems, pro-
tecting proprietary knowledge, or ensuring manufacturing integrity. However, if these
participants in such an inter-organizationally structured IS development industry could
ensure these objectives without vertical integration, they would, due to the technologi-
cal uncertainty, vertically disaggregate to a larger extent. The fact that monitoring can
be useful for achieving exactly this goal has been recognized as part of the relational
view. Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that information-sharing routines are an integral
part of the design of inter-organizational relationships. Only through these routines,
the relationships can be realized in a transparent way. Thus the effects of this vertical
disaggregation, negative due to behavioral uncertainty and positive due to technological
uncertainty, can be minimized respectively realized. Subsequently it is discussed how
these information sharing routines can be applied in the IS development context, fol-
lowing along the lines of ex ante and ex interim uncertainty as it has been discussed in
108For a contrary opinion see D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994), who argue for positive economies of
integration. However, they also note that these are “somewhat offset by increased bureaucracy costs”
(p. 1192). Therefore, “the trend away from vertical integration may be the result of widespread
uncertain demand conditions” (p. 1196) - a trend still observable today (Mpoyi, 2003).
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the section on agency theory. Considering ex post uncertainty is not included in this
discussion, as this type of uncertainty is very specific and is discussed as part of the
subsequent section on management through (personal) relationships.
The first measurements are those that can be taken to give participants in the network
ex ante more information about their partners. The two mechanisms usually mentioned
in this context are signaling and screening109. The two concepts can be considered “the
mirror image” of each other, differing only “in the assumption of which party moves
first” (Sanders and Boivie, 2004, p. 169). Therefore, subsequently signaling theory is
emphasized without loss of generalizability. This concept has been developed first on an
individual level and has later been applied in an organizational context. In his highly
influential essay on signaling effects in education, Weiss (1995) argues that increased
wages due to better individual education are not directly based on increased productivity
of better-educated employees. On the contrary, from this perspective, talented students
that have the potential for higher productivity also incur higher opportunity costs during
their time at school. They would thus have an incentive to leave school as early as
possible. However, if schooling is considered as a signal for unobservable information
to future employers, rather than as a pure means to increase productivity, prolonged
schooling can be explained:
They [talented students] would, however, stay in school longer if they cared
more about the future, or enjoyed school more than the average student, or
learned more rapidly. These preferences make workers desirable employees:
they would be less likely to quit or be absent (...) and more likely to partic-
ipate successfully in training programs. Of course, if people with desirable
preferences go to school longer, firms would use education in their hiring
criteria as a means of selecting workers with these desirable traits (Weiss,
1995, p. 137).
Thus, the duration of the education can be used as a signal by students (agents) to
overcome uncertainty on the side of future employers (principals) about unobservable
characteristics of the students. While this signaling of students is limited to an individual
level, there is also considerable need for signaling effects on behalf of organizations.
Especially those that produce intangible goods, which often have the property that
their quality is difficult to assess110, need to signal that their products fulfill certain
requirements. In an organizational context this signaling is commonly achieved through
accreditation or certification, which is the official appraisal - either through peers or
109This also corresponds with bonding and monitoring costs as they have been discussed as part of
agency costs. The first refer to those costs that are incurred for showing that a partner is not
inclined to behave opportunistically. The latter refer to those costs that are incurred for ensuring
that a partner does not behave opportunistically.
110As has been described above, the main reason for this is that intangible goods are experience goods.
Their quality cannot be assessed without experiencing (i.e. usually purchasing and using) it.
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through a third party - that the accredited organization fulfills certain quality standards.
Consequently, especially for fields such as health care or education, accreditation agencies
blossom (Durand and McGuire, 2005). Since IS components are also information goods,
they are in many aspects similar to education. Consequently, in the IS development
network, an accreditation process is supposed to be highly suitable to reduce ex ante
uncertainty (Alvaro et al., 2005; Stafford and Wallnau, 2001).
What exactly should be accredited and how is subject to considerable discussions.
In the end, accreditation as it has been discussed here is a signal that is intended to
testify that the quality of a product or service is meeting certain requirements. However,
exactly the fact that this assessment of quality is difficult to achieve has raised the need
for accreditation in the first place. Thus, accreditation is only a substitute for quality
assessments. That this substitute is difficult to define has been well covered in the liter-
ature on accreditation of business schools. Ideally, an entire school is accredited, such as
the accreditation of the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB)
(Trapnell, 2007). However, this accreditation of entire schools is difficult, if not impossi-
ble. So, other, more detailed measures have to be found. Scherer et al. (2005, p. 663) for
example discuss the assessment of program quality, but also argue that “program quality
depends largely on good students and good faculty.” In this context it seems obvious
that in IS development, ex ante quality assessment if facing similar difficulties, which
would make an assessment of the individual employees of an organization necessary. It
has even been argued by Siskos et al. (2007) that this individual assessment is supposed
to follow an approach based on multiple criteria, such as professional experience and
education. However, there is also another aspect to this certification - namely that the
final result of the IS development process is a piece of software. Here special metrics can
be imposed to measure how well this software fits with its requirements. Thus, it can
be assumed that both individuals and the software they have developed are subject to
an accreditation process.
However, this accreditation process, no matter whether individuals or software is ac-
credited, is by no means a panacea to guarantee the success of the IS development
network. As Casile and Davis-Blake (2002, p. 188) found, again in the academic sec-
tor, accreditation can be a costly endeavor, and that consequently, “schools were more
likely to seek accreditation if they were operating in a high-prestige, high cost mar-
ket.” Therefore, it can be assumed that, in the IS development context, the need for
accreditation substantially reduces the number of potential partners. Again, this is a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, through accreditation process, the low quality
suppliers of components are excluded from the network. This is obviously in the interest
of the inter-organizational network as a whole111. However, at the same time, it has been
argued that a key driver for the IS development network is the cooperation of multiple,
111Especially because the whole system is only as strong as its weakest link. This is well illustrated by
the above given quote of Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995, p. 154) that “it takes many partners
operating effectively to make the system work, but the negative behavior of only a few can bring the
whole system to a halt.”
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highly innovative companies. A key argument of this has been the role of entrepreneurial
spirit, especially in smaller, younger companies. On the other hand it is therefore very
well conceivable that especially these young, small companies that promise to be a pillar
of the network, are driven out by too strict accreditation standards. Since it can be
expected that the accreditation process is initiated by the hub, this is an example how
this organization has to act in a twofold role. From a strategic perspective, the more
partners can be included in the network, the higher to probability for innovative ideas,
the higher the variety of developed solutions, and the larger the addressable market.
However, from a managerial perspective, the low quality suppliers have to be excluded
to prevent damage to the overall system.
Besides this narrow edge of whom to accept and whom to reject, there is also an
issue with those organizations that already have been accredited. When researching
the answers of organizations to pressure from a normative environment - such as a
strong dependence on accreditation (Casile and Davis-Blake, 2002) - the theory of in-
stitutionalism evolved. This theory states that organizations do not really attempt to
maximize profits. Rather, organizations strive for stability in a complex environment.
The theory of institutionalism argues that organizations do this through following cer-
tain prescriptive behaviors when interacting with their environment. These behaviors
result in organizations becoming more and more similar. Through processes of coercion,
mimicry, or normalizing, diversity in organizational structure is reduced (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983). Since diversity and the therefrom resulting innovativeness are key to the
success of the IS development network, this process of becoming more and more simi-
lar is harmful for the overall success of the network112. Therefore, organizations need
to have strategic choices on how to counter this process and preserve their uniqueness
(Oliver, 1991). It is therefore of prime importance that the accreditation agency indeed
institute these strategic choices for partners.
Once a relationship with a partner has been entered into, there is still ex interim un-
certainty. Thus, the need to increase information during the relationship has to be a key
aspect of managing the IS development network. Jensen and Meckling (1976) mention
monitoring costs as a key constituent of agency costs. In their understanding, these
costs are not limited to observing or measuring the partners’ behavior. Rather, they
include various efforts to control the agent. In traditional (manufacturing) industries,
the principal has the choice between engaging in a close relationship with the partner,
which includes the necessity to control the partner and the resulting monitoring costs,
and contracting an arm’s length relationship, which does not incur these expenses (De-
quiedt and Martimort, 2004). In this context Nelson et al. (1996) argue that packaged
software has physical goods aspects that help reducing monitoring costs. However, the
IS development context cannot be limited to packaged software. On the contrary, it has
been argued that the often intangible knowledge required to successfully deploy the soft-
112That similar processes are working in the business schools has recently been raised by Mintzberg
(2004).
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ware is considered a key aspect of IS development. In this context, the discussion above
has shown that the immaterial, intellectual properties of the technology in IS develop-
ment result in enormous transaction costs, which render an arm’s length relationship
impossible. Therefore, monitoring the agent is the only means to ensure behavior that
is in the interest of the principal.
Monitoring of partners has not been a well researched field in IS deployment. Nelson
et al. (1996) mention project management and quality assurance as necessary aspects
of monitoring, however, without further dwelling on the issue. Yet, especially in the
literature on IS outsourcing, monitoring a relationship is somewhat better covered. As
Dibbern et al. (2004, p. 8) note, “the growth of IS outsourcing has spawned an industry
whose primary function is the monitoring of outsourcing contracts.” In order to achieve
this monitoring, several means have been established, among them benchmarking, au-
diting, or keeping a small group of IS professionals in the outsourcing organization, the
so-called retained organization (Gewald and Helbig, 2006). This retained organization
possesses the knowledge to assess the quality of the provided services, but not the capa-
bility to provide them itself. All these measures that are used to manage the relationship
to and to align the expectations of (i.e. monitoring in the sense of Jensen and Meckling,
1976) the service provider are commonly mentioned as best practice in outsourcing rela-
tionships. In the context of an IS development network using these monitoring devices
promises to be a feasible way for reducing uncertainty within a relationship. Here also
the above mentioned close inter-connection between the different management mecha-
nisms becomes obvious. Information sharing routines can very well also be subject to
standardization, which has also been covered in the literature. Here, standardization
“involves central repositories that provide a common knowledge base for sharing vi-
sions and contexts among the participants, such as discussion forums, frequently asked
questions (FAQs) facilities, and electronic libraries with problem definitions, successful
experiences and best practices” (Chi and Holsapple, 2005, p. 67). It can be rightfully
assumed that the partners in an inter-organizational IS development network use these
standardized information sharing systems for the reduction of ex interim uncertainty.
Summarizing the so-far discussion, information can be disseminated throughout the IS
development network through various ways and means. Of special importance are both
ex ante and ex interim dissemination mechanisms. The first referring to those monitoring
devices that give the partners better knowledge about each other before they actually
enter into a relationship. The latter referring to those mechanisms that give partners
better knowledge about the relationship they are already part of. Investments into these
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information sharing mechanisms by both the spokes and the hubs113 promise to be an
essential management mechanism due to uncertainty in the network. Thus the second
proposition on management mechanisms is the following one:
Proposition Mon. Both large IS producers (hubs) and smaller software pro-
ducers (spokes) invest into monitoring routines in order to manage their
relationship(s)114.
The discussion of ex post monitoring has so far been omitted, and this with good rea-
son. As it has been argued above and also in Section 2.1.2.4, due to its idiosyncrasies,
assessing the quality of IS is very difficult. It has therefore been argued that an increase
in the duration of the relationship promises to be a feasible mechanism to reduce ex
post uncertainty. If the interaction is not seen as a single event, but rather as a first
of reoccurring ones, ex post uncertainty can be substantially reduced. This is also well
covered in the literature, where for example Williamson (1979) notes that the enhance-
ment of a relationship’s duration increases the reliance on relational contracts. The main
idea of this type of contract is that the relationship is evolving over time, and that this
history of the relationship is more important for future adjustments than the original,
explicit contract (Williamson, 1979; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). With other words,
management of relationships in complex environments is best achieved through dynamic
adjustment in a healthy, trusting relationship (Kelly et al., 2002; Parkhe, 1998b). This
idea has already been raised in both the discussion on behavioral and complexity issues
and is subsequently addressed in the discussion of management through (personal) ties,
which are assumed to be key for this kind of relationship (Hamel et al., 1989).
2.3.3.3 Management through (Personal) Relationships
The final management mechanism that can be applied in the inter-organizational IS
development context is that of (personal) ties between the involved parties’ employees.
The rationale behind this aspect is again rooted in both behavioral and complexity issues.
As it has been argued, designing a relationship in such a way that it is long lasting can
lead to increased efficiency in this relationship, and therefore act as a safeguard that
curbs opportunistic behavior. Similarly, coordination costs can be substantially reduced
through mutual adjustments through personal ties, if the task that has to be coordinated
is very complex. Both aspects have been addressed in the literature on IS development,
and are subsequently briefly introduced.
113The fact that these investments have to be conducted by both the hub and the spokes is important
here. An example for this type of conjoint investment would be a certification mechanism. Obviously,
making sure that a piece of software or an employee is passing the certification can considered a
substantial effort by the spokes; however, at the same time preparing and actually conducting the
certification is also an effort for the hub.
114Similar to the last proposition on standardization, this one is also deliberately left rather open-ended.
I.e. it does not further specify what and how this monitoring is supposed to be achieved.
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Inter-organizational networks in general are often described as being governed by
incomplete contracts, which include a certain leeway, and therefore the ability to adjust
the contract when environmental conditions change (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000). The
fact that this not necessarily has to be a downside has been emphasized by Ghosh and
John (2005, both p. 356), who argue that “the naive notion that contract terms should
always be written as tightly as possible must be abandoned.” Especially when a network
is formed to realize product enhancements, adjustments over time are necessary, and
“thus, contract terms should be engineered to facilitate adjustments.” As the discussion
on the intellectual nature of IS as an information good has shown, this is clearly the
focus of IS development networks. Therefore, it can be expected that these principles
have a high influence on these networks. The motivation that Elfenbein and Lerner give
for their study of incomplete contracts in the setting of Internet portals closely mirrors
this perception:
The turbulence of the competitive landscape, the uncertainty of future value
decisions, the perceived need for speed in decision making, and the existence
of new but poorly understood measures of performance and effort correspond
well with the assumptions that lead theorists to build incomplete-contracting
models (Elfenbein and Lerner, 2003, p. 357).
In a similar vein, Banerjee and Duflo (2000, p. 1000) found that in IS development
offshore115 outsourcing relationships are based on the assumption “that the [providing]
firm’s current understanding of the project is correct and that the firm adheres to its own
productivity norms. The firm and the client understand that both these assumptions
may be false.” Consequently, these relationships are based on incomplete contracts in a
sense that they allow for dynamic adaptation in case that these assumptions should in
fact prove to be wrong. In very a similar context, Gopal et al. (2003, both p. 1678) found
empirical results that “underscore the incompleteness in the contracting environment”
and state that “it is important to recognize that an incomplete contract need not be
inefficient.” Thus, it can be argued that relationships in the IS development context are
very well described by an incomplete contract.
The second assumption that IS development or deployment projects are inherently
very complex endeavors and should thus use a high degree of informal, personal coordi-
nation mechanism has also been shown in multiple research efforts. Kraut and Streeter
(1995, p. 80) for example analyzed 65 development projects and found that informal,
personal mechanisms are, albeit expensive, “important for successful coordination in
software development.” As their work also indicates, these mechanisms are frequently
115This term refers to the fact that IS development is relocated to a distant country like India or
China. The main reason for offshoring are the lower labor costs in less developed countries, but
also for example the access to IS resources in general, and especially to well trained personnel. See
Hirschheim and Dibbern (2006) and the there quoted literature for an introduction to the topic.
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used and deemed to be of high value116 independent of project characteristics such as
size, certainty, or the stage of the project life cycle they were in. The main reason for this
is the fact that the “development of Information Systems (IS) is a creative effort that
involves the expertise, insights, and skills of many individuals” (Tiwana and McLean,
2005, p. 14). Thus, integrating this individually held knowledge or expertise is key for a
successful team performance (Okhuysen and Eisenhardt, 2002; Stein and Vandenbosch,
1996).
That this integration of individually held expertise is a process that requires a high
coordination effort has been analyzed by Faraj and Sproull (2000). They argue that
coordinating the expertise necessary for software development is determined by three
major factors. First, team members have to recognize the need for specific expertise.
Second, team members have to know who has what knowledge, and further “only in the
simplest situation does knowing expertise location refer to knowing where an answer to a
problem is located. In nontrivial cases, it refers to knowing the most effective expertise
to call on to develop a solution.” Finally, the team has to be able to successfully
integrate the expertise of its members: “Team members integrate individual outputs,
and problem solve through an emergent process of informal interactions and sharing of
expertise” (both p. 1557). This three-staged process of expertise integration is obviously
one that to a large extent has to rely on inter-personal ties, and thus is best coordinated
through informal, personal mechanisms (Kraut and Streeter, 1995; Tiwana and McLean,
2005).
As this discussion shows, the management of relationships that cross organizational
boundaries in a network cannot be solely based on formal control. As Parkhe (1998b, p.
222) notes, “there exists a “control gap” in managing networks, as compared to managing
hierarchical organizations.” The main reasons he asserts for this control gap are closely
related to the above listed factors that influence the dependence of one organization
on another: High importance of the relationship, low control over the relationship, and
little transparency in the relationship (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus, it can be
argued that this control gap is very difficult, if not impossible, to close and that a
certain degree of vulnerability exists in every relationship. If this vulnerability cannot
be overcome, a possible solution would be to ensure that the other parties do not exploit
these vulnerabilities. In this context the notion of trust plays an important role.
Trust in this context can be exactly defined as “the mutual confidence that no party
to an exchange will exploit the other’s vulnerability” (Sabel, 1993, p. 1133). Similarly,
yet more detailed, Mayer et al. (1995, p. 712) define trust as “the willingness of a
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that
the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the
ability to monitor or control that other party.” Thus, trust can be considered to be
116As Kraut and Streeter (1995) argue, both use and value are highly correlated. This first, as obviously
those mechanisms that people find more valuable are also used more often. However, it has also been
shown that people judge those mechanisms they are familiar with more favorable (Zajonc, 1968).
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addressing exactly the issue of overcoming the above mentioned control gap. Trust is
often considered the only feasible way, since despite all efforts to close the control gap,
this will only be possible partially: “As a practical matter, however, in real-life alliances
there will always be some uncertainty, (...) there will always be some vulnerability, (...)
and there will always be less than full control” (Parkhe, 1998b, p. 222).
As the so far discussion also has shown, organizations have manifold mechanisms for
addressing these issues, such as reliance on standardized processes, skills, or technolo-
gies or the implementation of far reaching monitoring structures. All these mechanisms
can be considered to be contributing to some type of mutual trust in a relationship.
In their discussion on the topic, Barney and Hansen (1994) distinguish between three
types of trust. Weak trust emerges when partners do not consider themselves vulnerable.
In highly transparent commodity markets exchange partners cannot take advantage of
each other, thus trusting each other is the norm rather than the exception. The above
described mechanism of standardization is contributing to this type of trust. If the
components that are exchanged in the IS development industry are absolutely stan-
dardized, the participating organizations are not vulnerable. However, as the discussion
on idiosyncrasies of IS development in Section 2.1.1.3 has shown, albeit striving for it,
complete standardization cannot be realized in the IS development context. Rather, the
focus of an IS development network are individually developed (or at least adapted) com-
ponents. Thus, higher levels of trust have to be initiated. Semi-strong refers to “trust
through governance” (Barney and Hansen, 1994, p. 177). That is, albeit certain vulner-
abilities exist in a relationship, these are not exploited, since the costs that come with
this exploitation are higher than the benefits. This type of trust is addressed through
the above discussion on monitoring. If the exchange relations between partners in the
IS development network would be highly transparent, severe penalties could be agreed
upon, if partners exploit vulnerabilities of others. However, here again the idiosyncrasies
of IS development render this approach difficult. It has been exactly the argument of
the preceding section, that albeit striving for sophisticated monitoring structures, the
nature of IS development makes this complete transparency impossible. Thus, again a
higher level of trust has to be initiated. This final type of trust has been labeled as
strong trust. If this type of trust exists between exchange partners, vulnerabilities are
not exploited, “independent of whether or not elaborate social and economic governance
mechanisms exist, because [this] behavior would violate values, principles, and standards
of behavior that have been internalized by parties to an exchange” (Barney and Hansen,
1994, p. 179). Therefore, in the complex, dynamic and interdependent environment of
IS development, strong trust promises to be the only feasible way to completely close
the control gap, and thus it helps to address not only coordination, but also behavioral
concerns. This has also been recognized by Parkhe (1998b) who proposes trust also as a
mechanism for guidance of partners’ behavior in these uncertain environments. The idea
of trust as a prerequisite for network success has also received considerable attention in
the literature. Gulati (1995, p. 105) for example argues that “trust is also an important
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component of the control mechanisms used within alliances,” and in studies conduced
by Zaheer et al. (1998, p. 154, emphasis in original), “empirical results in fact reveal a
direct link between inter-organizational trust and performance.”
The question that remains to be answered is whether trust can be deliberately built
(Parkhe, 1998b). The answer given to this question is best described with a cautious
yes. On the one hand, trust has to be built over time. The reason for this lies in the fact
that trust, defined as the not exploiting of vulnerability, is a positive experience. Albeit
partners have the opportunity to take unfair advantage, they do not do so. On the other
hand, destroying trust is a negative experience; despite not expecting one’s partner
to take unfair advantage he does so. As Parkhe (1998a) argues, positive experiences
require constant reinforcement to take effect, while negative experiences take effect after
only a single exposure. This can be summarized with Parkhe (1998a, p. 418): “Trust
must be nurtured continually because, like a house of cards, trust is hard to build
and easy to destroy, which strongly suggests that alliance dynamics must be managed
carefully.” Parkhe (1998a) argue in this context, that trust essentially emerges from
three sources: Backward looking from past interactions directly with a partner or from
reputation gained from past interactions with other partners; or forward looking from
future expectations.
In the context of past interaction directly with the partner, it is important to note that
these interactions always happen between individuals. This has already been touched
upon above, and is reinforced by Parkhe (1998a, p. 420), who states that the “key
requirement for such mutual comfort to arise is sustained involvement at all phases of
an alliance by people.” These ideas are also reflected in the concept of relational capital,
which has been defined as “mutual trust, respect, and friendship that arises out of the
close interaction at the individual level between alliance partners” (Kale et al., 2000,
p. 218). Obviously, these ties are also to a large extent helpful in resolving behavioral
concerns. However, they also promise to be the only viable way to coordinate the
complex interactions between network partners, which is the essence of this section. In
this light, the concept of relational capital is complementary to that of the relational
view, or as Kale et al. (2000, p. 232) frame it, “our findings [on the concept of relational
capital] are consistent with the relational view of competitive advantage offered by Dyer
and Singh (1998).”
Besides these direct experiences with partners, reputational effects can contribute to
the trust that an organization is enjoying. However, as Dollinger et al. (1997) also em-
phasize, just like trust, reputation is a multi-dimensional concept. An organization can
have a reputation concerning essentially every aspect of a modern firm: “A firm might
have an excellent reputation for financial stability, yet its products may be seen as non-
innovative and below-average quality” (Dollinger et al., 1997, p. 128). Consequently, all
the so far discussed aspects of a relationship - like innovativeness, quality, and speedy
delivery - are subject to reputation effects. However, in the context of trust, the rep-
utation for integrity and trustworthy behavior can be considered most important. As
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different as these types of reputation might seem, the underlying principle how they
might reduce frictions in the network is very similar, they act “as a surrogate for direct
experience with a partner.” With other words:
The benefits of a positive reputation would be expected to continue beyond
the completion of the transaction and enhance the chances for satisfaction
throughout the life of the relationship. If this were not the case, a positive
reputation would not be a desirable feature of a partner firm (both Saxton,
1997, p. 445).
Thus, Dollinger et al. (1997, p. 128) note, “a positive reputation can be shown to
increase the desirability of the target firm as a strategic alliance partner.” Conse-
quently, a negative reputation can also be seen as impeding the ability to partner in
inter-organizational networks. Similar to trust that is established through direct inter-
actions, building this positive reputation is often a long-term process117 (Weigelt and
Camerer, 1988), which requires continuously consistent behavioral patterns. One change
in behavior might spoil the entire reputation building exercise (Rhee and Haunschild,
2006). It can therefore be expected, that an organization that has invested into building
a reputation of being a trustworthy, respectable, and friendly partner, is not likely to
forsake this reputation through deliberately participating in a project without commit-
ment. Thus, the reputation of participants in the IS development network, promises to
lead to a decrease in coordination efforts between the different partners (Ring and Van
de Ven, 1992).
Finally, the importance of future events has to be emphasized. Only if the relationship
between partners is extended beyond the actual transaction, a relationship management
that involves trust or reputation of trustworthiness can be successful (Banerjee and
Duflo, 2000). If conjoint participation on a project is seen as a one-off event, there is
no reason why an organization should invest into behaving as or building the reputation
of being a trustworthy, respectable, and friendly partner. However, if recurrence of
projects is given, or at least can be expected, relational capital that has been built over
time promises to be a valuable instrument for managing the relationships with network
partners. This indicates the close connection with ex post alignment of incentives and
also touches upon the discussion on transaction frequency. Summarizing this section,
it has to be stated that building a trusting relationship between the partners in an IS
development network is an important management mechanism in the network. Thereby
it is irrelevant whether this trusting relationship is based on past direct interactions,
a positive reputation, or future expectations. However, obviously all three aspects are
highly interrelated.
117Please recognize here the close connection to the resource-based view. Reputation is considered to
be a resource yielding a sustained competitive advantage (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Dollinger
et al., 1997).
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Proposition Rel. Both large IS producers (hubs) and smaller software pro-
ducers (spokes) invest into building trusting relationships in order to manage
their relationship(s).
Again, investments of this type can be expected to be beneficial for both the hubs
and the spokes. However, it has to be stated that building trusting relationships is
probably the most expensive investment in the network. Therefore, it can be assumed
that the highly expensive coordination mechanism of personal relationships that foster
mutual trust cannot be applied to all the existing relationships with similar intensity.
Only those that are perceived to be most important are enjoying this kind of special
treatment. Finding out if this is really the case is exactly what has been described as
’connecting the two preceding threads of research objectives’ in the introduction. Several
benefits have been developed, as have been coordination mechanisms. After having
found whether these are indeed the driving forces behind the IS development network, a
connection between the findings of these research questions promises to reveal whether
those relationships that promise to be most important are also managed in the optimal
way. This has been the last theoretical proposition. The following section briefly wraps
up the so far conducted theoretical preconceptions and then leads over to the following
chapter, in which the methodology is explained in further detail.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter the theoretical foundations for this study have been laid. First, a thorough
discussion and delimitation of what constitutes the field of IS development has been
conducted. This discussion has emphasized specificities of IS as both intellectual and
information goods. Based on a subsequent discussion of general systems theory, it has
been argued that any complex product should be developed along the principles of
modularity on both the product- and the organizational level. In this context, it has
been argued that different industry structures are used to assign different tasks to various
stakeholders. In this consideration, the (emerging) IS development industry mirrors the
structure of a strategic hub-and-spoke network. After discussing briefly the specific
structure of such a network, a discussion of literature on the topic specifically for IS
development affirms the perception that this phenomenon is not well covered in this field.
Consequently a broader perspective is chosen that incorporates the field of organizational
science.
However, as this discussion unfolds, it becomes obvious that the idiosyncrasies of IS
render such a transfer of principles from industrial technologies difficult, if not impos-
sible. In this context, the recent emergence of Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA)
is introduced, as it promises to be a thrust in the development towards such a higher
degree of inter-organizational division of labor in the field of IS development. In this
context it has been argued that this development can essentially be analyzed from two
different perspectives, a technical one and an organizational one. As the latter is still
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largely neglected in research, this perspective is chosen. From this organizational vista,
research on inter-organizational networks usually poses one of two distinct questions:
First, answers are given to the question of the reasons why organizations enter into such
relationships. Second, answers are given to the question how such a relationship can be
best managed once it is entered. As both questions are closely intertwined with each
other, this study attempts to give a comprehensive answer to both.
The first perspective is filled with theories which are related to the field of strategic
management. As it has been argued, strategic management literature follows one of two
distinct paradigms - assigning organizational success either to the market surroundings
or to resources internal to the firm. As the industry is given in this study, the latter
paradigm is selected, and here especially the resource-based view. From this viewpoint
the resources that are at the disposal of an organization are the determining factor for this
organization’s success. Which of the multiple resources at the disposal of an organization
can lead to a sustained competitive advantage, and thus to organizational success are
covered in the basic theory. However, the basic theme has also been varied through
various enhancements. Among the concepts discussed here has been that of dynamic
capabilities, which covers the ability of organizations to react to changed environmental
conditions through adapting their resource base. Further, specificities of resources in an
inter-organizational context are introduced. In a complex interconnected environment,
all organizations have to rely on resources that they do not control directly. From a
theoretical perspective it is argued that especially those organizations are attractive that
posses resources that are complementary, supplementary, or surplus to the resources of
the focal organization. In this context, it has been argued that especially those resources
that give the focal organization access to new technologies, to innovations, or to new
markets are attractive. For these three perspectives, propositions have been developed
for answering the first research question, why organizations (both hubs and spokes)
participate in such a network.
The approach to finding an answer to the second research question is subdivided into
two broad research threads. The first thread is addressing behavioral concerns within
the network. These issues stem from the co-existence of two underlying assumptions
that all theories share. The first assumption is that of bounded rationality. Due to
limited cognitive abilities, humans are not able to correctly assess their environment in
its entireness. Therefore, they by necessity have to base their decisions on incomplete
information. The second assumption is that of opportunism. Humans do not obey the
rules. Rather they can be expected to use unfair means to take advantage of others. If
both assumptions hold true, which is assumed here, transactions between organizations
are hazardous endeavors, which have been analyzed in various theories. Most of these
theories originate in the field of economics. From the multitude of theories in this field,
especially those are discussed that are addressing issues at the organizational level. As
the relationships between organizations are of prime interest, only those theories that
analyze organizations through the relationships they engage in are considered.
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The overarching of these theories can be considered that of transaction costs. The
main idea of this theory is that similar to frictions in mechanical systems, transaction
costs reduce the efficiency of economic systems. Based on an analysis of what causes
higher or lower transaction costs, the theory addresses how organizational structures
adapt to these contingencies. Usually, high transaction costs result in organizational
structures that can be better controlled - usually the integration within one organization.
The main aspect of transaction cost theory is assumed to be the specificity of certain
investments necessary for a relationship118. Agency theory then especially addresses how
uncertainty influences the relationship between a principal that delegates a task to an
agent. Both, the effects of uncertainty before, throughout, and after the transaction, and
how to mitigate them are discussed in this theory. The final theory is that of incomplete
contracts and property rights. It is argued in these concepts that due to the above
mentioned underlying assumptions, long-lasting relationships have to be adapted over
time. As long lasting relationships are a desirable goal, these concepts emphasize the
importance of ownership of assets to realize them. All three aspects consequently have to
be addressed in order to minimize behavioral issues in the IS development network: Asset
specificity has to be kept low, uncertainty has to be reduced, and durable relationships
have to be designed.
The second research stream is addressing coordination issues. These arise primarily
from inherent complexities of the developed system, and only secondarily from behav-
ioral problems. These inherent complexities stem from the fact that in a conjointly
developed system, components are exactly not completely independent of each other.
Rather, organizations depend on the input from each other in order to successfully de-
velop and deploy such a system. Theories on organizational interdependencies have been
discussed and especially on the basis of the classification of organizational interdepen-
dencies as being either pooled, sequential, or interdependent, it has been argued that
IS development is one of the most complex tasks, which consequently involves all three
types of interdependencies. Thus, coordinating this endeavor requires different coordi-
nation mechanisms. First, it has been argued that standardization is one of the most
fundamental mechanisms. It can be addressed for example through the above described
wide-spread adoption of SOA principles. Second, monitoring through information shar-
ing routines is considered to be of high importance for the here described IS development
network. Finally, mutual adjustment through personal, informal ties has been deemed
to be of even higher importance. As the proposed management mechanisms from a
behavioral and a complexity perspective are very closely related to each other, this part
of the theoretical discussion closes with a discussion of these mechanisms in the context
of IS development. Here again, propositions have been developed how hubs and spokes
should manage their relationships with other participants in the network.
118Transaction cost theory also addresses the other two aspect of uncertainty and frequency. However,
as the other two theories are more detailed in this regard, they have also been discussed.
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This has been a brief summary of the above proposed reasons, why organizations enter
into such IS development networks, and how the management of such relationships is
supposed to be realized. These have been derived from the various theoretical lenses
that have been deemed as most appropriate for this study. Since there is no far reaching
knowledge of this phenomenon in the IS development context, the propositions have
deliberately not been formulated as sharp hypotheses. Rather, this theoretical discus-
sion has been intended to explicitly express the ideas that should guide the subsequent
empirical research. The chosen research methodology is that of a case study, which is
especially suited to answer the exploratory question of why such an IS development net-
work emerges, and how it should be managed. This methodology is introduced in more
detail in the next chapter. After this discussion, the following chapter is concerned with
the actual design of the empirical research.
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3 Research Design
As it has been noted in the introduction, a research design is can be defined as a
plan for answering certain research questions (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). Thus, after
having discussed the theoretical preconceptions in the preceding chapter, the goal of
this chapter is to address how the propositions that have been developed on the basis of
these preconceptions can be addressed in order to obtain answers to the posed research
questions. Much effort has been made in order to distill generic research designs that can
be applied in various contexts (e.g. Creswell, 1998; Kerlinger and Lee, 2000; McGrath,
1982; Stone, 1978). As a result of this effort, today a multitude of classifications for
research designs exist - which are partly disjoint and partly overlapping. Consequently,
this work does not completely and solely follow one of these taxonomies. Rather, a
multi-staged approach is followed. First, different research strategies are introduced on
the basis of the work of Stone (1978). This involves a discussion of dimensions that vary
in different research settings. These dimensions have an implication on which strategy
is more or less appropriate. The first section therefore closes with the selection of one
of the proposed research strategies according to the specificities of the IS development
context. In the second section of this chapter, this chosen strategy is further elaborated
on in considerable detail. Various specificities are discussed in order to prepare and
delimitate the approach taken in the empirical part of this study. Exactly this approach
of data collection and analysis is then described in more detail in the last two section of
this chapter
3.1 Research Strategies
3.1.1 Dimensions for Classifying Research Settings
In his work, Stone (1978) argues that researchers always have to make trade-offs when
choosing their research strategy. No strategy exists that is superior to other strategies
in all aspects (Scandura and Williams, 2000). However, only if the researcher has a clear
understanding of what the involved dimensions exactly are, which degree of each of the
dimensions is appropriate for his research objectives, and how well the different existing
research strategies meet these requirements, he is able to deliberately select the strategy
that best fits with his research objectives (McGrath, 1982). Commonly, three different
dimensions1 are given as most important for the selection of the research strategy: (1)
1 Stone (1978) gives seven dimensions. However, the first three are more or less identical to those
proposed here, and the latter four are related to at least one of these three. Therefore, the subsequent
discussion implicitly includes these four missing dimensions.
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the realism or naturalness of the context in which observations are made; (2) the control
that a researcher has over the setting, which includes the ability to precisely measure the
proposed variables; and (3) the generalizability of the research findings to other contexts
(McGrath, 1982; Scandura and Williams, 2000). In order to allow for exactly such a
deliberate choice of research strategy, these three proposed dimensions are subsequently
discussed.
The first dimension is that of naturalness or realism of the research setting. Studies
that emphasize this dimensions are placed in settings that are (at least perceived to be)
real for the participants of the study. Some research objectives can only be achieved
in this natural setting. Especially those issues that involve multiple, possibly even so
far undiscovered, often highly interrelated aspects are ideally analyzed in the setting
in which they naturally occur. Following Stone (1978) the main reason for this is the
fact that both the strength and the range of the studied variables are generally greater
in their natural settings. An example for this would be stress levels. In a natural
setting, the level of stress can be expected to be much higher than in any artificial
setting that the researcher constructs. Also, contamination by some artifacts, such as
demand characteristics - the fact that research subjects behave in a way that they believe
the researcher expects them to behave - can be minimized through the naturalness or
realism of the research setting (Stone, 1978). Thus, before conducting research, a clear
understanding of what degree of naturalness is expected to be beneficial. Once this has
be achieved, a research strategy can be chosen in order to attain (at least a relatively
close match with) this desired degree of naturalness.
The second dimension is that of control over the research setting. If the research
attempts to answer questions about the causal relationships between clearly defined
variables, some of these (the independent variables) have to be manipulated, and all
variables have to be precisely measured in order to allow for any drawing of conclusions
(Stone, 1978). In other studies this control is much less distinct, such as when certain
measures are taken to manipulate a variable but this variable is also subject to uncon-
trollable noise. In yet other studies the research does not have any control over the
variables, he can only observe them. This degree of control that a researcher has over
his subjects is also reflected in the notion of experimental, quasi-experimental, and non-
experimental research. In experimental approaches, the researcher has full control over
his research subjects, over the point in time when he is doing his research and over what
kind of treatment the subjects receive. In quasi-experimental research, the researcher
has no control over the treatment of the subjects. In non-experimental research, the
researcher has no direct control at all (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000; Stone, 1978). Again,
understanding what degree of control is necessary and achievable helps a researcher to
choose the right strategy.
Finally, the degree of generalizability of the findings is one of the three dimensions.
Although generalizability should be the aim of all research, some research efforts are
addressing this dimension more than others. Especially basic research is more concerned
with the fundamental understanding of a certain phenomenon. Generalizability to other
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contexts is often not the foremost consideration. Applied research in contrast is explicitly
addressing the applicability of its results to other contexts (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000).
Here again, the researcher needs a clear conception of what degree of generalizability is
most desirable for his research effort.
Selecting which degree of each of these three dimensions is most desirable for a certain
research effort is by no means an easy task. These three dimensions are mutually exclu-
sive in a sense that no research strategy can be found that is superior to other strategies
on all three dimensions. This fact has been illustratively described by McGrath as a
three-horned dilemma:
The very strengths of each strategy, plan, or method with respect to one
desideratum is often its main weakness with respect to another desideratum.
To maximize on one desideratum (boldly grabbing that horn) is to have rela-
tively unfavorable levels of the other two (that is, to get part way impaled on
both of the two other horns). Conversely, to optimize between two desiderata
(snugly fitting between those two horns) is to guarantee a minimum on the
third desideratum (that is, to get impaled, to the hilt, on the third horn).
There is no way - in principle - to maximize all three (conflicting[), sic!]
desiderata of the research strategy domain (McGrath, 1982, p. 76, emphasis
in original).
Thus, the researcher can choose between several inherently flawed research strate-
gies. The choice he has to make is which of the flaws is the least severe for a certain
research effort. The following section discusses a taxonomy of research strategies with
special consideration of weaknesses relating to the above discussed dimensions. Then,
the last section illuminates which strategy should be followed and why this strategy is
appropriate in the here addressed context.
3.1.2 A Taxonomy of Research Strategies
As it has already been discussed, there exists a multitude of research strategy taxonomies
(e.g. Creswell, 1998; Kerlinger and Lee, 2000; McGrath, 1982; Stone, 1978). As most
of these are at least in part congruent, subsequently the taxonomy of Stone (1978) is
discussed without loss of generalizability. Stone (1978) includes in his discussion of the
research strategies a three-legged approach. First, he introduces an example which uses
the research strategy. This part of his work is neglected in this paper, due to the age of
Stone’s (1978) work, and due to the fact that it is a work with a different focus than this
one, which renders the examples rather inappropriate for the current context. Second,
he discusses major characteristics of the strategy; and finally, he lists a representative
number of advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. The following part of this
section summarizes the latter two parts of Stone’s (1978) work.
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The first research strategy that is introduced is the laboratory experiment. This strat-
egy is characterized by the fact that it is conducted in a way in which the researcher
creates a setting which he or she believes is appropriate for testing his hypotheses. In
this setting, the researcher has virtually complete control over the research subjects, in-
cluding assigned tasks, treatment, and control conditions. This also gives the researcher
complete control over the independent variables, and therefore the ability to manipu-
late these independent variables at his will. Among the key advantages of this setting
is the high level of control. This allows the researcher to minimize the influence of
external variables, and therefore makes measurements more precise than in any other
research approach. Another advantage is the possible use of control groups. This gives
the researcher a clear comparison between a group that actually tests the hypothesis,
and another group that only believes to test the hypothesis. It therefore again makes
measurements more stable and reliable. There are obviously several disadvantages for
this approach, foremost the fact that natural phenomena often cannot be duplicated in
a laboratory, natural disasters and the behaviors associated with them spring to mind.
Furthermore, laboratory experiments might lack realism, and might therefore generate
results that are not per se applicable in reality. Finally, ethical or moral concerns have
to be addressed that might result from manipulating critical independent variables such
as race or social standing.
The second research strategy is that of a simulation. Closely related to the laboratory
experiment, the simulation also takes place in a setting that is largely controlled by the
researcher. However, instead of exposing participants to a predefined set of rules and
regulations that govern the laboratory experiment, in a simulation, the participants are
exposed to (simulated) real life situations, in which they are free to behave as they deem
appropriate; obviously within the given regulations of the simulation. Within these real
life situations several independent variables can be modified to a certain extend, and
the behavior of the participants shows the resulting dependent variable. The two most
prominent advantages of this kind of research are the relatively high (in comparison with
the laboratory experiment) realism, which goes hand in hand with a higher participant
involvement and lower participant demands, and the (in comparison with other research
strategies like the field study) higher control over he independent variables, and the
resulting high stability and reliability of measurements. Among the disadvantages of
this approach are the downsides of the higher participant involvement, which might
result in psychological harm of the participants, the fact that independent variables are
harder to identify, and under less control than in the laboratory experiment, and finally,
the obvious high costs.
The next research approach is the field experiment. Again, this approach closely re-
sembles the previous one. However, this time the experiment is conducted in a natural
setting rather than an artificially created environment. Independent variables are manip-
ulated to an extent that is permitted by the situation, and the systematic observation of
the experiment’s participants yields information on the dependent variable. The required
control over nuisance variables is achieved trough the use of control group research, or
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less effective through statistical calculations. Advantages of this design are obviously the
improved realism in comparison to the two so far introduced designs, and the therefore
improved external validity. Furthermore, field experiments allow not only the testing of
theories, but also the solution of applied problems; finally, and perhaps most important,
field experiments allow longitudinal studies, that would not be feasible in an artificial
environment. As disadvantages, the reduced control over, and the reduced precision in
measuring, the independent variables have to be mentioned. Furthermore, experience
has shown that willingness to participate in field experiments is rather low, and the
intentional manipulation of one variable often results in the unintentional manipulation
of others, often with unforeseeable effects.
The fourth research setting that is discussed is the field study. This research ap-
proach is the first non-experimental discussed here. The characteristic point for a non-
experimental research is the fact that the researcher has no control over, no possibility to
manipulate, the independent variables. However, the researcher systematically measures
variables in the natural setting he or she decided to study, and draws conclusions from
examining this gathered data. The manipulation of the independent variable is replaced
by self reports of participants, or some other way to measure the extent to which partic-
ipants have been exposed to the phenomenon in question. The same approach is used
to measure the dependent variable. Advantages of this approach are the even increased
realism in comparison to the prior introduced designs, the very low interaction between
researcher and research subjects, and the fact that complex phenomena can be studied.
Furthermore, this design is often used to research practical issues. Disadvantages are
the high influence of variables that have not been taking into account in the hypothesis
development. Field studies might yield results that are purely random, i.e. a strong re-
lationship might be found between independent and dependent variable, although none
exists in reality. Controlling for these influences is almost impossible, since manipulating
independent variables is impossible.
The fifth research strategy is the sample survey. In this approach, data is collected
from a sample of a known population. This is done using systematic techniques, e.g.
interviews or questionnaires. No independent variable is manipulated. Instead the mea-
surement of the independent as well as the dependent variable is directly taken from
the answers of the survey participants. The research subjects provide data in a natural
setting, is can be assumed that the influence the researcher is taking on research sub-
jects is minimal. Finally, nuisance variables are removed through statistical calculations.
Advantages of this approach are, among others, the fact that statistical methods allow
a sampling process that is free of biases, and that allows a generalization from the sam-
ple to the ex ante known population. Furthermore, data is collected directly from the
participants, and in a natural setting. This collected data often yields material for formu-
lating new hypotheses; and finally the approach is relatively inexpensive. Disadvantages
are the fact that standardized approaches often make participants agree to statements,
which they not fully support. The willingness to answer to surveys has decreased, which
might require the sending out of large numbers of questionnaires to obtain a reasonable
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number of returned questionnaires. Finally, this research strategy allows only snapshot
research. Developments in participants’ responses cannot be grasped with the required
precision.
The final research design is that of a case study. In this approach the researcher in-
tensely examines a single unit of interest, e.g. a person, a department, an organization.
Data is collected by multiple means, such as (published) secondary material, interviews,
personal observations, and so on. The independent variable is not manipulated. The
researcher solely relies on the collected data. The phenomenon of interest is studied in a
purely natural setting. Advantages for this approach are obviously the flexibility of data
collection, the fact that complex situations can be examined inclusively, the appropriate-
ness of a case study to generate new hypotheses, the natural setting, and the relatively
low costs involved. Disadvantages are that it is the least systematic approach, that case
studies are exposed huge biases, that generalization from a case study is usually difficult,
and finally that case studies are usually more time-consuming than other approaches.
3.1.3 Selection of the Research Strategy
The above conducted discussion on six generic research strategies has shown the three-
horned dilemma that McGrath (1982) found for such taxonomies very well. None of the
research approaches promises to be superior to all the others. Rather, each approach
has distinct advantages and consequently also disadvantages in comparison to the others.
So, as it has been discussed above, a clear understanding of which of the dimensions of
research strategies are more important than the others is needed in order to deliberately
select the most appropriate research strategy for a given context. With regard to the
context of networked IS development that has been discussed in considerable detail
above, in the following conclusions about the three dimensions can be drawn.
First, it can be safely assumed that the control over the setting and thus the ability
to manipulate and precisely measure the proposed variables is absolutely minimal. Ob-
viously, choosing on whether to join a certain organizational network or not is a highly
important decision for any organization, hubs and spokes alike. Thus attempting to de-
liberately manipulating this decision in a real-world context is a foredoomed endeavor.
The same is true for the active management of such an inter-organizational relationship.
Again, the financial prosperity of entire companies2 is in part dependent on the success-
ful management of these relationships. Thus, it can be expected that any attempt to
force companies to deliberately use management techniques which promise to be unsuc-
cessful is not taken well by these organizations. Furthermore, both the decision to join
or not and the management of the relationship once a network has been joined can be
expected to be influenced by a myriad of different factors. Thus, attempting to replicate
this setting in an artificial environment is also not promising to yield any meaningful
2 Which includes adverse effects for the companies’ employees. See Stone (1978) and Kerlinger and
Lee (2000) for a discussion on ethical issues in research.
140
141
results. The naturalness of the context in which observations are made is thus of prime
importance. Finally, the generalizability of the findings to other contexts is desired, yet
not the most prominent goal of this study.
Consequently, the most promising research strategy in this context can be expected to
be the one that is boldly grabbing the horn of realism, while getting part way impaled
on the horns of control and generalizability. The research strategy that seems to best fit
this description is that of a case study. The above mentioned advantages of this research
strategy fit very well to what is required for the actual context of IS development,
above all the naturalness of the setting and the realization that control over the research
setting is by definition minimal. The aspect of reduced generalizability can be addressed
through conducting a multiple case study (Yin, 2003; Stake, 2006). This, and further
specificities of case study research3 are discussed in the following section in more detail.
3.2 Specificities of Case Study Strategy
Applying the research strategy of case studies is commonly done in IS research. Building
on a rich tradition of analyzing research strategies in the IS field, Vessey et al. (2002)
examine the research strategy of a total of 488 articles that have been published be-
tween 1995 and 1999 in the five leading IS journals. They found that more than 40
percent4 have been using either the field or the case study approach. Consequently, IS
research has a long tradition of applying the case study strategy (e.g. Benbasat et al.,
1987; Cavaye, 1996; Lee, 1989, and the there quoted literature) and a rich body of lit-
erature on the topic has evolved in both IS and organizational science. This rich body
of literature is subsequently discussed in order to gain a deeper understanding of the
specificities of the here applied research strategy. This discussion highlights four differ-
ent aspects of research in general, which are discussed specifically with regard to case
study research. First, a brief discussion of the fact that multiple cases can enhance the
generalizability of the study is conducted. This discussion also includes how the studied
cases are supposed to be selected. Second, the fact that case studies can either be ex-
ploratory or confirmatory in nature is of importance for this type of research. Differences
between these two types are discussed and it is argued that the here conducted study
is inherently exploratory. Third, case studies can either follow a qualitative or a quan-
titative research approach. Again, the differences between these two types of research
approaches are discussed. As it is argued that the here proposed study is more quali-
3 Often case studies are subsumed as part of field studies (e.g. Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). Wherever
this is the case, backgrounds on field studies are also consulted for a deeper understanding of the
research design.
4 This number is very close to what Scandura and Williams (2000) report for the discipline of man-
agement science. Out of 363 articles published in the period from 1985 - 1987, 38.00 percent have
been reported to be field studies; out of the 411 articles published from 1995 - 1997 the reported
number is 40.90 percent. Also the relative share of case studies is consistent across different cultural
settings, e.g. the US and Germany (Wilde and Hess, 2007).
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tative than quantitative in nature, ramifications of this fact are also discussed. Finally,
the differences between variance- and process-theoretical approaches are discussed. In
this dimensions, the study so far followed a variance theoretical approach. Why this is
the fact and what this means for the present work is highlighted in the final part of this
section5.
3.2.1 Case Study Design and Replication Logic
Before discussing what the necessary steps of designing the actual research are, first
a clear understanding of what exactly is the unit of analysis of this study, is required
(Markus and Robey, 1988). As Yin (2003) notes, the unit of analysis is implicitly defined
through the research questions that a study is attempting to answer. The research ques-
tions that have been proposed in the introduction as guiding this research are addressing
the organizations that constitute the industry. Thus, these organizations are also the
most appropriate level of analysis. This has already been sketched in the introduction; it
has already been used in the discussion on different change perspectives in Section 2.1.3;
and it has also implicitly6 guided the discussion of the theoretical underpinnings for this
work in the preceding chapter. However, this decision is clearly spelled out here, as the
following discussion of the study design requires a clear and explicit understanding of
the addressed level of analysis.
Thus, conducting the case study research requires the selection of one or more orga-
nization(s) to be studied. However, as it has been touched upon above, contrary to the
perception of Stone (1978) case studies do not necessarily have to be confined to one
single unit of analysis. Rather, Yin (2003) mentions two dimensions through which case
study designs can vary. The first dimension is that of how many cases actually are ana-
lyzed as part of the research. Very broadly, Yin (2003) differentiates on this dimension
between single- and multiple-case designs. The in-depth analysis of only a single case,
in the sense of Stone (1978), is most appropriate in a couple of settings. Either, the
case might be critical in that it fulfills all requirements of a setting for testing a certain
theory; or the case might be extreme or unique in that it is so rare that each single
case is worth being analyzed; it is also conceivable that the case is typical for a certain
group of cases; or the case is revelatory in a sense that it has not been accessible for
analysis before; finally, the case might be a longitudinal case, which is followed over an
extended period of time. If none of these, or comparable, arguments is working in favor
of a single case study, the researcher is well advised to augment his research to include
5 It should be highlighted here that the choices in these different aspects of a research strategy are
not independent of each other. Rather, choices in one dimension have implication for the other
dimensions as well.
6 This is most obvious in Section 2.3.1.2, where especially those theories of the firm have been selected
that address issues at an organizational level.
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multiple cases. This especially as conducting multiple cases allows for a higher degree
of generalizability (one of the key disadvantages of single case studies mentioned above)
through cross-case analyses (Eisenhardt, 1989b).
On the second dimension, Yin (2003) argues for a differentiation between holistic
and embedded case studies. The first refers to a situation in which each case consists of
exactly one unit of analysis. In the latter, each case consists of multiple units of analysis.
The choice of whether to conduct a holistic or an embedded case study is more linked
to the research objectives than that of conducting a single or multiple case studies. If
the research focus is on the actual case level or if there are no possible meaningful sub-
units to analyze, a holistic approach promises to be more favorable. In contrast if an
analysis of sub-units is meaningfully possible, an embedded case design might be more
appropriate because comparing the units of analysis is easier if they originate in the
same context. However, as Yin (2003) notes, an embedded case design always requires
the returning to the overall case level. If no conclusions are drawn on this level, the case
actually becomes a multi-case, holistic study in which the original case becomes part of
the context. As this involves a change in the level of analysis, drawing conclusions from
such a case becomes highly complex. The resulting two-by-two matrix is illustrated in
Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies.
Source: Based on Yin (2003, p. 40).
As none of the organizations that develop complex IS promises to fulfill any one of
the requirements that have been proposed for conducting a single case research, the
here sketched research approach should be one involving multiple cases. Furthermore,
the discussed theoretical underpinnings have been largely limited to the organizational
level (as this has been selected as the level of analysis). Consequently, the focus should
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also be on holistic cases in which each organization is treated as one case7. The here
proposed case study design is therefore a holistic, multiple case design. The question
that remains to be answered is how these multiple cases should be selected.
This selection usually follows a specific logic, which is subsequently discussed. As
Yin (2003) notes, this is a replication, rather than a sampling logic. The goal of the
latter type of studies is the development of statements about a population of entities
that is studied. In order to obtain these statements a statistical method is employed to
generate a certain subset of respondents, with each data point reflecting one of these
respondents. The statistical methods are used again in order to draw conclusions from
the available data points to the entire population. Thus, a certain variance in the
answers is required in order to generate valid statements about the relationships between
proposed variables. Since for case studies the number of data points is limited and
the number of covered variables is extraordinarily high, such inferential statistics is
impossible, and consequently, “any application of this sampling logic to case studies
would be misplaced” (Yin, 2003, p. 48). Rather, and in contrast to this logic, case
studies should not be seen as data points out of a larger population. Each case should
be considered as a study in its own right. Similar to ensuring a higher validity of a single
study that yielded interesting results through replicating it, case studies should also be
replicated.
Yin (2003) proposes two different rationales for this replication. First, a literal replica-
tion predicts the same or at least highly similar results. Second, a theoretical replication
predicts different results; however, these results have to differ in a clearly prescribed
and theoretically explainable way. In this context it has to be noted that predicting
different results does not necessarily means that the final outcome has to be different.
Rather, the final result might be the same, yet for very different reasons. Yin (2003)
for example mentions the work of Szanton (1981), who studies different cases of eight
university and five nonunversity groups that all failed in advising city officials. Despite
the fact that the final result has been the same for all groups, “within each of the (...)
groups of case studies, Szanton has illustrated the principle of literal replication. Across
the (...) groups, he has illustrated theoretical replication. This potent case study design
can and should be applied to many other topics” (Yin, 2003, p. 49). Thus, the overall
selection of cases should follow a combination of the two underlying logics, as is has also
been very well described by Yin as a general recommendation for multiple case study
research:
The ability to conduct 6 to 10 case studies, arranged effectively within a
multiple-case design, is analogous to the ability to conduct 6 to 10 experi-
ments on related topics; a few cases (2 or 3) would be literal replications,
7 An embedded design, in which each relationship that an organization has with other organizations
is treated as an embedded unit of analysis, is also conceivable. However, as the organizational has
been chosen as the level of analysis, the holistic approach is more promising in this context.
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whereas a few other cases (4 to 6) might be designed to pursue two differ-
ent patterns of theoretical replications. If all the cases turn out as predicted,
these 6 to 10 cases, in the aggregate, would have provided compelling support
for the initial set of propositions (Yin, 2003, p. 47).
In this context, Yin (2003, p. 47) also notes that, “every case should serve a specific
purpose within the overall scope of inquiry.” Thus, as it has been mentioned in the
introduction, this study first addresses a hub organization. This selection has been
made, because this type of organization is assumed to play a pivotal role in forming
the entire network. Then, in order to increase the generalizability of the findings of
this study, a second hub organization is studied. This case is indeed selected so that it
promises to have similar results to the first one (literal replication). Once these findings
have been satisfactorily validated, the second step is to deliberately select cases that
promise to have divergent results - yet this for a very well founded reason (theoretical
replication). In the context of this study these are obviously the spoke companies in the
IS development network. As these are by definition more numerous, another eight of
these cases are analyzed. Thus, hub and spoke cases can be considered literal replications
among each other and theoretical replications with regard to the other group. This is
also illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: The Replication Logic among and in-between Hub and Spoke Cases.
Source: Own Illustration.
The question that remains to be answered is how the researcher determines whether
the cases turn out as predicted or not. Essentially this involves two distinct questions.
The first is that of what exactly the goal of each case is, the second is when this goal
has been reached. The determination of the goal of a case is largely based on the
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differentiation between exploratory and confirmatory case design. The answer to the
question of when a goal has been reached depends on the type of data collection, which
can be classified as being either qualitative or quantitative. Both aspects are discussed
subsequently.
3.2.2 Exploratory vs. Confirmatory Design
The insight that case (or field) studies can be either exploratory or confirmatory in
nature has been raised early on by Katz (1953). The key differentiating factor be-
tween the two types of studies is that the first attempts to seek what is rather than to
sharply predict relations: “From its [an exploratory study] findings may come knowledge
about important relationships between variables, but the more definite proof of these
relationships comes from” confirmatory studies (Katz, 1953, p. 74). Going more into
details, Kerlinger and Lee (2000, p. 586) argue that “exploratory studies have three pur-
poses: to discover significant variables (...), to discover relations among variables, and
to lay the groundwork for later, more systematic and rigorous testing of hypotheses.”
Consequently, exploratory studies commonly precede confirmatory ones (Katz, 1953),
especially if the subject to be studied is not yet well understood.
As has become clear during the discussion of theoretical preconceptions, the topic
addressed in this research effort is not very well covered in the literature. Although
intense reference has been made to the fields of general management and organizational
science, the topic has not been addressed under special consideration of the idiosyn-
crasies of IS development. Consequently, an exploratory research design, in contrast
to a hypothesis-testing one, is selected (Katz, 1953). This well mirrors the goals of the
present study as they have been described above. First, significant aspects that drive the
IS developing organizations to establish networks around the systems of large vendors
have to be found. Three of these aspects already have been discovered as part of the
preliminary theoretical work. However, if these are indeed the dominant factors remains
to be determined. There very well might be other aspects specifically form an IS devel-
opment context that have not been discussed in the existing body of literature. Exactly
to find out whether these factors exist and what they are has to be an explicit goal of
this study. Also, management mechanisms have been identified from the above men-
tioned reference disciplines (Keen, 1980) in order to counter behavioral and complexity
concerns. Whether these are indeed also relevant for the IS development industry and if
there might be others is also key for this study. Finally, how these found factors relate
to each other is an important issue. Is it indeed true that - similar to other industries -
partners can be managed differently according to what they contribute to the entire net-
work? Or is it rather the fact that it is impossible to make a differentiation between the
different partners in an IS development context? As it has already been touched upon
at various instances, answering this question also promises to clarify the issue whether
there indeed exists something like meta-capabilities or not (see Section 2.2.1.2).
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However, as it has become obvious through the last chapter, this study does not start
without preconceptions. As the research focus is on explaining why organizations in the
IS development industry behave the way they do, it is actually very prone to loose focus
as the amount of data that is collected through an exploratory study becomes over-
whelming. As Eisenhardt (1989b, p. 536) frames it, “without a research focus, it is easy
to become overwhelmed by the volume of data.” Yin (2003, p. 23) also recognizes this
fact when stating that at least some “degree of rationale and direction should underlie
even an exploratory case study.” So, throughout the preceding chapter an attempt has
been made to structure the issues that organizations in the IS development context are
facing. During this structuring, several propositions8 have been framed that are assumed
to be of prime importance for the above discussed research questions (Miles and Huber-
man, 1994). The exploratory study is now intended to shed more light on these research
threads, to identify potential other aspects that might furthermore be of importance, as
well as to discover the inherent dynamics of how these aspects interconnect with each
other9. This is well reflected in the literature on exploratory studies, for which Katz
(1953, p. 77) for example also recognizes the fact that “researchers do have hypotheses
in mind, but these are not precisely formulated.”
However, this research approach requires a very cautious proceeding, as it is an in-
herent characteristic of case study research that the researcher gets influenced by his
studies. This fact has been noticed as problematic for a long time. Stone for example
argues that
to the extent that a research strategy requires the investigator to maintain
prolonged contact with a studied system, his or her objectivity in studying
the system may suffer. Some research strategies (e.g., the case study and the
field experiment) would appear to be more subject to this problem than other
strategies (e.g., the laboratory experiment or the sample survey) (Stone,
1978, p. 114).
However, recently the perception of this issue as being problematic has decreased.
In part the problem of reduced objectivity accepted as a downside of the opportunity
for increased flexibility. Yin (2003, p. 50) for example argues that a (multiple) case
8 These reflect what is called themes in qualitative research. Please also see the following section.
9 This process is closely intertwined with the analysis of qualitative data as it is described below. In
this context, Patton (2002, p. 453, emphasis in original) argues that qualitative data analysis can be
either conducted inductive or deductive: “Inductive analysis involves discovering patterns, themes,
and categories in one’s data. Findings emerge out of the data, through the analyst’s interactions
with the data, in contrast to deductive analysis where the data are analyzed according to an existing
framework.” The here applied approach does not neatly fit into the categories of either inductive
or deductive research. It rather uses aspects of both, thus following Strauss and Corbin (1998,
p. 22) and their description of grounded theory: “At the heart of theorizing lies the interplay of
making inductions (deriving concepts, their properties, and dimensions from the data) and deduction
(hypothesizing about the relationship between concepts.”
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study is in principle a cyclic endeavor: “The loop represents the situation in which
important discovery occurs during the conduct of one of the individual case studies [and]
in which the discovery led to reconsidering one or more of the study’s original theoretical
propositions.” Key to this approach, however, is the awareness of potentially unjustly
selected theories on the one hand and of overlooked theories on the other. Both have to
be considered during the data gathering, in order to let the so-far developed theoretical
preconceptions guide, and not determine, the data gathering process: “Although early
identification of the research question and possible constructs is helpful, it is equally
important to recognize that both are tentative in this type of research” (Eisenhardt,
1989b, p. 536). So, after it has been clarified what goals this research effort has, the
next section addresses the question how these goals can be reached.
3.2.3 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Design
In the context of empirical studies, answers to research questions can be given either on
the basis of quantitative or qualitative data. In a nutshell, Kerlinger and Lee (2000, p.
588) define the difference in the fact that “qualitative research is different since it does
not rely on the use of numbers or measurements.” However, acknowledging the fact
that numerical measurements are more transparent, often real world settings cannot be
completely and meaningfully described by numbers (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). Thus,
while a quantitative study relies on some kind of operationalized measures of real world
phenomena, the goal of qualitative studies is “to obtain a rich set of data surrounding
the specific research issue, as well as capturing the contextual complexity” (Benbasat
et al., 1987, p. 374).
The given motivation for conducting qualitative studies already hints upon the close
connection with the other here discussed dimensions of research approaches. Creswell
(1998) mentions a number of reasons, why a qualitative approach should be selected.
Among others, he lists the following reasons: First, these studies are especially well suited
for answering research questions the start with why. Second, especially exploratory stud-
ies in which new theories are developed are often qualitative studies, as the rich data
obtained in these studies is particularly suitable for theory development. Third, a quali-
tative approach is especially well applicable in those research efforts that necessitate the
studying of research subjects in their natural setting. Obviously, this description closely
mirrors what has been so far discussed as essential for this study. However, as Creswell
(1998, p. 18, emphasis in original) also notes, a prerequisite for conducting qualitative
studies are “sufficient time and resources to spend on extensive data collection in the
field and detailed data analysis of “text” information.”
Similar to the uncountable number of classifications of research strategies, there also
exists a myriad of classifications of sources of these qualitative data. Stone (1978, p. 61)
argues that “among the various methods that might be used to collect data in organi-
zations are observations of behavior, interviews, (...) projective measures, sociometry,
Q-sorting, and a variety of unobtrusive measures.” Yin (2003) argues for six sources
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of data in case study research, documentation, archival records, interviews, direct ob-
servations, participant observations, and physical artifacts. However, the distinguishing
line between for example documentation and archival records does not seem to be that
distinct in organizational science. Therefore, this study uses the - albeit much coarser
- classification of Creswell (1998). He argues for four different sources of qualitative
data: observation, interviews, documents, and audio-visual materials. Out of these four
different means for obtaining qualitative data, the primary focus of this study is inter-
viewing, the secondary are documents obtained from the interviewees or from public
sources. This approach to obtaining qualitative data has been widely accepted, and
recently interviewing has also been described as being one of the most effective ways
to obtain information especially in the context of inter-organizational networks (Back
et al., 2007). Despite this acceptance of interviews as data sources, the importance of
the obtained documents for data triangulation10 should be emphasized here.
Having determined interviews as the primary way to obtain qualitative data, a closer
consideration of how these interviews should be structured and how the interviewees
are supposed to be selected is appropriate. Concerning the first question, Stone (1978)
argues that interviews can be either structured, that is following along a clearly defined
set of questions and/or answers, or unstructured, that is exactly not following pre-
described categories for answers and/or questions. From these dimensions a two-by-two
matrix can be derived that is illustrated in Figure 3.3
In this context, the here used interview strategy is a typical semi-structured interview
I 11. This type of interview “allows the respondent to answer a predetermined set of
questions in any manner he or she chooses” (Stone, 1978, p. 68). This approach accom-
modates very well for the exploratory nature of this study. As it has been mentioned
above, some structure has to be followed in order to not loose focus. However, this has
to be done in a way to allow research subjects to raise novel, so far unnoticed themes.
This semi-structured approach promises to be ideal for this endeavor12. This strategy
has been described by Yin (2003, p. 90) as “focused interview, in which a respondent is
10 The term triangulation stems from land surveying, in which multiple landmarks are used for a precise
determination of one’s position. The concept has recently received more attention as it is also the
basis of positioning systems such as GPS. In the context of data triangulation it refers to the fact
that data should be obtained from various sources in order to increase the validity of the data (e.g.
Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). It has also been used for applying various methods in order to gain more
validity for the studies’ findings. In this context see also the discussion on the three-horned dilemma
above.
11 Please note that even Stone (1978) argues that there are, to his knowledge, no uses of the other,
semi-structured interview II strategy.
12 Especially the exploratory nature of the study justifies this selection. As qualitative studies are most
suitable for complex situations, which require a flexible (re-)structuring of the research plan, this
approach seems most promising. In this context qualitative research relies on “direct observation
and semi-structured interviewing in real-world settings” (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000, p. 589). However,
this approach should be used carefully, as Mintzberg (1973, p. 222) argues that although “it would
appear that the simplest way to find out what managers do is to ask them,” these managers are
indeed “poor estimators of their own activities.”
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Figure 3.3: A Typology of Interview Strategies.
Source: Based on Stone (1978, p. 67).
interviewed for a short period of time - an hour for example. In such cases, the interviews
may still remain open-ended (...), but you are more likely to be following a certain set of
questions.” Concerning the second question on how to select the interviewees, it has to
be noted that the goal of the interviews is to achieve an as broad as possible coverage of
the individual cases. Thus, an attempt has been made to gain different viewpoints from
individuals with various roles in the different organizations. Which individuals these
have been, is reported in more detail in the next section.
Before covering how these theoretical assumptions have influenced the actual research
design of this study, finally it has to be discussed how the data is analyzed once it has
been collected. Obviously, the interviewing approach leads to an enormous complexity in
the collected data, which seems to be inevitable for studying contemporary phenomena
in real life settings (Patton, 2002). Mintzberg comments on the tendency to avoid this
inherent complexity and rather focus on quantitative studies - and consequently on the
excessive operationalization of variables - in organizational science as follows:
As soon as the researcher insists on forcing the organization into abstract
categories - into his terms instead of its own - he is reduced to using per-
ceptual measures, which often distort the reality. The researcher intent on
generating a direct measure of amount of control or of complexity of environ-
ment can only ask people what they believe, on seven-point scales and the
like. He gets answers, all right, ready for the computer; what he does not
get is an idea of what he has measured. (...) The result is sterile description,
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of organizations as categories of abstract variables instead of flesh-and-blood
processes. And theory building becomes impossible (Mintzberg, 1979a, p.
586).
Pettigrew (1992, p. 5) carries this perception further, when he states that “much of
strategic management writing, like a good deal of the social sciences, is an exercise in
comparative statistics.” However, this cannot be the goal of organizational research.
This goal rather has to be seen in explaining real world phenomena. As Mintzberg
(1979a, p. 587) put it: “We uncover all kinds of relationships in our “hard” data, but
it is only through the use of this “soft” data that we are able to “explain” them, and
explanation is, of course, the purpose of research.” Thus, the here proposed qualitative
research approach has to deviate from the techniques used for analyzing quantitative data
(Langley, 1999). Contrary to the clearly defined statistical methods used in this context,
“no precise or agreed-on terms describe varieties and processes of qualitative analysis”
(Patton, 2002, p. 453). However, it is recognized that at least a brief description of the
data collection and analysis procedures are helping to make the study more transparent.
These procedures are therefore described in the last two sections of this chapter.
3.2.4 Process vs. Variance Theory
The distinction between process and variance theory is a very common, however not
yet clearly understood, one in organizational studies. Van de Ven (1992) for example
argues that multiple meanings can be assigned to the label process. First, causal rela-
tionships can be considered as processes. In this context, a process explains why certain
independent variables influence other, dependent variables. Second, process can be used
to denote a category of individual or organizational actions. Work flows or decision
making prcesses can be subsumed under this category. The third and final meaning of a
process is that of a sequence of events or activities. Commonly, studies of this type take
a historic perspective in order to explain how things change(d) over time. Especially
the first and the last type of process are considered of prime relevance in the context of
this study. These two are also addressed in one of the most fundamental works on this
topic, the book written by Mohr (1982). He labels the first type of process as variance
theoretical, the latter as process theoretical approach. Elaborating further on this dis-
tinction, he develops four basic characteristics in which the two approaches differ. These
four characteristics are listed in Table 3.1 and subsequently discussed.
The first characteristic can be considered the prime differentiator between the two
types of theory. The fact that in a variance theory the precursor is necessary and
sufficient leads to the possible extension that more of the precursor leads to more of the
outcome. Obviously such an extension generates the two important aspects of prediction
and control of the outcome, which “are powerful benefits, and the potential for attaining
them helps to explain why variance theories are so commonly pursued” (Mohr, 1982,
p. 38). In contrast, process theories lack the factor of necessity. Therefore one might
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Variance Theory Process Theory
The precursor (X) is a necessary and The precursor (X) is a necessary
sufficient condition for the outcome (Y). condition to the outcome (Y).
A variance theory deals with variables. A process theory deals with discrete
states and events.
A variance theory deals with efficient A process theory deals with a final cause.
causes.
In variance theory time ordering among In process theory, time ordering among
the contributing (independent) variables the contributing events is generally
- is immaterial to the outcome critical for the outcome.
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Variance Theory and Process Theory.
Source: Mohr (1982).
not as simple as in variance theories predict or control the outcome. The second factor
that distinguishes variance- and process theory is that the first type relies on some kind
of operationalized measures of real world phenomena, while process theory takes into
account these phenomena as they actually happen. As Langley (1999, p. 692) frames
it: “Process data therefore consists largely of stories about what happened and who did
what when - that is, events, activities, and choices.”
The third differentiating criterion refers to the four different types of causality identi-
fied by Aristotle: (1) Efficient causality is a positivist definition of a relationship between
cause and effect in a temporal sense. The prior cause is the reason for the subsequent
effect. An example would be considering a house the effect of the labor of the construc-
tion workers involved in its building. (2) Material causality is defined as the relation
between an entity and its constituent elements. Referring back to the example of the
house, its material cause would be the bricks and mortar. (3) Formal causality refers
to the relationship between the structure of an entity and its form. In our house ex-
ample, the formal cause would be the architect’s blueprints. (4) Final causality is the
relationship between an entity and its purpose. The example is thus completed by the
requirements of the future inhabitants of the house as the final cause (Wendt, 2003). In
this classification, variance theory covers efficient causes, while process theory addresses
final causes.
Finally, the ordering of precursor events is of critical importance in process theories.
Again, this point has to be seen in context with the other three distinguishing factors.
As Mohr (1982, p. 60) notes, “as long as the necessary conditions are merely necessary,
their role is that of ingredients. Ingredients alone do not convey a sense of explanation.
(...) There must also be some instruction for mixing them - a recipe. Recipes generally
mandate activities that occur over time and in a prescribed order.” Other authors also
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state their favor for longitudinal studies when dealing with process theories (Van de Ven
and Huber, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990), but in part also mention the possibility to capture
past events through retrospective (Pettigrew, 1992).
Thus, the so far conducted discussion of theoretical underpinnings for this research has
been geared to a significant degree to the variance theory approach. This becomes most
obvious in for the first dimension. It has been argued that three different benefits are
necessary and sufficient preconditions for the emergence of IS development networks, just
as three different management mechanisms are assumed to be necessary and sufficient
preconditions for its frictionless coordination. For the other factors, this orientation is
less pronounced, yet still existent. So, it has been argued that the statements about what
benefits and what management mechanisms are active in this setting are formulated as
propositions rather that as sharp hypotheses between well measurable variables13. This
would contradict the perception of this work as being based on a variance theory, as
this type of study - at least according to Mohr (1982) - relies on variables. Also for
the third dimension, this study cannot be neatly classified as variance or process theory.
Here again, one might argue that the proposed benefits are causing the emergence of
the IS development network. However, at the same time this network emerges based
on the individual agendas (and thus purposes) of the involved participants, which again
hints towards a process theoretical view. The final dimension is again more inclined
towards variance theory. There is not (yet) a clear recipe how the theoretically developed
ingredients are mixed in the IS development network. Thus, it can be argued that
the study follows a variance theoretical approach, yet being in many aspects also in
accordance with a process theoretical approach. Such hybrid models are typical for IS
research Shaw and Jarvenpaa (1997).
3.3 Data Collection
After fundamental choices for the here applied research strategy have been discussed
so far, the final two sections of this chapter are concerned with the data collection and
analysis processes. The first step in this process is the already described deliberate
selection of the first case (termed purposeful sampling by Patton, 2002). As this case
promises to be setting the course for the remainder of the study, this selection is highly
important. As it has been argued in Section 2.1.2.3, the hub organization is of prime
importance for the overall IS development network. Thus, the first case should be one
of these hubs. As it has also been discussed already, the IS development industry can
be characterized as an oligopoly market, in which a couple of large, globally acting
corporations dominate the market (Farhoomand, 2006). Consequently, the first case is
one of these globally acting corporations. Thus, the first case is selected due to the
13 Which is a crucial part for a good hypothesis for Kerlinger and Lee (2000).
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fact that it’s a crucial case for the research questions, one “that can make a point quite
dramatically, or [is], for some reason, particularly important to the scheme of things”
(Patton, 2002, p. 236).
The first case fulfills the requirements posed of this critical case very well. The com-
pany has a proven track record of developing standardized IS for over thirty years. With
thousands of customers in over one hundred countries worldwide it can be characterized
as a truly global company. Finally, with multi-billion dollar revenues, it is truly one of
the leading organizations in IS development14.
In this first case, a round of interviews has been conducted during the spring and
summer of 2007. In this round, overall sixteen professionals from various positions
in this organization have been interviewed. One interview has been conducted with a
member of the top management group of this organization, two interviewees have a more
technical background, four are part of the company’s marketing organization, and nine
are actively involved in the partner management in some way. The overall structure
of the interviewees of this first and the subsequently conducted cases is illustrated in
Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Overall Structure of the Cases
These interview partners have been obtained through what Patton (2002) calls snow-
ball or chain sampling. In this sampling procedure, preceding interview partners are
explicitly asked for further knowledgable interview partners. Then these are interviewed
and again asked for further interview partners, and so on. This procedure also has a
built-in mechanism for determining when enough interviews have been conducted. As
14 It is acknowledged that this description of the first case company is rather superficial. However, the
fact that in the oligopolistic IS development industry only a handful of companies would render any
confidentiality of company information that has been promised useless. See Stone (1978, p. 150 ff)
for a discussion of the importance of confidentiality especially in organizational research.
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Patton (2002, p. 237) phrased it, “the chain of recommended informants would typi-
cally diverge initially as many possible sources are recommended, then converge as a few
names get mentioned over and over.” This has been exactly the fact, when the fifteenth
Interviewee in Case Company A mentioned that all relevant aspects of the partner orga-
nization have been covered through the so far conducted interviews. This also conforms
with the other advice Patton (2002, p. 244, emphasis added) gives, that “there are no
rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry” and that ideally, inquiring should continue
until no new evidences emerge, which has been the case in the sixteenth interview.
Due to the fact that all interviewees are professionals that scheduled some of their
spare time for the interview, it has been attempted to keep the duration of the interviews
deliberately short. As a rough guideline the interviews have been intended to last about
one hour. For the first case, the actual interviews had an average duration of slightly
more than this one hour. The shortest interview was half an hour long, while the
longest lasted for one and a half hours. After the assurance has been made that the
data will be treated anonymous, all the interviewees of the first case have agreed to
tape recording the interview. Subsequently, for each interview a verbatim transcript has
been prepared, which has then been sent to the interviewees to give them opportunity
to make individual changes to the transcripts. Most interviewees did not make any
adjustments, some clarified their statements, some also removed sections which they
wanted to be treated confidentially. The final result of this data collection process is a
qualitative data base with more than 180 pages of transcribed interviews with close to
110,000 words. Furthermore, eight out of these sixteen interviewees provided additional
information such as official company statements, but also internal reports or individually
designed illustrations or figures. All these documents are used for drawing conclusions
concerning the first case study.
After this initial case study, a second case has been selected as literal replication of
the first. As a literal replication of the hub role, the second case company also fulfills the
requirements of that role in the network. That is, it is also a large, globally acing, multi-
billion dollar company that has been selected. Again parallel to the first case, a similar
round of interviews has been conducted in that company. The number of interviewees
has been limited in this second case to eight, again from various different areas of the
company. This limitation has been justified, because much of the knowledge that has
been initially developed through the interviews in first case could also be applied in the
second case. Also after these eight interviews, convergence of potential new interview
partners as well as of addressed topics could be observed. The interviews also have been
intended to last about an hour, which has been slightly outrange with one hour and seven
minutes on average. The shortest interview has been 55 minutes, while the longest lasted
about one and a half hour. Again, anonymity has been ensured to the interviewees and
all of them have agreed on tape recording the interview. Verbatim transcripts have been
made of all tapes, and again the interviewees had the opportunity to adjust their own
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interview. The overall data collection resulted in a data base with close to 130 pages of
transcribed interviews. The total word count is almost 70,000 for the second case. All
in all the second case can rightfully be considered a literal replication of the first.
After this literal replication, several more theoretical replication case studies have
been conducted. As Yin (2003, p. 47) argues these replications are supposed to “predict
contrasting results but for predictable reasons.” The predictable reason for diverging
results from these cases is the fact that they are intentionally not hub organizations,
but rather spokes. As it has been a key requirement for these organizations to be of
small or medium size, this has been one of the key criteria for the selection of the case
companies. In this context, it had to be ensured that the selected companies are no
subsidiaries of larger, perhaps even globally acting cooperations. Another constraint
has been that, in order to make sure that the selected companies indeed participate in
an IS development network, only those have been selected that are officially part of Case
Company A’s partner network. Finally, in order to allow for interviewing employees of
these organizations only those have been selected that are located within a reachable
distance to the author. This approach is probably best subsumed under the heading of
criterion sampling as it is described by Patton (2002, p. 238).
In total, 27 companies that fulfill the above described criteria have been contacted by
phone and asked whether they wanted to participate in this study. If a general willingness
has been expressed these organizations have been further informed in writing, and a
personal meeting for conducting an interview has been scheduled. After this procedure
an overall of eight companies have actually participated in the study. The conscious
criterion to select small companies resulted in a further problem. As some of the spoke
case companies had even less then twenty employees, it has been impossible to acquire
more than one interview partner for six out of the eight cases. For the other two cases,
two and respectively three interviews have been conducted15. Similar to those in the
hub cases, on average the interviews in the spoke cases also lasted about an hour. Two
interview partners did not give their approval to tape record the interview. Accordingly
for these two interviews no verbatim transcript could be made. Rather, comprehensive
notes have been taken by both the author and an assisting graduate student that has
been brought along specifically for this task (Patton, 2002). For all the other interviews,
verbatim transcripts have been made, and the same procedure as for the two other
15 This is especially problematic due to what Yin (2003, p. 75) calls “undesired confusion between unit
of data collection and unit of analysis.” Under this heading, Yin (2003, p. 76) describes the fact
that “confusion begins because the data collection sources may be individual people (...), whereas
the unit of analysis of your case study may be organizational (...) - a frequent design when the case
study is about an organization.” Thus, similar to the approach of the two hub case analyses, also
for the spokes other materials, such as official documents are also used. However, again owing to the
ensured anonymity of both participant and their organizations, these documents are only implicitly
used and not directly quoted.
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cases has been followed in order to ensure the interviewees’ approval of this transcript.
Overall, the transcribed interviews for the spoke cases resulted in a total of 85 pages
and more than 50,000 words of qualitative data.
3.4 Data Analysis
In the following chapter, this qualitative data base is analyzed in order to draw con-
clusions first of all on the developed propositions, but also going beyond those. Before
describing the procedure used in the context of this work, it seems appropriate to loose
a few clarifying sentences on the underlying epistemological approach taken. Indeed the
dispute between positivist and interpretative stances seems to be especially prevailing
for case study research16. The basic idea of pure positivism is that all human thinking
and knowledge can be derived from sensation, i.e. the use of the human senses (Fried-
man, 1999, p. 89). Thus, one can argue that all ideas can be logically composed from
experience. Taking up the example of Hanfling (1981, p. 10), a ’golden mountain’, al-
though not a realistic concept, can be imagined by logically joining the ideas of gold and
mountains, two formerly known concepts. Thus, taking the concept to another stage, it
is obvious that, by further and further breaking down ideas into their basic components,
one ultimately has to arrive at basic statements that are impossible to be further ana-
lyzed. These basic components, which are immutable, objectively given structures and
objects, can be, through simple observation, verified to be true or false17. Therefore,
turning the concept upside down, every complex theory or concept can be proven to
be true or false by breaking it down into its basic components, observing if these basic
components are found to be true, and analyzing if the basic components are composed
in a logical and realistic way.
Pure Interpretative research in contrast assumes that such ultimately verifiable ba-
sic components do not exist. Rather the research derives knowledge from interaction
with the research objects. Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991, p. 13) argue that “reality,
and our knowledge thereof, are social products and hence incapable of being understood
independent of the social actors (including the researchers) that construct and make
sense of that reality.” Furthermore, they state that “the researcher can never assume
a value-neutral stance, and is always implicated in the phenomena being studied. Re-
searchers’ prior assumptions, believes, values, and interests always intervene to shape
their investigations.” Along the same lines, Soeffner and Hitzler (1994) argue that the
human environment, which influences the understanding and interpretation of reality,
is by no means restricted in any way. It is rather a constantly evolving concept that
16 Similar to the discussion on different research strategies above, also no clear definition exists for
epistemological approaches. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) for example consider positivism as one out
of four distinct interpretative paradigms in qualitative research. The subsequent discussion is thus
not intended to give a holistic overview over epistemological issues in general. It therefore contrasts
the two approaches as for example in Lee (1991, and the there quoted literature).
17 See also the discussion between normative and positive statements in Section 2.3.1.3.
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moves with the individual, that changes, when the individual changes, and that is closely
interdependent with the individual. Therefore, they argue that interpretative research is
at the same time universal and relative. Universal in a meaning that principles that are
used are of general validity. Relative in a way that the application of theses principles,
might yield - depending on the situation of the individual - different results.
In this context, IS research commonly uses a more positivist approach18. This has been
explained for example by Gadenne (1997), who argues that the IS research community is,
as it is largely influenced by reference disciplines, split with regard to the epistemological
approach used. One part of IS research is often is grounded in physical, technological,
or mathematical foundations, which make the use of positivistic research appropriate.
However, the other part of IS is, because it deals with the triad of humans, tasks, and
technology, considered to be rather a part of social science, than one of natural science.
Accordingly, positivistic research is not as appropriate as interpretative research19. This
is well reflected in the fact that a vast majority of literature supports the argument
that a more interpretative approach would improve the overall quality of research in IS
Lee (1999); Klein and Myers (1999); Serafeimidis and Smithson (2000); Butler (1998);
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991); Gadenne (1997). The present study thus tends to be
more interpretative in nature.
Thus, the advice of Dube and Pare (2003, p. 597) that “one of the keys [for rigorous
case study research] is to include better documentation particularly regarding issues
related to the data collection and analysis process,” has to be considered carefully in the
light of their focus on positivist case study research. However, as the usage of the word
pure in first two passages of this section, as well as the precautious statement that the
present study tends to be more interpretative already indicate, no empirical research
approach should be considered to be purely either the one or the other. Rather, “in
the actual practice of empirical research, we believe that all of us (...) are closer to the
center, with multiple overlaps” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 4 ff).
This interpretative background has to be considered in the subsequent description of
the data analysis process. Following Patton (2002, p. 463), the first step in such a
qualitative data analysis process “involves identifying, coding, categorizing, classifying,
and labeling the primary patterns in the data. This essentially means analyzing the core
content of interviews (...) to determine what’s significant.” The content analysis in the
18 Vessey et al. (2002) found in their study on diversity in the IS field (that addressed a total of 488
articles published in the five year period 1995 - 1999) that only 4.7 percent of all the examined articles
had an interpretative background. However, this is even an increase in comparison with an earlier
study, that found only 3.2 percent of the articles having an interpretative background Orlikowski
and Baroudi (1991).
19 This does not mean that a positivistic approach is not used in this context, even if not entirely
appropriate. Western culture in general, and specifically the scientific culture, is firmly rooted in
a long, historical, positivistic tradition. This results in a climate in which, “knowledge claims that
are not grounded in positivist thought are simply dismissed as ascientific and therefore invalid”
(Hirschheim, 1985, p. 3).
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present study is based on the theoretical framework20 developed in the preceding chapter,
a common approach to avoid data overload (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In order to
achieve this goal, codes have been developed for the theoretically developed propositions.
“Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential
information compiled during a study. Codes usually are attached to ”chunks” of varying
size - words, phrases, sentences, or whole paragraphs” (Miles and Huberman, 1994,
p. 56). Thus, each of the propositions has been assigned a brief label: Innovation,
Technology, and Market for the benefits explaining the emergence of the new industry
structure; Standardization,Monitoring, and Personal Relations for the mechanisms used
to manage it. With the use of this scheme, the transcripts of the interviews have then
been coded. Obviously, this is not an easy task, as it “involve[s] both technical and
creative dimensions. (...) No abstract processes of analysis, no matter how eloquently
named and finely described can substitute for the skill, knowledge, experience, creativity,
diligence, and work of the qualitative analyst” (Patton, 2002, p. 466). Furthermore, this
process of content analysis can be expected to be a reoccurring one, in which passages
are constantly re-coded until finally a set of interview passages emerges for each code.
Indeed, all the interviews had to be read several times until the passages have been
assigned the appropriate code. As coding has in part changed throughout the reading,
this process has been supported by a software that has been used to dynamically re-label
the passages.
Once the coding has been stable for consecutive readings, the coded interviews have
been used in a twofold way, as is has also been described by Crabtree and Miller:
Once a codebook has been prepared, different approaches may be taken for
using the codebook, in particular: (a) using codes as data management tool
in which segments of similar text are printed for subsequent reading and
analysis, and (b) coding text and then counting the frequency of different
code occurrences as a means of identifying key areas for further investigation
(Crabtree and Miller, 1992, p. 95).
This twofold analysis also refers to the above made distinction between a positivistic
and an interpretative epistemological approach. The first round of counting frequencies
is more positivistic in that it attempts to measure the importance of each of the given
category of benefits or management mechanisms and draws conclusions about the re-
search questions from this understanding of the constituent parts. This approach is not
an uncommon part of case study research in the field of IS (Dibbern et al., 2007; Sherif
et al., 2006).
20 Since the study is based on an existing framework, it is deductive in nature. This has already been
mentioned in Section 3.2.2. As the discussion in this section shows, the unfolding research process is
deductive only in a first step. At a later stage a inductive reasoning is conducted. Such an two-staged
approach is not uncommon in exploratory case studies (Miller and Crabtree, 1992; Patton, 2002).
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However, as it has been argued above, this study is intended to be more interpretative.
Thus, the counting of frequencies is only considered to be the first of two analyses. This
for two reasons. First, especially for the hub cases, the resulting data base of coded
interview fragments is still extensive. Second, and probably even more important, the
sheer number of passages in an interview that are relevant for a certain proposition is
a very limited indicator for determining the significance for this proposition. This has
been very well described by Stake (1995, p. 32) in his discussion of different degrees of
complexity in coding schemes: “The simpler the datum [that is coded], the easier it is
to develop distributions and statistical analyses. The more complex the item, the more
individual interpretation it will need when analyzed.” Thus, the here conducted analysis
of interview fragments can only be in part based upon quantitative analysis as those
mentioned above. This difficulty of quantitative measures on qualitative data has also
been recognized by Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 56): “Converting words into numbers
and then tossing away the words gets a researcher into all kinds of mischief.” Thus, as
it has been stated above, the more decisive aspect is the interpretative analysis of the
content of these passages, which does not readily lend itself to numerical descriptions21.
Therefore, a second round of analysis is conducted in which the underlying background
of each fragment is carefully considered in the light of each proposition. This two-legged
process is also common for both organizational (Lee, 1991) and IS research (Dibbern
et al., 2007; Sherif et al., 2006)22. It is thus reflected in the subsequent case analysis.
Here, first the pure frequency of fragments that are relevant for each proposition is
discussed without regarding the context of these fragments. Then, in the following
detailed, rich case narratives, the most descriptive interview fragments are quoted in
order to illustrate exactly this context found in each specific case.
However, that fact that this data analysis process is to a considerable extent based
on individual interpretation also very well reflects the key challenge in qualitative case
studies. Obviously, the determination of which passage is supporting or not supporting
which proposition to which degree has to be cautiously considered as not being entirely
objective. This is probably even more the case for the determination of the specific role
that each fragment plays in the context of a given proposition. From a positivist stand-
point, it could be argued that this reduces the reliability of the here conducted study.
Reliability in the context of case studies has been defined by Yin (2003) by the fact “that
if a later investigator followed the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator
and conducted the same case study all over again, the later investigator should arrive
at the same findings and conclusions.” However, here again the interpretative nature
of the present study and the advice to be aware of the epistemological orientation of
21 In this context, the above mentioned warnings to force qualitative data into quantitative measures
that has been raised for example by Mintzberg (1979a) or Pettigrew (1992) have to be re-emphasized.
22 The ambiguity and fuzziness of this approach, and thus also its difficulty, is well illustrated by the
fact that Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 254), who have argued for a careful usage of numerical
measurements above, state that “doing qualitative analysis of all data with the aid of numbers is a
good way of testing for possible bias, and seeing how robust our insights are.”
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cited references has to be emphasized. The second edition of the book written by Yin
has been labeled ”an excellent guide for a more quantitative approach” to case studies
by Stake (1995)! Thus, what is considered as weakness from a positivist perspective
is considered to be an integral part of case study research by the more interpretatively
oriented community. Stake (1995) for example takes this difficulty as reason to consider
case study research as an art rather than a craft. Patton is arguing along the same line,
when he states that
there are no formulas for determining significance. No ways exist of perfectly
replicating the researcher’s analytical thought processes. No straightforward
tests can be applied for reliability and validity. In short, no absolute rules
exist except perhaps this: Do your very best with your full intellect to fairly
represent the data and communicate what the data reveal given the purpose
of the study (Patton, 2002, p. 433).
This advice has to be heeded even more, as the coding of the interviews has revealed
that there are no clear cut boundaries between the benefit categories as well as between
the management mechanisms23. Rather, often an interview fragment that belongs to one
category also belongs to another24, denoting a link between the two. Thus, after this first
deductive inquiry, a second round of inductive inquiry is conducted in order to shed more
light on the relationships between the proposed benefits and management mechanisms.
Here the proceeding is similar to that of the first inquiry. Again, codes have been assigned
to either the relationships between the benefits or the management mechanisms. Then,
in a second evaluation round those fragments have been selected that very illustratively
show these relationships. These are then quoted in the end of the corresponding case
discussions. Again, it can be argued that both parts of this selection process are not
entirely objective. However, in order to counter this partial subjectivity, another advice
of Patton (2002) is followed. He recognizes that an important part of qualitative research
is the development of findings that go beyond what the interviewees are conscious of.
One way to test these findings is indeed to present them to the interviewees:
The best and most stringent test of observer constructions is their recog-
nizability to the participants themselves. When participants themselves say,
“Yes, that is there, I had simply never noticed it before,” the observer can be
reasonably confident that he has tapped into extant patterns of participation
(Lofland, 1971, p. 34).
23 In the terms of Patton (2002, p. 457) this might indicate that both categories are typologies rather
than taxonomies. The latter “completely classify a phenomenon through mutually exclusive and
exhaustive categories (...). Typologies, in contrast, are built on ideal-types or illustrative endpoints
rather than a complete and discrete set of categories.”
24 The facilitation of this multiple coding of one interview fragment has been described by Miles and
Huberman (1994) as a key advantage of using a computer-based coding software, such as it has been
done here.
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Thus, as a last test, the final version of this work has been submitted to all the in-
terviewees for additional remarks and adjustments. The interviewees have approved
this work, and thus also given their implicit consent to the developed typologies. Af-
ter this description of different research strategies, the selection and description of the
case study approach as the most appropriate one, and the discussion on the data collec-
tion and analysis procedures, the following chapter now addresses the actual empirical
analysis of the data collected in the different case companies.
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After having discussed the methodological approach chosen for this study in the preced-
ing chapter, in the present chapter the actual data analysis is conducted. In this context
it has been emphasized in the literature on multiple case study research that each case
should be first of all analyzed as if it were the only one. Stake (2006, p. 1) comments
on this phase of multi-case research with the word that “during work on the single case,
the collection of cases remains mostly at the back of the mind.” Only after the single
cases have been analyzed in due depth, a cross-case analysis addresses similarities and
differences between them. However, as the present study addresses two groups of cases
(hubs and spokes), a slight deviation from this approach is considered fruitful. Rather
than first analyzing all cases and then drawing conclusions across them, this chapter is
subdivided into three large sections.
The first is the analysis of the hub cases. In the first two parts of this section, each of
the hub cases is analyzed with regard to the research objectives as if it would be the only
case. Then, in the last part of this section, the cross-case analysis of the hub cases is
conducted. In order to truly understand the role of hubs in the IS development network,
both similarities as well as differences between the cases have to be discussed here. The
second section then follows along the same lines for the analysis of the spoke cases. Again
first a brief narrative is developed for each of the eight individual cases with regard to
the research objectives. In a second step these cases are integrated into a cross-case
analysis of the spoke organizations. Here again both similarities and differences between
the spoke cases are discussed in due depth. Finally, both perspectives are integrated in
the last section of this chapter. This develops a holistic analysis with a special focus on
the interactions between hubs and spokes in the entire IS development network.
4.1 Hub Cases Analyses
In this section the two hub cases are first analyzed in-depth without regard to the
other case. In this context, each case narrative is again subdivided into three sections.
The first, introductory part of each case analysis is a brief report of how the partner
strategy in this company developed over time. This section is intended to gain deeper
understanding each case company and give the reader a better impression of the contexts
for the subsequent case analysis.
Following this, the first research question is addressed. Here, the propositions that
have been developed in order to give an answer to the question why organizations partic-
ipate in such an inter-organizational IS development network are considered in the light
of the empirically collected data. As the propositions have been deliberately phrased in
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a very open-ended way, the two main goals of this section are to find evidence for the
proposed benefits, as well as to more clearly define them. This especially entails the
establishing of relationships between the proposed benefits. The theoretical discussion
has assumed that all three proposed benefits are equally important and concurrently
causative for the emergence of these networks1. Whether this relationship can also be
found in the collected data remains to be shown.
After this, the third part of each case analysis is concerned with the second research
question. Again, various mechanisms for managing such a network have been proposed
from a theoretical perspective. Here again, first an analysis is conducted, as to clarify
whether - and in which form exactly - these (or potentially other) mechanisms are actu-
ally applied by the different case companies. Then, in a subsequent step, the collected
data is also used to discuss the relationships between these different mechanisms.
The third research objective has been to answer the question of whether the network is
managed in accordance with the goals that the organizations have of their participating.
Thus, relating the goals or reasons for participation - discussed in the second part of
each case - with the mechanisms for managing the relationships - discussed in the third
part - promises to give an answer to exactly this research question. Taken together these
four parts of the individual analyses promise to yield exactly the rich description of each
case that has been demanded in the preceding chapter.
After the two hub cases have been analyzed individually the final step is the cross-
case analysis of these two. This analysis sheds more light on the question whether the
two hub organizations follow along the same lines in their decision to foster such an
inter-organizational network, as well as in their way to manage it.
4.1.1 Case Company A
4.1.1.1 Network Development
The partnerships of Case Company A have been developed already early on in the history
of this organization. Indeed, even the very first systems of Case Company A never have
been developed without necessary input from partners. The solutions of Case Company
A have been developed during a time when the integrated approach to supply a holistic
system from the chips, over the software, to sales and distribution as it is sketched in
Figure 2.3 has already been history. Rather, the systems relied from an early stage on
infrastructure like for example hardware and also data bases that have been supplied by
companies specialized on exactly these components. Thus, in order to guarantee a high-
performance system, Case Company A started to partner with these hardware and data
base companies from the very first day of its existence. As interviewee A5 comments on
this development:
1 This is, also in the following context of management mechanisms, characteristic for the chosen vari-
ance theoretical approach.
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We are developing software now for quite some time. The first important
partners have been, back in the days, technology partners. Because we have
decided that we are not developing hardware, we are also not developing data
bases or operating systems. So, it has been clear from the very beginning
that we want to partner somewhere. (Interviewee A5)
Thus, from its early beginnings, Case Company A had to make a deliberate choice
concerning the important question of the scope of the systems that it develops (Gawer
and Cusumano, 2002). The focus that Case Company A chose for its systems has been
that of standardizable business applications. Interviewee A12 argues that making this
choice early on has been of crucial importance for the development of Case Company A.
In the beginning every company that develops software is small. Just like
Case Company A. Case Company A has started to develop software for just
one customer. So it wasn’t really a software vendor, but rather a software
developer, individually tailoring software for one customer. But then the
founders of Case Company A had the vision to re-use this software. The
software had the capacity for being deployed at different customers. This
was an innovation and it has been accepted by the customers. Through
this model, in the next couple of years, Case Company A has turned into
a global company. Just like many of our competitors and partners. All of
them have started small and have made some right choices, have understood
the customers very well, have the ability to think in global structures, have
a really clever management, and they made it. (Interviewee A12)
However, this also entails the fact that Case Company A has been very well aware of
the fact that they cannot develop all necessary parts of the system themselves. Especially
the above mentioned hardware and infrastructure software, like operating systems or
data bases, has never been in the focus of Case Company A. Furthermore, another
component that is of prime importance in this context is the fact that the systems
developed by Case Company A have been and still are highly complex. They therefore
offer a multitude of opportunities for individual adjustment by the customer. However,
as it has been discussed in Section 2.1, the goal of organizations that are implementing
a standardized IS has been exactly to avoid the individual tailoring of their systems.
Consequently, a large consulting industry has evolved that exactly addressed these issues
for customers of Case Company A. Through these consultancies, industry-specific know-
how is available that allows customers to adjust their system specifically to their needs.
Interviewee A8 summarizes this development as follows:
Then the question came up how to scale customer projects? With time
the answer to this question has been that we have entered into strategic
partnerships with consultancies. These consultancies then have conducted -
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more or less - a major part of the customer projects, the consulting in the
field, the installation of the entire system, the customizing, the go-live, etc.
(Interviewee A8)
Thus, Case Company A has a long history of being involved in software ecosystems
as they have been described for example by Messerschmitt and Szyperski (2003). This
at first glance seems to run counter to the assumptions that have been made in the
introduction. Namely, that the IS development industry has been characterized by
increasing consolidation and that the systems developed in this industry have been
subject to a trend of encompassing ever more functionalities. Indeed, from the very
beginning, the early developers of these systems have been very well aware of where they
draw the boundaries of their systems. In this context it has to be especially differentiated
between providers of hardware or infrastructure software and those that develop the
business functionalities. While the intense partnering has been nurtured with the first
group, this has not been the fact for the latter group. Here, the system in itself has
not been developed in an inter-organizationally modular fashion as it is supposed to
be the fact of the here described IS development network (see Section 2.1.2.3). Yet,
this background of intense partnering in other fields gave Case Company A considerable
experience with alliance management, and also ensured that the system has been, at
least in part, already developed through a modular approach:
From the very first day, we could only grow in such a way as we did because
of the partners around us. Early on that led to an openness, both in our
architecture as well as in the mindsets of our employees. (Interviewee A8)
Consequently, it has only been a matter of time that mainly the involved consultancies,
but also other organizations, started to seize the opportunities that this openness gave
them and started to develop their own, standardized business applications (see also
Campbell-Kelly, 1995). This development has already started during the 1990s. As Case
Company A so far has made good experience with partners in different categories, newly
joining software partners have been appreciated and interfaces have been deliberately
opened for them. However, as it has been discussed in Section 2.1.2.4, this cooperation
has been rather cumbersome, as all partners had to individually connect their solution
to one of these interfaces. Yet, the recent emergence of SOA has exactly changed this
and thus, taken the partner strategy of Case Company A to a new level:
Then, during the 1990s, more and more software partnerships emerged with
companies that have augmented our system. We always had open interfaces,
but the sheer number has increased significantly up to today. (Interviewee
A5)
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One thing is - and we also say that in our official communication - that
Service-Oriented Architectures have revolutionized our partner strategy. The
idea behind that is, that (...) attaching third party solutions now is much
easier than it has been in the past where everything had to be interconnected
individually. (Interviewee A6)
Thus, the ideas that the organizations that develop complex IS are adopting a more
inter-organizationally modularized development approach also with regard to their spe-
cific system focus can be approved from the perspective of Case Company A. The sub-
sequent section now addresses the first research question, of analyzing reasons why such
a large IS development company like Case Company A is following such an approach.
Or, as Interviewee A11 phrased it pointedly:
Before we go into all the details of software partnerships, it maybe helpful
to give you an overview of why as a software company, we need software
partners? (Interviewee A11)
4.1.1.2 Reasons for Participating in the Network
Throughout the next couple of pages, the data collected in Case Company A is analyzed
with regard to the reasons why the organization not only participates in, but actively
fosters an IS development network. First, the propositions on why hubs partner that
have been developed theoretically in the second chapter of this study are thoroughly
examined. Here it is especially tested to which degree each of the developed factors is a
driver for this emerging network. This procedure follows the description given in Section
3.4. In Table 4.1 the number of interview fragments that have been coded for each of
the benefit propositions is listed.
As this table shows, ample support exists for the relevance of all the propositions.
Again following the procedure as it has been sketched in Section 3.4, not all of these
fragments are given in the following case narrative. Rather, only those that best il-
lustrate the propositions are quoted. Then, foreclosing one of the findings of this first
analysis, it has already been stated that this variance theoretical approach is not able
to fully explain the phenomenon of an emerging networked structure in the IS develop-
ment industry. Rather, these reasons cannot be addressed independently of each other.
They are closely intertwined and in part determine each other. Thus, going beyond the
proposed variance theoretical approach, the empirical data is used to develop a process
view that incorporates all these factors.
Innovation Benefits. In a nutshell, it has been argued in the theoretical part of this
study, that one of the key drivers for the emergence of an IS development network is the
ability to tap into innovations that are not developed within an organization’s bound-
aries. From the data collected in Case Company A, it can be safely stated that indeed
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“Innovation” “Technology” “Market”
Interviewee A1 2 1 1
Interviewee A2 0 0 0
Interviewee A3 5 1 1
Interviewee A4 0 4 5
Interviewee A5 5 4 5
Interviewee A6 2 1 0
Interviewee A7 0 2 1
Interviewee A8 2 3 2
Interviewee A9 1 3 1
Interviewee A10 2 0 6
Interviewee A11 7 3 8
Interviewee A12 2 2 6
Interviewee A13 7 1 8
Interviewee A14 1 4 2
Interviewee A15 3 2 1
Sum 39 31 47
Average 2.60 2.07 3.13
Table 4.1: Relevant Interview Fragments by Benefits: Case Company A.
Source: Own Assertion.
this is one of the driving themes behind the network strategy of this organization. Inter-
viewees A13 and A6 even see this fact as the main impetus of the currently developing
network strategy.
It comes down to the recognition that we needed a new innovation model.
And that owning all the innovation is no longer possible. This has happened
across so and so many different industries. [Another organization] is big
on their connected development approaches, where they recognized that the
vast majority of innovations are happening outside the four walls of their
organization. If you restrict your sources of innovation to those within your
organization, you’re definitely going to fall behind. (Interviewee A13)
It is surely the dominating goal to bring fresh blood into the company on a
regular basis, to tie innovations that emerge somewhere in the world to us.
(Interviewee A6)
From a theoretical perspective, one of the reason why large hub organizations, like
Case Company A, are partnering with smaller companies lies in the fact that - by virtue
of their smaller size - these companies possess the agility and flexibility that a large hub
organization cannot realize. In this context it has been argued to be especially important
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that these organizations potentially possess the entrepreneurial spirit that is necessary
to successfully pursue innovative ideas (Baumol, 2002). Again, the content analysis of
the data collected in Case Company A clearly supports this proposition why large hubs
partner with smaller partners:
We cover most of the necessary applications. Those which satisfy really
global requirements, which everyone, or at least almost everyone, needs in
various different industries. However, if it’s really a local or narrow functional
requirement, smaller companies surely have the advantage that they are much
more flexible and innovative, that they can develop a new product within two
months. (Interviewee A5)
Next practices are those highly innovative solutions that we do not want
to develop. And also those that we actually cannot develop, because the
flexibility that a small company has, cannot be copied by such a large orga-
nization as ours. This is a nice mechanism to integrate innovations into our
system very fast. (Interviewee A6)
As these quotes show, support for the proposition that the ability of smaller partner
companies to increase the pace of innovation is a key driver for large hub organization
to participate in this kind of inter-organizational network can be easily found in the
collected qualitative data. Besides the ability to conceive innovative solutions, another
aspect has been addressed as being of prime importance in this context: That of de-
ploying the innovative solution at the customer. As competitive pressure on customers
continues to increase, they are constantly looking for new opportunities to achieve a
competitive advantage (at least a temporary one, see the discussion on the resource-
based view). As IS are often strategic instruments to achieve this goal, their flexible
adaptation is key:
If you look at the market from our customers’ perspective, they are increas-
ingly facing hyper-competition with a lot of pressure to reduce costs and
also to differentiate themselves. So, they’re constantly innovating. So, one
thing we need to do - as IT provider - is to support them in that process.
(Interviewee A11)
Thus, the fact that innovative solutions are only valuable in the moment they are
successfully deployed at the customer plays an important role. The fact that the historic,
monolithic systems of the past have only been able to address this point in a very limited
way has been well recognized in Case Company A. Either innovation has to be conducted
on a system-wide basis, which is a rather cumbersome and slow process, or the system
has to be individually modified, which is a highly expensive process.
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You cannot do this any more like it has been done in the past: I have a large,
monolithic system, which I update every five years. I simply cannot do this
any faster, it’s simply not a profitable endeavor. However, I need some kind
of a process with which I can differentiate myself. And I need that process
now. It’s not sufficient to state that I need five years to implement this
process. (Interviewee A8)
So, the question is how to quickly assemble new solutions that allow me to
differentiate myself in an innovative way? In most cases, these solutions are
not a standardized part of the platform. The standardized platform covers
80 - 90 percent of the entire system. However, the other 10 - 20 percent,
that is where you can differentiate yourself. Up to now, this differentiation
is realized through modifying this large, monolithic block of a system. This
is expensive in the consequential costs. (Interviewee A8)
Thus, evidence has been found that supports the proposed (innovation) reasons why
large hubs participate in such a network, both the development and the deployment part
of this process. However, it has also been implicitly included in the above quotes that
these innovativeness is not necessarily a desired end-goal of Case Company A. Rather,
only if these innovative solutions are integrated with Case Company A’s system and are
also successfully deployed at customers, they are beneficial for Case Company A. Thus,
in the following especially benefits of the integration of specific technology are analyzed
in a similar way.
Technology Benefits. The second proposed benefit for the hub organization has
been that the access to certain technologies of other companies is driving the decision
to partner. In this context it has been argued that these technologies can be either
complementary or supplementary to the hub’s platform. As the subsequent discussion
shows, integrating complementary technological functionalities into the existing system
is indeed one of the reasons for Case Company A to embrace the networked strategy. This
integration of new functionalities that are deliberately not offered by Case Company A,
can again be sub-classified into two categories. The first is integrating those technologies
that are covering functionalities that are out of the scope of the product portfolio of Case
Company A. These are especially solutions that offer functionalities which are not offered
by Case Company A. However, as these functionalities often need to be integrated with
some of the solutions that Case Company A has developed, there is substantial interest
in seamlessly integrating these different solutions - both from Case Company A and the
partner.
There are systems for all industries that are reaching very far into the specific
niches, into the specific processes, into the specific technologies. We are in
contrast specialized in the business processes. For all solutions that control
the technical processes, for example the actual production or things like that,
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we offer interfaces that can be used to integrate the data of these solutions
into our system. However, we will not offer any software that is covering, in
an integrated way, these processes. (Interviewee A9)
In this specific context, an integrated system that allows for a continuous control
from a business to a technical perspective is a desirable goal. As Case Company A
is not developing any of these technical machines, partnering with providers of those
functionalities is the ideal way to realize this goal:
Let us use the example of manufacturing execution systems. The goal here
is to make our software communicate better with the embedded software on
the production lines. As the software that is running on the machines is
developed by those companies that sell the machines, partnering with these
companies allows us to completely integrate integrate the whole business
process from the business application to the machine. So, whenever I have to
cancel a customer order the production planning is appropriately adjusted.
(...) These are partnerships that are rooted in the fact that we want to
integrate our systems with other solutions, such as those that run on these
machines; or material management, we do not produce warehouse control
systems, but we have software that integrates with these. (Interviewee A5)
As the applicability of these general business solution packages is very broad, there
are a multitude of these industries, in which specific solutions exist that are deliberately
not offered by Case Company A, and in which a “bridging to other technical worlds”
as one interviewee framed it, is necessary. Among those that have been mentioned
throughout the fifteen interviews are the already mentioned manufacturing and execu-
tion systems and computer aided design systems for industrial production, but also for
example foundries, healthcare, mills, laboratories, or the diary industry.
The other instance in which Case Company A is not interested in offering a certain
solution, are those cases in which already a well established de-facto standard exists.
Even if this solution might be considered as core to Case Company A’s offering, the
dominating position of the other company makes a partnering the best possible solution
for both companies.
If there exists a certain de-facto standard, the question is raised as to whether
you should develop something yourself? Do you need to build your own
infrastructure and technology for this specific solution? In some examples
we decide that no, that we should enter into a strategic partnership and to
integrate an existing de-facto standard very tightly into our own solutions.
That makes it easier for us, as we are offering a solution that is, because it is
the de-facto standard, very well accepted by the customers. This also gives
our partner the opportunity to gain access to a new group of customers that
they have so far not addressed. (Interviewee A8)
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As many specific niche applications have already reached a status that can be described
as de-facto standard, this type of partnership is not really a rare one. Again, and this
explains the classification as technology benefit, many of these are of a technical nature:
Okay, for the business applications you have our system. You can modify
this system to a considerable extend so that you can cover most of your re-
quirements. However, the very special solutions, such as scanning, archiving,
fax functionalities, such things, we have integrated those things from other
suppliers from the very beginning on. (Interviewee A9)
Therefore, it can be argued that access to certain technologies is indeed a driver for
the fostering of organizational networks by large hub organizations. However, the nature
of these technologies is not necessarily the superior ability of partners, as it has been
anticipated in Proposition TH . Rather, the deliberate choice of the hub organization
not to supply specific technologies, either because they are tightly integrated with other
technologies, such as certain machinery, or because a well established de-facto standard
exist, is the critical aspect which differentiates what is part of the hub’s systems and
what is supplied by partners. Thus, there is ample support for the complementary part
of this proposition. Whether there is also support for the supplementary part remains
to be shown. Furthermore, again similar to the discussion of innovation benefits, the
integration of complementary technologies is not an end in itself. Here especially the
necessity to sell these integrated solutions to customers is playing a key role and leading
directly to the last discussed aspect - market benefits.
Market Benefits. The final factor that has been developed in the theoretical foun-
dation as key driver for the fostering of an IS development network by the large hubs
is the access to new markets that would otherwise be foreclosed for these vendors. As
Table 4.1 shows, this factor is the one that has been mentioned most often by essentially
all the interview partners:
It is basically the goal not to have to address the entire breadth. Rather, we
want to utilize the emerging partner networks for this broad market coverage.
(Interviewee A4)
Of course we cooperate in partnerships in order to conjointly open up new
markets. (Interviewee A9)
Now we have partners for many, many different markets. Every partner
has market-specific enhancements in order to make our system even more
valuable. The partner is adding value that we could not add. He has the
local or regional access and long-term expertise in this market. (Interviewee
A10)
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For us to penetrate deeply in new markets, we cannot do it alone. We just
don’t have the resources to do it alone. So partnerships become extremely
critical. We work with partners to come up with the right solutions, and to
go-to-market with them. (Interviewee A11)
Yet, again this addressing of new markets is similar to the realization of innovation
or technology benefits. It is not an end in itself. However, the accessing of new markets
is already very close to what should be considered the final goal of Case Company A’s
partner strategy, the generation of new revenue streams:
Addressing new markets, I would frame that as generating new revenue
streams. There are new revenue streams associated with having a network of
partners and offering this platform. We’re looking at new ways to monetize
this platform. (Interviewee A13)
Thus, the final goal of the partner network can be assumed to be the generation of
new revenue streams through the addressing of new markets. This fact, which should
come as no surprise, since the participants in the IS development network are for-profit
organizations, has been mentioned in one way or another, by all the sixteen individuals
that have been interviewed:
It [the partner strategy] has to result in that we can better sell our solutions,
that customers better accept these solutions. How many [partner solutions]
are being used? How much revenue has been generated through this over
the last year? With how many customers has this revenue been created? Is
that good enough? Does it give a good return for both partners, etc.? In
the end it is a question of money, or new customers, or new users, these are
the key indicators. Okay, obviously new customers and new users generate
new money. But it has to bring some measureable effect. That’s what all
partnerships get evaluated on. (Interviewee A8)
In the end it is very easy - it is all about potential additional revenues for
us. We are selling business application software, period. That’s what we’re
doing. With surrounding services, but key is the application software. So,
how much additional revenues can we generate in a specific time horizon?
(Interviewee A12)
So, it can be argued that again significant evidence has been found that supports the
proposition that gaining access to new markets is a key driver for the participation in
and the fostering of an IS development network for large hub organizations. However, it
has to be stated that the proposition, as it has been originally phrased, does not hit the
mark of why hubs actively foster those networks. Addressing new markets is not an end
in itself. Rather, the key driver can be seen in the fact that the accessing of new markets
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is a necessary precondition for generating additional revenues for Case Company A. This
is well reflected in the already discussed fact that the traditional markets of large IS are
largely saturated and that the newly addressed niche markets (like SMEs) have very
specific needs that cannot be completely included in the standardized package:
If we want to enter into the mid-sized to very small markets we need a very
different type of system. Easier, faster, etc. to install, and that paired with
the local presence of the partners. (Interviewee A10)
Until recently our focus was the traditional core enterprise application mar-
kets. Now, our goal going forward is to significantly grow our market share in
existing markets and penetrate new markets. Hence, we’re looking at a much
larger pie and we want to get a significant share of that. The only way we
can grow that fast is through partnerships. So our focus is, build a core busi-
ness process platform, which includes the core applications, and also provide
infrastructure, the tools, the web services, such that other nimble software
companies can leverage that and build new applications, or integrate their
current applications well enough. Hence, the customer gets a solution that is
the best suite, which is Case Company A’s suite, plus best of breed in terms
of industry. (Interviewee A11)
Thus, summing up the so far discussion on benefits of participating in an IS develop-
ment network, it can be stated that the theoretically proposed benefits have been found
to be of prime relevance in this context. This albeit the fact that some of the proposi-
tions could not be supported in the way in which they originally had been formulated,
but rather had to be specifically adjusted to the context2. Especially the interactions
between the three factors have posed a severe difficulty for the chosen variance theoret-
ical approach. Rather than being independent of each other, temporal dynamics exist
that reduce the explanatory power of such an approach.
Thus, rather then analyzing the factors that motivate organizations to participate in
these IS development networks independently of each other, it is probably more im-
portant to analyze the dynamic relationships between these factors. As it has already
been mentioned throughout the discussion above, innovation, technology, and market
access/revenue generation are all tightly interwoven with each other. The rich and mul-
tifaceted data that has been collected throughout the interviews is therefore subsequently
analyzed in order to especially shed more light on these dynamic inter-connections be-
2 This is again owing to the exploratory nature of this study that has been discussed in Section
3.2.2. The propositions have deliberately been framed as propositions and not hypotheses, with the
possibility in mind that they are likely to need a re-phrasing during the research process.
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tween the already discussed aspects3. As it has also been mentioned, as the factors are
in part in temporal progression to each other, these inter-connections are assumed to be
best addressed through a process perspective.
4.1.1.3 Towards a Process View on Network Participation
The perception that all three proposed benefits, the accessing of innovativeness, technol-
ogy, and markets, are important in the context of Case Company A has been mentioned
throughout the various interviews. However, further analysis of the data has shown
that not all motives are equally important for all partners. Rather, different kinds of
partnerships were identified: Some partners were loosely attached to the network, others
were tightly connected; some partnerships existed only for a brief time span, others were
long lasting. Studying these differences, it has been revealed that the static perspective
only insufficiently explains the underlying patterns of network formation. Rather, the
partnerships between hub and spoke were found to go through various stages, which are
characterized by these differences in the cooperation. In this context, the above discussed
three motives were in fact not drivers for the this network formation, but rather events
that triggered the transition between the stages in this developmental sequence4. Thus,
the following paragraph is intended to go beyond the individual analysis of these factors,
and to uncover how they inter-relate and what this means for the present case. From
a thorough analysis of the collected data it has become obvious that the three factors
and the relationships between them form a partnership process, as it has been discussed
under the label of process theory by Mohr (1982) and under the label of the third mean-
ing of process by Van de Ven (1992). In the following, this developmental sequence is
exemplarily traversed and corroborated with empirical data from Case Company A.
3 This is also in-line with the selected research design of a case study, “in which important discovery
occurs during the conduct of one of the individual case studies” (Yin, 2003, p. 50) and which con-
sequently is inherently equipped with a relatively high degree of emergent design flexibility, which
has been defined by Patton (2002, p. 40) as “openness to adapting inquiry as understanding deep-
ens and/or situations change; the researcher avoids getting locked into rigid designs that eliminate
responsiveness and pursues new paths of discovery as they emerge.”
4 As it has been mentioned in Section 3.2.4, it has been assumed that the present study can neither be
considered purely variance- nor purely process-theoretical in the framework of Mohr (1982). However,
this statement can no longer be upheld. First, it has been recognized that the three proposed benefits
are not variables, but rather events. Second, these are not necessary and sufficient preconditions
for the emergence of IS development networks. Finally, the sequence of these events indeed plays
an important role. Thus, the here proposed model could be assumed to be a pure process model.
However, this view is not the absolute truth. Rather, the events are in part determined by variables
- how important is an innovation for customers, how well is it integrated with the platform of Case
Company A, how complementary or supplementary is it? These are varibales that describe the
impact that the here described events have on the overall process. Referring back to the taxonomy
of hybrid models proposed by Shaw and Jarvenpaa (1997), it can thus be argued that the following
passage clearly described a Hybrid Model I. This type of model closely resembles a process model,
but mixes variables and events. This recognition is equally valif for the discussion on Case Company
B, below.
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The first step in this partnership process is the emergence of an innovation5. In
this context, it can be argued that partner innovations are not theoretical concepts or
ideas. Rather, only those innovations are interesting for Case Company A that are
already existing software solutions. This already hints upon the sequential nature of
these relationships, as Case Company A is very conscious of its final goal of revenue
generation. Especially when interviewees are talking about innovation benefits, they
are well aware of the Schumpetrian nature of innovations that has been discussed in
Section 2.2.3.1. Throughout the interviews it has been repeatedly mentioned that the
IS development network is not intended to act as development aid for small start-ups.
Partners are supposed to be profitable. That is they should have a certain
track record in their market. The partner program should not help someone
to gain a foothold in the market. We are no incubator for those who want to
establish themselves in the market (...). We do have other programs for that.
The standard partner program does not exist to bring someone without any
infrastructure into the market. (Interviewee A9)
We won’t go to market with a partner product that’s not validated, both
technically and business wise. We don’t put ourselves into that kind of
situation. (Interviewee A11)
Thus, the first step in the partnership process is that of turning innovative ideas into
a piece of software technology6. There are essentially two ways how such an innovative
solution can emerge. Either it is consciously identified by Case Company A and its
customers and deliberately left to a partner to develop. Or it emerges without conscious
knowledge from Case Company A from the vast number of Independent Software Vendors
(ISVs) that act in the industry.
How do we bring innovations to market? We don’t do everything by our-
selves, but enable co-innovation. We cooperate early on with customers to
identify upcoming topics and requirements that are of importance within the
next year or so. Then we decide on how to best deliver this together with
partners. Either way it is integrated with the rest of our systems from the
very beginning. (Interviewee A5)
5 Selecting innovation benefits as the first step is obviously an arbitrary choice. However, it is very
intuitive to start a process with the emergence of something new. Therefore this choice has been
made.
6 One can argue about whether this is actually the first step in the partnership process of Case Company
A, as this is supposed to happen without intervention of this organization. However, as an existing
software solution is required for participating in the network, it is seen here as the first step.
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And we look at so-called white spaces, where we don’t have functionality,
and where there is emerging greater customer interest. And often there are a
variety of partners, software solution partners in particular, who either have
a solution or are developing a solution that is addressing this white space in
a compelling fashion. (Interviewee A13)
Our focus is increasingly to enable innovative solutions to be developed out
there and that we don’t know about. (...) So that one day, when there’s
a market disruption, that solution is already there and we can effectively
leverage the solution for our customers on our platform. (Interviewee A11)
Once the innovative solution has emerged, the logical next step is to make its function-
ality available within the platform of Case Company A. Thus, it has to be technically
integrated with the existing overall system. That this technical integration of partner
functionality is another key driver for the Case Company A has already been discussed
above. Thus, once these innovative solutions have emerged, no matter whether this
happen through a concise plan or through mere happenstance, the next step in the
partnership process is their integration with the entire system. Interviewee A11 very
well illustrates this interconnectedness between innovations and integrating them with
the overall system through the following two examples. In each of the examples a part-
ner has developed a solution that has to be considered innovative in the context of Case
Company A. Then, in a next step, this innovative functionality has been made accessible
from the entire system through a technical integration.
We have a partner who does incentive management. Most of the incentive
management and compensation management they do is in the financial and
high tech industries. We have a very good footprint in those industries in
terms of other solutions. However, this is a unique solution, which is getting
a lot of market traction and a lot of our customers like it. Therefore, we
looked at that company in terms of their management capabilities, in terms
of their strategy, revenue, and customers feedback. We realized that it is a
good solution to be part of our network. That’s how we approach it. It’s not
that they open up a brand new market for us; we already were in high tech
and finance. But it’s a fact that they bring a unique solution to the table
which fits very well with what we are already offering to our customers. A
solution that a customer sees a lot of value in, and especially sees a lot of
value in working in conjunction with our solutions. (Interviewee A11)
One of our partners’ solution is focused on capturing real time data from
the plant floor. We have an example where the customer is a big dairy
manufacturer. So our partner’s solution is providing information all the way
from the cow, where the milk comes from, to where it is bottled and shipped
to the distribution center, and on to the retail shelves. So, they handle a
lot of plant information and at the same time the customer uses our system
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for business applications. The customer wanted to get real time visibility for
their executives to look at any point and see, how the plant production is,
inventory, demand etc. They accomplished this by integrating a lot of data
captured by the partner’s solution into our system. Now, the customer can
be sitting in his/her executive suite and be looking at how much milk has
been produced in a particular plant today and where it is and in what stage
it is, how the inventory is and how that converts into euros in revenues. So
that’s another case where we decided not to be in the business of providing
plant floor information in the dairy industry. But here is something where a
customer gets a lot of value through having integration between us and an
ISV like that. So that’s the reason why it makes a lot of sense for us to work
closely with the partner. In some ways it’s complementary and for customers
it makes sense if both the solutions work together effectively. (Interviewee
A11)
The examples cited above also indicate what the final step in the partnership process
is: That of generating value for all the involved parties. Thus, as the final goal of Case
Company A is the generation of revenue streams, innovative ideas not only have to be
turned into software solutions that have been integrated with Case Company A’s system.
They have to be turned into integrated, marketable software solutions. These integrated,
marketable software solutions are finally those that Case Company A is looking for, as
these drive revenues up. Interviewee A13 has explained the ideal partnership as being
driven by customer requests:
We’re looking for customer deals where there’s a partner solution that doesn’t
just look academically interesting because it conceptually fits into this white
space, but where we actually have customers craving for this kind of function-
ality. We don’t have it today, here’s a partner that has it, and they’ve already
certified their application to be interoperable with ours. So it’s largely based
on what our customers are telling us and what are the resulting opportunities
for us. (Interviewee A13)
However, what is already implicit in the words “we don’t have it today” is the fact
that this successful relationship does not necessarily continue infinitely. It has been
discussed as one of the fundamental idiosyncrasies of IS development, that IS are intel-
lectual goods, which can be endlessly innovated. Closely related to this perception has
been the idea that IS development is therefore an inherently dynamic field. Therefore,
network relationships are subject to constant change and thus, constant re-evaluation.
As Interviewee A12 phrased it:
The relationship between us and our partners not necessarily has to continue
steadily. The markets change, and just like we have to change, our partners
also have to change. (Interviewee A12)
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Thus, once the partnership process - from developing an innovative solution, over in-
tegrating it with the overall system, to successfully going to market, has been passed
once, it does not necessarily lead to a stable industry structure in which certain part-
ners assume the responsibility for developing certain components. Rather, the stability
of partnership relations is achieved only for some of these components. Thus, there
are essentially two potential development paths: Either the relationship continues un-
changed, or the hub is deciding to enter into the market that the solution of the partner
is addressing.
The first case is the one that has, at least in part, been described in the paragraph
on technology benefits. Case Company A has a deliberately chosen strategy, which
components are developed internally and which are sourced from partners. The most
prominent examples for components that are sourced from partners are those solutions
that are either very technical, which already have an established de-facto standard, or
both. These solutions are developed by partners on a continuous basis. If this type of
clear-cut sharing of tasks exists in the relationship to a partner, there are no objections
for this relationship to continue almost infinitely. The stable nature of these relationships
has been described through various examples in the interviews.
In the easiest case we have a partner that is developing hardware, servers
and let’s say an operating system. That’s not what we are doing, so we are
very relaxed, both organizations’ developments continue in coexistence. We
have agreed that we do our thing and the partner does his thing. And to
the best of our knowledge this will not change for the next twenty years.
(Interviewee A12)
In the technology field we have been cooperating with some of our partners
for more than fifteen years. We have long lasting relationships with those
partners who supply for example the servers or the databases. We have
selected the market leaders in every single field and cooperate with those.
And as this is a business model in which the partners earn their share, there
is not a single partner that has left the network. (Interviewee A14)
Thus, Case Company A does not have an inherent interest to go into those markets.
However, as the solutions developed by Case Company A use the infrastructure that is
provided by these companies, a partner relationship is important to guarantee a high
performance of Case Company A’s solutions running on this infrastructure, just as it has
been described in the introductory passage of this case analysis. Very similar to this type
of relationship, are those partners that develop infrastructure software solution. Mostly,
Case Company A does not consider these to be a crucial part of its portfolio. Again,
relationships of this type exist in the network, and they have already been discussed in
the section on technology benefits:
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We have decided not to go into archiving, that one of our partners is sup-
posed to do this. This has been and still is a wonderful symbiosis. Until
today we have never addressed archiving. That is a very fruitful relation-
ship. (Interviewee A12)
Furthermore, another type of partnership exists that is very similar to technology or
infrastructure partnerships: Those with providers of small niche solutions. This type
of partner solution is in principle included in what Case Company A considers to be
the scope of its system. From a hypothetical scope consideration, they could thus be
classified as supplementary components. However, as the market that is addressed by
this specific solution is too narrow, Case Company A does not intent to include this type
of solution into its generic, standardized system. Thus, considering the actually realized
scope of Case Company A’s system, these solutions have thus to be classified as com-
plementary components. Here again, the partner relationship between Case Company
A and the providing organization of this niche solution is not restricted in its lifespan.
In case that a partner enters into the market of business applications, which is
inherently our market, there are two possibilities. The first is if the solution is
a niche product and always stays a niche product. Then this is uninteresting
for us. Niche products are often very country-specific and not replicable into
other countries or regions. If this is the case, the partners actually have a
very easy life. (Interviewee A12)
This stability in the relationship to Case Company A does not mean that the entire
network really continues to develop unchanged. However, if partners are subject to
change, this change is not initiated by Case Company A. Rather, dynamics internal
to the industry segments that these partners operate in sometimes result in changed
partnership relations:
The partner might get acquired by a competitor within their niche. But that
is none of our business. (Interviewee A12)
The so far discussed cases are those, in which the solutions developed by the partners
are complementary to those developed by Case Company A. This can be the case because
the solution is providing a technical functionality, or because it provides a functionality
that is not considered attractive by Case Company A. If this is the case, the relationships
are rather stable. However, there are also those cases in which this is exactly not the case.
These cases are inherently very similar to the above described niche functionalities. The
key difference between these two cases is however, that in the complex and dynamic IS
development industry the functionality that is covering a niche today does not necessarily
have to remain in this niche tomorrow. Thus following the above described temporal
dynamics between accessing innovations, their technical integration, and the successful
go to market, there is also dynamic change of organizations thriving and perishing within
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the network. Case Company A is well aware of these dynamics within its industry and
is constantly checking as to whether partner solutions are indeed leaving their niche and
becoming general purpose solutions.
These might be functionalities that initially have been part of a niche, but
which are generalizable, which are getting on our radar screen because a lot of
customers ask us to include them into our system. Then this niche partner
has to recognize that his solution is becoming a commodity. (Interviewee
A12)
We are analyzing the market for standardized software that might be inter-
esting for us because it is within our scope. We start with a market analysis;
we watch the markets. Is the problem something that can be and should
be addressed with a software solution? If yes, is it standardizable, or is it
different, e.g. from country to country? There are some areas which have
only one potential customer in each country, and each of these customers
has very specific requirements. This asks for a classically custom built solu-
tion. We do not touch this. Then there are other areas which are inherently
standardizable, but which we have not yet addressed, simply because we had
other things to do. (...) There are multiple areas in which suddenly a po-
tential for standardized software is emerging. So it is imperative for us to
monitor these areas and to make decisions (...) as to whether we are offering
solutions for these markets or not. These things are happening permanently.
(Interviewee A12)
So, in the cases in which the partner functionality is promising to become a general-
izable solution, which is not confined to certain niches, the partnership process as it has
been described above is inherently a cyclic development. Once a technical integration of
the partner solution has been realized and conjoint market success has been achieved,
the subsequent step for the partner is to outspeed the developments of Case Company
A. Especially solutions that are mass-marketable are highly attractive for being not only
integrated, but absorbed into the overall system. The main idea of how partners can
prevent being absorbed into the overall system is through relying once more on their
agility and flexibility that has been discussed as a key driver for their innovative solu-
tions. The overall context of this relationship is very well illustrated by the following
quote of Interviewees A13 and A12:
We do a market analysis and then communicate to our partners, here’s a
place where we do not intend to go, in the near term. We don’t provide a
life-time guarantee. It might be that over time the notion of what’s in our
system and what’s on top of our system is a very dynamic landscape that
evolves over time due to a variety of factors. As a partner to be successful
you need to stay on the edge, you need to add value to the system, and
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that’s not a static thing over the long run. But at least over the short run
we can tell the partners, these are areas that we do not intend to focus on.
(Interviewee A13)
Those who recognize this change and act out of a position of strength, simply
because they have the money to do so, are on the right track. Those that
remain in the status quo, run the risk of getting in trouble. (Interviewee
A12)
The question is who will survive? In such a model those partners will survive
that are very close to the customer; those that have very good knowledge;
that are accepted by the customer for developing new processes or new ser-
vices; and that can develop those very efficiently with a reuse factor. Oth-
erwise it does not work. That is the positive model. (...) Those that will
loose something in this model, are those that are not so close to the cus-
tomer, those that are not so innovative, the after sales or me too partners.
(Interviewee A12)
The final question that remains to be answered is what is happening with those
partners that are not innovative or flexible enough to stay abreast of the developments
of Case Company A? This context has been described by one of the interviewees as a
simple make-or-by decision. The first option is to develop a solution independent of what
has been developed by the partner. The second is to simply acquire the partner and to
integrate this acquired solution with the people that have developed it into the system.
The latter case seems to be more attractive, especially for the partner. Yet, both cases
have happened during the history of Case Company A, as the following quotes show:
If we recognize that the partnership has ceased to make sense, it is better to
terminate it. You can even terminate partnerships entirely. One historic ex-
ample shows this very well. We had a very big partner for a certain solution.
Then we have decided that this specific solution is a too important topic,
that we have to add this to our own solution portfolio. With this decision,
it has been clear that this partnership will cease to exist. It even changed
from a very close partner model to a very intense competition. That has
happened. (Interviewee A12)
In other cases it has been the fact that certain topics have not been that
important in the past. In a very recent example we have acquired a partner.
Before that we have integrated their solution on a partnership basis. At
some point in time, we have recognized that this solution is indeed crucial
for our system and that we cannot leave this to others. (...) So we have
reacted to our customers who have said that this topic is very important and
that we ourselves have to offer a solution, if we don’t want to loose certain
business opportunities. This change obviously also had an impact on the
partner network. (Interviewee A12)
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Especially smaller and mid-sized partners might have the goal to become
so attractive through their solution that we want to acquire this partner.
There are different exit strategies for partners. It might be a goal to stay
independent partner forever. But it might be another goal of a partner to
get acquired. (Interviewee A8)
However, in both of these cases the company ceases to exist as an independent part of
Case Company A’s partner network. Thus, it can be argued that the partnership process
of Case Company A is a cyclic one. It starts with an invention that is developed by a
partner. Once it becomes clear that this invention is attractive for some customers, it can
be technically integrated with the platform of Case Company A. This integrated solution
is then expected to be successfully sold in the market. Once this market success has been
achieved the next step depends on the nature of the partner’s solution. If it is a technical
or niche solution the partnership continuous to exist as long as it is successful in the
market. If Case Company A decides that the solution is supposed to become part of the
platform, it either develops its own solution that copies the functionalities of the existing
partner solution. Or it outrightly acquires the entire partner. If partner organization’s
management wants to stay independent, it is then required to come up with a new
invention, and the process begins anew. The overall structure of this partnership process
is also illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: The Innovation Cycle in IS Development for Case Company A.
Source: Own Illustration.
This first section of Case Company A’s analysis has focused on answering the research
question why this company not only participates in but even actively fosters such an IS
development network. As it has become obvious, the reasons for this strategy cannot
be fully understood from a variance theory perspective, but rather the entire life cycle
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of such a partnership has to be examined. The result of this analysis of the partnership
process has been described above. However, another implication of this discussion is the
fact that - contrary to what has been discussed in the theoretical part - Case Company
A can no longer be assumed to develop different partner categories in accordance with
the different proposed benefit categories. If a reasonable classification of partners exists,
it should be based on the potential revenues that a partner generates for Case Company
A. Whether this differentiation is indeed happening, and what different management
mechanisms are applied in these different types of relationships are topics discussed in
the following section.
4.1.1.4 Management of the Network
The following section addresses the mechanisms that Case Company A utilizes to man-
age the relationships in the partner network. Similarly to the approach to this first
research question, the subsequent discussion also relies on the propositions that have
been developed on the basis of the theoretical preconceptions discussed above. As a first
step in this data analysis process Table 4.2 shows the number of interview fragments
that have been considered relevant for each of these management mechanisms.
“Standardization” “Monitoring” “Personal Rel.”
Interviewee A1 1 0 0
Interviewee A2 0 2 0
Interviewee A3 1 0 0
Interviewee A4 2 0 1
Interviewee A5 2 9 6
Interviewee A6 1 1 2
Interviewee A7 0 1 6
Interviewee A8 1 2 5
Interviewee A9 1 7 2
Interviewee A10 0 1 3
Interviewee A11 6 2 3
Interviewee A12 0 2 1
Interviewee A13 6 3 4
Interviewee A14 1 1 4
Interviewee A15 4 2 1
Sum 26 33 38
Average 1.73 2.20 2.53
Table 4.2: Relevant Interview Fragments by Management Mechanisms: Case Company
A.
Source: Own Assertion.
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Here, again good support could be found for all theoretically developed propositions.
Also following the already discussed process, not all of these interview fragments are
quoted, but only those considered most illustrative. Again similar to the proceeding of
the last section, these theoretical preconceptions are used to guide the research, not to
determine its outcomes. Wherever appropriate, concepts are adjusted to the research
findings derived from the empirically collected, qualitative data. This also includes a
second part of the discussion of the mechanisms of standardization, monitoring and
relationship building. In this second part, links between these categories are discussed
and conclusions about their inter-relationships are drawn.
Standardization. It has been proposed in the theoretical part of this study that the
participants in the inter-organizational IS development network are assumed to prefer
standardized over proprietary approaches. The fact that this coordination mechanism
promises to be among the easiest and cheapest to implement has been well recognized
by Case Company A. As Interviewee A15 framed it:
At the end of the day we do have a multi-vendor landscape [in our partner
network]. That involves a range of very general problems, and our answer to
many of these problems is of course, standards. (Interviewee A15)
The first aspect of standardization that has been mentioned is the reliance on stan-
dardized technologies, such as those that are part of SOA. These technologies promise
to facilitate coordination as outputs are standardized, as well as to reduce transaction
costs, as physical assets specificity is reduced. The fact that SOA is seen as a key impe-
tus for the emergence of such organizational structures has already been discussed. That
the rationale behind this is to a large extent standardization has also been acknowledged
by the interviewees in Case Company A:
What is SOA actually? In the end SOA is the opening of standardized, well
documented interfaces that allow you to use close to the entire functionality
of the existing system. (Interviewee A4)
A key idea behind SOA is the fact that we have standards. That means
that we can utilize the entire system and that we can attach third party
applications much easier than in the past, when everything had to be custom
built. (Interviewee A6)
One of the advantages of SOA is that it is based on general industry stan-
dards. The core of SOA is that you can use open standards like WSDL,
UDDI etc. (Interviewee A11)
One big topic in the context of SOA is standards. That addresses a very
fundamental problem. We have to know how a sales order looks like. If
we don’t know how it looks for vendor A and how it looks for vendor B,
the partnerships become extremely inefficient for us. And there are a lot of
industries which do not have any standards. (Interviewee A15)
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The importance of the development of these standards for integrating third party ap-
plications is well recognized by Case Company A. Thus, first the organization actively
interacts with standard setting organizations in order to ensure that the applied stan-
dards are up to date. This also includes the active participation in these standard setting
organizations wherever possible.
We also work on industry standards. We engage with industries more broadly
to figure out how do we stay appropriately open so that we conform to the
most important standards and comply with those. Where do we exercise
leadership and where should we perhaps take a different path? (Interviewee
A13)
Of course standardization addresses one of our fundamental problems. This
is also the reason why we are participating in all these bodies which define
standards and attempt to establish some kind of uniformity. (Interviewee
A15)
However, as it has been argued above, IS development is an inherently very complex
endeavor. Consequently, reliance on standards promises to be only one first step in
the management of these complex relationships. For example the necessity to exercise
reasonable care that these standards are also consistently upheld in the IS development
network has been mentioned. This aspect has to be attended with due diligence.
One of the goals of these technical standards is to ensure that all our partners
have the same starting basis. What you will see often is that some of those
partners use their relationships to attempt to open special solutions only for
themselves. There you have to be really strict, either it is part of our official
offering and everyone can use it, or no one. (Interviewee A8)
Thus, standards can contribute significantly to the reduction of frictions in the IS
development network, and are consequently utilized by Case Company A as one of the
key management mechanisms in this context. However, they can do so only if they are
accompanied by other management mechanisms. The two other approaches that have
been developed in the theoretical part are monitoring and relationship building. Both
are subsequently discussed.
Monitoring. The second aspect how such a complex network of relationships can be
managed is the mutual monitoring of partners. As it has been discussed in the theo-
retical part of this study, especially the concept of partner certification is an important
monitoring device in an inter-organizational setting. Consequently, in almost all inter-
views certification has been a topic in one way or another. In this context, various
potential certifications exist. However, as it has been discussed in the theoretical part of
this study, what is exactly not certified are complete organizations. Rather, only very
specific aspects of these organizations are certified.
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What we are not doing is certifying an entire organization. It is mentioned
every now and then that we do this, but it is not true. We certify capabilities
of the organizations, either of their employees or their products. (Interviewee
A9)
Whereas all these certifications are important for the cooperation, the one that is
deemed most important for this study is the certification of (software) solutions. Even
this certification of solutions is a very complex task so that solutions are only certified
depending on the current state or condition of a software version.
And so, when partners go about certifying their solution for our system this
solution becomes a certified solution. We don’t certify the partner. We
certify the solution. (Interviewee A13)
If you have ten solutions out of which only one passed the certification pro-
cess, then only this one solution is certified according to our interface and
product standards. (Interviewee A5)
[We even certify] a certain version of a solution against a certain version of
our system interface. (Interviewee A9)
However, even this labeling of certifying a solution is misleading. The only thing
that is actually certified is the interoperability of this solution with the system of Case
Company A. What is not certified is the inherent quality of the partner solution. Case
Company A even refers to this certification as integration certification.
We do not pretend that we can certify partner solutions. We cannot do this
also due to customer liability reasons. We can only certify that the solution
conforms with our conventions and that the technical integration is running
correctly. That is what we promise with the integration certification of a
solution. (Interviewee A9)
We certify solutions for our system in an open program. Our company does
not certify the quality or functionality of these solutions, simply because we
do not give any statement to customers about the partner solutions (Inter-
viewee A5)
Nevertheless, this certification of technical integration is considered to be the most
basic aspect of the entire partner network. This certification of a given solution is a
necessary requirement for being recognized by Case Company A as a member of its
partner network. Consequently, it is also a key requirement that partners keep this
certification updated.
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First, a partner needs to prove that his technical integration is working cor-
rectly. That is the key element for software partnerships. As a general rule
this is achieved through the integration certification. So, this certification is
a fundamental building block [for our software partnerships]. (Interviewee
A9)
The partners who join the network with their certification have to keep this
certification updated. They actually break the rules of the partner program
if a new version of the relevant interface of our system is released and they
do not re-certify their solution for this version within a given period after it
is released. (Interviewee A9)
Thus, ex ante monitoring in the form of certification is a fundamental pillar for man-
aging the IS development network by Case Company A7. Besides this ex ante monitoring
of partners it has also been noted that ex interim monitoring is an important aspect of
such relationships. At Case Company A this monitoring is conducted on various lev-
els of aggregation, from a single partner to the entire network. As it has been argued
above, creating revenues for Case Company A is the main goal of the partner network.
Therefore, revenues are also the most important indicator that is used to monitor the
success of the partners:
So, all these priorities are broken down to the single partner. We have KPIs
for each partner, which are then aggregated into groups, which are then
consolidated into KPIs for the entire partner management. (Interviewee A6)
What counts at the end of the day is revenue, revenue, revenue. (Interviewee
A7)
We have a clear controlling of the partner success at Case Company A. This
controlling happens for each single country, it gets consolidated for different
regions, and then goes up to the very top of the organization. The success
clearly shows in the growing revenues that are generated by the partners.
But also in the growing number of successful projects or new customers.
These are two very clear KPIs that we’re controlling. (Interviewee A10)
7 Case Company A has a very well established opinion of the reason why this is important. As
Interviewee A11 phrased it: “Basically we have set up a certification program where we make sure
that the different partners’ solutions work well with our system. So that we make sure that we are
the trusted advisor for customers. So, when an ISV goes to a customer and says we work well with
Case Company A and we have the right certification to prove it, the customer should feel comfortable
to say, okay if Case Company A says it works, it really works. ” This idea has been well elaborated
on in the discussion of the market benefits from the spokes’ perspective. Therefore this issue is again
addressed in the corresponding section of the spokes’ case narratives. However, this also clearly
shows how closely intertwined the drivers for participating in and the mechanisms for managing the
network are. It is thus another corroboration for conjointly addressing these two issues.
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We have mechanisms to measure how much revenues is coming from a partic-
ular partner. This is what we’re calling incremental revenues. (Interviewee
A11)
However, it is also recognized in this context that the potential of monitoring the part-
ners through measuring generated revenues is very limited. As it has been mentioned
throughout the theoretical discussion on the topic, ex interim monitoring is difficult due
to the idiosyncrasies of the IS development industry. This fact has also been well rec-
ognized by the responsible individuals in Case Company A. Interviewee A9 for example
mentions the following shortcomings of monitoring the partners:
It is not really a tight monitoring. (...) At the moment we do not have a well
developed measurement of what the single partner is actually doing and how
this is contributing to the network. Today we cannot exactly measure this.
We do not have access to the partners’ operational data. Neither is there
any obligation for the partners to show these data to us, nor are we allowed
to demand them from our partners. (...) But a tight monitoring whether all
partners fulfill our criteria? Whether that is actually happening? We would
need more people and highly automated processes for this! (Interviewee A9)
Today, we cannot really observe what is happening in sales. We sell, our
partners sell, and that does not necessarily have to happen simultaneously.
A customer uses our partners’ software and the customer therefore requires
additional licenses from us. That is the optimal case. However, we do not
know the inter-relations between these two parts of the process. We cannot
determine how big the common customer base is with each partner. Some
partners communicate this to us, but they don’t have to. And there is
actually no way to monitor this, especially not for all the partners and on
a permanent basis. At least not with the current size and systems of the
partner group’s staff. (Interviewee A9)
So, albeit it can be concluded that monitoring the partners plays a pivotal role in the
management of the inter-organizational IS development network, there also seems to be
no feasible way to make the relationships in the IS development industry completely
transparent. Consequently, the theoretical discussion has concluded that a control gap
exists in such inter-organizational relationships, and that this control gap cannot be
closed. Thus, a third management mechanism has been proposed in order to safeguard
against partners exploiting this control gap - the building of a trusting relationship with
a partner.
Relationship Building. Indeed the building of trusting relationships has been men-
tioned throughout the interviews at various instances. This also includes the perception
that these trusting relationships between organizations can only be fruitfully built on
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the basis of close personal ties. Often, these ties are even considered to be the most
important management mechanism that Case Company A has for managing the IS de-
velopment network. Interviewee A7 emphasizes this with the following words:
The most important challenge in the cooperation with partners is the people
component. That both sides trust each other. In the end we are all driven
by revenues, we’re living on our revenues, the partners are living on theirs.
(...) As I said from my perspective this is the most important challenge. (...)
If people do not trust me, I will not stand a chance in this business, and it is
hard work to develop this trust. But in the end that’s also what makes this
job so exciting for me. (Interviewee A7)
This relationship building corresponds with the theoretical discussion in several ways.
Foremost, it has to be mentioned in this context that these relationships are always based
on personal ties between the involved companies’ employees. As it has been developed
in the theoretical discussion, only if the participants in such an inter-organizational
relationship cooperate on a trusting basis in their day-to-day work, the relationship
promises to be able to realize its full potential. This reliance on personal relationships
is perceived to be among the strongest indicators for a successful relationship.
Such a partnership has to be a living thing. The best partnerships are those
in which the people closely cooperate, where things work well on a personal
basis. (Interviewee A5)
You try to manage the relationship in a way that you’re meeting regularly
in order to agree on certain KPIs, on revenue targets, on exit criteria, etc.
That is a crucial part of such a relationship. (Interviewee A8)
We have a long lasting partnership with a company that’s one of our fiercest
competitors in other fields. This partner relationship works very well because
it is managed by people who are doing this for ten years. They know the
dos and the don’ts very well. On the other hand we have partners which are
not even close to being in competition with us. However, they nevertheless
attempt to push us into directions that we don’t want to go. (Interviewee
A14)
The second aspect that is also implicitly included in the last quote is the fact that time
is recognized as a crucial dimension for relationship building. It is of prime importance
to note that building and, perhaps even more so, maintaining a trusting relationship can
only be achieved through a continued effort. The employees of Case Company A have
realized this very well, as the following quotes show:
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Of course we know our partners very well through years of cooperation. If
I’m talking to a partner, I can tell very well whether I can trust this partner.
There are others, I know that if they present me some of their numbers I
better have to deduct 20 percent of everything. With time you notice these
things. (Interviewee A14)
I think, at least for my division, but also for my colleagues, we have the rela-
tionships to our partners under control. We have built a trusting relationship
in the past. But we have to demonstrate that again and again, every single
day. (Interviewee A7)
It is extremely important that we’re working hand in glove with our partners
and that we’re having an open, trusting relationship. This is the linchpin
of the entire partner network. (...) Obviously this includes a considerable
preliminary effort to ensure this. (Interviewee A7)
The last aspect that is addressed by the reliance on trusting relationships is the special
role that the hub organizations are playing in a hub-and-spoke structured network. As
it has been argued, the hubs are assumed to have a certain interest in the well-being of
their partners, as these are necessary for the overall success of the network. During the
interviews in Case Company A it has shown that especially personal relationships to the
partners are important mechanisms to realize this partner support.
For such a partner network it is important to build a trusting relationship.
(...) Building this trusting relationship is important to ensure that people
treat each other fair and that both sides benefit from the relationship. (In-
terviewee A8)
Often, the partner is also on trade fairs so that this is a really tight, trusting
cooperation, a real community. In this context you will help your partner to
survive bad times. If you see an opportunity to help him out, you will do it.
(Interviewee A10)
However, while relationship building is an important mechanism for managing the
relationships in the IS development network, it also has to be used with care. Interviewee
A9 gives the following cautionary note on relationship building from Case Company A’s
perspective:
Informal networks exist in Case Company A, as they exist everywhere. How-
ever, we have to make sure that this does not give an unfair advantage to a
particular group of partners. We have a policy to treat all partners in our
program equally. We have to pay close attention to this, because we are one
of the market leaders. These companies are kept under very tight surveil-
lance by the authorities. (...) There is a very close monitoring whether we’re
influencing the market in a certain direction or not. (Interviewee A9)
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Thus, it can be summarized that the reliance on trusting relationships as they have
been discussed in the theoretical part of this study, is an important factor in the man-
agement of the inter-organizational IS development network. The so far conducted dis-
cussion on the management of this network has therefore resulted in significant support
for the proposed co-existence of the three mechanisms that have been developed from
the discussed theories.
However, similar to the preceding discussion on benefits of the networked approach,
also the three proposed management mechanisms cannot be understood as being de-
tached from each other. Rather, very deliberately the mechanisms are applied in differ-
ent intensity for different partners. As it has been argued in the theoretical discussion
of this study, the different management mechanisms come at different costs. Thus, the
following section analyzes first whether the different mechanisms are in fact perceived
as being more or less expensive as it has been described in the theoretical part. Further-
more, it is also analyzed whether the presumedly ’cheaper’ management mechanisms are
used more often then those that are more ’expensive,’ and how they inter-relate.
4.1.1.5 Developing Relationships between the Mechanisms
The underlying rationale behind the relationships between the above discussed mecha-
nisms is the perception that managing the network requires considerable effort from Case
Company A. This very well aligns with the motivation of the second research objective
to determine through which mechanisms the network can be managed most effectively
in such a way that the discussed benefits are not offset.
You need more formal coordination with partners in comparison to making
it alone. You have to be much more professional in documenting things, in
agreeing on targets, in verifying them, in review meetings, and so on. This
also results in more overhead. (Interviewee A8)
It is obviously more effort. You can look at it in a clear-cut, black and white
fashion. If we wouldn’t have our partners, we could save all those partner
efforts that we’re currently having. However, then we would miss out on all
the benefits and value creation - also for the customers. (Interviewee A5)
In this context Case Company A indeed focuses on the above discussed three man-
agement mechanisms. It furthermore classifies the partners into three groups in each of
which one of the mechanisms is predominantly used. This has resulted in a three tiered
partner pyramid8. The lowest segment of this pyramid is the open network that has
naturally developed around Case Company A. It contains organizations that develop so-
lutions based on the system of Case Company A. However, this in part even without the
8 This should not mean that at each segment of the pyramid only one of the management mechanisms
is used. Rather, at each segment one of the mechanisms dominates and the other two are less distinct.
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awareness of Case Company A9. As Case Company A cannot be assumed to have a clear
understanding who is actually participating in this lowest level of the (potential) partner
pyramid, controlling or monitoring this group is similarly impossible as the development
of close personal ties. Case Company A does not considered this group of partners to
be an integral part in the IS development network. Consequently, the only management
mechanism that is active at this level is standardization. Through standardized, open
interfaces (potential) partners do have the opportunity to attach their solutions to the
system of Case Company A in a relatively easy way. Interviewee A11 sees this segment
of partners as the one that Case Company A needs to focus on most in the future:
Our focus increasingly is to enable innovative solutions to be developed out
there and that we don’t know about. So that they are attracted to our
network and that they can, with a minimum amount of effort, build their
solution on our platform. So that one day, when there’s a market disruption,
that solution is already there and we can effectively leverage the solution for
our customers on our platform. In the next couple of years, our focus is to
work with a larger set of partners. We will do this by standardizing and
productizing a lot of the capabilities. (Interviewee A11)
In the middle segment of the partner pyramid, the mechanism of monitoring is added
to standardization. Here especially the certification of specific solutions as it has been
discussed above is the most important aspect. Through this certification, an organiza-
tion is officially recognized as partner, and Case Company A certifies that the solution
that is developed by this partner works well with the existing system. As it has been
discussed above, this monitoring of partners requires some effort from both sides. Case
Company A has to provide the certification scenarios, in part also prepares the partners
for certification, and also has to conduct the actual certification process. However, at
the same time, Case Company A has a veritable interest in attracting partners into this
certification program. Therefore, not a lot of the necessary management effort can be
transferred to them, especially not for those partners that provide an attractive solution:
The statement that we are making is that the solution works well with our
system. So there are concrete certification scenarios, which we pass through
together with our partners in order to ensure that the solution is really
working well with our system. (Interviewee A5)
We have actually published how such a certification process looks like. We
also assist in the preparation. We guide our partners through the whole
process and tell them what is really important. (Interviewee A5)
9 Case Company A therefore does not even officially recognize this level as part of their network.
However, as these ’partners’ are indeed an important part of the network, they are also discussed
here.
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However, while there are indeed some expenses for this certification process, these
are not considered to be critical. Rather, certification is seen as an initial level for
partnerships by Case Company A. Therefore, the expenses at this level are deliberately
held low.
The lowest level is achieved through the certification process. In principle
that is a pure certification of interfaces. The partner has to connect his
solution with our system and has to prove that he can transfer data from left
to right. This costs him a couple of dollars. There are roughly two thousand
partners that have done this so far. (Interviewee A15)
This degree of effort changes when a partner attempts to reach a higher level of the
partnership pyramid. The reason for this can be seen in the fact that for those partners
that are member of the final segment of the partnership pyramid, Case Company A not
only certifies that the solution works well with their system, but also recommends the
partners’ solutions to customers. This also includes that Case Company A is, in contrast
to the preceding two segments of the pyramid also willing to actively foster relationships
in this type of partnership. Obviously this kind of relationship requires yet again much
more effort from Case Company A, which is often realized though adding the mechanism
of personal relationships to the other two. One direct result of this it the fact that access
to this top-tier level of partnership has to be much more restricted than to the other
partner categories.
In a top-tier partnership we’re even going to customers to see how the part-
ner solution actually works. We’re also having personal meetings with our
partners. That is the reason why the number of these partners is much
smaller than for the other segments. We want to build a good governance
and that is very expensive. But only through this mechanism this kind of
partnership works. Only signing a contract, giving out a press release that
we’re cooperating from now on and nothing happens? That hurts us and it
hurts the partner. (Interviewee A5)
We have to place our partner’s solution in the market, we have to commu-
nicate this to our customers and potential customers so that they know the
solution is there and the solution can do this and that. Of course that entails
much effort. (Interviewee A14)
If you take a look at the top-most level of the pyramid, there we have only
one partner for each functionality that we want to add to our portfolio. We
only chose the best one. Otherwise we would have a long list of solutions
and the effort is ever growing. If I have three top-tier partnerships for one
functionality we do have three times the effort. But the question is whether
we also have triple revenues? (Interviewee A5)
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The entire partner pyramid is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The pyramid indicates that the
number of partners decreases as the relationship becomes more intense. The dotted line
for the bottom-most segment, as well as the quotation mark around the word ’partner’,
indicate that this segment is not considered to be part of the partner program by Case
Company A. Finally, next to the pyramid are three bars that are suppose to give an
idea of which effort is put into which management mechanism for each partner category.
These bars are not drawn to scale, they are intended for illustration purposes only.
Figure 4.2: The IS Development Partner Pyramid for Case Company A.
Source: Own Illustration.
Summing up the so far conducted discussion on managing relationships in the network,
it has been confirmed that Case Company A is using the three proposed management
mechanisms. Indeed, three different partner categories exist that are each managed
predominantly through one of these mechanisms. Analyzing how this management of
partners inter-relates with the above discussed benefit categories has been the third
research objective. This is subsequently addressed.
4.1.1.6 Matching Benefits and Management Mechanisms
In the preceding sections good support has been found for the three theoretically de-
veloped proposed benefits why Case Company A is indeed participating in and foster-
ing such inter-organizational IS development networks. Also, good support has been
found for the co-existence of the three theoretically proposed management mechanisms.
However, what has also emerged from the empirical data is the importance of the inter-
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connections between these proposed factors. Thus, addressing the third research objec-
tive in this section again slightly deviates from the original research question. It has
been one of the key findings of the so far conducted study that the three proposed bene-
fits of an inter-organizational IS development approach cannot be considered as separate
of each other, but rather form one coherent process that leads to conjoint market suc-
cess. This also led to the finding that the classification of partners that exists cannot
be based on the different benefits that have been discussed. Rather it should be based
on the potential that a partner solution has for generating additional revenues for Case
Company A. Thus, in the context of Case Company A, the third research objective is
slightly re-phrased to answer the question of whether the proposed management mecha-
nisms are appropriately utilized in order to support the inter-organizational innovation
cycle in IS development, which in turn culminates in market success. Indeed, this goal
is well recognized by Case Company A. As Interviewee A11 comments on the striving
for a scalable process:
We are improving how we support partners effectively, but also make it a
scalable process so that it doesn’t cost us a lot of money to support the
next new partner. Because we have couple of thousand partners, we need to
understand how adding another 1000 partners impacts our cost and revenue
model. Hence, we’re looking at making partner engagement a much more
scalable process. That includes the entire process from the time of identifying
the partner and developing a joint business plan with them, to going to
market with them, what are all the different activities that can be scaled.
Because some of the processes are not easily scalable, so that it’s very cost
prohibitive. (Interviewee A11)
However, in this quote interviewee A11 also highlight the fact that some parts of the
process are not easily scalable and that consequently partnerships of the most intense
type have to be limited in number. At which point in this partnership process, this
necessary limitation can be achieved most easily is illustrated through a matrix in which
the two so far discussed dimensions are put on top of each other10. Thus, Figure 4.3 is
a combination of the two previously developed Figures 4.1 and 4.2. On the horizontal
axis, the partnership development process is sketched over time. Similar to the process
that has been developed in Section 4.1.1.2, this axis is sub-divided into the three phases
innovation, technical integration, and market development. The vertical axis in contrast
shows the management mechanisms that are applied at the three levels of the partnership
pyramid that has been developed in Section 4.1.1.4. This axis is sub-divided into the
three mechanisms of standardization, monitoring, and relationship building.
The process starts with an innovative solution that is developed by one of the (poten-
tial) partners of Case Company A. This step has already been described in the discussion
on the innovation cycle. This innovative solution is then designed in such a way that
10 Using cross-dimensional matrices is a common approach to classify qualitative research data. See
Patton (2002) for a discussion on this topic.
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Figure 4.3: The Combined Process Management Matrix.
Source: Own Illustration.
it inter-operates with Case Company A’s system. As Case Company A provides open,
standardized interfaces, this can be done without the awareness of Case Company A.
This integrated solution can then be sold to customers that are using Case Company A’s
systems - so far still without any awareness of Case Company A. The typical scenario
for this kind of process is what Case Company A terms after sales solutions.
The typical after sales partner is selling into our network, but completely
independent from us. He waits until a customer has deployed our system,
until he has a sound basis of installed solutions, and then complements these
with his own. For his own solutions, he can use any kind of technology,
you name it. With this solution he is addressing the customer completely
independent from us. Sure, this solution is using our interfaces. Great, but
that has nothing to do with Case Company A. We do not see this, we do
not recognize this, we do not have any relationship at all to this partner.
(Interviewee A12)
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This process corresponds to the lowest level of the above sketched matrix. ’Partner’
development along these lines happens completely without the awareness of Case Com-
pany A. However, in this context all the involved parties can be assumed to have a
veritable interest in bringing more transparency into this relationship. As it has been
discussed, the customers are interested in having a stable, well integrated solutions port-
folio. Case Company A is interested in tying the partners to their network. Finally, the
partner is interested in being positively recognized by Case Company A’s customers.
Thus, a possible next step would be to formalize the so far implicit relationship between
Case Company A and the partner. This is done through officially certifying the inter-
operability between the partner’s solution and Case Company A’s system, as it has been
described above. This process is described by Interviewee A12 as follows:
The beginning is that I am a simple software vendor. That means I have
a solution that does - not exclusively - inter-operate with Case Company
A’s system. I am a completely independent company, I do not have any
relationship to Case Company A. (...) The next step would be that more
and more customers of this ISV - remember ’I’ stands for ’independent’ -
demand that the quality of this inter-operability is tested. Case Company
A does have a certification program, why don’t you let your solution pass
through this? If you do this, we can close a deal, if not we have to think
about it. (Interviewee A12)
So this certification of the technical inter-operability is the necessary step to take the
relationship to the middle layer of the matrix in Figure 4.3. Once this certification is
achieved, the conjoint market development that is resulting from this relationship is
closer than before. Yet, in this regard, both parties still act to a considerable extent
detached from each other. Consequently, these solutions are not (yet) considered key
to the software portfolio of Case Company A. Rather, Case Company A only uses this
solution (interface) certification as a mechanism to get a better idea of who is acting
in its environment and a first entry into the partner network. This has been aptly
summarized by Interviewee A12:
We only need certified partners because our customers need them, because
they round off our portfolio. One example is archiving. I doubt that there
are customers out there that decide on our system because we have such
a great archiving solution. Rather, they decide against our system if we
would not have an archiving solution. Other aspects are more relevant for
the customers’ decision. (Interviewee A12)
Our partner comes to us and lets us certify the interfaces of his solution.
Then he gets a logo that we have made a quality check and that his solution
really works with ours in certain areas. Okay, great. But what is really
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interesting is, if this ISV sees an added value in developing new solutions or
completely re-engineering his solution based on our systems. (Interviewee
A12)
Thus, Case Company A is actively looking for successful partners that can be classi-
fied in these higher partner categories. In this highest level of partnership markets are
addressed conjointly by Case Company A and its partners. This can happen through
two distinct ways. First, Case Company A can actively promote the partners’ solu-
tions, for example through joint marketing efforts or the like. Contrary to the above
described secondary importance of partners’ solutions for closing a deal, these recom-
mended solutions are an primary reason for customers to decide for Case Company A’s
system.
Partners can certify their solution. Then they can show - mainly through
successful customer projects - that they and their solution are highly relevant
also for other customers. So coming from the open program a partner can
distinguish himself through success stories. (Interviewee A5)
In the concept of recommended solutions our partners still sell their own
solutions. I get a certain fee for my efforts in helping him sell his solution.
Why should I actually do this? Because I’m hoping that through these sales
a certain drag for my own solutions is emerging! Otherwise I would be crazy.
(Interviewee A12)
Second, Case Company A can even go one step further, and actively sell the partners’
solutions. In this context the effort that Case Company A is having, is even higher than
with only recommending a partner’s solution. As interviewee A5 phrased it:
Obviously the effort is also much higher. We have to develop capabilities
especially for this relationship. We are really selling this solution globally,
we receive requests from all over the world, we need to translate the solution,
we need to document it, we have to support the solution. Because of this
the entire relationship is a different one, especially from the business and
financial perspective. (Interviewee A5)
Thus, it can be assumed that the goal of Case Company A is to develop partners into
these recommended or resold solution partnerships. However, again referring to the idea
of an innovation cycle in IS development, from a partner perspective, these solutions
are also those that are most attractive for being acquired or otherwise absorbed by Case
Company A. In Figure 4.4, this consecutive cycle in such a (successful) relationship is
briefly illustrated through the arrow leading from the top right corner of the process
management matrix to the bottom left corner of a new matrix. In contrast, the certified
partners that are more likely to be providing the niche or technical capabilities are also
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more likely to co-exist with Case Company A for a longer time horizon. This does
not mean that these partners are not innovative. However, this innovation is necessary
because of inherent competition within their industry segment. Thus, as long as they
keep abreast of their competitors their relationship to Case Company A can continue
almost indefinitely. This is illustrated through the arrow staying within the middle right
part of Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Cyclical IS Development Relationships for Case Company A.
Source: Own Illustration.
However, this risk is not a unilateral one. Especially for the reselling partnerships,
Case Company A is also incurring high risks. Interviewee A15 exemplarily mentions the
risk that a partner is acquired by another company and that subsequently the solution
that Case Company A has invested in, is no longer fitting with the other systems.
Especially today, the acquisition risk is very high. If we rely on a reselling
partner, and this partner gets acquired by a competitor, this naturally results
in a disruption of the relationship.
Summing up the narrative for Case Company A it can be stated that indeed many of
the theoretically developed concepts could be successfully applied in the context of this
company - albeit some of them in a different fashion than anticipated. Here, especially
the fact that all these theoretical concepts are closely intertwined is highly striking.
The relationships that were found have been illustrated in a matrix (Figure 4.3). This
matrix not only shows the process of partnership relations from innovation to market
development, but also the management mechanisms that can be applied at each of
these stages. As the innovation process has been found to be a cyclical one, there
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are potentially multiple of these process matrices that can be traversed in a sequential
ordering. This is summing up the most important findings for the partner management
from Case Company A’s perspective.
The following section addresses another hub company in order to develop a similar
case narrative to this one. This is intended to verify whether the here developed model
is highly specific for Case Company A, or whether it can be generalized for other hub
organizations as well. After this verification the other perspective of this study is ad-
dressed - that of the spokes. Here multiple companies are analyzed as to their point of
view on the topic. In a final step, these two perspectives are then integrated in order to
gain a holistic view from an organizational perspective on the entire inter-organizational
IS development network, as it has been demanded in the introduction.
4.1.2 Case Company B
4.1.2.1 Network Development
The development of partnerships has to be considered an essential part of Case Company
B’s history. Especially important in this context is the fact that the company has
its background in hardware development. Thus, the first partnerships that emerged
had been hardware reselling arrangements. However, during the more recent history,
the importance of these reselling relationships has declined and software partnerships,
as they are the focus of this study, have become more important. This development
has been given even more impetus through the wide adoption of SOA principles in
the industry. In the following quote Interviewee B4 comments on this development.
Furthermore, Interviewee B6 adds another interesting side note to the development of
the partner network. Essentially all companies in the IS development industry can be
assumed to have their own partner network. Thus, the acquisition of various companies
by Case Company B has also led to some new partnerships.
If you take a historical look at it, the first partners that joined our network
came from the areas of hardware or hardware services. Those have been
the first real resellers in our community. However, especially during the last
couple of years the number of software partners has grown enormously. That
started roughly 15 years ago. No one talked about SOA back then. That has
developed during the last five years, and it has been connected with large
investments into the middleware of Case Company B in order to facilitate
communication between a large number of applications. (...) Today we have
a partner network with more than 10,000 companies - out of which most
are software partners. This obviously includes many smaller, local partners.
(Interviewee B4)
We have also attracted, step by step, new partners simply through acquiring
companies. We had selling partners for our infrastructure solutions. Then,
as a next step, we have acquired [a company], and we have thus also acquired
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the partners that [this company] already had. So you cannot really say that
we have built up these partners, we have simply acquired them. We have
acquired [this company] and they already had a working partner model. As
a next step we have acquired [another company]. Through this acquisition
we also got new partners. (Interviewee B6)
Besides this general development of the partner relations of Case Company B, there
is one other very important aspect in the history of its partner network. During the
1990s Case Company B deliberately decided to stop developing business applications
and instead focused on developing infrastructure solutions. Case Company B considers
everything to be an infrastructure solution that does not need to be specifically adapted
to the customer context. This includes for example operating systems and databases, but
also collaboration tools including e-mail and the like, network management systems, or
even systems that support software development processes. As this decision dates back
more than a decade, most interviewees could not give real evidence on the backgrounds
of it. However, it nevertheless should be considered as the most influential decision in
the history of IS development in Case Company B. This is illustrated by the following
quotes of Interviewees B1 and B3. Also, Interviewee B5 gives his perspective on the
decision.
Roughly ten years ago there has been the very fundamental decision that
Case Company B is no longer addressing business solutions. We have quit
this field, we have stopped developments of business solutions, we have not
sold applications or solutions any more. That has been a fundamental strate-
gic decision. We have dissolved the organization and have decided that from
now on the solutions are developed by partners. Consequently, we have a
strong interest in working with those partners. (Interviewee B1)
From my perspective, an even better decision has been that we do not de-
velop any business applications any more. Case Company B does not have
software for accounting or controlling. You will not get a software that can be
used to manage a utility company. However, what we have is good services,
consulting, and a great infrastructure. We consider ourselves as provider
of everything that a customer needs in order to get his software running.
(Interviewee B3)
For my line of business I can say very well how it developed. During the early
1990s Case Company B has still developed applications. We have invested
heavily in the development of applications for all different kinds of indus-
tries. Then, somewhen during the 1990s, we have noticed that the different
markets are developing with an enormous pace and that we cannot cover all
the diverse markets ourselves. (...) That’s why we have decided at the end
of the 1990s that we do not continue to develop business applications. We
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have sold everything in this context and have started to focus more on solu-
tion partners. For us, a solution partner is anyone who is either developing
this type of software himself, or who is refining third party software for a
customer. (Interviewee B5)
As it has already been implied in the quotes above, the interviewees in Case Company
B consider this decision a positive one. However, this overarching strategic decision is
highly influential for all other decisions concerning the partnerships in Case Company B.
It therefore has to be kept in mind when reading the following case narrative. Wherever
it is especially important, it is selectively highlighted. One of these passages where
this decision becomes especially important is throughout the following discussion on
Case Company B’s reasons for participating in these inter-organizational IS development
networks.
4.1.2.2 Reasons for Participating in the Network
In this section, the benefits that Case Company B sees in the participation in and even
the fostering of such a network are discussed. Here, the approach that has already
been applied for Case Company A is followed. Again, the three reasons that have been
proposed on basis of the theoretical work in the second chapter are of prime importance
for guiding the case analysis. As a first step of this analysis, Table 4.3 gives an overview
of the number of relevant interview fragments in each of the interviews.
“Innovation” “Technology” “Market”
Interviewee B1 2 3 3
Interviewee B2 1 1 0
Interviewee B3 2 1 3
Interviewee B4 1 2 3
Interviewee B5 0 1 2
Interviewee B6 1 0 6
Interviewee B7 0 1 5
Interviewee B8 1 1 2
Sum 8 10 24
Average 1,00 1,25 3,00
Table 4.3: Relevant Interview Fragments by Benefits: Case Company B.
Source: Own Assertion.
As this pure number of relevant fragments is in itself not yet considered to be highly
meaningful, the subsequent discussion goes into more details. First, this is done indi-
vidually for each of the categories. Then, in a second step, again inter-relations between
these three categories are introduced on the basis of the interviews in Case Company B.
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Innovation Benefits. The first category that is assumed to drive the partner rela-
tionships of Case Company B are innovation related benefits. Interestingly, innovation
benefits do not seem to play such a prominent role in this case. However, the above men-
tioned fact that Case Company B has deliberately decided to discontinue its activities
in the business application development domain due to the fast paced development of
this industry indicates that innovation indeed plays an important, albeit implicit, role.
The reason why these innovation aspects are not explicitly addressed by the intervie-
wees can also be found in this strategic decision. Innovations of partners are de-coupled
from those of Case Company B in a way that the partners innovate on the basis of the
infrastructure that is provided by Case Company B. The following quote of Interviewee
B1 very well illustrates this implicit innovativeness:
It is the very clear goal of Case Company B’s partner strategy to involve
partners in such a way that they develop their own solutions based on our
technology. (Interviewee B1)
While this implicit innovativeness has been recognizable in all interviews, innovative-
ness of partners has only rarely been explicitly mentioned as driving the partner network
of Case Company B. Interviewee B6 mentions the flexibility of smaller, local partners
as key for the inter-organizational network; Interviewee B8 has been the only one who
explicitly mentioned innovativeness of smaller partners.
Our partners are very flexible in reacting to unforeseen customer demands.
They are very quick in deciding whether they want to fulfill these novel
demands or not. Especially the successful partners are unbelievably quick in
these decisions. So, it is important for us to understand how the customer
demands change, and to flexibly support our partners in creating value for
the customers. (Interviewee B6)
I also strongly believe that this large network of small partners is the most
important source of creative innovations. We have huge labs with thousands
and thousands of researchers, that’s one thing. But we also need very clever
people that think about very specific problems. We have to nourish this.
(Interviewee B8)
In this context the fact is also very important that Case Company B does not only
consider other (for profit) organizations as sources of innovativeness. Other sources of
innovation are actively involved in the partner network of Case Company B. Examples
that have been explicitly mentioned by the interviewees in this case are universities and
the open source community, which are also closely related.
Universities are actually also among our partners. There are a lot of free
thinkers in universities, and we as Case Company B would be foolish to
ignore them. We are actively trying to involve universities into our partner
network, in order to better understand what’s actually happening in research.
(Interviewee B3)
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There are solutions, and we have successfully done this, which are brought
into the open source community. We have seen that we are not able to
develop these solutions fast enough in order to turn them into breakthrough
solutions. So we have transferred the whole project, the source code and
everything, into the open source domain. We have won enormously through
this move. One example is [a product of Case Company B]. We have seen
that we simply cannot beat our competitors, simply because we have been too
slow. So we had to involve others. After we have brought [the product] into
the open source community there have been universities, other organizations,
and so on that supported this solution. Suddenly this thing starts to exist
totally detached from our organization. (Interviewee B1)
Thus, innovations do play an important role in the partner network of Case Company
B, which considers itself to be more a facilitator for the innovativeness of others. The
reasons why Case Company B considers this facilitator role as more promising than
pursuing the innovations internally, are very close to those reasons that have been de-
veloped throughout the theoretical part of this work. Interviewee B3 comments on this
as follows.
Case Company B is listed on various stock exchanges. Our revenues and
their development are under very, very tight external surveillance. A small
start-up or a university are not subject to this kind of pressures and thus
also less restricted in what they are doing. (Interviewee B3)
Another part of the innovation aspect is the need to bring innovative solutions to the
customer. This has already been touched upon above in the quote of Interviewee B6 on
the flexibility of partners. This fact is implicitly included in the facilitator role in which
Case Company B sees itself. Interviewee B4 argues that this is exactly one of the main
reasons, why Case Company B has decided to follow this model.
The solutions are very specific and they need to be implemented and ad-
pated very quickly. Assuming that a legislative change is happening, we as a
solution provider would have to ensure that our system reflects this change
as soon as the new law becomes effective. That is exactly where we say, that
we don’t want to stringently follow all this specific developments. There are
specialists that can do that better than we do. (Interviewee B4)
Thus, there support has been for the different shades of the innovativeness proposition,
smaller partners are in part able to recognize opportunities for innovations faster than
Case Company B. They are also able to bring innovations faster to the customer. Sub-
sequently, the other two proposed benefits are subsequently analyzed in a similar vein,
in order to determine whether these are more dominant in the context Case Company
B.
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Technology Benefits. As it has been stated in Proposition TH , the accessing of soft-
ware components that either supplement or complement their own solutions portfolio has
been assumed to be a key goal of Case Company B. This is very true, as Case Company B
has deliberately decided to discontinue its own business application development. Thus,
partnering with companies that supply these complementary functionalities is indeed
not only a key benefit, but even a necessity for Case Company B.
This strategy has been born out of the recognition that we will never be
able to address the application needs of different industries in which we
operate in such depth as specialized partners. Especially in the business
application environment, the market leader usually has so much industry
specific expertise that he can cover most of what his customers need. We,
in contrast, sell solutions across all industries. So we cannot sustain this
in-depth knowledge in all industries. So it is easier to develop solutions that
address problems across industries. (Interviewee B4)
The software products that Case Company B is developing are all infras-
tructure products. We do not develop business applications. The answer to
the question why we involve partners clearly emerges from this statement. If
we do not involve partners that develop business solutions on our platform,
I do not have a viable platform. Our customers typically do not want to
buy a platform. They want to buy a business application. The customer
is buying a specific solution from one of our partners, and he is interested
only marginally in the underlying technologies. He has an HR problem, an
accounting problem, a controlling problem, or a material management prob-
lem that he needs to address. He does not have an infrastructure problem.
(Interviewee B1)
Our partners are depending on us because they need infrastructure to imple-
ment their business applications at their customers. And we are depending
on our partners, because customers only rarely buy computers to heat their
buildings. That is an ideal cooperation because we are complementary to
each other. (Interviewee B8)
Thus, business applications that complement Case Company B’s infrastructure solu-
tions are in fact the type of software that makes partnering for Case Company B most
attractive. As an interesting side note, Case Company A as a key supplier of these
business applications is also the most important software partner of Case Company B.
Interviewee B4 recognizes this aspect in the following quote.
Since we are a large company specialized in providing infrastructure, we’re
lacking extensive business applications. This makes our strategy very trans-
parent: Case Company B is cooperating with those software developers that
have exactly this expertise on the upper application levels of the stack. Case
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Company A is one of the biggest application developers with whom we are
cooperating. If we consider our partners in terms of revenues that we’re
generating through conjoint projects, Case Company A is a clear number
one. Obviously there are thousands of other software developers that we
have close cooperations with in order to fill this application layer. Some of
them are also competitors of Case Company A. (Interviewee B4)
Bringing in partners’ business applications that complement Case Company B’s own
solution portfolio has to be considered a necessity due to the decision not to develop any
business applications. Furthermore, the interviewees also mentioned infrastructure solu-
tions that are developed by partners at various instances. These infrastructure solutions
are commonly those that Case Company B does not have in its portfolio. These solu-
tions can therefore be considered as being hypothetically supplementary. However, as
Case Company B is currently not offering a similar functionality, they indeed have to be
considered as being complementary. Interviewees B1 and B7 mention this complemen-
tary aspect of infrastructure partnerships. Interviewee B3 goes even one step further in
stating that solutions of Case Company B are actually competing with those developed
by partners, thus hinting upon partners that are developing not only hypothetically, but
real supplementary solutions.
There are for sure those partners that supply solutions that are sitting on top
of ours. However, there’s also a smaller group of partners that complement
our own portfolio. If I’m working in the database sector, and I do not possess
very distinctive competencies in a specific niche, then I might partner with
someone who is developing a solution that complements my own. Simply
because I’m not complete in what I’m offering. (Interviewee B1)
We’re actively considering whether we have an opportunity to augment our
portfolio with partner products. As part of this we’re also considering the
potential of this partner to generate cross-selling opportunities11 for us. And
we’re actively developing our partners into this direction. (Interviewee B7)
The relationship between our partners’ solutions and our own? That’s a
clear competition. A positive competition. If we have our own solution in a
specific area and we see that there’s something better out there, we would
sell the better solution. Simply because we want to win the project. Internal
to external, that’s a competitive situation. But that is deliberately so, that
has been our intention. (Interviewee B3)
11 The term cross-selling has been used in this interview to denote sales that are triggered by sales
of a partner. Commonly, the term refers to sales that are triggered by one company selling other
products or services to the same customer (Harding, 2002).
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Thus, the dominating rationale behind Case Company B’s partner selection is the
complementarity of these partners’ products. This complementarity is clearly given if
the partner develops business applications. Also infrastructure components might be
complementary and thus an attractive portfolio addition. However, even those com-
panies that develop infrastructure components that are in direct competition to Case
Company B’s are not excluded from the partner network. Yet another aspect has been
implicit in most quotes above and has become very obvious in the quote of Interviewee
B7. Case Company B is cooperating with partners to actively push its own products into
the market. This aspect is addressed subsequently in the discussion of the last benefit
category: Market access.
Market Benefits. In the theoretical part of this work it has been argued that partners
are used to gain access to a broader market. Indeed this proved to be the dominating
reason why Case Company B is intensely partnering with smaller software vendors.
As it has already been discussed above, tapping into innovations and thus integrating
complementary or in part even supplementary solutions is key to the partnership network
of Case Company B. However, this partnering is only seen as a means to the end of
successful market cultivation. Furthermore, the pure addressing of markets is also not
the final goal of Case Company B. Rather, the revenues generated on these markets
are what Case Company B is aiming at. Again, as Case Company B is a for-profit
organization, this should not come as a surprise.
The intention that we have to integrate our partners is that we can place
our own technologies on the market. (...) It has been a strategic decision
to discontinue our engagement in this business application segment and to
let partners develop these solutions. Consequently, partners do have a very,
very prominent position in the software group. (Interviewee B1)
Case Company B does not see the satisfaction of partners as an end in
itself. It’s not that we supply them with our technologies, so that they can
just play around with them. Rather, we want those partners to generate
customer revenues. (Interviewee B6)
We cooperate on the basis of a conjoint business plan. Part of this plan
is, which topics we should address conjointly so that the market accepts
our cooperation. That is, what are the technologies and services that Case
Company B can bring into the relationship and what are the solutions that
a partner can bring into the relationship so that the market recognizes the
added value of this partnership. (Interviewee B5)
The basic rationale behind this strong focus on market success can be found in the role
of Case Company B as an infrastructure provider. The smaller complementing firms ob-
viously have a strong incentive to successfully sell their solutions to customers. However,
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if they are close partners of Case Company B, the likelihood is high that through the
selling of their own solutions, they also implement the infrastructure of Case Company
B at the customer. This has been described as inter-organizational cross-selling oppor-
tunities by Interviewee B7 above. And, this is also the reason, why Case Company B
would sacrifice parts of its own system for a successful project. This has been implicitly
assumed as a reason for accepting supplementary partner solutions above: Case Com-
pany B does put the highest emphasis on successfully fulfilling its customers’ demands.
If a customer requests a certain partner solution, Case Company B offers this solution,
no matter whether Case Company B has an own solution addressing this functionality
or not. Also, Case Company B supports its partners in their marketing activities for this
reason. So, through their partner activities Case Company B is essentially generating
revenue streams. In this context, there are two distinct sources of these revenues. First,
direct revenues result from partners that are re-selling Case Company B’s infrastruc-
ture. Second, influenced revenues result from a customer buying Case Company B’s
infrastructure because a partner recommended it.
It is very important to recognize that we have two fields of interest when we’re
working with partners. The first is a partner is recognizing an infrastructure
pain point at a customer; he then buys this infrastructure solution from us
and sells it to the customer. That’s the first source of revenues. The second
one is a partner who is offering a specific solution to the customer, an e-
mail system or whatever. This partner now has the opportunity to do this
based on Case Company B’s infrastructure, or on that of our competitors.
Obviously we want this partner to do it on our infrastructure. (Interviewee
B6)
The generation of revenues is therefore considered as the key rationale why Case
Company B is fostering these IS development networks. Thus, it is also recognized that
the success in partnering is key for the success of Case Company B. It is also recognized
that this success in partnering cannot be achieved, if the development of the partner
network is not continuously supported. Interviewee B3 illustrates this crucial time aspect
with the reference to the durability of such a software infrastructure platform.
Such infrastructure topics will be of more and more importance in the future.
We have to educate our partners better with regard to our strategy, our
offerings, our technology, so that these partners can be successful in the
market. Whenever one of our competitors’ platforms is installed somewhere,
we’re having a huge problem. Software-wise it takes eight to twelve years
to exchange this infrastructure. The moment that thing is installed at a
customer we’re out of the deal. If you want to phrase it like this, the partner
has failed. And that means that we have failed to support him, to train him,
to educate him, to inform him, it’s our fault. (Interviewee B3)
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For Case Company B, the three theoretically developed categories of benefits have
been found to be highly relevant for the decision of Case Company B to participate in
and foster such a network. However, temporal dynamics between these three factors have
been recognized in this context. Thus, in the following section the variance theoretical
approach is abandoned and a process view is used to especially analyze these dynamics,
and integrate the factors into a coherent picture.
4.1.2.3 Towards a Process View on Developing Networks
The fact that the above discussed three key benefit categories are closely inter-connected
has already been implicitly included in many of the given quotes. Especially the decision
that Case Company B is deliberately not offering any business application functionality
has indicated that in order to achieve market success, partners’ solutions are a key ne-
cessity. Thus, here again thes static (variance or type one process) view is not sufficient
for explaining the partnerships Mohr (1982); Van de Ven (1992). Consequently, again
a dynamic perspective is used in order to explain how these relationships change over
time. Similar to Case Company A, the above discussed three motives were not found
to be drivers for the this network formation, but rather events that triggered the tran-
sition between the stages in this developmental sequence. During the interviews, the
partnership process of Case Company B has been commonly assumed to begin with the
identification of a partner solution that is considered to be attractive for Case Company
B. This screening process is already geared towards the final goal of revenue generation.
However, as Interviewee B7 also mentions, revenue generation is considered to be a
multi-dimensional concept for Case Company B. Consequently, partner selection is also
based on multiple criteria.
We’re selecting partners on the basis of a market screening. We’re closely
analyzing the successful ISV solutions with regard to the potential that they
have for our own systems. We also consider what industries are currently
promising and screen who’s active in this industry and whether we can part-
ner with them in order to grow in this industry. (Interviewee B7)
If we see an opportunity for growth, we’ll recruit partners in this context.
These partners are selected on the basis of their potential [to contribute to
this growth]. This is a multi-dimensional approach. We consider the product
that the partner has, we consider the customers of the partner, we consider
the industry he’s in, and we also consider geographical aspects. (Interviewee
B7)
Thus, Case Company B is actively fostering partners wherever market potential is
recognized. The fact that these partners are necessary for Case Company B’s market
success is thus evident. That the partners’ solutions by definition have to be emerging
from innovations as they are defined in this work is also recognized by Case Company
B. Interviewee B8 phrased this as maturity component.
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The dominating characteristic [for successful partners] is market potential.
Period. But there’s also a maturity component to this issue. We have talked
about software development so far and I have assumed that we’re talking
about existing applications. Obviously you can develop new applications.
You can develop applications, from which we believe that they have a huge
future market potential. They may contain patents or other rights that give
us access to large markets in the future. (Interviewee B8)
Thus, this time component is also included in the partner considerations of Case
Company B. This goes as far as to support the development of specific smaller partners
that promise to have large market potential.
It is an art to correctly assess the abilities of the partners. Also in a sense of
what they can achieve and when they can achieve it. The big partners they
have much more power. But the smaller ones, those with 20 or 30 people,
they simply do not have the power to implement everything all at once. We
have to guide them through the sequence of their activities. (Interviewee B5)
We support our partners, we invest in our partners. That can be through skill
development, through knowledge transfer, through support in development,
and so on. In return our partners have to realize certain revenues with Case
Company B’s infrastructure platform. (Interviewee B1)
We’re analyzing to which degree it is justified to support this partner through
whatever is necessary to motivate the partner’s developing in such a way that
we participate in the success of this partner. (Interviewee B8)
However, Case Company B is not only approaching partners. There are also those
partners that are making this first step. Thus, either the partner is approaching Case
Company B, or vice versa. Interviewee B4 is illustrating these two ways to integrate
partners into Case Company B’s network. These two approaches should, however, not
be considered as being disjoined from each other, as the quote of Interviewee B5 shows.
There are indeed two scenarios. Either we’re approaching companies and ask
them if they want to join our community. We’re actively acquiring partners
for our community. There is also the other case, that a software company
is inquiring what we’re offering in this context. If they consider our partner
program attractive they join and through this become part of our community.
(Interviewee B4)
It might happen that a partner suddenly comes to our attention. We’re using
all types of information, customers, our sales force, other external parties to
see whether there are companies that might be of interest for us. If this is
the case, we are increasing our activities with this partner. It’s not a static
system, there’s a high dynamic in this context. (Interviewee B5)
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Thus, there are multiple ways how a company that has successfully developed an
innovative solution can partner with Case Company B. The fact that these partnerships
are essential for integrating the business applications which run on Case Company B’s
infrastructure has already been discussed above. This also includes the fact that these
business applications are necessary for market success, not only of the partners, but
also of Case Company B. So, the conjoint financial success is seen as the ideal situation
of a partnership by Case Company B. This close interconnection is illustrated by the
following two quotes from Interviewee B7.
I have a thousand reasons why I’m talking to partners. The main one is
that I see a certain market potential. This includes an ISV that has a great
solution that I can integrate. If this is the case, for sure I will cooperate with
this partner. (Interviewee B7)
I always need to consider how I position myself in the market. This also
includes the partner. I have to give the partner the opportunity to earn
money. That’s what he’s expecting from us. (Interviewee B7)
However, despite the fact that such a successful relationship is seen as ideal by Case
Company B that does not mean that this type of relationship continues infinitely. Two
closely related aspects of this have already been implicitly mentioned. First, the inherent
dynamics within the IS development industry are constantly changing the competitive
landscape that Case Company B and its partners are operating in. As the quote of
Interviewee B7 below indicates this dynamic might eventually result in the termination
of a partner relationship. Furthermore, despite the fact that partners are important for
conjointly addressing markets and that Case Company B is even supporting partners
in order to be successful, this does not mean that there is no competition between
Case Company B and its partners. Especially if a partner is developing infrastructure
functionality, Case Company B actively considers whether partnering with this company
is the optimal solution. Interviewee B1 makes this relationship very explicit.
This might lead to a point where we don’t need the partner any more. The
partner is no longer useful for us, simply because he has developed in a
different direction. He simply doesn’t use our products any more. (...) It is
for sure so, that partners develop into different directions. There are some
that develop very well, some that stay on a constant level, and others that
simply die away. (Interviewee B7)
It’s a question of what development costs I can afford. If I am able to address
a certain segment in which a partner might already be well established? Do
I have a chance to develop an equivalent or better functionality than this
potential competitor or partner? This within a reasonable timeframe? These
are very strategic considerations. (Interviewee B1)
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These strategic considerations might in some cases lead to a decision to partner with
some companies, in other cases the decision is to develop an own solution, still in others
the decision is acquire the other company. The fact that the latter two options are
also viable for Case Company B has been very well illustrated by Interviewee B3 in the
following quote.
Case Company B has acquired a three digit number of companies during the
last year. This happens if we see that these companies are very, very good
in a certain area. If we need a very specific functionality in a certain context
we have two options. We can educate people especially for this functionality.
This is very hard work and takes a long time. Or we’re checking the markets
if there is a company that fits well in this context that we can acquire.
(Interviewee B3)
Thus, not all of Case Company B’s partnerships are designed to last forever. In specific
cases, mainly in the infrastructure domain, Case Company B has deliberately decided not
to partner, but rather to compete with other companies. This competing might result in
imitating the functionality or in an outright acquisition of the partner. In any case, the
official partnership is terminated. Summing up the discussion, indeed innovations are
a necessary pre-condition for a successful partnering of Case Company B and smaller
software development organizations. Once this innovative solution has emerged, Case
Company B has considerable interest to integrate this functionality with its own platform
in order to ensure good performance. Once the solution is well integrated with Case
Company B’s platform further development of the relationship depends on the kind of
functionality that the partner is offering. If it is a business application, the partnership
continues as long as it is profitable for all partners. However, if the solution is considered
to be part of the technical infrastructure, the functionality might be absorbed in some
form or another. These relationships between the three developed benefit categories is
illustrated in Figure 4.5
In this context it has to be mentioned that especially the decision of Case Company B
not to develop any business applications is seen by its partners as an important aspect
of consistency in the relationship. The fact that partners can act within a reliable,
transparent, stable environment is considered an important pillar of Case Company B’s
partner network. As some of the interviewees argued, Case Company B today still
benefits from this decision.
The guaranteed openness towards our partners is one of the main reasons
why Case Company B is not offering any business applications. If I am
offering any business applications, I’m competing heavily with those partners
that want to sell similar applications to our customers. We rather have
those partners who offer solutions to do this on the basis of our standardized
infrastructure, no matter in which direction they are developing. (Interviewee
B6)
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Figure 4.5: The Innovation Cycle in IS Development for Case Company B.
Source: Own Illustration.
Especially from an application developer’s perspective, we recognize that
these companies appreciate the fact that we are not competing with them.
For sure they also appreciate that we’re technology leader in many fields. But
especially smaller companies pay close attention that their bigger partner
does not squeeze them out of the market overnight. Other companies are
infamous for not only acquiring smaller partner, but for simply developing
a competing product and thus squeezing them out of the market. In order
to prevent this, we have a very good understanding of the boundary of the
functionalities we offer and we respect the core business of our partners.
(Interviewee B4)
The market appreciates the fact that Case Company B is deliberately avoid-
ing the business application layer. We do not want to compete with software
firms. That actually brings more and more members into our community. In
this regard, the fundamental decision 15 years ago pays off today. You could
argue that those who made this decision have been real visionaries. Or it has
been developing in this direction by pure happenstance. In any way it is a
great attractor that lets our partner community grow steadily. (Interviewee
B4)
However, even when considering infrastructure solutions, the absorption of these func-
tionalities is considered by no means as an automatism by Case Company B. Rather,
the decision how to deal with those companies that are developing what is assumed to
be an integral part of Case Company B’s infrastructure is highly complex. One very
important issue in this context are the idiosyncrasies of software development, which
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make an acquisition difficult (see also Arndt and Dibbern, 2006a). These idiosyncrasies
are very well illustrated by the following quote of Interviewee B1. Also the fact that
one Case Company B is facing a multitude of smaller complementers is contributing its
share to make the situation more complex. Interviewee B8 illustrated this one-to-many
relationship very well.
Software is for sure different than for example the automotive industry. If
you acquire a company and are not successful in integrating the employees
they will quit. Then the question is what is the actual benefit from this
acquisition? Sure you have the intellectual property, you have the code that
these employees have developed so far. But if you acquire a company with
20 employees and after one year these 20 employees have quit, then you’re
actually back to where you started from. (Interviewee B1)
It is simply not true that we, as a global player, can beat the smaller com-
panies. If you consider one small company, every one of the global players
can beat one small company. Through acquisition or some other way. But
if you consider the dynamics of the market, all global players have difficul-
ties to beat one million small companies. Instead, the global players have
to cooperate with the smaller companies in order to participate from their
market development. (Interviewee B8)
This discussion has highlighted the relationships between the different categories of
benefits that Case Company B derives from partnering with smaller software develop-
ment firms. It has been argued that the three theoretically developed benefits are all
highly relevant. However, all interact in a complex, cyclically dynamic pattern between
innovation, technology, market success, and novel innovations. After this section has
attempted to give an answer to the first research question of why Case Company B
is extensively partnering, the following section resumes the second research question of
how Case Company B manages its relationships to other network participants.
4.1.2.4 Management of the Network
In order to give an answer to the second research question, again three aspects have
been developed on the basis of various theories. From this theoretical discussion it can
be assumed that these three are of prime importance in the management of the network
relationships. Table 4.4 shows again how often the interviewees in Case Company B
have mentioned the three mechanisms in their interviews.
These numbers well support the propositions that all three aspects are of prime impor-
tance in the context of Case Company B. Thus, similar to the approach of the preceding
section, the data collected in Case Company B is subsequently used to first address them
individually. Then however, in the concluding part of this section the inter-dependencies
between the three factors are again discussed and brought into the context.
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“Standardization” “Monitoring” “Personal Rel.”
Interviewee B1 0 2 1
Interviewee B2 1 0 0
Interviewee B3 1 0 3
Interviewee B4 1 5 3
Interviewee B5 2 3 4
Interviewee B6 2 3 2
Interviewee B7 1 1 1
Interviewee B8 2 1 4
Sum 12 15 18
Average 1.50 1.88 2.25
Table 4.4: Relevant Interview Fragments by Management Mechanisms: Case Company
B.
Source: Own Assertion.
Standardization. During the preceding discussion it has already been implicitly and
explicitly argued that Case Company B very well recognizes the important role that
standards play in an inter-organizational IS development context. Interviewee B6 for
example mentioned open standards as key for allowing partners to flexibly integrate
their solutions on the basis of Case Company B’s infrastructure.
If I have a standardized model I am open to go in very different directions.
I can take a look at the markets and see what the customers actually want.
Then I can determine how we can address these requirements together with
our partners. (Interviewee B6)
Especially smaller companies and those that are not very experienced in the partner
network of Case Company B heavily rely on these standardized technologies for their de-
velopments. In this context, again Service Oriented Architectures have been mentioned
as being key for driving the industry towards a more standardized model. Interviewees
B8 and B5 illustrate this through the following quotes.
Companies with only ten employees rely heavily on our partner portal. They
can download various development tools that we are offering there. They
can test them, they can see what’s good and what’s bad. They can integrate
their own solutions into what we’re offering. That’s done very frequently.
(Interviewee B8)
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Of course we’re talking to our partners about market trends. Especially in
the context of integration of and communication with partner applications,
SOA is a hot topic. The topic will be key to our success over the coming
years and we’re pushing this very much. We’re helping our partners to get
into these service oriented architectures. (Interviewee B5)
Also, Case Company B is not only recognizing the importance of using open standards,
it is also actively trying to set these standards. Interviewee B4 heavily emphasizes this
fact.
We do not protect ourselves through the encapsulation of our network. Our
experience has shown that, especially in IT with its high dynamics in in-
terfaces and communication, such closed systems are not very long-lasting.
Eventually, one component fails and then the entire system breaks down. It
is much better to live up to this openness and to let others participate in the
network, even if we cooperate with some of our competitors. I’m sure that
we’re different than others in this regard. We have opened many of our solu-
tions for example into the open source community. There are standards set
through this, and these standards are then the basis for all our further devel-
opments. In this regard we have progressed very far on the open-ended scale
of standardization in the IT industry. (...) Many of our partners appreciate
this approach and thank us through an intense cooperation. (Interviewee
B4)
However, this reliance on standardization is not limited to using specific technologies.
Case Company B is going beyond this, in that it considers standardization an integrated
approach that is encompassing technologies, but also information flows between part-
ners. Indeed, the access to standardized information is seen as an integral part of these
relationships. This is illustrated in the quote of Interviewee B5. Going even beyond
this, Interviewee B7 mentions a further integration of for example processes as part of
this integrated approach in the following quote.
We have a global portal for partners. The partners can register and thus
become members. Through this membership they gain access to development
information, for example early code. There are also different other kinds of
relevant information, like the announcements of training and the like. Our
partners are pro-actively supplied with information that is relevant for them.
(Interviewee B5)
There are also very simple aspects to this cooperation. The integration
of standardized processes and even the standardization of entire business
relations is a good example. I believe that this will be increasing in the future.
I would even consider that as the quintessence of our relationships. Obviously
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this is also supported by technologies, such as collaboration tools that can be
used by partners. (...) We are currently enforcing this through systems that
our partners can access in a self-service fashion. They are actually integrating
their processes with ours though these systems. (Interviewee B7)
Yet, even the use of standardized technologies and processes as management mecha-
nism is - albeit highly important - not sufficient when it comes to more close partnering.
Thus, this access to the web site and the self-service systems of Case Company B is only
considered to be the first step in an ongoing process. As Interviewee B4 argues, sub-
sequent steps include the application of more sophisticated management mechanisms,
which are described in the following quote.
I want to put it like this. On the very first step, which gives a partner access
to standardized products and information, the relationship is not very tightly
governed. I believe that every company is becoming a lot more formalized in
the moment that it acts on the markets conjointly with third parties. In this
case the reputation of Case Company B is at stake, so we significantly raise
the bar. But I do not believe that we’re much different than our competitors.
We do, as our competitors, have very clear criteria what a partner is allowed
to do and what not. (Interviewee B4)
These criteria of what a partner is allowed to do and what not leads over to the next
proposed management mechanism, the increase in transparency in a relationship that is
achieved through the monitoring of partners. This particular mechanism is discussed in
the following in more detail.
Monitoring. Besides the above discussed access to standardized products and infor-
mation, Case Company B is using other management mechanisms. Going beyond this
very basic foundation in the relationship between Case Company B and its partners
can be considered as Case Company B sees the underlying rationale to partner in the
joint market success. However, when jointly addressing markets with a partner, Case
Company B has a legitimate interest in gathering more knowledge about the partners.
This distinction between simply accessing standardized products and information and
the necessity to ex ante reduce uncertainty in order to go beyond this initial level is well
described in the following quotes.
The first step to become a member in our partner network is not very for-
mal. Especially software developers usually start with this step. They have
access to certain products, they can download them, experiment with them.
Essentially this is a show case to become familiar with our technologies. The
partner is not allowed to go to market with these products. The moment
they want to go to market it is becoming a lot more formalized, up to very
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specific certifications. For this certification, the partners need to invest in
education of their sales and technical skills because we want to ensure that
everyone who is going to market with our products and solutions is suffi-
ciently qualified for this. (Interviewee B4)
As it has been implicitly mentioned in these quotes, the certification of Case Com-
pany B in general addresses people’s skills. There are various types of certifications -
reaching from sales certification to technical ones. These certifications are furthermore
differentiated according to different products that Case Company B has. In order to
ensure that partners certify their employees, Case Company B even prescribes that cer-
tain certifications have to be obtained in order to receive incentives for certain projects.
Another aspect of this certification of people’s skills is the fact that the certification has
to be renewed on a continuous basis to stay valid.
In order to sell [a product of Case Company B] a partner needs a certain
amount of qualified, certified employees in this context. Case Company B
has to attest that these employees possess certain skills. Partners need sales
certifications and technical certifications so that we can ensure that they are
able to conduct a project from beginning to end. This is a clear quality
criterion. In order to participate in our programs that provide incentives
for this joint value creation, certain certification criteria have to be fulfilled.
(Interviewee B6)
Of course these certifications are not valid forever. You have to renew it in
certain cycles. Through this, we keep the partners knowledge consistently
high. (Interviewee B4)
However, besides this personal certification of partner organizations’ employees, there
is also a focus on the solutions of these partners. Here it is especially important whether
a partner has successfully conducted one or more customer project(s). If this is the case
this partner can specify this project as a reference show case. A reference project of this
kind is considered to be an integral part of a successful partnership by Case Company
B. This has been described by Interviewee B5.
The partner has to show us a reference project. It does not need to be a
public one, it can also be internal. We have to be able to check into this
project and see some of its details. If we are satisfied with the reference, we
offer more benefits, like conjoint marketing activities, the compilation of a
brochure, or the like. It is a comprehensive set of activities that we provide
to those of our partners who have qualified. (Interviewee B5)
These two aspects are the supporting pillars of Case Company B’s monitoring activi-
ties. A partner has to show his quality through the fact that he has both considerably
qualified (i.e. certified) employees and considerable customer references. Only if both
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aspects are fulfilled, this partner is allowed to refer to the partnership with Case Com-
pany B, for example at its customers. However, Case Company B is also well aware of
the shortcomings of this monitoring of partners. Especially the ex interim monitoring
of a partner’s success promises to be difficult. The reason for this can be seen in the
two different types of revenue generation through partners. Thus, there are also consid-
erable difficulties in truly assessing what constitutes a successful partner, and what an
unsuccessful. Interviewee B4 very well describes the difficulties that Case Company B
is facing.
How can we measure the success of our partner activities? It is pretty easy
wherever partners resell our products. The partner is buying our product,
integrates it with his own solution, and resells the entire package. We’re
simply measuring the incoming orders from our partner community. But
that’s only one part of it. The second part is what we’re calling “influenced
revenues”. These are revenues that are generated through a partner who is
recommending our infrastructure, or through the fact that the solution of
the partner is running exceptionally well on our infrastructure. This type of
revenues is obviously much more difficult to measure, simply because there
is no direct order through the partner involved. Ultimately the customer is
buying our infrastructure independent of the partner. Nevertheless the work
of the partner has been the trigger for this order. This is very difficult to
measure. (Interviewee B4)
Thus, there is a need for even more sophisticated management mechanisms. This,
because the monitoring of partners is so difficult. This also, because the monitoring is,
despite the fact that Case Company B highlights its importance, only considered to be a
potential indicator of the quality of a partner. The final decision of whether a company
is becoming part of a certain project or not is always with the customer. This decision
is obviously not always an entirely transparent and objective one. Case Company B also
recognizes that more than standardization and monitoring contributes to this decision.
Mostly, close personal ties are an integral part of this decision.
Relationship Building. Indeed, good relationships between Case Company B and its
partners are considered as being of prime importance for the success of the entire partner
network. It is also recognized that these good relationships between the organizations by
necessity have to be based on close personal ties between the employees of the involved
organizations. Thus, while the above discussed programmatic management mechanisms
are for sure important, they always have to be accompanied by personal relationships
between the involved individuals. This is very well illustrated by the two quotes below.
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Of course you have a second element. That is how the partnership is lived.
You need people with a certain skillset. They need to understand how net-
works work, they need to understand the soft values that are the most im-
portant part of these relationships, they need certain character traits to fill
such a relationship with live. (Interviewee B5)
The entire partner network depends on personal relationships. If you walk
out of this office, you’ll see that our partners have offices right next to ours.
We’re renting out to partners not because we’re in need of the money, but
because we want the partner to be right here, right next to us. We want
the partner to know that myself and other colleagues are walking around
here and that the partner can approach us. We’re trying to organize this
networking right here in our offices. That’s real people business. Especially
in IT much is driven by trust, and that only works if you know each other.
(Interviewee B6)
However, in the perception of Case Company B, this basing of cooperations on close
personal ties also has a severe draw-back. In this context it has to be foremost ensured
that these personal relationships do not lead to unequal treatment of different partners.
Rather, all partners have to be treated equally in order to guarantee a successful partner
network. This is indeed one of the fundamental pillars of the inter-organizational network
around Case Company B, as the following two quotes illustrate.
Our partner concept is first, to treat all partners fair and equal. That is
all partners have the same rights if they have the same duties. Part of
this concept is the web platform. This platform covers various aspects of
a partnership: Development, sales, and a lot of other things. For all these
areas we have different rules that are consistent over all partners. We have
rules for joint marketing, rules for joint training efforts, rules for supporting
our partners, and so on. (...) Every partnership has to be based on the same
rules. (Interviewee B8)
As I said, we have a partner charter, which is basically the constitution of all
our partnerships. All the basic rules are formulated in this charter. We keep
this very general, for example that we have to treat all partners equally, that
we commit ourselves not to show any preferences for specific partners to our
customers, etc. (Interviewee B4)
Thus, indeed personal ties are a core aspect of a functioning relationship between Case
Company B and its partners. However, these personal ties have to be carefully managed
in order to positively contribute to the overall network. This foremost, as they should
not result in unequal treatment of different partners. Second, these personal relations
have to be considered the most expensive management mechanism.
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Thus, summing up the discussion on the individual management mechanisms, there is
ample support for the co-existence of all three proposed mechanisms. Implicitly, there
has also ample support for the perception that different partners are managed through
different mechanisms. The main reason for this can be found in the fact that, as it
has already been mentioned at various instances throughout the interviews, different
management mechanisms come at different costs. Thus, the sheer number of the partners
in the network makes a highly intense, dedicated personal treatment of all partners
infeasible - even for a large organization like Case Company B. Thus, there have to be
different levels in the partner network - as otherwise Case Company B would conflict
with its own policy to treat partners with equal rights equally. Which these partner
categories are, and how they can be reached is covered in the following discussion.
4.1.2.5 Developing Relationships between the Mechanisms
The constraint that equal treatment is only granted to the partners if their duties are
equal is especially important with regard to the degree of utilization of the different
proposed management mechanisms. In this context, Case Company B does not consider
its partnering with others as a static event. Rather, it is considered to be a dynamic
process, which is not only differentiated between the temporal stages of a partnership
that has been discussed above. Also, the intensity of the partnership is subject to change.
In this context, the accessing of standardized technologies - and also information - is
only seen as a first step. This is achieved through signing up on the already mentioned
partner web site. Partners can become members of this site and receive information
about Case Company B’s developments. This membership as the very first step is very
unrestricted by Case Company B, it is even assumed that most of its competitors have
also signed up here. However, as unrestricted as this access is, it is also limited. The
following quotes show this very well.
If we recruit partners it is the first step for them to become members of our
network. This membership costs a little money, so there is some commitment
to sign up. It’s not a big sum, but especially for very small partners this is
not done for no reason. Thus, these companies officially become partner of
Case Company B. (Interviewee B6)
As a member of this web site you’re not a recognized business partner of Case
Company B. You do not have any rights to use our name, to communicate
this partnership to anyone in the market. I assume that every single one of
our competitors is a member of this web site. (Interviewee B8)
In order to increase the intensity of the cooperation with Case Company B, partners
first of all need to be successful in what they are doing. Further, these also have to
be open towards a certain monitoring of their success. In this context, especially certi-
fied employees and customer projects have been mentioned as the only way to gain an
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improved status in the partner network. This improved status is first of all a quality
signal to the markets. Partners that reach this level have shown their quality, explicitly
towards Case Company B but therefore also implicitly to the market. Furthermore,
addressing the idea of equal rights for equal duties12 that has been raised above, they
also earn more rights in the cooperation, foremost the right to officially use the name of
Case Company B in the market.
You have an implicit quality insurance. This quality insurance is realized
through the different levels that you have in our partner program. The basic
level is being a member. Then there are different criteria in which a partner
can score. He can certify employees, or he can show us his references. For
both he receives a certain score. If a partner has reached a certain score, he
is raised to the next level of partners, which also communicates some aspects
of the quality of this partner. (Interviewee B6)
Reaching further levels in the relationship between Case Company B and its partners
is achieved in a similar manner. Again, a partner receives points for certified employees
and successfully complete customer projects. A certain number of points enable this
company to reach a new partnership level. However, another important aspect of this
next partnership level is that a certain score does not guarantee that a partner reaches
this level. Rather, it is ’by invitation only’.
We have defined these quality parameters and also evaluate the results. The
last status is reached by a partner that collects even more points in a broader
set of criteria. This gives customers an even better understanding of this
partner’s quality. (Interviewee B6)
The highest level of partnership is by invitation only. We come to a very
specific agreement in which we state that we want to cooperate more intense
for certain reasons. We do have specific contracts for a well selected number
of partners. That is very limited, we pick those partners very carefully, and
we also cooperate for a longer time-frame. (Interviewee B5)
In an operational sense, the main difference between the middle layer of partnerships
and this top layer is the increase in dedicated personal support. As the expenses of this
dedicated personal support are significantly high, the number of partners in this category
is limited in the above described fashion. This is especially important if one considers
that large, global companies like Case Company B often do have thousands of partners
worldwide. Personal attendance to each single one of them is therefore prohibitively
expensive. This is also recognized by Case Company B, as the following quotes show.
12 The duties in this context are for example to keep the certifications up-to-date.
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Depending on the status or the size of the partner, they have a designated at-
tendant in Case Company B. There are other partners that are satisfied with
the access of the web site that’s open for the partner network. They retrieve
their information without ever receiving personal support. (Interviewee B4)
We have designed our partner concept in such a way that most of our partners
receive that kind of and amount of support that can be justified. The very
small partners are also highly important for us, but I simply cannot offer
resources to an organization with five or ten employees that surpasses this
organizations revenues. I cannot invest two millions to realize a project
that’s worth 200,000 Euro. We’re doing this with a very distinct sense of
proportion, especially for the thousands of partners with whom we do not
interact on a daily basis. For these partners we have our web site. We will
not send someone to each of these partners to discuss things with this partner
for an entire day. This day costs us 1,000 Euro. If we have 100,000 partners,
that’s just not possible. (Interviewee B8)
A lot is covered over personal relationships. However, obviously we’re trying,
especially for the smaller partners, to do a lot on the phone. We simply
cannot afford to visit all of them personally. (Interviewee B7)
Thus, the entire partner network can be classified into a three level pyramid. The
bottom layer consists of the simple members of the network. They receive standardized
information and have access to parts of Case Company B’s technology. The next level can
be reached through certification of employees and successful customer projects. These
companies are officially recognized as partners of Case Company B. They have the right
to use this official partner status in the markets and also receive additional support, like
joint marketing and sales events or training. The final stage of the pyramid consists
of those partners that have an exceptional track record with Case Company B. These
partners receive additional support in the above mentioned categories and also a more
intense, personally dedicated support. The degree of personal support across the three
stages of the pyramid is briefly described in the following quote. The entire pyramid is
also sketched in Figure 4.6.
We have a three staged concept. For the topmost layer we have direct con-
tacts just for this partner. In the middle we have contacts that support
roughly twenty to thirty partners in the region. On the very bottom we have
partners that work with us from time to time but they are not in our direct
focus. (Interviewee B3)
However, it also has to be stated that this three staged pyramid is not a static concept.
There are again considerable dynamics between the levels of the pyramid. Also, the type
of management mechanism applied predominantly at the three stages is not fixed. Well
founded exceptions exist. This is illustrated below.
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Figure 4.6: The IS Development Partner Pyramid for Case Company B.
Source: Own Illustration.
In the end it’s about our investments. We invest into specific target groups,
but obviously not only into these. We have a group of partners in the very
top level of the pyramid. We have a close, dedicated support for these,
they are important to us, we want to develop the relationship with them.
However, there are also partners in this middle segment that we want to
develop into top-tier partners. Obviously this is a small part of the entire
group. However, all of these middle segment partners do have access to a
general kind of support. Sure, they can also get in touch with us, they can
also use the programs that we provide. (Interviewee B5)
Summing up the discussion on the management of the network relationships by Case
Company B, it can be stated that indeed access to standardized technology and informa-
tion on the lowest level is the foundation of all partner activities. One the one hand this
is intended to ensure that all partners are treated equally. On the other hand it is seen as
a first step in a partnership process especially for smaller and younger companies. Once
the ongoing quality of such a partner has been shown through certifications and success-
ful projects, this partner reaches a certified level. Obviously through this process, Case
Company B has more knowledge about this partner, but the partner in return has also
considerable more rights. Finally, if the relationship is continuously highly successful
the partner might be invited by Case Company B to join the highest partner category.
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The distinct feature of this partnership level is the close personal interaction with the
partners. As this management mechanism is also the most expensive one, the number
of partners on this level is highly limited.
4.1.2.6 Matching Benefits and Management Mechanisms
Addressing both the benefits that Case Company B derives from cooperating with the
partners and the management of the relationships to these partners is indeed considered
to be fruitful by the interviewees. Interviewee B5 indicates in the following quote that
both aspects are highly important for the success of the overall partner network.
For the success as the sum of all our activities we have two clear indica-
tors. The success of our partnerships is clearly depending on two aspects:
Did we choose the right partners and did we manage them the right way?
(Interviewee B5)
After addressing the two issues largely detached from each other in the two previous
sections, the present section focuses on the integration of the two. As it has already
been discussed in the two preceding sections, indeed Case Company B considers the
relationship to a partner to be a dynamic process. These dynamics can be found on the
one hand in a temporal dimension. Here a partner first develops an innovative solution;
then he integrates this functionality with the infrastructure of Case Company B; finally
the partners go to market conjointly with Case Company B. On the other hand the
partnership is also a dynamic process with regard to the intensity of the relationship.
Here, the first step is becoming a member of Case Company B’s partner network. This
step is relatively unrestricted. Then, through the certification of employees and through
successful customer reference projects, a partner can advance to a higher level of part-
nership. Finally, if even more employees are certified, if more customer projects are
successfully completed, and if this partner is invited, he might reach the highest level of
the relationship. Characteristic of this highest level is the intense personal support by
Case Company B. This two-dimensional process has already been identically described
for Case Company A. It is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
In this process, the final goal of Case Company B is the successful market cultivation
conjointly with a partner. As shown in Figure 4.3 there are essentially three ways how
Case Company B can address markets conjointly with partners. Staying on the bottom-
most level of the matrix, the market cultivation could actually not be a joint one. Rather,
the partner and Case Company B could address customers completely independent of
each other. That this type of ’partnership’ exists has been mentioned above in the
context of the two types of revenues generated by partners. However, it has also been
noted that this type of partnership is not considered ideal by Case Company B. This
simply because there is much tentativeness in this type of relationship. Consequently,
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Case Company B has deliberately reduced the entry barriers to their partner network
with the introduction of the member status. Through this, more transparency in terms
of who is partnering with what solution is induced in the network.
However, this does not indicate that the member partners necessarily have to leave
the bottom-most layer of the matrix. There still is not necessarily any certification in-
volved at this stage. Partners can access standardized technologies, information, etc.
in order to generate successful customer projects. This almost detached market access
is considered as the optimal process of joint market success. The partner is indepen-
dently identifying and addressing market opportunities, based on existing technologies
but without individual input from Case Company B. This would be the optimal case,
which is following the bottom-most path to isolated market development in Figure 4.3.
Interviewee B6 describes this ideal case in the following quote.
We determine the attractiveness of a partner predominantly by the partner’s
ability to independently identify and close a deal. That’s the most important
criterion for a partner. We want to have partners that use the technology,
the marketing, the sales support, that we provide them with. But we want
a partner who can also work on the actual project independent from us. A
partner that is identifying opportunities that are interesting for him, where
he can close a deal, and where we can also sell our technologies and services
is the optimal case. (...) We’re a coach who provides a ball, but the players
have to play alone, rather than a coach who is also playing in the game.
(Interviewee B6)
However, as the discussion above has also shown, this situation cannot be assumed to
be a realistic scenario. Rather, especially during the first projects, the partner needs to
be supported by Case Company B in order to push this partner into the right direction.
Thus, Case Company B is actively supporting partners in order for them to reach an
advanced status. This has been described by Interviewee B7. The main benefit of
this advanced status is that Case Company B can rightfully attest the quality of this
partner. However, as this includes considerable risk for Case Company B, this step
is usually preceded by a concise monitoring of the partner, first through certifying its
employees and second through the necessity of a customer reference. This situation can
best be described as affiliated market development on the middle layer of the matrix in
Figure 4.3. It has been described by Interviewee B6 in the following quote.
Well, the life cycle of a partner essentially starts in the moment that this
partner is becoming a member of our network. With time, this partnership
will grow. However, in the beginning we are well aware that the partner
is unable to possess all the competencies that he needs to sell his and our
products. We support this partner accordingly. Over time we expect this
partner to educate his people and to reach a position from where he can
perform all of these services himself. (Interviewee B7)
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The optimal case would be a system that is based solely on programmatic
routines. In the ideal case that I have sketched above, where a partner
is completely autonomous in his business, there would be no one involved
from Case Company B. (...) But the reality is simply different, the market
conditions are different, the complexities are more intense, so you cannot
govern this solely through these programmatic routines. Especially those
partners that have shown their quality through their partner status simply
have a higher relevance for Case Company B, and they are also supported
differently. (Interviewee B6)
Thus, the middle layer of the partner matrix is characterized by the fact that Case
Company B implicitly makes a statement of this partner’s quality through the certifi-
cation. The partner then has the opportunity to actively promote his partner status in
the market. Finally, there are also those partners that Case Company B considers to
be of prime importance. These are invited to join the top-most level of the partnership
matrix. This includes close personal interactions between employees of the partner and
Case Company B. This type of partnering is very well illustrated by the relationship that
Case Company B and Case Company A have. As it has been mentioned, both companies
are among the most important partners of each other. This relationship therefore very
well illustrates the differences in magnitude of support that such a highly important
partner receives in comparison to the lower levels of the partner matrix described above.
Imagine a new product of Case Company A would be released. Customers
use this new product in a realistic setting and the response times go up from
accepted sub-seconds to unacceptable hours. That’s happening in reality.
Simply because interfaces are not used correctly, because the fine-tuning has
not been sufficient. Therefore, there are software engineers of Case Company
A that are sitting in our labs and cooperating with our engineers to ensure
that the way software is developed at Case Company A fits with our own
developments. (Interviewee B8)
Case Company A is our biggest partner. Therefore we do have a huge number
of our own employees that are dedicated only to this relationship. Only here
in Germany we have roughly 200 employees in this context. That’s not just
alliance management but also software engineers that adapt and test the
inter-operability of our products. That is indeed a relatively large group.
(Interviewee B4)
However, as it has been touched upon, this type of long-lasting relationship is only
feasible with partners that are developing business applications. These are consequently
also those that are most likely to advance to the top-most partner category. Those that
are developing infrastructure solutions are less likely to be of that high importance for
Case Company B. Thus, their relationship to Case Company B is probably developing
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either along the middle, or even along the lowest level in the matrix. For these types of
partners, being acquired is also definitely a viable option for Case Company B. At least
if the functionality is attractive. However, this aspect is limited by the fact that Case
Company B has a self-restraint not to perform hostile take-overs of certified partners.
Once a company has established itself as a successful partner, Case Company B is
attempting not to disturb this relationship. This is illustrated by the following quote.
The company that gets acquired is at that point in time no partner. We do
not acquire our partners. We scan the market and if we recognize a company
that is offering a solution that we consider complementary to our platform
we might acquire this company. That has happened in the past. If a solution
has become relevant for our customers we have in some cases acquired the
company that has been developing this solution. Mostly these have been
smaller companies. We have also acquired competitors, which have been
bigger deals. (Interviewee B1)
The transition between partner cycles is also illustrated in Figure 4.7. In this figure,
suppliers of infrastructure solutions are developing on the middle or the lower levels.
In case that they are actually not a certified partner, either an acquisition or imitating
the functionality as it has been described above is attractive for Case Company B. If
this happens, the cyclical partner process starts anew. Similarly, partners that develop
business applications are also expected to innovate their solution. However, as it has
been described in the preceding section, the functionality they provide is not absorbed
into the platform of Case Company B. Rather, if they lose the innovation race in their
(sub-)industry they might be acquired or imitated by competitors.
Figure 4.7: Cyclical IS Development Relationships for Case Company B.
Source: Own Illustration.
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This closes the second case narrative. In this company, the theoretically proposed
aspects have been found to be of high relevance in this organization. Most aspects have
been highly similar in Case Company A and B, thus, after this second hub case narrative
it becomes obvious that the findings of Case Company A cannot be considered unique.
Rather, there seem to be consistent patterns between the two hub cases. Also, there are
explanations for the differences between the two cases. Highlighting these is the topic
of the following cross-case analysis.
4.1.3 Cross-Case Analysis
The goal of this section, as it has been described in the brief introduction to this chapter,
is to explore the similarities as well as the differences of the two hub cases in order to
develop truly generalizable findings of the role of this type of organization in an IS
development network. Many similarities between the cases have indeed become obvious
throughout the two preceding case narratives. This has also resulted in the fact that
many of the figures that have been used to clarify the process of the development of such
a partnership, both over time and through increasing intensity, vary only marginally
between the two cases. Nevertheless subtle differences exist between the two companies
both in how they benefit from their network and in how they manage it. Both aspects
are subsequently discussed.
4.1.3.1 Similarities and Differences in Benefits
In fact both hub organizations follow close to the same process in developing their part-
ners from an innovation over the technical integration towards joint market success.
This is very well illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.5, which are close to identical. How-
ever, in these figures also a subtle difference between the two companies can be found.
They differ only with regard to what kind of functionality leads to a prosperous, long-
lasting relationship and what functionality puts a partner at the risk of being acquired
or imitated. In a nutshell, Case Company A considers infrastructure providers as ideal
partners, while Case Company B focuses on providers of standardizable business appli-
cations as ideal partners. The rationale behind this decision is clearly connected to what
both companies consider as their core business. As it has also become obvious through-
out the discussion on the cases, this is business applications for Case Company A and
infrastructure solutions for Case Company B. So, both hub organizations focus their
efforts on those partners that supply complementary products. The proposition that
has been brought forward in the theoretical part, that also those partners that supply
supplementary products are in the focus of the hub companies is therefore clearly not
supported by the empirical data. This is illustrated in the generalized model of Figures
4.1 and 4.5, which is shown in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: The Generalized Innovation Cycle in IS Development.
Source: Own Illustration.
An exception to this rule is whenever the hub companies consider a supplementary
solution to be essential for market or even project success. If customers demand the use
of a specific third party solution that is considered to be supplementary to their core
offerings, both companies are willing to use this component. However, as it has been
emphasized by both companies, this is mostly considered to be a temporal solution. Both
hub organizations are more than willing to integrate not only these successful solutions,
but also the entire companies that developed them into their own portfolio. This idea is
also well addressed in the fourth principle of architectural competition as it is asserted
by (Morris and Ferguson, 1993, p. 92): “General-purpose architecture absorbs special-
purpose solutions.” This fact is illustrated by re-iterating the following two quotes on
this topic.
These might be functionalities that initially have been part of a niche, but
which are generalizable, which are getting on our radar screen because a lot of
customers ask us to include them into our system. Then this niche partner
has to recognize that his solution is becoming a commodity. (Interviewee
A12)
Case Company B has acquired a three digit number of companies during the
last year. This happens if we see that these companies are very, very good
in a certain area. If we need a very specific functionality in a certain context
we have two options. We can educate people especially for this functionality.
This is very hard work and takes a long time. Or we’re checking the markets
if there is a company that fits well in this context that we can acquire.
(Interviewee B3)
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An interesting theoretical viewpoint on this topic is provided by Bresnahan (1998) and
his discussion of the horizontally layered computer industry that has been illustrated in
Figure 2.4. As he argues, the key misconception of the horizontally layered model is
that it allows for more competition. As he phrased it, “several of these ’competitive’
horizontal layers have very concentrated structures, typically suggesting a dominant-
firm and fringe model13” (Bresnahan, 1998, p. 4). In order to illustrate the concept,
the general idea of a horizontally layered computer industry is applied especially to the
enterprise IS industry in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: The Horizontally Layered IS Industry.
Source: Based on Grove (1996).
In this figure, the slightly overlapping oval for Case Companies A and B also illustrate
the fact that both indeed have many touch points, so that besides being complementary
to each other there is also considerable competition between the two. This relationship
is a typical example of co-opetition (e.g. Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1997), which is
also recognized by the interviewees in both companies.
Taking a look at our partner network, we also have very large partners. Like
Case Company B. They are also a big software developer that is providing
infrastructure functionalities. (Interviewee A12)
There are rarely software companies that we consider solely as competitors.
A typical example is Case Company A. Case Company A is by far our biggest
software partner worldwide. We need Case Company A because they provide
essential functionalities for our platform. In other areas we’re fiercely com-
peting with Case Company A. That’s a typical co-opetition. (Interviewee
B3)
This competition in the relationship between two companies in different layers of the
horizontally structured IS industry can also very well explain the differences in partner
selection. This perception is based on two of the “strategies deployed by firms in one
13 I.e. a hub-and-spoke model.
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layer against firms in another layer” of the industry stack that have been proposed by
Bresnahan (1998, p. 15). First, hub organizations are supposed to try to include the
important complementing functionalities within their own solution portfolios and thus
making their portfolio an important bottleneck in the stack. Second, they are supposed
to support different partners on the adjacent level in order to make the partners’ solutions
more a commodity and thus less of a bottleneck14. This very well describes the approach
of the hubs to consider partnerships in business functionalities as temporal and those
in infrastructure functionalities as permanent (Case Company A) or vice versa (Case
Company B).
4.1.3.2 Similarities and Differences in Management Mechanisms
Similar to the discussion on differences in benefits, the general structure of the manage-
ment mechanisms employed by both hub cases is very similar. However, here also subtle
differences exist, especially in the lower levels of the partner pyramid. Both companies
have classified their partners into three distinct sub-categories. On the top-most level are
those partners that the hub organizations have a long-lasting track record with, which
are of prime importance with regard to the revenues that they generate for the hubs,
and which consequently do have a very intense relationship with the hubs. As it has
been discussed in the individual case narratives, this intense relationship goes even as
far as having engineers conjointly working on development projects.
The middle layer of both networks consists of those companies that have proven their
ability to successfully work with the hubs. In both cases this involves a certification
of some kind - either the product of the partner, its employees, or both. While these
partners indeed contribute their share to the revenues of the hub organizations, they
are not considered to be that critical. Thus, the dedicated personal support that they
receive is a lot less distinct in comparison with the top-most category. Up to this point,
both partner networks have been close to carbon copies of each other. However, for the
middle and the bottom part of the network subtle differences exists.
For the middle part, the difference is one of certification. Becoming a certified partner
of Case Company A requires only the technically successful interaction between the
partner solution and the hub’s platform. In contrast becoming a certified partner of
Case Company B requires not only certified employees, but also a successful customer
reference project. Through this higher entry barrier, Case Company B seems to be
able to retrieve more knowledge about their partners than Case Company A. Thus, the
certification is indeed not only a declaration of the technical inter-operability of the
solutions, but also an, albeit limited, assessment of the partners’ quality. Especially
14 Please note in this context the very close connection to the resource dependency theory, in which
power of an organization “derives from its discretionary control over resources needed by that other
and the other’s dependence on the resource and lack of countervailing resources or access to alternative
sources” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 53).
233
234 4.1 Hub Cases Analyses
with regard to the fact that such a certification is considered especially important for
customers, this more sophisticated quality assessment seems to better meet the demands
of such a certification.
However, while getting certified by the hub is more difficult for partners of Case
Company B, the initial access to the partner network seems to be easier for them.
Becoming a partner of Case Company B starts with a simple signing up on the company’s
web site. Despite the fact that this simply signing up does not give such a ’partner’ any
rights except accessing certain technology and information it nevertheless binds the
partner to this specific hub organization. These companies can utilize the technologies
that Case Company B is providing them without extensive investments, both financial
and other. Thus, they are likely to rely on exactly these technologies, to educate their
employees in it, to use it for their customer projects. Through this selection of a hub
platform and the subsequent investments in it, Case Company B is able to initiate a
positive feedback loop that has been discussed as key requirement for network goods
in Section 2.1.1.3. In this context of two or more companies struggling for dominance
in a certain market it is a well tested strategy to develop a competing standard, which
are incompliant with that of the competitor. The result of this kind of development is
labeled standard war (Shapiro and Varian, 1999a). Partners are thus required to select
one of the multiple standards. Once they have chosen their standard, switching to a
different one results in high costs - the partner is locked in (Shapiro and Varian, 1999a).
Another aspect of this locking-in of partners is the fact that, as it has been discussed,
only the cooperations with some of these partners are promising to yield significant rev-
enue improvements for the hub organizations. This viewpoint is also supported by the
perception of Dyer and Singh (1998) that partner scarcity is a key to sustaining com-
petitive advantages that originate in network relationships. Thus, assuming that, first,
only a very limited number of the small, innovative companies that want to participate
in the partner network of the hubs are those that have significant revenue potential, and
second, that it is a priori not known which of the entire group these are, it is the conse-
quent decision to integrate as many of those small partners as possible in the network.
This especially as the lowest level of this partner pyramid is relying solely on standard-
ized technology and information dissemination mechanisms. It is thus not involving
large investments to add additional partners to this layer. This is illustrated by the fact
that in Figure 4.6 the lowest level is bordered by a solid line, which indicates that Case
Company B considers these partners as integral to their partner network. In contrast,
in Figure 4.2, the lowest level is bordered by a dotted line, which denotes the opposite.
Thus, through its open partnership (member) program, Case Company B seems to be
better able to achieve this goal of easy, hassle-free integration of small companies into
the partner network.
As it has been mentioned, these subtle differences in both the benefits of the partner
network and its management are negligible in comparison with the similarities of the
cases. Thus, indeed the denotation as literal replication in the sense of Yin (2003) has
been justified. First, the general model of the partnership process from the hubs’ per-
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spective, as it has been illustrated in Figure 4.8, is indeed identical for both companies. It
only differs with regard to which layer in their industry these companies consider their
home turf. Similarly, the discussion of the three-tiered partnership pyramid has also
been almost identical. Differences exist on the lower levels, but these are only marginal.
Consequently, also the entire partnership process matrix, which has been developed as
an integration of the two discussed perspectives, is also very similar.
Thus, the following section turns towards the second perspective of this work - that
of the smaller spoke partners. Here again, first individual case analyses are conducted
with eight smaller partners of Case Company A. These eight individual case narratives
are then integrated into a cross-case analysis of the spokes. After that, as the last step
of the empirical data analysis, both hub and spoke perspectives are integrated into a
comprehensive view on the entire network in the last part of this chapter.
4.2 Spoke Cases Analyses
Similar to the preceding discussion of the two hub cases, the following sections on the
spoke cases are sub-divided into three parts. The first part of each case narrative gives
a brief description of the developed solution of each of the case companies. Then, the
company itself is briefly described. This part includes aspects like the history and the
size of the company. After this, the relationship of the company in Case Company A’s
IS development network is described. In the second part of each case narrative, the
reasons for participating in this IS development network are discussed in the light of the
theoretical propositions that have been developed in Chapter 2. The final part of each
case narrative then covers the second research objective to analyze how these companies
manage their relationship in the network. Again, this discussion is largely based on
the three theoretically developed propositions. Also for the spokes, often more relevant
interview fragments have been identified than have been used in the case narrative.
However, for many of the spoke case only one interview has been conducted. So, the
information that would be contained in an analysis of the number of relevant interview
fragments is even more limited than for the hub companies. Therefore, this discussion
is postponed until the cross-case analysis in Section 4.2.9, where an aggregated analysis
of all the spokes is conducted.
4.2.1 Case Company C
Case Company Description. Case Company C develops interfaces through which
various machines can be connected to the system of Case Company A. Customers of
Case Company C are for example companies that are running vending machines. With
the solution of Case Company C, these customers can automatically feed business data
- for example the amount of sold goods - into their business application systems, if they
have been developed by Case Company A. The focus of this company is especially on
large enterprises, as the necessary expenses of integrating the vending machines into the
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software system do not pay off for smaller companies that are running only a couple of
vending machines. Furthermore, these smaller enterprises are usually not (yet) customers
of Case Company A, and thus also not potential customers of Case Company C:
If you are acting in a line of business as ours, vending machines, you have
essentially two types of customers. You have the small ones, which are
running three, five, or even twenty machines. And you have the large ones,
which are running up to 100,000 machines. If you have a company that
has the goal to develop interfaces for these customers for Case Company A’s
system, you know very well that the small ones are not your target. Someone
who is running 20, or even 200, machines simply does not use a system of
Case Company A. (Interviewee C1)
Parallel to this line of business, Case Company C has also customers from the energy
sector. Here especially the solution of the company if feeding data from, for example,
wind energy plants into the systems of Case Company A. Similar to the vending machine
business, the data that is transferred through the solution of Case Company C is not
primarily technical. Rather, business related data, for example the total amount of gen-
erated power, is collected. A new project of Case Company C is furthermore addressing
the inter-connection of intelligent refrigerators with the system of Case Company A in
a similar fashion.
Most of the developed solutions of Case Company C are standardized and not subject
to significant changes between customers. For innovative projects, like the intelligent
refrigerators, some new developments are initiated. Yet these new developments are
based to a large extent on existing solutions. In addition to the development of interfaces,
Case Company C also offers consulting services in related fields. However, this consulting
represents only a small fraction of the overall business volume of Case Company C.
Case Company C has been founded in 2005 as a publicly held company. Currently
the company has offices at three locations and is employing 15 people. Out of these 15
employees more than 80 percent are software developers. The only interview in this case
has been conducted with the founder and CEO of the company.
As the solution of Case Company C is an interface that integrates into the systems of
Case Company A, it comes as no surprise that the relationship between the two organi-
zations is one of the most important pillars for Case Company C’s business. Especially
noteworthy is the fact that this relationship has been established even before Case Com-
pany C has been founded. The interviewee comments on this with the following words:
Basically the relationship with Case Company A has been lasting for a long
time. It did not emerge with the founding of Case Company C. Many of our
employees - including me - had relationships with Case Company A when
they were working in their former jobs. For Case Company C these relation-
ships even intensified. We have been very fast with the development of our
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interfaces and among the very things in this context has been the certifica-
tion by Case Company A. We became partners very early on. (Interviewee
C1)
What has been described by the interview partner as a very natural process is now
further analyzed according to the two research questions. First, what have been the
strategic reasons why Case Company C entered into this relationship? Second, how
does the company manage this relationship?
Reasons for Participating in the Network. It has been the first proposition that
small software vendors, like Case Company C, participate in inter-organizational net-
works of large hubs because they have the opportunity to gain access to the architectural
innovativeness of these large hubs. For this proposition no evidence could be found in
Case Company C. The only instance where the interviewee talked about architectural
innovativeness has been a discussion on SOA. However, as the following quote very well
shows, this ’architectural innovation’ is not considered a key reason for participating in
the network:
Currently we are in a project that is intensely using these Service Oriented
Architectures. However, I do have a very pragmatic view on this. For me, this
is old wine in new skins. I have not yet discovered the underlying differences
to object oriented programming. I mean, the real differences for a real user.
If you have written your code in a structured fashion it already has been
re-usable and modular before the emergence of SOA. If you are writing bad
code today, SOA cannot turn that into good code. I’m having a bad feeling
with this. Okay, this is currently the hype topic. You can ask whoever you
want to, everyone is talking about SOA. In this context we’re to some extent
also on this bandwagon. However, I don’t think that it has any significant
impact on our strategic partnership. This partnership did not change a bit
through SOA. (Interviewee C1)
While architectural innovativeness is not considered a driver for participating in the
network by Case Company C, this cannot be asserted with absolute certainty for all kinds
of innovations. Especially the relationship to the R&D department of Case Company
A has been mentioned by interviewee C1 as important for the relationship. In contrast
to architectural innovativeness, assessing the existing technology base of the hub - the
second proposition - is considered as being an important issue in the relationship with
Case Company A. Here especially the in-depth knowledge of Case Company A’s systems
are perceived to be imperative for the partnership. However, Interviewee C1 also gives
a cautionary note, that indeed this access to technology should not be considered as a
differentiating factor for partner in comparison to those who are not partners.
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About 80 - 90 percent of our employees are software developers. These are
primarily concerned with the integration to Case Company A’s system. Thus,
we also have people with in-depth knowledge how this system is working.
They know how to turn all the 27 million adjusting screws in the system in
order to get it up and running correctly. That is, very roughly, the context
in which we are working. (Interviewee C1)
Yes, of course there is professional training at Case Company A, plentiful and
for all occasions. However this is no different whether you’re a partner or not.
We can, like everyone else, book a training course, we can take the materials
with us, but that has nothing to do with the partnership. (Interviewee C1)
So, the first proposition that has been discussed in the context of Case Company C
cannot be supported by the there collected data. Support for the second proposition
is ambiguous. The access to the technology is for sure important for Case Company
C. However, a more restricted access to this technology would be desirable. Which
should come as no surprise, this would give Case Company C an advantage over its
competitors. The remaining proposition has been that gaining access to the existing
market of Case Company A is a driver for participating in the inter-organizational IS
development network. Indeed this aspect has been mentioned by the interviewee as the
most important one for Case Company C. In this context the fact that Case Company
C is very small, yet its customers are very large is seen as the most important aspect of
the relationship.
In most cases [large customers like ours] do have Case Company A’s systems.
When you are an official partner, accessing these customers is much more
convenient. Simply because you’re starting with a certain contact and don’t
have to go through 38 levels of the hierarchy. The decisions that concern the
adoption of our solutions are mostly strategic, also technical and economic,
but mostly strategic. So we have to talk to someone who can decide whether
the customer wants to go into this direction or not. (Interviewee C1)
Gaining access to the right contact persons, who can make these strategic decisions, is
thus one of the main problems of a small company like Case Company C. Helping with
this issue is therefore also the most important reason why the partnership with Case
Company A has been entered into.
If you’re very small, like Case Company C is, and you want to talk to the big
guys you’re facing a problem. That’s like in the old saying, ’if you’re going to
bed with an elephant it’s nice and warm, but you have to beware when the
elephant turns.’ That means you can have large customers, but the different
approaches to this relationship are so significant that it’s better to find a
large partner who’s supporting you. For us that has been Case Company A.
(Interviewee C1)
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So, for Case Company C, clear support has only been found for the proposition that
market access is driving small vendors into the inter-organizational networks. Some
support could be found for the access of technology as driving the relationship. The
architectural innovativeness of Case Company A does not seem to play a role at all.
The next section addresses the second research question, how small partners manage
the relationships in these networks.
Management of the Network. The first proposition of how such an organizational
network is supposed to be managed has been standardization. In this regard, the inter-
viewee has a controversial opinion. On the one hand, standardized technologies are for
sure playing a role in the IS development network. While these technologies are not in
themselves of prime importance, they are important for other aspects of the relation-
ship. In the example of Case Company C, this becomes especially important when it
comes to educating employees. On the other hand standardization is not as far as it
could be. Especially the different vendors of large system do not rely on interchangeable
technologies. And, according to interviewee C1 deliberately so.
Yes, investments in the education of employees have been necessary for the
partnership. However, these are not investments specifically for our relation-
ship with Case Company A. In order for my employees to do their job, I have
to educate them anyway. If this would have happened exactly in this fashion,
I think yes but that does not necessarily have to be the case. (Interviewee
C1)
The world is not simple enough to support two or three large system provi-
ders. The reason is that these providers are, for sure even deliberately so, too
different, especially with regard to technology. You simply cannot switch the
underlying system on a daily basis. The basic functionality that is offered by
these systems is identically, but that’s the management perspective. From a
technical perspective they are really absolutely different. (Interviewee C1)
Thus, while standardized technologies for sure facilitate the cooperation, these stan-
dards are not considered comprehensive enough by Case Company C. The second man-
agement mechanism that has been proposed is the monitoring of partners. The data
collected in Case Company C confirms the perception that monitoring on behalf of the
hub organizations is a crucial ingredient for managing the network. So, interviewee C1
discussed the process how Case Company C got certified in considerable detail. However,
there is even no clear understanding of how this process is working:
If you have a certified product you also have the opportunity to officially
become software partner. In order to apply for this partnership you have to
provide Case Company A with a host of data concerning your company. This
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data is then run through an internal process, I have seen this afterwards.
They are testing the information you provided. That is a rather complex
process that can last a long time. (Interviewee C1)
So, as there is no clear understanding of how the internal certification processes at
Case Company A are working, there is also no reverse of this process, the monitoring
of Case Company A by its partners. However, this is not only not done, but in the
perception of Interviewee C1 also not considered to be important.
Right now, I would say that the involved risks are manageable. Case Com-
pany A is not that kind of partner who is constantly looking for other part-
ners, and who suddenly stops doing business with us. We are not at a level
where we’re in danger that Case Company A could and would stop the entire
business relationship from one day to the next. (Interviewee C1)
That Case Company A is going bankrupt is a probability that is very close
to zero, so the risks are manageable. (Interviewee C1)
So, Case Company C does not have institutionalized any formal mechanisms that help
to provide an insight into its large partner. The only ’monitoring’ that is conducted is
an informal evaluation of the state of the relationship by the CEO and the board of
directors.
The partnership is judged to be positive from both myself and the board of
directors. That is done without any sophisticated measurements. Collecting
these measurements would also be very difficult. Projects are often acquired
due to recommendations of others, but how do you assign this project to
a partner? For sure he has played a role, but if you’re not doing a good
job all recommendations in the world are of no help. So, I would not know
how I should collect these measurements if I wanted to, that is impossible.
(Interviewee C1)
Thus, the two so far discussed propositions cannot be univocally supported by the
data collected in Case Company C. The remaining proposition has been that managing
a relationship is done through intense personal, trusting relationships. Especially this
mechanism has been brought forward by interviewee C1 in various instances. As it has
been mentioned in the company description, (personal) relationships to Case Company
A existed even before Case Company C has been founded. These personal relationships
are still the most prominent management mechanism that is employed by Case Company
C, a fact that is very well illustrated by the following two quotes:
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If you know each other long enough you’re treated differently than if you’re
completely new. This is the old rule: Business deals are conducted between
persons, the same is true for partnerships. In many instances you have people
with whom you have cooperated now for four or five years and had solely good
experiences. That is coining such a relationship, through this you get access
to the next deal, the next project runs just a little smoother. Furthermore,
you can overcome obstacles more easily then during the ramp-up phase. If
you know the right person, that only costs you one phone call. (Interviewee
C1)
Case Company C, in parallel to the board of directors that we need to have
as a publicly traded company, also has a technical board. This body does not
have any supervisory function, it is only consulting in technical questions.
We have two university professors in this technical board. The third member
of this board is [a high ranking member of Case Company A]. Through such
channels we’re also supported in a non-material way. (Interviewee C1)
Summing up the so far conduced discussion on Case Company C, it has to be stated
that only three out of the six theoretically proposed aspects are really of considerable
importance. The overriding reason why this company participates in the IS development
network is the simpler access to large customers. The overriding management mechanism
that is applied by Case Company C is the reliance on close personal relationships.
4.2.2 Case Company D
Case Company Description. Case Company D is specialized in solutions for Prod-
uct Lifecycle Management (PLM). This field includes software for managing the entire
lifecycle of a product, from conception through engineering and production to service
and disposal. The systems most often mentioned in this context are Computer Aided
Design (CAD), Computer Aided Engineering (CAE), and Computer Aided Manufactur-
ing (CAM) systems. Case Company D also grew out of this context. The organization
started to sell CAD software from a specific vendor (not Case Company A). Soon af-
ter, Case Company D also started to develop its own software solutions, that were to
a large extend still add-ons to the system that the company has originally specialized
in selling. Today, Case Company D offers the entire range of solutions, from hardware
over software to services, in the PLM context. Furthermore, it also offers application
management outsourcing in this context. In contrast to classic outsourcing the serviced
infrastructure is located on the premises of and owned by the customers. Thus, Case
Company D only provides manpower and specific know-how for the maintenance of these
systems. In this context, the key focus of Case Company D is running the hardware,
developing individually tailored software solutions, and consulting the customers with
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regard to implementing and integrating standardized software packages. Case Company
D can therefore be considered a sophisticated IS service provider with a differentiated
service portfolio.
Case Company D has been founded in 1988, and went public in 1998. Today, it has
more than 500 employees and is thus the biggest of all analyzed spoke companies15.
The company has eight locations in Germany and also one in each of the countries
of Bulgaria, France, Switzerland, and the USA. It serves multiple in part very large
customers, but also small and medium sized businesses. As the focus of the company
suggests, most of these are from the engineering and here especially from the automotive
industries. Despite the size of Case Company D, only one interview partner could
be acquired. The interviewee has been working in the business development for the
company’s solutions for several years. In addition to the analysis and the assessment of
new business opportunities, the interviewee is also one of the key persons in charge for
partnerships with other software companies.
As it has been mentioned, Case Company D started its partnerships with the developer
of a CAD software system. However, in the year 2000, the company started to develop
interfaces for its existing solutions into the systems of Case Company A. Consequently,
also in the year 2000, Case Company D got certified by Case Company A. Today,
the CAD software and the systems of Case Company A are closely inter-connected in
that Case Company A is actively supporting the integration of the two systems. Thus,
services in this context are one of the most important lines of business for Case Company
D.
Reasons for Participating in the Network. It has been the first propositions,
that smaller vendors are attracted to IS development networks because the large hubs
are able to enforce architectural innovations. However, this is exactly not the case for
Case Company D. Here, the interviewee sees these architectural innovations more as a
difficulty in the cooperation than as a benefit:
If we’re developing a new product we have to calculate a business case which
includes how many licenses we can sell over the years. In this context we
already have to consider the development of our partners’ underlying systems.
Is there a new architecture coming in the future? If the system is changed
to a completely new architecture, to new standards, the risk that I cannot
sell my solution any more is significant. This consideration is part of a trade
off as to whether develop such a new solution or not. (Interviewee D1)
So, the architectural innovativeness of the hub organization cannot be seen as an im-
portant benefit of the participation in an IS development network. The second propo-
sition has been that accessing the technical base of the hub company is key for this
15 This number is only slightly more than one percent of the total number of employees of Case Company
A. For Case Company B, this number is even lower. This very well illustrates the difference in size
between hubs and spokes.
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participation. Indeed this proposition is well supported by the data collected in Case
Company D. Here, however, the specific nature of this case has to be mentioned. Case
Company D acts as an agent between the company that is developing the CAD system
and Case Company A. Obviously, CAD systems are of an enormous inherent technologi-
cal complexity, in the same way as Case Company A’s system is of an enormous inherent
business complexity. Consequently, integrating these with Case Company A’s systems
is rather left to partners than conducted by the developers of these systems:
So, if Case Company A gets a request to integrate their systems with the
CAD or PLM world, we are asked to do this integration, concerning both
products and services. We provide the technical know-how that Case Com-
pany A does not have, but we also provide the business know-how that our
other partner does not have. (Interviewee D1)
The last proposed benefit has been the fact that smaller software vendors can increase
their market access through partnering with hub companies. For Case Company D this
proposition is very well supported, even from the perspectives of both its large part-
ners. Especially important is the accessing of new markets, for example geographically
separated ones that have so far not been addressed by Case Company D.
One thing is clear, both companies with which we have intense partnerships
are world market leaders in their specific area. Thus, it is very important for
us to have partnerships with those companies, as in the end we profit from
this market presence. For us as a company which is very much focused on
the German market, we only have a few smaller subsidiaries worldwide, it
is very difficult to gain an international foothold. Especially as a company
that is not very well known in a specific environment, it is eminent to have
a strong partner. (Interviewee D1)
From a strategic perspective, this profiting from the worldwide market pres-
ence and through this also the generation of growth have been the main
reasons for partnering. (Interviewee D1)
Thus, support could be found for the propositions on accessing technical capabili-
ties and market reach. However, no support has been found for the proposition that
architectural innovations are a key benefit of partnering for smaller companies.
Management of the Network. The first proposition on how the relationships in
such a network should be managed has been through standardization. Case Company D
also recognizes this importance of standards for the integration effort that is key to their
business model. However, as Interviewee D1 stated, standards are not perceived to be
entirely beneficial for the business of his company. Rather, the actual reason why Case
Company D exists are shortcomings of existing standards. The company has specialized
on interfaces between two systems, and in case that these interfaces could indeed be
standardized, Case Company A would loose its raison d’eˆtre.
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During our early years the following has been our unique selling point in
comparison to others who were selling these systems: We were not only able
to offer the standard, but we could also close certain other gaps that the
customer had. (Interviewee D1)
What has happened is that certain functionalities that have been part of our
solution appeared as part of the standard system. When that happened, we
had a tough time selling our products. The added value has been much less
if this functionality is part of the standard system. (Interviewee D1)
Albeit it has not been explicitly mentioned, it can be assumed that Case Company D
also relies to some extent on standards. However, the business model of this company
clearly is the exploitation of shortcomings in existing standards. Thus, the first propo-
sition for management mechanisms cannot be fully supported. The second proposition
has been the monitoring of partners. Here, Case Company D is facing considerable dif-
ficulties. Albeit, the management of this company is well aware that a monitoring of
partner relationships would be desirable, Interviewee D1 sees no feasible way to actually
conduct this monitoring.
Of course we are getting large projects in this context only because we are
profiting from the skills that we have in our partners’ solutions. I believe
that this has a significant impact on our success. However, measuring this is
not easy. (Interviewee D1)
As today we do not systematically evaluate our partnerships. However, as I
said, our partnerships are very complex. We have a partnership in sales, one
in services, one in development. Determining whether we would also have
gotten the project at customer XYZ if we wouldn’t have had the partnership?
I don’t know. In this context I would rather consider the overall picture than
each single partnership. (Interviewee D1)
So, albeit monitoring the partners would be desirable, it is not systematically done
by Case Company D. Despite the fact that this is recognized, Interviewee D1 has not
mentioned any deteriorating effects that this missing monitoring has on the relationship
to Case Company A. Thus, monitoring is not used, yet it is also not gravely missed.
The last proposed management mechanism has been the building of personal, trusting
relationships. This proposition is well supported by the data that has been collected in
Case Company D. Again only one quote is given exemplary for this mechanism:
If you want to be successful, personal contacts are the most important thing.
That is true for the relationships with larger partner just as well as with
smaller ones. A lot depends on the management of personal relationships.
Just to sign a contract between two partners, to meet twice a year to exchange
some figures and numbers, that type of relationship will not be successful.
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At least not in our case. The relationship has to be really intense, you have
to talk to each other on a regular basis, you have to meet and support each
other. (Interviewee D1)
Summing up this case narrative, only partial support for the developed propositions
has been found. Innovation on an architectural level has been perceived as obstacle
in the relationship rather than as benefit. Technical capabilities are important in this
specific case. Even more important is the access to existing markets. Standardization is
used, however, the shortcomings of standards are key to the company’s business model.
Monitoring the hub is recognized as being somewhat important, yet the fact that it is
not really done is not considered to be a serious handicap in the relationship. As a last
point, close personal relationship are seen as the most important aspect of managing the
relationships in the inter-organizational IS development network.
4.2.3 Case Company E
Case Company Description. Case Company E has been founded as an engineering
company specialized in manufacturing plant development and in microelectronics. One
key aspect of this line of business has been the development and deployment of tailor
made software and hardware solutions for these manufacturing plants. Parallel to this
technical focus, Case Company E has been looking for a diversification in its revenue
sources. In this context, Case Company E has acquired a software firm that has special-
ized on the integration of existing groupware solutions in Case Company A’s system in
2003.
Case Company E has roughly 200 employees, and four office locations in Germany.
Furthermore, the company has one subsidiary in the Czech Republic. The organization
is divided into three main divisions, two focused on engineering and one on software
solutions. Roughly half of the 200 employees are concerned with software development.
However, as the department that is focused on developing the solution that is integrat-
ing with Case Company A’s system has been acquired only in 2003, it is still rather
small. Only about ten software developers are working in this department, the remain-
ing developers are working in the engineering departments. Consequently, customers of
Case Company E are also found mainly in the manufacturing industries like automotive,
chemistry, or power generation.
The interview in Case Company E has been conducted with the head of the business
solution department. In this context, it has to be also mentioned that the relationship
with Case Company A is not based on a rich history. The official partner status has
been reached in early 2006. Why this partnership has been entered in and how it has
developed since then is subsequently discussed.
245
246 4.2 Spoke Cases Analyses
Reasons for Participating in the Network. The reasons that the interviewee in
Case Company E has been given for the participation in the IS development network
of Case Company A have been largely limited to market access benefits. Architectural
innovation has not been mentioned in a single instance. Accessing the technological
base has been mentioned in two instances, but rather as a prerequisite for accessing the
market of Case Company A’s customers.
Yes we had to educate our people. Especially in the basic technologies de-
velopment and administration would be infeasible without this education.
That’s true, of course. (Interviewee E1)
In contrast to this secondary role that the existing technologies of Case Company
A are playing, accessing new markets has been the dominating theme throughout the
interview in Case Company E. This has been repeatedly mentioned by Interviewee E1.
The entire partnership is based on making business. On the one hand, Case
Company A wants to sell additional licenses. On the other hand we also
want to sell our solutions. (Interviewee E1)
I think that this is a mutual business. Both partners are trying to acquire
new customers. (Interviewee E1)
As it has been assumed in the theoretical discussion on this topic, the underlying
rationale for most smaller solution vendors is the fact that Case Company A has a
broad, also international, customer base. This broad existing market has also been the
key reason for Case Company E to participate in the IS development network.
The sales aspect is the most important one. Together with Case Company
A we can access new customers and new markets, both national and inter-
national. (Interviewee E1)
Case Company E is especially interesting, as the partnership has been forged only
roughly one year ago. As the access to the existing customer base of Case Company A
has been mentioned as the strongest reason for partnering, this give additional support
for Proposition MS. Subsequently, the management mechanisms employed by Case
Company E are discussed.
Management of the Network. As the partnership with Case Company A has so
far not been lasting for a long time, the management of the relationship of this case
company is promising to yield very interesting results. Interviewee E1 believes that
standardization is indeed playing an important role in the IS development network.
However, he addresses this aspect from a very different viewpoint that what has been
theoretically developed, and argues that there is a danger luring in the emergence of
comprehensive standards. Indeed, he sees standardization as a danger to the entire
partner model of Case Company A:
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A general risk to the partnerships are Service Oriented Architectures. Up
to now the business model has been that Case Company A is selling its
system to a customer and the partners then do integration projects. Now,
Case Company A is offering open interfaces and certain development tools,
customers can add functionalities easily and quickly themselves. (...) Most
customers have their own software developers. If they can easily access the
system themselves, why do they need partners? (Interviewee E1)
This quote very well shows a danger especially for those partners that have so far
integrated solutions from other, third party companies. As this integration effort is
reduced, the need for those partners ceases to exist. The aspect of monitoring the partner
has again only been mentioned from Case Company A’s perspective. The certification
process has been an important theme during the interview. However, the monitoring of
Case Company A by the smaller spoke organization has not been considered. Overall the
partnership is considered to be successful by Case Company E, however no systematic
evaluation of why this is the case could be found in this case. What is very interesting
is the fact that - albeit the partnership officially exists only for about one year - the
importance of personal ties for this relationship has already been clearly recognized by
Case Company E.
Yes, yes, personal relationships are very important. I do have a couple of
contacts in Case company A. I know them very well and they do support us.
(Interviewee E1)
You need a couple of contacts, you need to know people. You can also go
the official way, but the official way takes forever. (Interviewee E1)
So, again here only the last proposition of how relationships in an IS development
network are managed is supported. Even for an organization that is officially partner
only for one year and that is besides that very small, personal ties are considered to
be the most important aspect of this relationship. The proposition that standardized
technology is a key mechanism for managing the relationships has even been clearly
contradicted in the perception that standards are actually harmful for the partners.
4.2.4 Case Company F
Case Company Description. Case Company F is developing software for automatic,
mobile data recording. They offer solutions for automatic identification through various
underlying technologies like, for example, bar codes or radio technology like RFID16.
Recently, Case Company F also developed a voice controlled system that can be used
16 RFID stands for Radio Frequency Identification. It refers to a technology which uses transponders (or
tags) to store and remotely (without necessary intervisibility) retrieve data. Through this technology,
flows of goods can be optimized.
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with head sets, and thus allows for example warehousemen to work with both hands
while using the system. In this context, Case Company F is cooperating in diverse
partnerships and is thus able to offer the entire spectrum of hard- and software and the
accompanying services, ranging from specification over implementation to training.
Case Company F has been founded in 1992. In its early years, the company developed
a very broad solutions portfolio out of the original line of business of the founder and
managing director, which had been cash registers. Case Company F is a small company
which employs less than twenty people at a single location in Germany. The company’s
customers are working in a variety of industries, especially logistics, production, and
commerce. In general, these customers are of magnitudes larger than Case Company F,
often having thousands of employees.
In 1998, today’s second managing director joined the company. With him, the fo-
cus of the company shifted towards Case Company A’s systems. In the same year
Case Company F also officially became partner of Case Company A. Their solutions
are specialized on integrating the various hard- and software functionalities in the above
described context with the general business applications provided by Case Company A.
The interview has been conducted with an employee who is responsible for accounting,
business development and marketing, and partner contracts. By request of the intervie-
wee the discussion has not been tape recorded. Instead verbatim field notes have been
taken independently by both the researcher and a graduate student. After the interview
both interviewers have discussed their sets of notes and a written summary has been
crafted. The subsequent discussion is to a large extent based on this summary. As this
approach is rather limited in comparison to the tape recording conducted in the other
cases, only a few quotes are given in this case.
Reasons for Participating in the Network. The only reason that has been men-
tioned in the interview has again been the accessing of new markets. Especially the fact
that Case Company A is one of the dominating players in the global IS industry has
been a driving force behind the decision to partner with this organization.
The main goal of Case Company F to partner with Case Company A are
benefits in marketing and sales. This especially because Case Company A
has a market share of approximately 80 percent, especially in Germany. We
want to take advantage of that. (Interviewee F1)
Case Company F also explicitly attempts to internationalize its business. In this
context, the partnership with Case Company A is seen as crucial. Especially due to the
small size of Case Company F, this strategic thrust could not be followed without the
use of a strong partner that is already internationally well recognized.
Other reasons have not been mentioned explicitly as goals of Case Company F. How-
ever, it has been mentioned that the company sees itself in the role of a technical
facilitator. Especially because the projects of Case Company F involve the integration
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of sophisticated hardware with the business application systems of Case Company A.
Thus, it can be argued that technical integration does play a role in the participation of
Case Company F in the IS development network. However, this technical integration is
more a reason for Case Company A to partner with Case Company F than vice versa.
Management of the Network. When it comes to managing the relationships in the
network, Case Company F recognizes the importance of standards. However, the focus
of Case Company F is currently the integration with the system of Case Company A.
Standards in this context are currently not far enough developed in order to support the
integration with other vendors’ systems. Especially not due to the small size of Case
Company F.
There are no general objections against using our know-how with other part-
ners. Our developers could easily work on a different platform. However, to
support multiple platforms we’re simply too small. (Interviewee F1)
Thus, standardization is seen as a positive aspect, however its limitations are clearly
recognized. Close to the same is true for the other management mechanism, monitoring.
Case Company F is systematically monitoring its partners, however usually before a
relationship is entered into. Once the partnership has been officially commenced, the
systematic monitoring is problematic. Especially, the intended developments of Case
Company A’s systems are less than transparent. Consequently, Case Company F is
extensively using the final management mechanism, close personal relationships. These
personal ties are especially used as a substitute for the impossible monitoring of Case
Company A. The importance of this mechanism is recognized by Case Company F, and
it is employed to a considerable extend. As interviewee F1 comments on this topic:
If issues emerge, these are usually resolved through personal relationships.
Generally a lot is based on trusting relationships. Consequently, having good
connections with the partners is very important. (Interviewee F1)
It is a risk for us that intended developments are not clearly communicated.
In the worst case considerable effort on our side is wasted. We need to gather
the necessary information ourselves, often times in the coffee corners of our
customers. (Interviewee F1)
The basic decision to partner with Case Company A, and not any other system vendor,
has also been based on the good relationships that the above mentioned second managing
director had to this company. Thus, trusting personal ties are indeed heavily used in
Case Company F. This not only in the relationship with Case Company A, but also
with other partners. In conjoint projects, Case Company F is generating revenues based
on consulting services, and hardware partners are generating revenues based on sold
hardware. The risk is immanent that hardware partners are making profits on the
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expense of Case Company F if they sell hardware that is not suited for the specific
project. Thus, Case Company F has developed its own (unofficial) inter-organizational
network in which those partners participate to which a trusting relationship has been
built.
Summing the discussion up, all three management mechanisms are employed by Case
Company F. Standards are playing a role, yet not a very important one. This mainly
because they are not far enough developed to ensure inter-changeability between various
vendors’ systems. Monitoring is considered an important issue, yet one that still needs to
be developed further. Thus, again the most important aspect to manage the relationships
are close inter-personal ties.
4.2.5 Case Company G
Case Company Description. Case Company G is a full-range supplier of IT ser-
vices for newspaper publishing companies. Its offerings range from outsourcing over third
party software implementation projects to its own software solutions. These solutions
are independent of other vendors’ systems and geared especially to the newspaper pub-
lishing market. The strategically probably most important solution is covering complex
processes in a publishing company. This solution covers standard processes like control-
ling or marketing, but also specialized processes, like subscription management, that are
characteristic for the publishing industry. This solution is, however, not integrated with
Case Company A’s system. In fact, Case Companies A and G are even competitors in
this field. Parallel to its own solution, Case Company G is also offering specific services
in the IS development network of Case Company A. Specifically consulting services in
the publishing industry play a key role in this context. However, Case Company G is
also offering specific extensions for Case Company A’s system. Examples are solutions
for the management of advertisement, or for transforming printed newspapers into online
presences.
Case Company G has been founded as a spin-off out of the data centers of various
newspaper publishing companies. These companies are today still the proprietors of
Case Company G. The original business model of Case Company G has been to acquire
Case Company A’s system and to align this system according to the specific needs of the
publishing industry. The focus customers have been Case Company G’s proprietors, but
the services have also been offered to the open market. This has been the focus during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, when mainframe computers still were the norm. Since
then, the above described relationship to Case Company A emerged out of this focus.
Today, both companies are inter-connected through a multitude of complex relationships.
Despite this broad offering of Case Company G, the organization only employs around
100 people at one location in Germany. As it has been mentioned, the customers of Case
Company G are from the publishing industry.
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Case Companies A and G are thus in some aspects competitors and partners in others.
Especially with regard to their offered software systems, but also in consulting services,
Case Company G is a key competitor in the publishing industry. However, at the
same time most of the extensions that are offered for Case Company A’s system are
certified. This partnership is especially strong in the newly developed solution for small
and mid-sized customers that Companies A and G are developing conjointly. To make
matters even more complex, Case Company G is also a customer of Case Company A.
The company is buying licenses of Case Company A’s system for its proprietors. In
Case Company G, interviews have been conducted with three individuals that represent
different aspects of this complex relationship with Case Company A. Interviewee G1 is
heading the division that is developing the extensions for Case Company A’s system.
Interviewee G2 is head of the consulting and implementation division. Interviewee G3
is the head of the marketing department. He is not a part of the line management but
rather in a staff position.
Reasons for Participating in the Network. Considering the fact that Case Com-
pany G has been founded explicitly with the intention to support its proprietors in their
usage of Case Company A’s systems, it is difficult to analyze the reasons for this partner-
ship. This especially because the founding of Case Company G has happened decades
ago. However, some of the underlying rationales for the partnership could be detected
throughout the three interviews. So, architectural innovativeness is indeed considered to
be an aspect in this partnership. The example that has been given for Case Company G
is the adoption of Application Service Provisioning (ASP)17. However, Case Company G
also recognizes that these architectural innovations are not necessarily in the partners’
best interest.
Application Service Provisioning is a model that is actively pushed by Case
Company A. Perhaps that is also what we want, that we become the hosting
specialist for publishing companies. We’re not 100 percent sure about that
yet. (Interviewee G3)
Thus, support for the first proposition is ambiguous. Architectural innovation is
playing a role in the relationship, yet it is not considered to be a key benefit by Case
Company G. The existing technological base of Case Company A is also not considered
to be a key benefit for Case Company G’s customers. Especially the fact that the
publishing industry is not a key focus of Case Company A is seen as the underlying
reason for this:
17 In an ASP context, software is no longer installed on the premises of the customers. Rather, it is
hosted at a central data center and customers access this software via electronic data networks.
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You have to say that the publishing industry in general is not actively pushed
by Case Company A. It is simply too insignificant for that. We have to adapt
the technology that Case Company A is offering for our purposes. It is not
realistic to assume that the publishing industry stands any chance to alter
the strategic direction of Case Company A. (Interviewee G2)
However, a direct result of this missing focus on the publishing industry is the fact
that Case Company G has to have an intimate knowledge of the systems in order to
successfully adapt them to the specific industry needs of its customers. This is very well
recognized by the interviewees in Case Company G, and the company also invests into
the building of this intimate knowledge of Case Company A’s systems.
We are really close to the existing systems. Case Company A also recognized
this and they are beginning to ask for a cooperation with us in product
development. These beginnings are still rather hesitant, yet it goes into this
direction. (Interviewee G2)
I would say the first-mover advantage is also part of this. Especially when
it comes to innovations we are very interested in staying very close to Case
Company A. We are, for example, willing to act as ramp-up customer for
the publishing industry. So we’re testing new solutions and through this
we have the advantage to generate know-how faster than our competitors.
(Interviewee G3)
So accessing and especially understanding both the innovations and the existing tech-
nology of Case Company A is seen as a necessary precondition for customer projects,
rather than as a driver for the partnership. In contrast, the final proposition is well
supported by the collected data. Especially the internal development of Case Company
G, from a pure service provider for its proprietors to an independent participant in the
IS market in the publishing industry, has been supported by this partnership.
At some point in time it has been realized that there are only so and so
many projects from our proprietors. The next step has been to say, that
there is a broader market that can be addressed with the know-how that
we possess. Since Case Company G had a certain size and also had highly
specialized knowledge, it should be possible to tap into the full potential of
this organization through acquiring more projects on the open market. With
this background in mind we approached Case Company A with our request
for a more intense partnering. (Interviewee G3)
Thus, the final proposition is the one best supported by the collected data. This
should come as no surprise, as Case Company G is explicitly following the strategy to
support publishing companies in their use of Case Company A’s systems. So, addressing
this market is seen as the key reason for the partnership by all the interviewees in Case
Company G:
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The partnership with Case Company A is not a value in itself. The value is
only there if we can realize market success through it. The best partnership
does not help me, if no one buys anything from me. It is only a means to
an end to bring new products to market. That is the criterion whether the
partnership has been successful or not. (Interviewee G2)
The long-term relationship with Case Company A is the basis for bringing
our solutions and our services to market. That is our strategic direction, and
I would say in this context we are market leader in Germany. (Interviewee
G1)
The partnership is only a means to an end. It is only the instrument for
realizing market success. And a lot depends on this. (Interviewee G3)
In Case Company G again mixed support for the theoretically developed propositions
has been found. Architectural innovativeness is seen as a given, yet not as a benefit of the
relationship. Accessing the technology is also seen as necessary, yet again not a driving
benefit. Thus, the final aspect of market access is the only proposition that is supported
unambiguously. However, what is also nicely shown in this case is the inter-connection
between the three aspects. It is almost impossible to understand one without the other.
Management of the Network. Concerning the first proposed mechanism for man-
aging the relationship - standardization - good support could be found in the collected
data. The fact that much of the systems that are developed by Case Company A
are standardized business applications and that these possess standardized interfaces to
integrate with other, specialized solutions, is seen as key to the partnership by Case
Company G.
We at Case Company G specifically address the publishing industry. In this
we are supported by Case Company A through their standardized solutions,
such as human resources, financials, or controlling. This is their domain,
they know that very well. (Interviewee G1)
Case Company A is coming from the business side. They need partners that
use their standardized interfaces to integrate the more technical solutions in
the entire process of publishing media. (Interviewee G2)
Thus, standardization is considered to be an important aspect of managing the rela-
tionship. In the perception of Case Company G, the same is true for monitoring. The
intense monitoring by Case Company A is recognized and understood by Case Company
G. However, it has been questioned whether the reverse is also true. Especially the in-
formation policy concerning the further development of Case Company A’s systems has
been criticized.
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Where we’re facing tedious and cumbersome discussions with Case Com-
pany A is in the strategic direction of their solution development. What is
the roadmap for the solutions, how are they further developed? We are in-
volved in these discussions, we can contribute. But we receive relatively little
feedback about the decisions, especially concerning the dates when a certain
solution is available. Case Company A is having a very restrictive informa-
tion policy. They only publish what actually is already officially available.
(Interviewee G2)
Concerning solution development, we have very little capability to influence
this. We don’t know if Case Company A is developing anything at all in
a certain area. If they do, we don’t know when they are developing it. So
we have to decide as to whether we want to address these gaps ourselves
and offer our solution to the customers, with the risk involved that Case
Company A is offering the same functionality as part of their system. This
is a real problem in the partnership. (Interviewee G1)
What do you want to measure in such a relationship? The only thing how
you can approach this is, you say Case Company A is supposed to respond
in such a way, but they don’t do it. It’s a long way to a working relationship.
(Interviewee G3)
So, it can be argued that Case Company G is attempting to monitor their partnership.
Yet this monitoring is not feasible, as Case Company A is not acting in a transparent
enough way. This missing transparency is also considered to be a key aspect when it
comes to the last management mechanism, personal relationships. Case Company G
realizes that these personal ties are important for the management of the relationship.
Insofar, Case Company A is supporting us in that they ask for our partici-
pation in specific projects. So we’re acquiring projects through our contacts
with Case Company A. That is how it works in real life. (Interviewee G3)
However, Case Company G is not really satisfied with this management through per-
sonal relationships. Especially with regard to the above mentioned missing transparency
in the relationship, personal ties are not seen as an appropriate means to overcome this
issue. Thus, Case Company G is attempting to formalize this cooperation through writ-
ten contracts in which the obligations of each partner are clearly spelled out. However,
the difficulties of this approach are also recognized.
We are missing the reciprocity. That Case Company A is clearly communi-
cating what the focal areas are for the next couple of years. Official feedback
of this kind is non-existent. Essentially you can only guess what Case Com-
pany A is doing. You have to know your contacts very well in order to get
some idea of this development. But there is never any official statement
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that can be used at a customer. Based on this diffuse information we are
then developing a gut feeling that our development decisions are based upon.
Obviously this is a very risky approach. (Interviewee G2)
The disadvantage of oral agreements is simply the fact that in the past it
has shown that Case Company A is making turnarounds which we are not
informed about. We are unable to influence these turnarounds, despite the
fact that we had a very productive relationship in the past. So the conclusion
has to be drawn that we need a formal agreement on how we are to approach
joint operations. These regulations have been formalized in a contract that
is also accepted by Case Company A. (Interviewee G3)
Another point is that we have formalized our cooperation through this con-
tract in a way that increases the transparency in the relationship. We com-
municate our goals and our partner is communicating his goals. We talk
about this and conjointly reach a decision. It is very important that we ad-
dress the market with the same pace, with the same frequency. This has not
happened in the past. Now we’re perceived very differently by the market.
(Interviewee G3)
So, albeit the fact that personal ties are very important, they are not the ideal way
to manage the relationship. Summing up the discussion, Case Company G perceives
many differences between how the relationship should be managed and how it actually
is managed. Monitoring Case Company A is desired, yet almost impossible to achieve.
Personal ties are used, yet the dependence on them is also considered highly insecure.
4.2.6 Case Company H
Case Company Description. Case Company H is developing solutions for data
archiving. The solution has been developed since data bases for Case Company A’s
mainframe system have been subject to sharp restrictions concerning their size. As soon
as this restriction has been reached, data had to be stored in external devices. This re-
sulted in the inability of the system to access these data for analysis and reporting. Case
Company H has developed a solution that enabled customers to access these externally
stored data. Current systems are not subject to these restrictions any more. However,
even today many customers want - especially due to performance reasons - further reach-
ing archiving functionality than what is offered by Case Company A. Other customers
have to archive their data for a very long time due to legal reasons. Both requirements
can be fulfilled by the archiving solution of Case Company H. Thus, the organization
focuses especially on very large customers.
Case Company H has been founded in 1991. Today, the company employs 30 pro-
fessionals in one location in Germany. Its customers are, as it has been mentioned,
mostly large, international corporations. Especially those companies that generate a lot
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of data during their operations are at the focus of Case Company H. Therefore it serves
customers from all kinds of industries, such as automotive, manufacturing, oil and gas,
pharmaceuticals, but also postal services or transportation.
The relationship to Case Company A has been a quintessential part of Case Company
H ever since it has been founded. The relationship during the first couple of years has
been an unofficial one. The solution developed by Case Company H has been officially
certified by Case Company A in 1999. Since then Case Company H sells its solution to
customers of Case Company A that require enhanced archiving solutions. The interview
in this company has been conducted with the head of sales and marketing. As part of
this function, the interviewee is also responsible for the coordination of the partnership
to Case Company A.
Reasons for Participating in the Network. Concerning the reasons for partici-
pating in Case Company A’s IS development network, the interviewee has a very clear
opinion. Case Company H’s original line of business has been and still is the development
of additional archiving functionalities going beyond what is offered in the standard sys-
tem. Consequently, architectural innovativeness has not been mentioned as a driver for
this participation in a single instance. Support for the first proposition could therefore
not be found in the data collected for this case. However, the second proposition could
be supported very well. This should come as no surprise, as the technical integration
with Case Company A’s system is a necessary precondition for the developed solution.
We have an explicit technology partnership since a couple of years ago. We
cooperate with Case Company A because our solutions are complementing
each other. That is very important for our solutions. We are developing con-
nectors between Case Company A’s systems and archiving systems. These
connectors are attached very closely to Case Company A’s system. (Inter-
viewee H1)
We are developing new add-on solutions for Case Company A’s system.
Therefore it is obviously imperative that we cooperate very closely with our
partner in order to facilitate this development. (Interviewee H1)
So, while accessing the technological base of Case Company A is very important for
Case Company H, in the end, addressing customers is the driving strategic goal for Case
Company H.
Of course the strategic goal for the partnership is to further grow as company
through increasing our revenues. (Interviewee H1)
So, while architectural innovation is not playing an important role in the partnership,
both accessing the technology and the existing market are crucial for Case Company H.
Obviously, both aspects are highly intertwined in this case. Only through the in-depth
knowledge of the existing technologies, new solutions can be developed that offer an
added value for the customers of Case Company A.
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Management of the Network. Especially in the business of Case Company H, stan-
dardized interfaces play a very important role for managing the relationship to the part-
ners. In the system of Case Company A, several of these standardized interfaces are used
by Case Company H to attach their solution to the existing system. However, what is
also recognized in this case is the fact that standards are only beneficial of the smaller
partners, if the large hub company adheres to the given promise to not go beyond the
standardized interfaces. As soon as this promise is no longer upheld, Case Company H
is facing severe problems.
There are specific points at which Case Company A is developing standard-
ized interfaces. It then says, look we do not develop anything that goes
beyond this interface. We have third party solutions from our partners avail-
able on the market. These decisions have been reached in a professional
and cooperative way. Insofar I hope that we maintain this professional and
cooperative way, because this is absolutely necessary for the success of our
business. (Interviewee H1)
For sure it is a very substantial risk that Case Company A is offering a
comprehensive solution as part of their standard. That would make our
solution obsolete. We would instantly feel that. That’s one of the risks.
(Interviewee H1)
Concerning the monitoring of Case Company A, it is also recognized that this endeavor
is infeasible. Yet it is also not perceived to be of prime importance. The only aspect
that is recognized as potentially harmful is the missing clear communication of where
Case Company A sees its future development paths.
We cannot measure a strategic partnership like the one with Case Company
A in numbers. It for sure has a very significant influence on our own de-
velopment, that’s why we’re very interested in fostering this relationship.
For sure our overall success depends to no small degree on that relationship.
Simply because we are specialized in developing add-on solutions for their
system. However, we do not expect that Case Company A is going bankrupt
or becoming insolvent tomorrow. Thus, we can rest easily. (Interviewee H1)
Again, the final proposed management mechanism is the one that has been supported
mostly throughout the interview in Case Company H. Subsequently, two quotes illustrate
the importance of close personal ties for the success of the partnership for Case Company
H.
We are profiting from the partnership because we are working with our
contact persons now for a very long time. Through this, something like
a permanent conversation emerged, through which we get advice concerning
imminent risks but also potential prospects. (Interviewee H1)
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The success in the detail is dependent on the involved people. They have
to live the relationship, they have to be motivated, they have to drive the
relationship, call their contacts, meet with them, talk over this or that issue.
The partnership has to be a living thing in order to ensure long-term success.
(Interviewee H1)
Thus, support could be found for the first proposition, that standardization is key for
managing the relationship to Case Company A. However, the danger that Case Company
A is augmenting its standardized offerings is a constant threat to Case Company H. The
proposition that monitoring the larger partner is important could not be supported. This
point is neither perceived to be desirable nor feasible. Finally, good support could be
found for the proposition that the relationship is managed through close, inter-personal
ties.
4.2.7 Case Company I
Case Company Description. Case Company I is developing solutions in the area of
Enterprise Output Management. This field involves the creation of documents, both in
print and electronically. Especially for high volume document handling, the solutions of
Case Company I offer various advantages over standardized solutions. The solutions for
example allow for a better traceability of each printing process. Case Company I also
develops solutions for electronic document handling, which includes for example digital
signatures as an important feature. Finally, Case Company I also offers consulting
services, which are often part of the implementation projects for the company’s software
solution.
Case Company I has been founded in 1994. Its customers are obviously mainly those
organizations that need high volume document handling. Especially public utility com-
panies, big mail order firms, in growing numbers also banks and insurance companies,
but also manufacturing companies have been mentioned in the interview. The company
employs a low two-digit number of professionals in one location in Germany.
Throughout its history, Case Company I has been involved in many partnerships.
Especially, technological partnerships with the providers of the actual printers have been
of prime importance. However, in 2001 Case Company I decided to not only partner
with the destination of the printing data, but also officially partner with the source. This
has been often enough one of Case Company A’s systems. The interviewee is the head
of software development, who is, in this function, also responsible for the partnerships of
Case Company I. The interview has been conducted via telephone. No approval has been
given to tape recorded it. However, intense field notes have been taken. These notes
have also been briefly discussed with and approved by the interviewee at a personal
follow-up meeting. Furthermore, the interviewee himself has also briefly answered the
question in writing and offered these answers to the researcher.
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Reasons for Participating in the Network. Several reasons for participating in
the network of Case Company A have been mentioned in the interview. Arranging
them in accordance with the proposed benefits of such an approach, again no support
could be found for the idea that architectural innovations play an important role in this
decision. The second proposition, accessing the technological base, has been mentioned
by Interviewee I1. However, the partnership with Case Company A goes beyond the
pure access to technology, rather this partnership is intended to realize both, technical
and strategic goals.
In order to realize the different requirements for our solution we have various
very important technical partnerships. However, the focus of this interview
is specifically the technical and strategic partnership with Case Company A.
This partnership exists since 2001 and it had the original goal to integrate
our solution with the system of Case Company A through certified interfaces.
(Interviewee I1)
Thus, technical access is indeed an important aspect of the relationship between the
two companies. However, there is also another aspect, what has been termed strategic.
This aspect can be considered as part of the final proposition, the accessing of existing
markets of Case Company A. Interviewee I1 very well illustrates two aspects of this
strategic goal of the partnership. First, he argues that the certification makes a difference
for customers; second he argues that the large existing installed base of Case Company
A is a great benefit for smaller partners, like Case Company I.
It is clearly observable that customers attach great importance to this part-
nership. In part, this certification with Case Company A makes the difference
in sales situations. Case Company I is favored over competitors due to this
partnership. (Interviewee I1)
Through the partnership with Case Company A, Case Company I has an
advantage over its competitors. Roughly 80 percent of our customers are
using Case Company A’s system. Since these customers favor a certified
solution, we can generate additional revenues in this context. (Interviewee
I1)
So, no support at all has been found for the proposition on architectural innovativeness
of the hub as a benefit for the spoke. Further, accessing the technological base has
been mentioned as an explicit key benefit of the partnership with Case Company A.
Furthermore, this aspect has been considered to be a precondition for the final proposed
benefit, the access to existing markets. This aspect has been well supported in the
interview.
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Management of the Network. Concerning the mechanisms through which the re-
lationship is managed, Case Company I has a very distinct perspective on standards.
Interviewee I1 argues that indeed standards are very far developed, so that integration
on the basis of standardized interfaces could be achieved even without the awareness of
Case Company A.
The goal of the cooperation with Case Company A has been the certification
of our solution’s interfaces to the system of Case Company A. We could have
developed these interfaces and attach our solution completely without the
cooperation with Case Company A. Many solution developers actually do
this. (Interviewee I1)
However, the above conducted discussion on the benefits of certification renders this
approach not a feasible option. Rather, Case Company I has gone through the certifica-
tion process in order to signal the inter-operability of their solutions to the customers.
However, while Case Company A is heavily monitoring its partners, Interviewee I1 also
recognized that this monitoring is not possible for the smaller partners. He sees this as
a shortcoming in the partnership and as an inherent risk to it.
One of the disadvantages of the partnership is the fact that we have to
continuously keep track of the strategic and technical developments of Case
Company A. The larger partners often make strategic decisions, for example
concerning the interfaces to their system, without considering the smaller
partners. (Interviewee I1)
According to Interviewee I1, this is also tangible in the personal relationships in-
between partners. Efforts on the side of Case Company A are recognized. However, it
is first of all doubted whether these efforts are effective in improving the relationship.
Further, it is doubted whether these efforts are indeed taken serious.
Despite all the efforts of the ’large’ partners to create a level playing field
through a specifically installed partner management, a certain imbalance has
emerged in the relationship so that one cannot really talk of a ’partnership’
in all instances. (Interviewee I1)
Furthermore, it has to be noted that the partnerships are becoming more
and more anonymous. There are no personal meetings on a management
level in order to agree on strategic directions. Rather, only mailing lists and
web sites are used to disseminate information. It has turned into a ’push’
service from the large partners to the small partners. (Interviewee I1)
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Thus, for Case Company I support has been found that standardized interfaces play an
important role in the management of the relationship to the larger partner. The support
for monitoring has been less distinct. Again, it has been argued that in principle such
a monitoring is desirable, yet that it is almost infeasible to actually conduct it. Finally,
personal relationships have been considered important for Case Company I, yet less so
for its large partner.
4.2.8 Case Company J
Case Company Description. Company J develops Product Information Manage-
ment (PIM) solutions. This software solution is essential for cross-media publishing.
In this context, product information that is stored in a central repository can be used
for various communication channels. In general, this information is used to design out-
lets like catalogs, price lists, booklets, or flyers. The solutions of Case Company J also
enable the design of instruction manuals or maintenance guidelines out of the stored
data. These outlets are often printed, yet electronic publishing - for example through
the Internet or on a CD - is also possible. In international contexts, the solution can
also be used to automatically adjust the language according to the context. Usually the
therefore required data is scattered in various data bases throughout the entire organiza-
tion, and the design of these outlets is preceded by a manual data collection process. In
contrast, the solution of Case Company J allows a higher degree of automation for this
process of publication in various media types. The offering of Case Company J involves
not only the system, but also services that are required in an implementation project.
The company also offers outsourcing services in that it maintains the systems, either on
premise on in the data center of Case Company J.
Case Company J has been founded in 1999 and as of today has roughly 40 employ-
ees. Its main location is in Germany, and the company has sales offices in Austria and
Switzerland. Case Company J is serving customers of various sizes from different indus-
tries. In general, the solution is more interesting for larger corporations that produce a
larger number of products, and perhaps even have to publish globally in different lan-
guages and types of media. Thus, it is not uncommon for the customers to be global
players with up to one thousand times more employees than Case Company J.
The relationship between Case Companies A and J has been implicitly given since the
founding of Case Company J. Especially because many data are extracted from systems
like that of Case Company A, the developed solution need to access these systems. In
2003 the relationship between the two organizations has been formalized in that Case
Company J’s solution has been officially certified. In this company two interviews have
been conducted. Interviewee J2 is the managing director of the company. Interviewee
J1 is heading the sales department.
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Reasons for Participating in the Network. Analyzing the reasons why Case Com-
pany J is partnering with Case Company A, again accessing markets has played the
dominant role in the interviews. Architectural innovativeness of the hub organization
has not been mentioned with a single word by either of the two interviewees. Access-
ing an existing technological base has been mentioned, however not in the context of
the partnership with Case Company A. In contrast, Case Company J explicitly distin-
guishes between those partnerships that allow the company to access technologies, and
those that allow it to access markets. The first is explicitly in the context of data bases
or output management systems, while the latter is in the context of enterprise IS, like
those developed by Case Company A.
We have one area of partnerships, that’s technology partnerships. Then we
have, and that is the second focus, the area of integration partnerships, and
closely related to this, sales partnerships. (Interviewee J1)
Thus, it can be argued that the partnership with Case Company A is neither in-
tended to, nor does it actually deliver access to architectural innovativeness or existing
technologies. However, gaining market access has repeatedly been mentioned by both
interviewees.
One reason for partnering is that it is always difficult for a young software
company to get access to the market. Through partnering with an established
player, who can fill a niche in his own portfolio through this partnership, this
market access is ideally much easier. Especially if a way can be found how
to use the channels of this partner. That is an important point. A second
important point is that a company’s credibility and reliability can be very
well communicated in the market through a partnership and the correspond-
ing recommendations of a well established player. This has been especially
important after the burst of the IT bubble in 2001, 2002. Customers did
not dare to buy any solution from a young company, without assurance that
there is sustainable development in this company that the company does not
disappear in two years. Through a partnership you can get this assurance
very easily. (Interviewee J2)
It is the strategic goal of our partnerships to penetrate markets for our solu-
tion. We simply do not have the momentum to act in the markets as we wish
to do. So we’re trying to create awareness for our solution through various
partnerships. (Interviewee J1)
Here again, the dominating role of Case Company A in the enterprise IS market
has already been implicitly recognized as the driving force behind this development.
Interviewee J2 makes this perception even more explicit through the following statement:
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We are actively addressing companies with more than 100 million annual
revenues. In this context, the market share of Case Company A is roughly
70 percent. So the probability that we have to integrate with Case Company
A’s system at our customers is pretty high. (Interviewee J2)
Thus, again the dominant reason why Case Company J is partnering with Case Com-
pany A is the ability to address the large existing market of that company. The other
two theoretically proposed reasons play, if at all, a secondary role.
Management of the Network. Concerning the ways and means, how Case Company
J is managing its relationship with its partners, a clear support could be found for the
proposition that standards play an important role in this context. Both interviewees
have mentioned the fact that both partners base their solutions on standards as key for
the easy integration of the solutions:
From a technical perspective, the effort to integrate has been very limited.
This admittedly because our solution is compliant with Case Company A’s
system. We have standardized technologies and the only thing we had to do,
is develop a new design on top of that solution. That has not been a big
deal. The effort has been manageable. (Interviewee J2)
Technology-wise we’re always using open standards where they are available.
(Interviewee J1)
So, from Case Company J’s perspective standards do indeed play an important and
positive role in the relationship between the two partners. Interestingly, Case Company
J has a pronounced perspective on monitoring as a management mechanism. First of all,
the fact that Case Company A is not perceived to be very transparent in its decisions
has been mentioned as harmful for the relationship in the interviews.
You’re facing conflicts in such a relationship. For example if a salesman of
Case Company A wants to sell another 100 consulting days for individual
development rather than selling our solution. In most of those cases, Case
Company A is winning in the conflict. Simply because the smaller partner
is taking a back seat in this issue. If the smaller partner would insist on his
rights, he might jeopardize many other prospects. (Interviewee J2)
However, not only the fact that monitoring Case Company A is perceived to be difficult
has been mentioned in the interviews. Also the fact that the certification process might
lead to know-how leakage of a certain extend has been mentioned.
There’s always a lot of politics involved, and the risk that a lot of know-
how is transferred to Case Company A through the certification. If you’re
accessing a higher level of partnerships that goes as far as opening the source
code. You need a very trusting relationship for this. (Interviewee J2)
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Thus, the certification process is not seen as entirely positive. Especially the close
interconnection with the third proposed management mechanism, the building of close
trusting personal ties, has been mentioned at various instances. So, as no transpar-
ent monitoring exists in the relationship, Case Company J actually sees these personal
relationships as a substitute for monitoring the partner.
One aspect of the partnership is to stay in contact with the responsible per-
sons. You have to nurture all your personal ties so that you get information
about potential problems in an early stage. Only then you can counteract.
In the end there are always opportunities for cooperation, even if there is
a certain solution overlap. You just have to get notice early enough, before
there is an actual conflict. (Interviewee J2)
So, in general personal ties are considered the most important aspect of the manage-
ment of the relationship. Only through these ties, a relationship can be implemented
that is profitable for both involved parties.
Managing the relationship is conducted through managing a personal net-
work and personal ties. If the fundamental requirements, like the fit between
the solutions, are fulfilled, personal ties are the nuts and bolts of the relation-
ship. Whoever neglects this issue will not be successful in the partnership.
(Interviewee J2)
Summarizing this case, indeed good support has been found for the reliance on open
standards as key to the relationship. However, the monitoring of Case Company A has
been described as being desirable, yet close to impossible to realize. Going even further
than this, knowledge leaking dangers have been identified in the certification process.
Finally, personal relationships are considered to be a fundamental building block of the
partnership. Yet again, this is not seen as positive, as these are not really objective.
This has been the last spoke case narrative. In the following final section of the spoke
case analysis all eight cases are compared in a cross-case analysis. It is the goal of
this analysis to emphasize characteristic similarities and differences between the spokes.
These are then used in the concluding discussion to develop a holistic view on the entire
inter-organizational IS development network of Case Company A.
4.2.9 Cross-Case Analysis
After having discussed the eight cases in the preceding sections, this final part of the
spoke case discussion aggregates these individual case narratives and forms a holistic
picture of the inter-organizational IS development network from the spokes’ perspective.
As a first step of this aggregated analysis the number of relevant interview fragments is
given in Table 4.5 for the proposed benefits and in Table 4.6 for the proposed manage-
ment mechanisms.
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“Innovation” “Technology” “Market”
Interviewee C1 1 2 2
Interviewee D1 1 2 2
Interviewee E1 0 2 5
Interviewee F1 0 0 1
Interviewee G1 0 0 2
Interviewee G2 0 2 1
Interviewee G3 1 1 3
Interviewee H1 0 2 1
Interviewee I1 0 1 4
Interviewee J1 0 1 1
Interviewee J2 0 0 4
Sum 3 13 26
Average 0.27 1.18 2.36
Table 4.5: Relevant Interview Fragments by Benefits: Spoke Case Companies.
Source: Own Assertion.
This information already very well describes what has been found in the individual
case narratives: Architectural innovativeness is not considered to be of any positive rele-
vance by any of the spokes. The accessing of existing technology is somewhat important,
yet not the dominating factor of why small companies partner with a large hub. This
is indeed considered to be the accessing of novel markets that is facilitated through
such a partnership. Similarly, management or the relationship through standards and
monitoring is considered to be of importance. However, the dominating factor in this
context is the reliance on close personal relationships. However, once more the issue
that qualitative case analysis cannot follow clearly prescribed rules or formulas emerges
strongly in this analysis (Patton, 2002; Stake, 1995). Therefore, subsequently a content
analysis of the relevant interview fragments attempts to shed more light on these as-
pects. Furthermore, this analysis also is intended to reveal underlying reasons for subtle
differences between the spoke cases, despite them being designed as literal replications
of each other. In this regard this cross-case analysis is similar to the procedure of the
hub cases, where the deductive analysis of the different factors has been followed by an
inductive analysis of relationships between them.
This content analysis is sub-divided into three parts. The first part is addressing sim-
ilarities and differences in the reasons why these smaller software companies cooperate
with large system developers like Case Company A. The second part then addresses
similarities and differences in the management mechanisms that are used by the spoke
companies. As the hub case analysis above has shown, the fact that it is a literal repli-
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“Standardization” “Monitoring” “Personal Rel.”
Interviewee C1 2 5 6
Interviewee D1 2 2 2
Interviewee E1 1 1 3
Interviewee F1 1 1 2
Interviewee G1 2 2 1
Interviewee G2 1 2 1
Interviewee G3 1 2 5
Interviewee H1 2 1 6
Interviewee I1 1 2 2
Interviewee J1 1 0 0
Interviewee J2 1 3 4
Sum 15 21 32
Average 1.36 1.91 2.91
Table 4.6: Relevant Interview Fragments by Management Mechanisms: Spoke Case
Companies.
Source: Own Assertion.
cation does not indicate that all case are completely identical with regard to their per-
ceptions of the benefits and the management of the network. Rather, subtle underlying
differences exist between them. These are addressed in the final part of this discussion.
In this part of this section, a comprehensive line of argument is developed why certain
factors are perceived differently in the eight different cases. This is then integrated into
a general model which is intended to explain different kinds of partnerships.
Similarities and Differences in Benefits. Concerning the reasons why spoke com-
panies partner with large system vendors, a clear pattern could be detected in the eight
spoke cases. Indeed two out of the three propositions have been answered very similar
across all cases. These two, innovation and market benefits, are thus first discussed.
This fact becomes very obvious in the context of architectural innovativeness of the hub
organization. For none of the discussed case companies, the architectural innovativeness
of the hub has been considered as a key benefit of their relationship. In most of the
cases, this dimension is not recognized as playing any role at all. An opinion on this
issue has been raised only in rare exceptions. In none of the cases, architectural inno-
vativeness has been explicitly desired by the smaller partners. Rather, in those cases
that architectural innovativeness has been recognized at all, it has been felt that this
newly emerging architecture has the potential to threaten the spokes’ business model
(Case Company D), or that the spoke is not sure about the implications of this new
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development (Case Company G). However, none of the spoke cases has argued that this
architectural innovativeness is seen as a key benefit for the partnership. Thus, Propo-
sition IS has to be clearly rejected. Architectural innovativeness on the side of the hub
organization has not emerged as a reason for spokes to partner with the hub in the here
collected data.
A clearly different picture has emerged in the discussion on accessing novel market
through the partnership with Case Company A. Indeed, all interviewees in all eight
spoke cases have unanimously declared that gaining access to existing markets is the
key reason why they participate in Case Company A’s inter-organizational IS develop-
ment network. In this context, good support has been found for both aspects of this
proposition. First, essentially all clients of spoke companies already possess a large en-
terprise IS. Interviewees J2, F1, and I1 explicitly mention the market share of roughly
70 to 80 percent of Case Company A. In this context, the integration with such a system
simply offers additional value for customers. Next to this, there is also another aspect
has been discussed in the theoretical development of the proposition. Especially the fact
that spokes are by definition smaller software companies is playing an important role in
this context. Here, the good reputation that such a small company can gain from the
partnering with a large, well recognized organization like Case Company A is crucial.
Again, good support has been found throughout the conducted interviews. Interviewees
in the Case Companies G and I explicitly mentioned the fact that customers prefer their
organization over competitors because of their partnership with Case Company A. Thus,
clear support for the proposed benefit of market access has been found in the collected
data.
A less unambiguous picture emerges in the discussion of accessing existing technology
as driver for partnering with Case Company A. Here, the eight spoke case companies
are almost neatly separated into two distinct groups. For one group accessing the tech-
nological base is seen as being of eminent importance (Case Companies C, D, E, H,
and I). The interviewees of the other group to a large extent do not even mention the
access to this technology, or if they do, they are not considering it as prime reason for
partnering with Case Company A (Case Companies F, G, and J). It can be argued that
for some of the spoke partners the access to the existing technologies of Case Company
A is an important issue, while it is not for others. However, one similarity is given
between these two groups. Neither of them considers the access to technology really as
the driving reason for participating in such an inter-organizational network. Rather, as
it has been stated above, this is the accessing of novel markets. The two groups vary in
how necessary this access to technology is as a precondition for realizing the final goal
of market access that all spokes do have in common.
These findings are again summarized in Table 4.7. The first proposed aspect of ar-
chitectural innovation does not play a role in this decision at all. The second aspect
of accessing existing technologies does play a role, depending on how important it is
as a precondition for market access. This market access is the final aspect, which is
important in all spoke cases. This is reflected in the table through marking whether the
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Innovation Technology Base Market Access
Case Company C o + +
Case Company D - + +
Case Company E o + +
Case Company F o o +
Case Company G o o +
Case Company H o + +
Case Company I o + +
Case Company J o o +
Table 4.7: The Spokes’ Reasons to Participate in the Network.
Source: Own Assertion.
propositions that the access to certain factors like architectural innovation, technology,
or markets is a key benefit for the spoke companies are either reversed (-), rejected (o),
or supported (+).
Similarities and Differences in Management Mechanisms. The first proposition
on management mechanisms used in the IS development network has been addressing
standardization. The fact that this aspect plays an important part in the management of
the inter-organizational relationships in the IS development network has been acknowl-
edged in all eight cases. However, in the individual case analyses another interesting
facet of this issue emerged. Not all eight case companies view standards as positive
without restraint. Rather, for half of the cases a cautionary note has overshadowed the
discussion of this aspect. Interestingly, in all four cases close to the same reservations
have been raised. All case companies have mentioned that their solutions heavily rely on
standardized interfaces that are offered as part of Case Company A’s system. However,
Case Companies C, D, E, and H have also mentioned that they see their solution as
being endangered by enhancements on Case Company A’s system’s interfaces. If the
interfaces are standardized to a larger extent than this is the case today, the solutions
of these case companies might become obsolete. This because their business model is to
explicitly address shortcomings in Case Company A’s interfaces.
In contrast to this, the other four companies see standards in a more positive light.
They do not feel that an enhancement of standardized interfaces of the large system
would jeopardize their prospects. Thus, it can be argued that essentially all partners
rely on standardized technologies and the other aspects, like standardized training, that
come along with this. However, for some of the partners, standardization might also be
a deteriorating effect on the partnership. The discussion on how exactly this happens is
involving an active role of the hub organizations. Therefore, this discussion is postponed
until the next section, which covers exactly the dynamics of the cooperation between
hubs and spokes from both perspectives.
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A similar perspective emerges, when comparing the perception of the eight spoke
case companies with regard to the management through monitoring their partner. In
this context, in all of the cases the common thread emerged, that monitoring the large
partner is almost impossible. At least not through clearly defined ways. In one way or
another all interviewees have argued unanimously that the information policy of Case
Company A is less than transparent for the smaller partners. Thus, while the availability
of standards is perceived as being actively influencing the relationship, the opposite is
true for monitoring mechanisms. Exactly their absence is influencing the relationship.
However, in what perception the spokes differ is, whether this is deteriorating the
relationship between them and the large vendor. For some of the cases, this absence has
not even been recognized. For others, it has been argued that indeed a comprehensive
monitoring is not necessary, because Case Company A has been experienced as reliable
partner which does not need to be monitored (e.g. Case Companies C, D, E, and H).
A reason for this can be found in the fact that the smaller companies participate in
the network in order to gain a reputation of continuity in their existence through this
partnership. This reputation would be harmed only if Case Company A would be in
considerable difficulties that threaten its existence. As this has not been perceived to
be realistic in the nearer future, this aspect is not affected by the missing transparency
in the relationship. However, for another group of partners, this missing transparency is
indeed considered to be deteriorating the relationship. Especially the Case Companies
F, G, I, and J have explicitly criticized this fact.
Interestingly, the two groups are close to identical to the two groups that have been
distinguished on the basis of whether they see the standardization that the relationship
is based upon in a positive light or not. However, there is an interesting side note to
this. It should be expected that especially those companies, that have raised concerns
about the danger of an increasing degree of interface standardization are also extremely
interested in monitoring the developments within Case Company A in order to early
on recognize whether their own solution is threatened. However, exactly the opposite
is true. The companies that have raised concerns with regard to the enhancement of
standardized interfaces are exactly those that do not feel that a closer monitoring of
Case Company A would be necessary.
A similar picture emerges in the discussion of the management through personal rela-
tionships. Just as all spoke case companies have raised the fact that standardization is
playing an important role in the relationship, also all companies have brought forward
their perception that personal relationships are important. Indeed, for all cases it has
been stated that this management mechanism is by far the most important aspect of
their relationship management. Different shades of these personal ties have been men-
tioned, ranging from trusting relationships that have been established and developed
over the last couple of years (e.g. Case Company H), to the fact that a member of the
technical advisory board is a high ranking member of Case Company A (Case Company
C). However, while this strong reliance on personal relationships has been accepted by
half of the spoke partners, the other half criticizes this approach.
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Case Companies F, G, I, and J argue that from their perspective, personal relation-
ships are only that important because no formalized monitoring exists. Thus, the per-
sonal ties act as substitute for other mechanisms intended to create more transparency
in the relationship. However, as interviewees from all these case companies have argued,
personal relationships are a bad substitute for formalized mechanisms. Especially the
fact that these personal relationships are not working predictably has been raised in the
interviews. So, through the reliance on personal ties for the management of the entire
relationship, a significant degree of uncertainty is introduced into this relationship. This
uncertainty is taken for granted by most of the spokes that do not believe that this
can be changed. Some of the interviewees, however, have argued that such uncertainty
should not be part of the network. Rather, formalized monitoring mechanisms should
be employed.
Standardization Monitoring Personal Ties
Case Company C +/o -/o +/+
Case Company D +/- -/o +/+
Case Company E +/- -/o +/+
Case Company F +/+ -/- +/-
Case Company G +/+ -/- +/-
Case Company H +/- -/o +/+
Case Company I +/+ -/- +/-
Case Company J +/+ -/- +/-
Table 4.8: The Spokes’ Perception of Management Mechanisms.
Source: Own Assertion.
Table 4.8 summarizes the findings of this cross-case analysis. In this table, two sym-
bols are given for each cell. The first symbol indicates whether a certain management
mechanism is actually available in the relationship to Case Company A. The second
symbol indicates whether this mechanism is perceived to be beneficial for managing the
relationship. In this context the meaning of a (+) is that the mechanism is available
or that it’s beneficial. The meaning of an (o), which is only used with regard to being
beneficial or not, is that the mechanism is neither beneficial nor harmful. The meaning
of a (-) is that the mechanisms is not even available or that it is harmful. To make
an example, all case companies rely on open standards for integration their solutions
(+). Yet Case Company C feels that these standards are not comprehensive enough
(o). In contrast Case Companies D, E, and H also see a threat in this (-), while the
others consider this management mechanism as being beneficial for their relationship
(+). None of the companies has reported that it is really able to monitor what Case
Company A is doing (-), yet Case Companies C, D, E, and H do not see any problem in
270
271
this fact (o). Similarly, all case companies feel that personal ties are used in managing
their relationship to Case Company A (+), yet Case Companies F, G, I, and J feel that
this is harmful for their relationship (-).
Summing up this discussion, two distinct groups of spoke companies have been iden-
tified. The first encompasses Case Companies C, D, E, and H. The second consists of
Case Companies F, G, I, and J. Interestingly, these two groups are, with the exception of
Case Company I, also those that either emphasize the importance of accessing existing
technologies or not. The following discussion therefore highlights what exactly distin-
guishes these two groups. Also the special position of Case Company I, for which this
clear overlap between the benefits and management mechanisms cannot be achieved, is
discussed.
Distinguishing Different Partnership Models. Two groups have been identified
that share a lot of common characteristics with regard to the six developed propositions.
The first group consists of Case Companies C, D, E, and H. In a nutshell, these compa-
nies are interested in accessing the existing technological base, they see a certain danger
in standardization, they do not feel that monitoring the hub is of prime importance, and
they do not see any downsides of managing their partnership through personal ties. The
second group consists of Case Companies F, G, and J. In contrast to the first group,
these companies do not see accessing technology as key benefit, they do not feel that
standards are threatening their business, they feel that missing monitoring of the hub is
deteriorating their relationship, and they are not entirely happy with managing the rela-
tionship through personal ties. Why do these differences exist between these two groups?
In the following, first a distinction is drawn between the two above identified groups of
spoke case companies. Then, the different results for the six developed propositions are
explained in the light of this distinction. Finally, Case Company I is described in more
detail, as this company seems to fall somewhat ’in the middle’ of the two groups.
The underlying explanation for this sharp distinction between the two groups can be
found in what kind of solutions the spoke partners are actually developing. For the
first group, the developed solutions are mainly offering integration functionalities with
other systems. The solutions of Case Company C are integrating vending machines
or intelligent refrigerators with the system of Case Company A. Case Company D is
developing integration interfaces between the system of Case Company A and the CAD
suite of their other big partner. Case Company E is focusing on the integration between
Case Company A’s system and a specific groupware system18. Case Company H is
offering data archiving solutions. Key to these solutions is the integration between Case
18 Through their engineering departments, Case Company E is also offering other solutions. However,
the partnership to Case Company A is not in the focus of these engineering departments. Therefore,
the focus is on the business software department.
271
272 4.2 Spoke Cases Analyses
Company A’s system and the storage solutions offered by other partners. Thus, the
integration between Case Company A’s system and the system of another partner is key
to the business models of these companies.
While the other group of case companies also integrates their solution with the System
of Case Company A (otherwise they would not need to partner at all), this integration
is not a crucial part of their business model. Rather, they see the added value of
their solution in the business functionality that is covered by this solution, and not
simply in the technical integration. Accessing this added value is facilitated through the
integration with Case Company A’s system, yet the added value is not restricted to the
integration in itself. Case Company F for example develops a solution for automatic,
mobile data recording. For example the voice controlled warehousing system allows for
a more efficient inventory handling, even if it is not integrated with Case Company
A’s system. However, this integration does indeed further enhance the efficiency of
the inventory handling process, as the recorded information otherwise would have to be
transferred manually. The same is true for Case Company G’s solutions that are specified
on managing advertisement or on transforming printed newspapers into online presences.
These solutions offer an added value for newspaper publishing companies even without
integration with Case Company A’s system. However, here again, the integration of
for example advertisement data directly into the standard business applications of Case
Company A facilitates the usage of these solutions. The same story can be told for
the Product Information Management solution of Case Company J. All these would be
valuable for customers as stand alone software. However, the integration with large
enterprise IS, like those of Case Company A, facilitates their usage and thus makes
the solution even more attractive for customers that already use this large enterprise
IS. Thus, it can be assumed that the importance that this business functionality plays
in comparison to the technical integration features is key for distinguishing the two
identified groups. Figure 4.10 illustrates the importance of this business functionality
for the different solutions of the eight case companies19.
Based on this assumption, also the differences with regard to the six theoretically
proposed benefits and management mechanisms can be explained. First, the difference
in the perception of accessing existing technology can be explained through the fact that
for the group of case companies that is offering technical integration services, obviously
this aspect is of prime importance. Thus, Case Companies C, D, E, and H see this
aspect as a key benefit for their partnership with Case Company A. In contrast to this,
the interviewees of the other group (Case Companies F, G, and J) to a large extent not
even mention the access to existing technology of Case Company A.
The difference in the perception of standardization can be explained in a similar
vein. The focus of the first group’s business model is on technical integration of Case
Company A’s system with the systems of other vendors. As it is the business model of
19 This is the author’s perception. There has been no quantifiable measurement of the importance of
business functionality included in a solution.
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Figure 4.10: Degree of Domain Knowledge in the Partner’s Solution.
Source: Own Illustration.
these companies to integrate these systems, they would loose a significant revenue source
if this integration could be achieved on the basis of standardized, open interfaces. Again
the contrast is true for the second group. This is also no surprise, as the solutions that are
offered by these companies are an inherent added value. The easier the integration can
be achieved, the easier it is for those companies to convince customers that they should
utilize their solution. In this context standardized, open technologies would improve the
market prospects of these solutions.
Finally, the difference in monitoring and personal relationships can be explained by
the fact that the first group is acting in a more stable environment. The existing in-
tegration solutions are offered on a continuous basis, while the domain solutions might
be subject to integration efforts from Case Company A. Thus, for the first group, mon-
itoring the large partner is not seen as necessary, and personal relationships are a good
enough management mechanism. The contrast is true for the second group, which sees
better knowledge about the large partner as necessary and personal relationships as an
insufficient substitute for this more sophisticated monitoring. This aspect is yet very
fuzzy. It is therefore further dwelled upon in Section 4.3.2, which covers differences
between the two groups in the transition from one partnership process to another.
The final aspect that has to be discussed here is the special role that Case Company
I is playing. This company does not neatly fit into one of the two categories. This case
seems to be part of one group with regard to the benefits, yet part of the other with
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regard to management mechanisms. The underlying explanation for this is the changing
business that Case Company I is in. Its traditional line of business has been printing
solutions, which clearly belongs into the group of technical integration solutions. In
this context, the company sees accessing the existing technology base as being of prime
importance. However, with the uprising of sophisticated electronic document handling
processes, this is currently changing. As it has been mentioned in the case narrative,
recently, aspects like digital signatures have emerged. Consequently, a growing fraction
of the case company’s business is consulting in this area, rather than technical solutions.
For this reason, the company is growing into more domain knowledge intense business
areas. Thus, technical integration is still a large source of revenues, and consequently
accessing existing technology is seen as key benefit for this aspect. However, at the
same time, missing monitoring and the reliance on unpredictable personal relationships
as substitute for this, are taking their toll on the consulting business. Case Company I
is therefore pictured as being in a transitional phase between the two groups in Figure
4.10.
4.3 Network Analysis
After the preceding two parts of the case analysis have been addressing first, specifically
the hub cases and second, specifically the spoke cases, the present, concluding part in-
tegrates both perspectives into one comprehensive picture. The context of this analysis
is the partner network of Case Company A, because the spoke cases have been selected
from this partner network. The following discussion is to a large extent based on the
single process matrix that is illustrated in Figure 4.3, and on the perception that multi-
ple passages through this process might be required, depending on the type of solution
(see Figure 4.4). Thus, first a discussion sheds more light on how the network partners
perceive their passage through this process matrix. Then, the following discussion il-
luminates how the transition from one process matrix to the next is perceived in the
network.
4.3.1 The Partnership Process from both Perspectives
As it has been discussed, both for the hub and the spoke organizations, the accessing of
new markets can be considered the driving force behind the decision to participate in an
inter-organizational IS development network. Thus, indeed reaching the very right-hand
side of Figure 4.3 is the targeted goal for both partners in the network. There is also
no divergence between the hubs and spokes, from where a spoke partner is supposed to
start its passage through this matrix. The discussion of the spoke cases above has given
clear evidence that all analyzed spokes in unison argued that standardized technologies
are important for developing a solution in the context of the hub’s system. Thus, the
first step in the partnership process is, just as this has been illustrated in Figure 4.3,
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the development of an innovative solution on the basis of open standards. The result of
this first step is a solution that is integrated with the hub’s system. At this stage, the
development can potentially be achieved without awareness of the hub20.
Once this stage is reached, the decision has to be made whether this solution is
supposed to be certified by Case Company A21. Here, open standards play a pivotal
role in that they would potentially enable a spoke to go to market without certifying
the developed solution. Going this way has not been done by any of the analyzed case
companies22. However, the interviewee in Case Company I has mentioned that many of
this company’s competitors are actually going this way. A potential reason for this has
also been mentioned during the interviews. Especially for Case Company J, the concern
has been raised that the certification process might lead to a substantial drainage of
knowledge towards Case Company A.
However, in all of the analyzed spoke cases, the certification process has been consid-
ered to be of prime importance for the successful management of the relationship. Again,
a potential rationale for this has been given in the interviews. One of the key benefits
for partnering with larger system vendors has been the signaling that the existence of
the smaller spoke is not threatened. This benefit is only achievable if the relationship is
official, and the large, well established hub company has signaled exactly this through
the certification. This aspect has again been mentioned by Case Company J as key
reason for conducting the certification.
So far, the ’ideal’ partnership process has been identical form both the hub’s and the
spokes’ perspective on their network activities. The reason for that can be found in the
fact that the process so far is neither very expensive for the hub, nor for the spokes.
That the hub sees the certification process as the lowest level of a partnership, and that
Case Company A therefore deliberately keeps the necessary expenses for partners in
this process low, has been discussed in Section 4.1.1.5. This perception is shared by the
spokes, which also do not consider the certification process as very costly or requiring a
lot of effort. Answering the question of how much effort they put into the certification
process, all interviewees answered comparable to the two exemplary quotes shown below.
The effort is manageable. It’s definitely below a level where we would have
said we need to push ourselves to reach this certification. It’s a reasonable
effort. This especially because the certification is a re-occurring event. For
20 This is somewhat different in Case Company B. Here especially through the status of an uncertified
network member, the hub is able to gain considerable insights in who is part of this company’s
network.
21 Again this is slightly different for Case Company B. Here, certifications of employees, not of solutions,
are only one aspect of reaching the middle layer. Also a successful customer project is needed as a
reference. This obviously makes this process more complex, yet the signaling effect that’s discussed
below even stronger.
22 Indeed, it has been one of the selection criteria for the spoke case companies that they are offi-
cially part of Case Company A’s partner network. This can only be achieved by going through the
certification process for at least one product.
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the first time, the effort has for sure been higher. Simply because you had to
become acquainted with how the process works. If that comes up periodically,
it’s more routine work. The effort is relatively low, it’s within a reasonable
scope. (Interviewee H1)
The effort for the certification has been relatively low. Case Company A
itself has helped us very much, because they had a strategic interest in our
solution. The certification itself has a certain price. However, whenever
there’s something starting new at Case Company A, there are lots of dis-
counts involved. If you’re clever in using these discounts, the certification
is manageable even for very small companies. That’s not a huge burden.
I can also understand very well that Case Company A is charging for the
certification process. Otherwise everyone would certify his solution just for
the fun of it. (Interviewee J2)
However, after this common denominator how the partnership process starts, it has
to be mentioned that indeed both partner categories are striving for very different layers
in the process matrix when it comes to market access. While Case Company A has
considerable incentives to force partners to stay on a middle layer trajectory, the spokes
attempt to reach the highest level. This is illustrated in Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11: The Perceived ’Ideal’ Trajectories from the Hub’s and Spokes Perspective.
Source: Own Illustration.
For this difference in perceived ideal trajectories, ample support exists in the collected
data. First, the following quotes from the spokes’ perspective illustrate the fact that
this partner group is striving for a very high intensity in joint market accessing:
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The next step of the partnership that would be interesting for us would be
to get our solution on the price list of Case Company A. Before that, there
is actually another step, a joint sales agreement. I would frame it like this,
we’re selling together and share the revenues. (...) The price list is for sure
an interesting topic, simply because we have the sales force of Case Company
A working with our solution, that would be thrilling for us. (Interviewee C1)
What I’m wishing for is more support in joint sales. In this regard, we could
achieve more than we’re currently doing. We have many international in-
quiries, which we cannot satisfy because we are not present in the different
locations. We’re simply too small to have subsidiaries in all different coun-
tries. So, a more intense cooperation in sales would be desirable. (Interviewee
E1)
Our desire is very clear. The ideal situation would be, if we would provide
the Cross Media Publishing solution of choice for Case Company A. In this
context we’re exclusively recommended by Case Company A, we’re on the
price list of Case Company A, or we’re even an integral part of Case Company
A’s system and they are paying license fees for our solution. That would be
ideal. (Interviewee J2)
Thus, while it can be argued that most of the spoke partners are attempting to reach
those higher levels of partnership, Case Company A is actively attempting to limit the
number of partners on those levels23. This has been very well described in Section
4.1.1.5. The rationale behind this difference in perception of hubs and spokes is very
evident if their roles in the network are considered. For the spokes, experience has
shown that close personal ties are key for managing their relationship with the hub
successfully. Thus, they are striving for a position in the network, which allows them to
gain access to these close personal ties. This is, as the discussion of the hub perspective
on the network has shown, especially the case for those solutions that reach this ’highest
level’ of partnership. However, this clearly contradicts the goals that have been raised
from Case Company A’s perspective, namely to make the partnership process scalable.
Basing the partnership on close personal ties essentially achieves exactly the opposite of
a scalable process, as these personal relationships are the most expensive management
mechanism that can be employed in this context. Interviewee A11 has realized this very
well.
23 Here Case Company A and B are indeed very similar. Both have severe restrictions concerning the
access to their highest partner category. Case Company B mentions that, similar to Case Company
A, these partners have to achieve first of all a certain score with regard to certified employees and
successful customer projects. But even then access is only ’by invitation’ (see Section 4.1.2.4)
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For certain tasks in technical enablement, we have a senior engineer working
with a partner to identify issues in integrating their solution with our plat-
form and that takes a lot of time and it takes valuable resources. And that’s
a very expensive way to do technical enablement. (Interviewee A11)
Thus, the underlying reasons for these diverging ideal trajectories can be considered
the one-to-many nature of the relationship. Most spokes are only partnering with one
or at most a couple of partners. Thus, for them it is easy to manage these relationships
through personal ties. However, as the hub organization has a relationship with all of
the spokes, potentially thousands of them, it is very cost prohibitive for this hub to
manage each relationship through close personal ties. This contradicting perception is
well supported in the interview data.
It is important to recognize that our partners do not have that many solu-
tions. In an extreme case this is a 1:n relationship. The partner has one
solution which he wants to sell, and he’s now talking to Case Company A,
which has n solutions. For them, the partner solution is simply one solution
among many, many more. So, the penetration of Case Company A’s sales
organization is not really an easy task. This is a potential source for conflicts,
if the partner calls us every four weeks and asks why we have not generated
any sales leads for him. For us, the ideal model is, if the partners bring their
own business. (Interviewee A6)
Thus, Case Company A has to have some selection criteria in place that determine
how far a partner can rise towards this rightmost third of the partnership process matrix.
It can be argued that the dominating decision criterion is indeed the importance of the
business functionality that the partner solution is containing24. Thus, through laying
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 on top of each other, the different partner paths can be explained.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.12.
In the collected data of the various spoke cases, indeed support for both of these
partnership models can be found. The first quote illustrates a case that is located more
in the top-most square. In this example close personal interaction between the hub and
the spoke is necessary, due to the critical business functionality that the spoke brings
into the relationship. The latter quote illustrates a case more in the lower area of the
matrix. Here, no close personal relationships are required, both hub and spoke act very
independent from each other.
There is always a central project owner who is located directly at the cus-
tomer. I’ll give you an example. We are currently working on a project
that Case Company A has with a Danish newspaper cooperation. That is
24 In the context of Case Company A this also means that these solutions are supplementary to the
platform. Whether this would be different for Case Company B could not be determined from the
here collected data.
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Figure 4.12: Partner Trajectories and the Business Knowledge in their Solutions.
Source: Own Illustration.
centrally coordinated by the Danish subsidiary of Case Company A. We are
participating in this project through several of our employees that are per-
manently working in Denmark, either as consultant or developers. But the
leadership is clearly assigned to Case Company A and its Danish subsidiary.
(Interviewee G1)
Currently we are having a case that is very interesting. We have installed
our solution for collecting data from vending machines at a customer. For
this customer, our solution has triggered the consideration to use the system
of Case Company A. We’re turning the tables here, that is very interesting.
(Interviewee C1)
Each quote represents the ’ideal’ case of a partnership, at least from the perspective
of Case Company A25. The Danish newspaper project can be assumed to rely heavily on
the domain knowledge that Case Company G is bringing into the project. Consequently,
the joint go-to market is very intense in this example. This type of project can only be
successfully addressed through such a joint approach. In contrast this joint approach
is not necessary in the second example. Rather, the partner’s solution that has been
25 As it has been discussed in Section 4.1.2.6, this is also perceived to be the ideal case for Case Company
B.
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integrated into the overall solutions portfolio triggered additional revenues for Case
Company A without necessary generating additional effort. However, the empirical data
that has been collected in the spoke cases indicates that Case Company A is still far away
from this ideal model in most of the cases. Indeed, it is not only true that most spoke
partners strive for reaching the highest partner categories, but also that even the middle
one is dominated by personal relationships as the most used management mechanism.
Thus, one of the key challenges for Case Company A is indeed to develop formalized
tools, methods, and procedures that allow it to manage the joint market accessing with
certified partners in a cost minimizing way. This has also been highlighted in various
interviews in Case Company A.
4.3.2 The Transition between Cycles
Besides the question of how the spokes traverse through the process from innovation over
integration to market access, another issue that emerged as being of prime importance
is the fact that this process is a cyclical one. Indeed, often spokes do not pass through
this process once and then reach a steady state. Rather, they are engaged in a constant
struggle for outspeeding the developments of both the hub and other, competing spokes.
Commonly this happens through developing their own solution further, so that ideally
a new innovation is emerging in the IS development network. Obviously this is very
well in the interest of the hub, as it has been discussed in the concluding paragraph
of the key benefits of Case Company A, in which the cyclical partnership process has
been developed (see Section 4.1.1.2). However, as this has been a perspective that has
been singularly coined by the perceptions of Case Company A, the present discussion is
again intended to highlight the comprehensive picture, which also includes the spokes’
perspective.
In this context it has been argued that indeed two potential paths exist for spoke
companies (see Figure 4.4). The first is that which has been proposed for technical or
niche functionalities. The main idea behind these solutions has been that Case Company
A deliberately has decided not to offer solutions in this context, they are considered as
non-core26. As a result, these smaller partners do not have to fear that their solution is
becoming integrated into the overall system of Case Company A. This does not neces-
sarily mean that partners do not have to innovate their solutions. However, their key
rationale of why innovation is necessary is more motivated from an industry compe-
tition perspective. Obviously, IS are subject to constant innovation, so the partner’s
competitors are also further developing their solution and a stagnancy in this develop-
ment naturally leads to a decline in the partner’s business, without any action of Case
Company A. The fact that this is an issue has already been well described by the in-
26 This is also the reason, why the environment of case companies that act in this role has been described
as being more stable above.
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creasing scope of Case Company A’s standardized interfaces that has been perceived
as threatening to some of the spoke companies. A historic example for this kind of
development has been mentioned by the interviewee in Case Company H.
A good example is the transition from mainframes to client-server architec-
tures. In this context we had to precisely define where we’re setting our focus.
It has been clear that our mainframe business has been declining strongly
and we had to substitute these revenues in the client-server environment.
We have offered a solution that has been an enhancement of our mainframe
solution. That has been a clear continuing of our strategy. Similar events
might happen in the future, there are always dynamics in this business. But
I’m confident that we’ll master any challenges. (Interviewee H1)
Thus, albeit enhancements to Case Company A’s system had an impact on the solution
of Case Company H, this impact has not been a deliberate attempt to integrate the
functionality of this solution into the system. Rather, the progression of the system has
rendered parts of the solution obsolete. However, as Case Company H has been flexible
enough to adjust its business model, they have been able to successfully continue the
relationship. The reason why Case Company A has decided against addressing this
specific niche solution has been also given by Interviewee H1. Interestingly, this quote
sounds like a brief summary of the developed theoretical propositions, why partnering
between large system vendors and small software developers promises to be especially
fruitful. While the fact that this decision is not necessarily a stable one has also be
recognized, this is a risk that the partners of Case Company A have to live with.
Case Company A is for sure considering that we are relatively far in this
specific aspect. They would have to catch up with our years of experience,
they have to build this from scratch so that this is not worth the effort.
This probably also, because they have much more distributed development
teams. We, as a small company do have the advantage that we can react
very flexible to requirements. This is simply not possible to this extent in
a large company like Case Company A. For us, different development paths
that are addressed by different teams are much easier to coordinate than for
a large company. So this is difficult to tell. (Interviewee H1)
Especially in our business, Case Company A has initiated developments in
the past that have led some of our customers to question whether there’s
still need for our add-ons. We have been hard pressed to explain what the
added value of our solution exactly is. For sure it is a very substantial risk
that Case Company A is offering a comprehensive solution that would make
ours obsolete. We would instantly feel that in our business. That’s one of
the risks involved for us. (Interviewee H1)
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So, this type of complementary relationship between Case Company A and providers
of infrastructure solutions ceases to exist only if the partner is not able to live up to the
average rate of innovativeness in the industry. However, there are also those relationships
in which the existing functionalities of a partner are considered to be standardizable
business applications by Case Company A. For these, a different development has been
proposed, that of a transition from one partnership process to another. This because
Case Company A reserves the right to develop own solutions or even buy the partner
company in order to integrate the solution into their existing system. There has also been
an exemplary case for this scenario among the eight spoke companies. Case Company
J is currently facing a situation in which their larger partner has acquired a company
that is offering a solution which has a very similar functionality to what Case Company
J is offering. As this has happened only very recently, the situation is not yet clearly
understood by all the stakeholders. As Interviewee J2 comments:
An important factor in our current partnership is the fact that Case Company
A has acquired a company that is offering a solution that is addressing our
niche. So through this acquisition Case Company A has an - albeit inferior
- solution and they cannot just throw that away. So we’re now facing an
unattractive situation which is not yet completely understood by the market.
In some aspects we’re now competitor, in others we’re still cooperating. That
is making the forging of a strategic alliance in which markets are jointly
addressed very, very difficult. Actually that is a real show-stopper, we’re
currently on hold, we’re waiting... (Interviewee J2)
This situation of existing overlap is in itself not considered to be extremely harmful
for the relationship between the two companies. Rather, it is recognized that a certain
overlap between the solutions of the involved parties is unavoidable, and that this overlap
is not even considered to be critical - as long as the overlap does not concern aspects of
Case Company A’s system that are considered critical by this organization.
There’s always a certain degree of overlap. With such a large partner, who
has such a diverse solution portfolio it is impossible to avoid overlaps al-
together. What counts, however, is to limit these overlaps to certain, well
restricted areas. A complete overlap has to be avoided. (Interviewee J2)
In the end, there are always opportunities for cooperation. If there is a certain
overlap, this functionality can be excluded from the partnership. You can
always find a solution if you’re aware of the problem before it escalates. One
limitation to this are areas that Case Company A considers to be part of
the strategic core of their system. If there is any overlap, you’re excluded
from the partner network at lightning speed. They can’t take a joke there.
(Interviewee J2)
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However, as Case Company A has acquired a company that is offering a solution that
is very similar to that of Case Company J, it might very well be the case that Case
Company A now perceives this newly acquired solution as belonging to the strategic
core of its system. Yet, as this decision does not seem to be made, Case Company
J is obviously not completely inactive. Rather, its executives are working heavily at
influencing Case Company A into not developing their newly acquired solution any
further. Again, the mechanism of choice for this endeavor are the personal ties that
exist between the two companies.
How this thing develops is currently completely open. It depends on the
decision of Case Company A, whether they want to expand this solution
into a full-fledged product; or whether they discontinue the development
over the medium term and push our solution. An important aspect of this is
the fact that this decision involves many different people in Case Company
A and that these people do have different opinions on the issue. (Interviewee
J2)
It is also clear for Case Company J that the partnership can indeed be terminated
if this decision is not made in their favor. If Case Company J is unable to find a new
innovation that can again be integrated with the system of Case Company A - and
at least in the interviews none has been mentioned - the decision would indeed be to
terminate the partnership with this hub organization, and perhaps find another partner
that does not have the specific functionalities that Case Company J’s solution is offering
in his portfolio.
We would favor Case Company A, simply because we know them very well.
Our principal shareholder has worked for them many, many years. It would
be a real personal problem for him, if the partnership would be terminated.
It is very clear for us, that a partnership with a business application vendor
is very important. We would favor Case Company A. But if they tell us that
they have their own product and that we’re competitors from now on, we
have to go to another partner. With a heavy heart, but that’s how it is.
(Interviewee J2)
Of course we have contacts to other vendors as well. We know the people
who are responsible for strategic partnerships in these companies. As I have
mentioned, our relationship to Case Company A is currently slowing down,
so we have to consider alternatives. Case Company A is our favorite partner,
and we are investing heavily into this relationship. But in case that we don’t
see progress in the relationship, we have to cooperate with others. There
are a couple of companies that are very, very interested in working with us,
because they do have a gap in that functionality. (Interviewee J2)
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Thus, summing up the discussion on the dynamics within this inter-organizational
network, it can be argued that IS development is a fickle business. While some part-
nerships are designed to last for a long time, most of the attractive partnerships are
subject to complete makeovers due to the inherent dynamics in the industry. Thus,
analyzing these dynamic relationships can indeed be considered as a key challenge of IS
research. In this regard, the present study can only be seen as a first step in an ongoing
process. The next and final chapter summarizes the study’s main findings, discusses
its implication both on theory and practice, and illuminates potential paths for further
research.
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
5.1 Summary
The IS development industry is currently undergoing a fundamental change towards a
more inter-organizationally structured development approach. While this industrialized
approach has been adopted by many other engineering disciplines, it has so far not
been successful in the field of IS development. Recently this seems to change with the
wide adoption of SOA principles. However, while this change is currently happening in
the industry, IS research has so far not addressed its underlying rationales. This work
has been conducted in order to fill this gap. In this context very fundamental research
objectives have been stated at the outset of this study. The first has been the answering
of the question why organizations in this industry are adopting this - albeit only for their
industry - novel approach. Parallel to this first research objective, the second research
objective has been the addressing of the closely connected question of how this newly
emerging industry structure can be managed by the organizations that are part of it.
Finally the third research objective has been the integration of the two preceding ones
into one comprehensive model of fruitful partner relationships and their management.
There is a key rationale why this structure has been developing only during the last
couple of years in the IS development industry. There are specific idiosyncrasies of this
industry that have impaired the emergence of this structure in this industry so far. It
has been argued in the fundamental part of this work that the fact that IS have to
be considered as information and intellectual goods has so far breeded an integrated
approach that has dominated the industry throughout the last decades of the twentieth
century. In contrast to this integrated approach, many other industries have adopted an
inter-organizational network structure. This approach has also been further analyzed in
the foundational part of this work. The preliminary result of this analysis has been the
clear understanding, that the structure within the IS industry is not undergoing a revo-
lutionary change. Rather, today’s dominating firms are going to develop into hubs of a
network of hundreds or even thousands of smaller partners (spokes). Consequently, these
two broad categories of companies are also selected as the two main subjects of the em-
pirical data analysis. This decision is rooted in the choice of change perspective. It has
been argued that indeed the overarching goal of this work is the explanation of changes
in industry structure - which could be achieved through a dialectical perspective of con-
flicting development paradigms. However, as it has also been noted, these development
paradigms have to be filled by individual organizations. Thus, the more appropriate
perspective for this work is the teleological one, attempting to answer questions as those
stated above for individual companies.
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Thus, as a next step the answering of the first two research objectives is prepared
through a comprehensive discussion of the relevant theories. For answering the question,
why organizations are adopting this approach, a strategic perspective has been chosen.
As the context of this study is limited to the IS development industry, the guiding
theory necessarily had to address differences between the organizations in this industry
for explaining their behavior. The resource based view and its enhancements have been
selected as they are the dominating theory in this context. The idea behind the inter-
organizational application of this theory is that those companies that possess resources
that others do not posses are attractive for partnering. Thus, this first theoretical part
has focused on finding what resources or capabilities a company can potentially possess
that make it an attractive partner. Three of these have been identified: the capability
to innovative, the availability of complementary or supplementary technologies, or the
capability to access novel markets. As this study is approaching the network from a hub
and a spoke perspective, all three have been adapted to the specific context. So, the hubs’
innovativeness if focused on architectural innovations, while the spokes are supposed to
focus on modular innovations. The hubs’ technology is that of an existing platform of
basic functionalities, while the spokes focus on niche functionalities. The hubs’ market
access is granted through their reputation and their already existing customer base,
while the spokes are assumed to be more flexible and agile in responding to customer
needs. These ideas have been phrased as a first set of propositions to guide the empirical
study.
The second research objective has been approached through a discussion of man-
agement mechanisms that can be applied by the organizations in the IS development
industry. The theoretical foundation of this discussion has been the recognition that
two problems emerge in the inter-organizational context much stronger than in an intra-
organizational one. First, behavioral issues have to be addressed. The combination
of bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior results in difficulties to control the
partners. Three theories have been discussed, and each of them has yielded a (domi-
nant) perspective. First, assets should be standardized. Second, transparency in the
relationship should be increased. Third, the relationship should be designed to be of
long-lasting nature, which is commonly achieved through close personal ties. All three
aspects minimize the possibility of and the incentives for opportunistic behavior. The
second perspective has been that of coordination of complex interactions. This can be
achieved through three distinct means: The reliance on standardized processes or tech-
nologies, the controlling or monitoring of interacting parties, and finally, close personal
interactions between the parties. Obviously, the two distinct paths have led to very
closely related mechanisms. These promise to be those that are applied by companies
interacting in inter-organizational cooperations. So, it has been argued that both hubs
and spokes use them in their relationship management. Again, these have been phrased
as a second set of propositions.
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These two sets of propositions are used to guide the empirical part of this study.
As research is scant in this area, the propositions have explicitly not been phrased
as clear-cut, sharp hypotheses. This indicates that this study is more exploratory in
nature, meaning that it is considered to be only a first step in shedding more light
on the issues discussed above. Consequently, from a discussion of different research
strategies in the third chapter, the methodology of exploratory case studies is selected.
Some of the specificities of this research methodology are also discussed in this chapter.
Here especially the already mentioned exploratory nature is important, as is the closely
related qualitative background of this study. Also, as no long-term analysis has been
feasible, the study has been designed as a variance theoretical approach. Furthermore,
the replication logic of this study has been discussed. As literature on this research
approach commonly suggests both literal and theoretical replication, the cases selected
have been two hub organizations (literal replication) and eight spoke cases (theoretical
replication). Finally, the applied processes of data collection and analysis have been
introduced.
In the fourth chapter, these ten cases have been analyzed in a three-staged process.
As a first step the individual cases have been analyzed with disregard to the other cases.
Then, the two categories of cases - hubs and spokes - have been analyzed with disregard
to the other group of cases. Only in a final step, both categories have been integrated
into a holistic analysis of the entire IS development network. The rationale why the hub
cases have been analyzed first, is that it has been argued that they have been and still
are playing a dominate role in the industry.
5.2 Discussion of the Findings
As a very fundamental first step the fact has to be recognized that indeed hubs and spokes
partner with each other because of capabilities or resources that the other possesses but
oneself is lacking. To which extent these are the ones that have been developed in the
theoretical part of this study is subsequently discussed, first from the hubs’ and then
from the spokes’ perspective.
5.2.1 From the Hubs’ Perspective
Concerning the first research question, indeed all three aspects are considered to be of
prime relevance by both case companies. The fact that usually smaller spoke partners are
more flexible and agile in reacting to novel environments has been mentioned by various
interviewees. As it has been theoretically proposed, this innovativeness is twofold. First,
specific innovative solutions can be developed faster by the spokes. The main reason the
hubs see for this has been found in the lean organization of these companies. Second, the
spokes are also able to bring innovations faster to the customer. Here especially the close
proximity between spokes and customers has been mentioned as a key advantage that the
spokes possess. Also, the proposition that spoke partners provide complementary niche
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functionalities has been very well supported. Especially those functionalities that are
beyond the scope of the hubs’ core activities or those that are addressing a very narrow
market are in the primary focus of the hubs. However, the proposition that hubs also
partner with those organizations that develop functionalities that supplement those of
the hubs has only partially been supported. If customers explicitly ask for those partners’
solutions the hubs do partner with them, but reluctantly. Especially the timeframe of
these partnerships promises to be rather limited. This asking of customers for a specific
solution has already hinted upon the last aspect that has been theoretically proposed as
key benefit: The access to novel markets. Indeed, very good support has been found for
this proposition. It can be argued that the hubs see this as the dominating reason why
they partner. As spokes are very close to their specific customers, hubs are able to gain
access to these markets through partnering with them. Thus, all the propositions why
hubs partner with spokes have been supported.
However, what has also been shown in this data analysis is the fact that the three pro-
posed benefits are not independent of each other. Rather, complex temporal dynamics
exists between them. Thus, the initially devised variance theoretical approach had to be
abandoned, and a process perspective had to be used to explain these dynamics. The
process of partner relations that has been identified starts with an innovative solution
of a partner. Then, the technical functionality that is the result of this innovation is
technically integrated into the portfolio of the hub. As a final step, a package consisting
of the partner’s solution and the hub’s platform is brought to market, either by the hub,
by the spoke, by a third party, or by any combination of the three. This process has been
described in close to identical terms for both hub case companies. It is thus reasonable
to assume that indeed such a process is of general relevance for all hub companies in
this industry. However, what has also been mentioned for both cases is that fact that
once this process has been traversed, the relationship between the involved parties is
not a stable one. Rather, the dynamics in the industry render such a stable balance
impossible. Always looking for ways to augment the functionalities of their platform,
hubs have a veritable interest in completely integrating the partners’ solutions - either
through acquisition or through imitation.
The partnership process is thus a cyclical one. Once the partners’ solution has been
identified as target for absorption by one of the hubs, it is the most common way
for these partners to develop a novel innovation, which makes the process start anew.
This cyclical nature of the partnership process also clearly supports the idea of IS as
intellectual goods. As it has been argued, the functionalities of these goods are not
limited by their physical aspects. Rather, IS are constantly applied to novel contexts by
their users and their developers. Therefore, they are subject to continuous innovation.
This fact gives spoke companies, which interact much closer with their customers than
large hub organization, the opportunity to constantly outspeed their partner. They are
thus not only ensuring their own survival in the networked IS development industry, but
also realizing the endless innovation proposed by (Lee, 1999).
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In this context, also the above mentioned partial support for the proposition on supple-
mentary technologies is playing an important role. For both case companies only those
supplementary solutions have been considered as running an increased risk of being ab-
sorbed into the platform. Thus, absorption is only considered to be a feasible option for
those partners that act on the same layer of the horizontally organized industry stack
as the hub. Contrary to this, for adjacent levels of this stack, hubs are attempting to
support a multitude of partner solutions in long-lasting relationships. These hubs are
therefore following a twofold strategy to, first, increase the role of their solution as a
bottleneck in the stack, and second, to decrease the role of the solutions of partners on
different layers of the stack. This has been shown very well in the present study, as both
case companies consider adjacent levels as their core business. Thus, both hubs are,
in certain areas, engaged in intense partnering with each other, yet they are also fierce
competitors in other areas.
Analyzing the second research objective from the hubs perspective yields similar re-
sults. Both case companies rely on standardizing both technologies and information
for their partners. Indeed, as it has been theoretically proposed, this is the fact be-
cause standardization is a very scalable process. Once the standard has been defined,
additional partners can be managed at almost no costs. However, in which both hubs
differ is how access to these standardized technologies and information is governed. The
access seems to be simpler for partners of Case Company B, here only a signing up at
the partner portal is required in order to get the most basic access. In contrast, Case
Company A only officially recognizes a partner once he has certified his solution. Before
that partners are not even considers as that. This leads over to the second proposed
management mechanism, monitoring. Also, monitoring the partners is applied by both
hub organizations. However, again slight differences exist in how this is achieved. As it
has been mentioned above, officially becoming partner of Case Company A is achieved
through certifying the inter-operability of a spokes solution with the hubs platform. Cer-
tification of spoke employees is possible, yet it is not perceived to play such a dominant
role. In contrast, officially becoming partner of Case Company B is achieved through
certifying a certain number of employees and producing a customer show-case. Thus,
while the initial access to the partner network seems to be less restricted in Case Com-
pany B, the official recognition as a partner seems to be more restricted. This is well
in line with the theoretically discussed aspect of certification as a substitute for a direct
quality assessment. For the last proposed management mechanism, dedicated personal
relationships, both hubs are close to identical to each other. Only a highly restricted
number of partners is managed mainly through this mechanism. This well reflects the
theoretical considerations that this mechanism is perceived to be the most expensive
one. Thus, the findings of this analysis are highly similar for the two hubs. They can
therefore also be assumed to have high validity for other hub organizations as well.
However, similar to the partnership process described above, also these three mecha-
nisms are not independent of each other. Rather, an incremental approach to managing
the relationship is taken by the hubs. The first step in this incremental approach is
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considered to be the development of a specific solution by the spokes. This first step
is not intensely supported by the hubs. In both cases, the above mentioned standard-
ized technologies information flows have been the only touch point between the hubs
and this (early) spokes. This changes, once the solution is actually perceived as being
connected to the hub by the customers. Then, both hubs engage in close monitoring of
both the spokes’ employees and their solutions through the above described certification
processes. Such an affiliated addressing of markets is only considered by hubs, if they
are convinced of the quality of their partner. Then, in a final step, some very carefully
selected partners are promoted to the top-most level of partnerships. These partners
are actively assisted by the hub through a dedicated personal support. Also, these
top-most partner category is in part recommended to customers by the hubs, or even
sold as integral part of the hub’s platform. This incremental approach is well explained
through the fact that the hubs are engage in a one-to-many relationship with spokes.
Standardized technologies and information flows are highly scalable. The marginal costs
of adding one partner are close to zero. This changes with the monitoring of partners.
The marginal costs of this process can be considered as being of multitudes higher than
that of standardization. Finally, the dedicated support through personal contacts can be
assumed to be the most expensive type of relationship management mechanism. Thus,
this mechanism is limited only to the most important or promising partners.
Combining the findings of the two above described threads of this study can be used
to answer the third research objective. The questions in this context have been whether
differences in partner categories exist, whether these are managed through different
mechanisms, and whether there is a fit between the two. Actually all three questions
can be answered positively. Indeed, different partner categories exist. This albeit the
fact that they are, contrary to what has been initially assumed, not based on the three
benefit categories. Rather, the dominating benefit in the partnership process has been
the addressing of novel markets and therewith the generation of additional revenues.
Thus, partner categories exist, depending on the potential that the partner has for this
revenue generation. These different partner categories are indeed managed through
different mechanisms as it has been described above. Finally, there is a fit between
the two in that partners are receiving a more intense treatment if they have a higher
potential.
5.2.2 From the Spokes’ Perspective
Parallel to the analysis of hub companies, also spokes have been analyzed. In the context
of benefits derived from the relationship to the hub, the propositions are not as clearly
supported. Architectural innovativeness of the hubs is considered to either be of no
importance at all, or even to be a disadvantage of the relationship. This clearly rejects
the proposed positive benefits of this aspect. A reason for this can be found in the fact
that smaller spokes feel that their position in the network might be threatened through
architectural innovations. The availability of a broadly established technical platform
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has been the second proposed benefit for spokes in their relationship to the hub. This
benefit, however, is also not clearly supported, as it is only recognized by some of the
spoke partners. The others do not feel that accessing the existing technology of the hub is
a key benefit for their relationship. In contrast to the first two propositions, the final one
is clearly supported. The market access that the hubs offer is of dominating importance
for all of the spokes. As it has been theoretically proposed this aspect consists of two
parts: First, the fact that most customers of the spokes are also customers of the hubs, so
that seamlessly integrating their solutions is often a prerequisite for spokes. Second, the
long history and stability of the hubs is also increasing the reputation of the partnering
spokes. Thus, except for the accessing of technology, spokes seem to be guided by very
similar benefits.
Considering the analysis of the three management mechanisms, also no clear support
could be found for the propositions. Here, one group feels that standardization is, albeit
important, also a danger to their business model. The other group sees standardization
in a more positive light. Also, some of the spokes see monitoring the hub as key neces-
sity for a successful relationship, while others do not feel this way. Some of the spokes
believe that personal relationships are the optimal management mechanism, others dis-
agree. Interestingly, these distinctions on all aspects run constantly between two neatly
separable groups of spokes.
Analyzing the underlying reasons for this dissent between the two groups, the im-
portance of the business functionality that is included in a spoke’s solution has been
determined as playing a key role. The two groups differ largely between whether the
spokes are supplying largely solutions for technical integration or whether they are sup-
plying solutions which include much business knowledge. For the first group, accessing
technology is considered as being of prime importance. However, at the same time the
enhancements of standardized interfaces are threatening their solution, as the technical
integration that they so far provided might be included in the new standard. Interest-
ingly, these spokes are also those that are not primarily interested in monitoring the
hubs. A possible argument for why this is the case has been found in the fact that
the stability in their context is much higher than for the other group. Finally, personal
relationships are considered a good enough management mechanism in this context, as
the increased stability in their environment is more predictable than in the context of
the other group. This renders the subjectivities in personal relationships less grave.
However, when considering the entire picture of an inter-organizationally structured
IS development industry, a more sophisticated picture emerges. The first group is indeed
considered to be less important by the hubs, and thus also has to live with less dedicated
support. However, at the same time, the solutions developed by this group are also not
in the focus of the hub organization. Thus, they are assumed to indeed enjoy a longer
lasting relationship. In contrast, the partners that supply domain knowledge are also
those that might be acquired by the hub - at least the successful ones. This is indeed a
tightrope walk that can be considered very specific to the IS industry. Those partners
that provide important domain knowledge are those that are best supported by the
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hub. However, if they become too successful, they are also those that are acquired first.
This is indeed a cycle that is even today making the realization of an industrialized
IS development approach difficult. This industrialization can only be realized through
foresighted management of fruitful partner relations by both hubs and spokes.
5.3 Contribution to Theory Development
The present study has yielded significant insights not only into why currently the struc-
ture of the IS development industry is changing, but also into how the newly emerging
structure should be managed. However, from a scientific viewpoint it also contributed to
the development of the applied theories and concepts. In order to obtain these insight,
various theories have been applied to the context of IS development. Indeed, such an
application of theories to various specific contexts is the only possible path towards a
better understanding of the underlying theories themselves. This in turn allows for the
identification of possible shortcomings within the theoretical frameworks and through
this, the progress of a scientific field (Kuhn, 1970). Thus, the following discussion focuses
on the contributions to this type of theory development of the present study.
The first research objective, why organizations developing enterprise IS are adopting a
cooperative, networked growth strategy, has been motivated through the resource-based
view and its derived theories. Indeed, as it has been discussed, today this scientific
school is playing an important role not only in IS research, but further in the field of
organizational science, which was used as a reference discipline (Keen, 1980). Especially
in the context of exploratory studies, this concept has proven to be sufficiently narrow
to allow for the explanation of strategic decisions based on a well structured taxonomy
of resources that an organization possesses. At the same time the concept is sufficiently
broad to allow for the inclusion of a vast range of these resources. This study has also
clearly benefited from this flexibility of the concept.
Besides the pure resource-based view as underlying theory, other derived concepts
have also been supplied in the context of the present study. First, the idea of dynamic
capabilities has been used. This concept has been criticized for being a endlessly re-
cursive, multi-order concept (Collis, 1994). That is, one can always find a capability
that alters other capabilities. It has been argued in the context of this study that, as
the ability to develop complex IS has to be considered a dynamic capability in itself,
the ability to manage such a IS development network should be, if the critics are right,
such a second order capability. However, as the present study has clearly indicated, the
capability to manage such a network are not too different from the management of other
complex, boundary-spanning arrangements. Thus, the finding of this study support
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 1116) in their perception that “dynamic capabilities
are not tautological, vague, and endlessly recursive (...). Rather, they consist of many
well-known processes such as alliancing, product development, and strategic decision
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making that have been studied extensively in their own right, apart from RBV. Their
value of competitive advantage lies in their ability to alter the resource base: create,
integrate, recombine, and release resources.”
Furthermore, the concept of intra-organizational resources of capabilities has be ex-
tended to the inter-organizational context. Here, especially the idea of supplementary
and complementary resources and capabilities as it has been raised by Das and Teng
(2000) has played an important role. Indeed, very good support has been found for
the distinction between these two different types of resource alignments. However, also
a temporal notion has been added to the concept. The hub companies were found to
also partner with those small companies that were offering functionalities that the case
companies considered to be within the scope of their systems. However, this only for
functionalities for which no actual solution of the large companies existed. This situa-
tion could be termed as latent supplementarity or temporary complementarity. In such a
situation, the partner is providing a solution that the hub case companies would actually
like to provide themselves. However, they have so far been unable to do so - for whatever
reasons. Those partners had similarly fruitful relationships with the case company as
those that provided infinitely complementary functionalities. The situation was found
to be entirely different if the small spoke partners provided supplementary functionali-
ties. These were indeed allowed to partner if customers actually demanded their specific
niche functionalities. However, these relationships were not found to be very stable ones.
Indeed, the case company actively attempted to integrate these functionalities into its
own system.
Approaching the second research objective, how organizations manage the relation-
ships to other network participants, has been conducted form two distinct starting points.
First, three theories of the firm have been used to explain how behavioral issues can be
countered in such a setting. These have been transaction cost theory, principal agent
theory, and the theory of incomplete contracts. The first has been widely used in the IS
community. Here, especially one point emerged. Commonly, in IS transaction costs are
reduced to those emerging from human assets specificity. In this study, no support has
been found for this limitation. Indeed, large IS vendors explicitly partner with smaller
organization in order to gain access to their closeness to potential customers. The princi-
pal agent theory has also been widely used in IS research. In this context one prominent
aspect emerged throughout the present study. Namely, that the conjoint development
of complex enterprise IS cannot be considered a typical principal agent relationship, in
which one party (the principal) delegates work to another party (the agent). Rather,
both parties are dependent upon each other, the hub requires the spokes for complement-
ing its solutions portfolio and the spokes require the hub for providing essential basic
functionalities within the platform1. Finally, in IS research, the theory of incomplete
1 This is more a situation of mutual dependence as it has been described in the excursus on the resource
dependency theory.
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contracts has so far been applied largely to outsourcing or offshoring arrangements. The
present study has yielded interesting insights on the basis of this theory, which gives
good support for further pushing this somewhat neglected theory.
Parallel to the application of these theories of the firm, also the concept of interde-
pendencies and their coordination has been used in this study. A first remark to these
two broad concepts used to approach the second research objective is the fact that they
yielded similar hypotheses. This integration of these two different bodies of literature
has, to the best knowledge of the author, not been conducted before. It can be considered
a valuable contribution to the better understanding of complex interactions specifically
within the IS development industry, but also in other inter-organizational settings in gen-
eral. Thus, the perception of Gulati and Singh (1998) that, in these inter-organizational
networks, two distinct types of issues emerge from behavioral and complexity reasons
could not be clearly supported. Besides that, the classification of interdependencies of
Thompson (1967) has proven to be a valuable instrument for the studying of IS develop-
ment. Especially the perception that these classes of interdependencies build upon each
other has been well supported by the studying of IS development networks. Also the
therefrom resulting coexistence of multiple coordination mechanisms has been found in
the present study.
Besides these main theories, various others have been highlighted during several delib-
erately positioned digressions throughout the text. These have not been further followed,
thus no clear deductions could be made on their appropriateness. However, the reader
of this study is advised to pick up these ideas and follow them as deemed fruitful. Some
possible new directions of future studies are subsequently introduced in more detail.
5.4 Delimitations of this Work and Implications for Further
Studies
The above conducted brief summary of this work, its findings and theoretical contri-
butions, has already shown that the approach has yielded significant results. However,
before considering the implications of these findings, first its delimitations should be
discussed. The goal of this discussion of the delimitation of this work is not a general
criticism of either the applied theories or the applied methodology. These have already
been discussed throughout the theoretical part of this study (e.g. Chapters 2 and 3).
Rather it is the goal of this discussion to point out issues that had a very fundamen-
tal influence on the entire research effort. As main aspect here again the four already
discussed motors for change come into play (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). As it has
been argued in Section 2.1.3, also the two motors that have not been discussed in more
detail could have been fruitfully applied in this context. Discussing them first of all
makes the delimitations of this work even clearer. And, as addressing these delimita-
tions can be considered the consequential step in the research process, it also translated
into directives for future work.
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The first change motor that could be successfully applied would be the life cycle one.
Considering such an entire life cycle of a partner, it becomes obvious that inherent dy-
namic could be addressed much better through a process perspective than through the
here selected variance theoretical approach. This has been one of the key delimitat-
ing aspects of this study. As it has become obvious, the partnering between different
companies in the IS development industry ideally should not be seen through this lens.
Indeed, both the benefit categories and the management mechanisms that have been
considered as core to this work have yielded process views on the discussed issues. Thus,
it would be beneficial to actually consider the process of a partnership development as
a unit of analysis of future work. This would require a future researcher to conduct a
well founded selection of partners and to follow these partners over time (Van de Ven,
1992). The current study has been able to distill this process view from the snapshot
interviews that have been conducted. While this extrapolation of a process from a single
point in time can be done in research, it is less than ideal (Zaheer et al., 1999). Thus,
its explanatory power is limited as “process theorization needs to go beyond surface de-
scription to penetrate the logic behind observed temporal progressions - whether simple
or complex.” (Langley, 1999, p. 694).
In this context, it has to be stated that such a process theory development poses
considerable more obstacles than a variance theoretical approach (Mohr, 1982), and
thus also requires substantially different methods (Langley, 1999). In this context, Van
de Ven (1992, p. 181) argue convincingly that, “if the purpose of a study is to understand
how to manage the formulation or implementation of an organizational strategy, it will be
necessary for researchers to place themselves into the manager’s temporal and contextual
frames of reference”. This is also in line with direct research, as it has been proposed
by Mintzberg (1979a, p. 586): “Measuring in real organizational terms means first
of all getting out into the field, into real organizations. Questionnaires often won’t
do. Nor will laboratory simulations, at least not in policy research.” As the present
study has laid the foundational groundwork for such a future approach, the amount of
collected data promises to be manageable in this context. This especially as it might
now be possible to carefully focus on the simplest form of an organizational network,
“the pairwise relationship between two organizations” (Van de Ven et al., 1979, p. 20,
emphasis theirs). Through this, it would also be possible to limit the research with regard
to the number of involved individuals. In the present study, individuals responsible for
the entire partnership program for each case company have been interviewed. In contrast
to this approach, a narrower focus might reduce the number of individuals that could
be interviewed or otherwise consulted. This would also reduce the vast amount of data
that is given, a common problem in such research (Mintzberg, 1979a).
Obviously, this is only one potential direction in which this research could be further
developed. Indeed, while this direction is including a reduction in the number of studied
organizations, there is also the option to increase that number. At some instance it has
already been mentioned that the networked IS development industry has been described
as an ecosystem. Thus, using the evolutionary change motor, the findings of this study
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could be further validated in, for example, a more comprehensive survey. Obviously, this
would include the digging into more details of each single aspect of the broad umbrella
that has been spanned in this study. An operationalisation of the different aspects of
the proposed model, and the testing of the here preliminarily unfolded coherences might
yield interesting results2. Relating a somehow measured innovativeness, e.g. through the
number of patents pending, the R&D budget, or other things, to successful partnering
with hub companies might yield whether indeed more innovative companies are more
successful. Similar approaches might be taken in the field of managing the network.
One could for example measure whether indeed those partners that are bringing the
most revenues are also those that are enjoying the closes dedicated support. As the
emphasis on the exploratory nature of this study has suggested, there are a multitude of
open opportunities in this area. Every single research effort in this context contributes
to a better understanding of the complex interactions in the inter-organizational IS
development network.
These ideas are all rooted in the broad paradigms of organizational research. However,
there are also other lessons that can be learned from this research effort. These lessons
are mainly of relevance for practitioners that have to manage the network relationships
of their organizations. However, these ideas might also be of value for researchers in
neighboring disciplines of IS research.
5.5 Implications for Practice
Besides opening the door for new scientific endeavors in the field of organizational re-
search, such as those sketched above, this study has also several implications for practi-
tioners, both from hub and spoke organizations. Foremost, the newly evolving industry
structures have to be actively considered for strategic decisions of managers in both
hub and spoke companies. Whenever determining the direction in which a company is
supposed to evolve, partners have to be considered. This has been aptly summarized
by Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995, both p. 157) under the heading of Simultane-
ous Structuring and Strategizing : “Strategy conception and implementation of ideas is
shared between central firms and their webs of partners.” In this context, especially the
“structuring of the relationship between the partners goes hand in hand and is seen as
key part of the strategy.” Two aspects have to be emphasized in this context.
First, partner structures have to be considered simultaneously as open networks and
tight binding to the hub. Simply because breakthrough developments of small, innova-
tive partners can be definition not be foreseen by large hub organizations, a multitude
of these partners has to be integrated into the hubs’ partner networks in order to ensure
2 This approach would follow the typical sequence of exploratory, such as this one, and confirmatory
studies, as it has for example been put forth by Kerlinger and Lee (2000, p. 586): “Exploratory studies
have three purposes: to discover significant variables (...), to discover relations among variables, and
to lay the groundwork for later, more systematic and rigorous testing of hypotheses.”
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that the few critical partners are among them. This viewpoint is also emphasized by
the perception of Dyer and Singh (1998) that partner scarcity is a key to sustaining
competitive advantages that originate in network relationships. These critical partners
have to be bound to the network early on in order to tap into their potential. In order
to achieve this goal, network structures have to be easily accessible for even the smallest
and presumably most unimportant partner. This is the openness aspect of the network
relationships. At the same time, these partners have to be tightly bound to the hub
on a long-term basis. If small partners are alternating their loyalty on a regular basis,
they are of no substantial value for the network. Only if the spokes consider themselves
an integral part of the hubs’ partner networks, their binding to this network will be of
substantial durability, and thus of mutual benefit. This fact leads over to the second,
probably more concrete lesson learned from this work.
Active partner management is mandatory in this context. As it has become clear
through the discussions on the spoke partners in this work, the dominating manage-
ment mechanism clearly are close personal ties between involved individuals. As it has
also been discussed, this is at the same time the most expensive one of the discussed
mechanisms. Two possible consequences can be derived from this fact. Either, it can
be attempted to reduce these personal interactions in the relationships. All participants
in the IS development network are well advised to enforce the use of standardized tech-
nologies, but also standardized communication channels and the like. They are also well
advised to enforce transparency in the network through better monitoring their partners,
but also through allowing their partners to better monitor themselves. However, at the
same time it can be expected that this will not be enough. So, the second advice is to
better structure the necessary personal relationships. In the context of software devel-
opment this structuring of individual cooperation has recently been addressed as part
of the reliance on collaborative software development platforms. These platforms have
emerged from the open source community, in which specialist software engineers coop-
erate in a highly distributed fashion across geographical and organizational boundaries
(Robbins, 2005). Further developing these platforms would first enable the involved in-
dividuals as well as their organizations to smoothly coordinate their cooperations. From
a scientific perspective these platforms also promise to be an interesting study object.
First, their enhancements themselves can and should be considered as scientific work in
the sense of design science as it has been proposed for example by Hevner et al. (2004).
Also, building on the recent analysis of these platforms with special regard to the social
networks that form around them promises to improve the understanding of their dy-
namics (Lopez-Fernandez et al., 2006), and thus also to contribute to the here described
goal of smoother functioning network relationships.
Besides these implications for hub organizations, there are obviously also those for
spokes. They are less involved in the management of the entire network and focus
more on the single relationship. Thus, the advice given to them is also addressing these
concrete relationships. The most important aspect of this is the overlap of the spokes’
solution with those of the hub. Small partners are well advised to focus on those tasks in
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the network that they are better able to address then their large partner. This is mostly
the development of innovative solutions. Small partners are well advised not to rest once
they have achieved a seemingly comfortable situation in the network - the hub is not
going to do so either. Rather, the small partners should strive for continuously cooper-
ating with their customers to enhance their solution. These enhancements should not be
limited by past developments, also not foreseeable directions should be considered. This
agility, flexibility and closeness to customers is what distinguishes them from the large
hubs, and what can consequently be successfully deployed in the inter-organizational IS
development industry.
This involvement of various parties in such a networked industry is thus key to its suc-
cess. However, these different parties are all playing different in this structure. This is the
key idea in the context of an IS development ecosystem (Messerschmitt and Szyperski,
2003). In order to ensure that this ecosystem is also a robust one, all involved organiza-
tions and individuals have to be aware of these characteristics and also to manage their
relationships according to their role (Iansiti and Levien, 2004).
298
Bibliography
[Ahrne et al. 2000] Ahrne, G. ; Brunsson, N. ; Garsten, C.: Standardizing through
Organization. In: Brunsson, N. (Ed.) ; Jacobsson, B. (Ed.): A World of Standards.
Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 50 – 68
[Ahuja 2000] Ahuja, G.: The Duality of Collaboration: Inducements and Opportu-
nities in the Formation of Interfirm Linkages. In: Strategic Management Journal 21
(2000), No. 3, pp. 317 – 343
[Akerlof 1970] Akerlof, G. A.: The Market for ”Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism. In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (1970), No. 3,
pp. 488 – 500
[Alchian 1998] Alchian, A. A.: The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics.
Vol. 3. Chap. Property Rights, pp. 1031 – 1034. London, UK : Macmillian, 1998
[Alchian and Demsetz 1972] Alchian, A. A. ; Demsetz, H.: Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization. In: The American Economic Review 62 (1972),
No. 5, pp. 777 – 795
[Allen 1983] Allen, R. C.: Collective Invention. In: Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 4 (1983), No. 1, pp. 1 – 24
[Alvaro et al. 2005] Alvaro, A. ; de Almeida, E. S. ; de Lemos Meira, S. R.:
Software Component Certification: A Survey. In: 31st EUROMICRO Conference on
Software Engineering and Advanced Applications IEEE (Organizer), 2005, pp. 106 –
113
[Amit and Schoemaker 1993] Amit, R. ; Schoemaker, P. J. H.: Strategic Assets
and Organizational Rent. In: Strategic Management Journal 14 (1993), No. 1, pp. 33
– 46
[Anand and Khanna 2000] Anand, B. N. ; Khanna, T.: Do Firms Learn to Create
Value? The Case of Alliances. In: Strategic Management Journal 21 (2000), No. 3,
pp. 295 – 315
[Andrews 1987] Andrews, K. R.: The Concept of Corporate Strategy. Homewood,
USA : Dow Jones-Irwin, 1987
[Angel 1989] Angel, D. P.: The Labor Market for Engineers in the U.S. Semicon-
ductor Industry. In: Economic Geography 65 (1989), No. 2, pp. 99 – 112
299
300 Bibliography
[Apte et al. 1990] Apte, U. ; Sankar, C. S. ; Thakur, M. ; Turner, J. E.:
Reusability-Based Strategy for Development of Information Systems: Implementa-
tion Experience of a Bank. In: MIS Quarterly 14 (1990), No. 4, pp. 421 – 433
[Argyris and Scho¨n 1978] Argyris, C. ; Scho¨n, D. A.: Organizational Learning a
Theory of Action Perspective. Reading, USA : Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1978
[Arndt and Dibbern 2006a] Arndt, J. M. ; Dibbern, J.: Co-Innovation in a Service
Oriented Strategic Network. In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference
on Services Computing. Washington, USA : IEEE Computer Society, 2006, pp. 285 –
288
[Arndt and Dibbern 2006b] Arndt, J.-M. ; Dibbern, J.: The Tension between Inte-
gration and Fragmentation in a Component Based Software Development Ecosystem.
In: Sprague Jr., R. H. (Ed.): Proceedings of the 39th Annual Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences. Washington, USA : IEEE Computer Society, 2006
[Avison and Fitzgerald 2003] Avison, D. ; Fitzgerald, G.: Information Systems
Development - Methodologies, Techniques and Tools. 3rd Ed. London, UK : McGraw-
Hill Publishing Company, 2003
[Bacharach 1989] Bacharach, S. B.: Organizational Theories: Some Criterial for
Evaluation. In: Academy of Management Review 14 (1989), No. 4, pp. 496 – 515
[Back et al. 2007] Back, A. (Ed.) ; Enkel, E. (Ed.) ; von Krogh, G. (Ed.): Knowl-
edge Networks for Business Growth. Berlin, GER : Springer Verlag, 2007
[Bain 1959] Bain, J. S.: Industrial Organization. New York, USA : John Wiley &
Sons, 1959
[Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt 1986] Balakrishnan, S. ; Wernerfelt, B.: Techni-
cal Change, Competition and Vertical Integration. In: Strategic Management Journal
7 (1986), No. 4, pp. 347 – 359
[Baldwin and Clark 1997] Baldwin, C. Y. ; Clark, B.: Managing in an Age of
Modularity. In: Harvard Business Review 75 (1997), No. 5, pp. 84 – 93
[Baldwin and Clark 2000] Baldwin, C. Y. ; Clark, K. B.: Design Rules - Volume
1. The Power of Modularity. Cambridge, USA : The MIT Press, 2000
[Banerjee and Duflo 2000] Banerjee, A. V. ; Duflo, E.: Reputation Effects and the
Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry. In: The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 115 (2000), No. 3, pp. 989 – 1017
300
Bibliography 301
[Banker and Kauffman 1991] Banker, R. D. ; Kauffman, R. J.: Reuse and Pro-
ductivity in Integrated Computer-Aided Software Engineering: An Empirical Study.
In: MIS Quarterly 15 (1991), No. 3, pp. 375 – 402
[Barnard 1938] Barnard, C. I.: The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, USA :
Harvard University Press, 1938
[Barnes and Bollinger 1991] Barnes, B. H. ; Bollinger, T. B.: Making Reuse
Cost-Effective. In: IEEE Software 8 (1991), No. 1, pp. 13 – 24
[Barney 1986] Barney, J. B.: Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck, and
Business Strategy. In: Management Science 32 (1986), No. 10, pp. 1231 – 1241
[Barney 1991] Barney, J. B.: Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage.
In: Journal of Management 17 (1991), No. 1, pp. 99 – 120
[Barney 2001] Barney, J. B.: Is the Resource-Based ”View” a Useful Perspective for
Strategic Mangement Research? Yes. In: Academy of Management Review (2001)
[Barney and Hansen 1994] Barney, J. B. ; Hansen, M. H.: Trustworthiness as
a Source of Competitive Advantage. In: Strategic Management Journal 15 (1994),
No. Winter Special Issue, pp. 175 – 190
[Barros et al. 2005] Barros, A. ; Dumas, M. ; Oaks, P.: A Critical Overview of the
Web Service Description Language (WS-CDL). In: BPTrends 3 (2005), No. 3, pp. 1
– 24
[Bartlett and Goshal 1990] Bartlett, C. A. ; Goshal, S.: Matrix Management:
Not a Structure, a Frame of Mind. In: Harvard Business Review 68 (1990), No. 4,
pp. 138 – 145
[Bartlett and Goshal 1993] Bartlett, C. A. ; Goshal, S.: Beyond the M-Form:
Towards a Managerial Theory of the Firm. In: Strategic Management Journal 14
(1993), No. Special Issue: Organizations, Decision Making and Strategy, pp. 23 – 46
[Baumol 2002] Baumol, W. J.: The Free-Market Innovation Machine - Analyzing
the Growth Miracle of Capitalism. Princeton, USA : Princeton University Press, 2002
[Beck and Andres 2004] Beck, K. ; Andres, C.: Extreme Programming Explained.
Embrace Change. Boston, USA : Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 2004
[Bello et al. 2002] Bello, M. ; Sorrentino, M. ; Virili, F.: Web Services and
Emergent Organizations: Opportunities and Challanges for IS Development. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 10th European Conference on Information Systems. Gdansk, PO, 2002,
pp. 439 – 449
301
302 Bibliography
[Benbasat et al. 1987] Benbasat, I. ; Goldstein, D. K. ; Mead, M.: The Case
Research Strategy in Studies of Information Systems. In: MIS Quarterly 11 (1987),
No. 3, pp. 369 – 386
[Bennet 1996] Bennet, K. H.: Software Evolution: Past, Present and Future. In:
Information and Software Technology 39 (1996), No. 11, pp. 673 – 680
[Benson 1977] Benson, J. K.: Organizations: A Dialectical View. In: Administrative
Science Quarterly 22 (1977), No. 1, pp. 1 – 22
[Berle and Means 1932] Berle, A. A. ; Means, G. C.: The Modern Corporation and
Private Property. New York, USA : Macmillan, 1932
[von Bertalanffy 1950] Bertalanffy, L. von: An Outline of General System Theory.
In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (1950), No. 2, pp. 134 – 165
[Bharadwaj 2000] Bharadwaj, A. S.: A Reousrce-Based Perspective on Infomration
Technology Capability and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation. In: MIS
Quarterly 24 (2000), No. 1, pp. 169 – 196
[Biehl 2004] Biehl, R. E.: Six Sigma for Software. In: IEEE Software 21 (2004),
No. 2, pp. 68 – 70
[Bingi et al. 1999] Bingi, P. ; Sharma, M. ; Godla, J. K.: Critical Issues Affecting
an ERP Implementation. In: Information Systems Management 16 (1999), No. 3,
pp. 7 – 15
[Black and Boal 1994] Black, J. A. ; Boal, K. B.: Strategic Resources: Traits,
Configurations and Paths to Sustainable Competitive Advantage. In: Strategic Man-
agement Journal 15 (1994), No. Special Issue Strategy: Search for New Paradigms,
pp. 131 – 148
[Boehm et al. 1978] Boehm, B. W. ; Brown, J. R. ; Kaspar, H. ; Lipow, M. ;
Macleod, G. J. ; Merrit, M. J.: Characteristics of Software Quality. Amsterdam,
NL : North-Holland, 1978
[Borgatti and Foster 2003] Borgatti, S. P. ; Foster, P. C.: The Network Paradigm
in Organizational Research: A Review and Typology. In: Journal of Management 29
(2003), No. 6, pp. 991 – 1013
[Brehm et al. 2000] Brehm, L. ; Heinzl, A. ; Markus, M. L.: Tailoring ERP
Systems: A Spectrum of Choices and their Implications. In: Sprague Jr., R. H.
(Ed.): Proceedings of the 34th Hawaii International Conference on Systems Science.
Washington, USA : IEEE Computer Society, 2000
302
Bibliography 303
[Bresnahan 1998] Bresnahan, T. F.: New Modes of Competition: Implications
for the Future Structure of the Computer Industry / Stanford University. 1998. –
Prepared for the Progress and Freedom Foundation Conference Competition, Conver-
gence, and the Microsoft Monopoly
[Brooks 1982] Brooks, F. P.: The Mythical Man-Month - Essays on Software En-
gineering. Corrected Reprint. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1982 (Reading,
USA)
[Brunsson 2000] Brunsson, N.: Organizations, Markets and Standardization. In:
Brunsson, N. (Ed.) ; Jacobsson, B. (Ed.): A World of Standards. Oxford, UK :
Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 21 – 39
[Brynjolfsson 1993] Brynjolfsson, E.: The Productivity Paradox of Information
Technology. In: Communications of the ACM 36 (1993), No. 12, pp. 67 – 77
[Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1998] Brynjolfsson, E. ; Hitt, L. M.: Beyond the Pro-
ductivity Paradox. In: Communications of the ACM 41 (1998), No. 18, pp. 49 –
55
[Butler 1999] Butler, J.: Risk Management Skills Needed in a Packaged Software
Environment. In: Information Systems Management 16 (1999), No. 3, pp. 15 – 20
[Butler 1998] Butler, T.: Towards a Hermeneutical Method for Interpretative Re-
search in Information Systems. In: Journal of Information Technology 13 (1998),
No. 4, pp. 285 – 300
[Campbell-Kelly 1995] Campbell-Kelly, M.: Development and Structure of the
International Software Industry, 1950 - 1990. In: Business and Economic History 24
(1995), No. 2, pp. 73 – 110
[Campbell-Kelly 2003] Campbell-Kelly, M.: From Airline Reservation to Sonic
the Hedgehog: A History of the Software Industry. Cambridge, USA : The MIT Press,
2003
[Casile and Davis-Blake 2002] Casile, M. ; Davis-Blake, A.: When Accreditation
Standards Change: Factors Affecting Differential Responsiveness of Public and Private
Organizations. In: Academy of Management Journal 45 (2002), No. 1, pp. 180 – 195
[Cavaye 1996] Cavaye, A. L. M.: Case Study Research: A Multi-Faceted Research
Approach for IS. In: Information Systems Journal 6 (1996), No. 3, pp. 227 – 242
[Caves 1980] Caves, R. E.: Industrial Organization, Corporate Startegy, and Struc-
ture. In: Journal of Economic Literature 18 (1980), No. 1, pp. 64 – 92
303
304 Bibliography
[Chandler 1977] Chandler, A. D.: The Visible Hand - The Managerial Revolution
in American Business. Cambrigde, MA : Belknap Press, 1977
[Checkland and Holwell 1998] Checkland, P. ; Holwell, S.: Information, Systems
and Infomration Systems - Making Sense of the Field. Chichester, UK : John Wiley
& Sons, 1998
[Chi and Holsapple 2005] Chi, L. ; Holsapple, C. W.: Understanding Computer-
Mediated Interorganizational Collaboration: A Model and Framework. In: Journal of
Knowledge Management 9 (2005), No. 1, pp. 53 – 75
[Chi and Nystrom 1998] Chi, T. ; Nystrom, P.: An Economic Analysis of Matrix
Structure, Using Multinational Corporations as an Illustration. In: Managerial and
Decision Economics 19 (1998), No. 3, pp. 141 – 156
[Coase 1937] Coase, R. H.: The Nature of the Firm. In: Economica 4 (1937), No. 16,
pp. 386 – 405
[Collis 1994] Collis, D. J.: Research Note: How Valuabel are Organizational Capa-
bilities? In: Strategic Managment Journal 15 (1994), No. 2, pp. 143 – 152
[Conner 1991] Conner, K. R.: A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory
and Five Schools of Thought within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We Have
a New Theory of the Firm? In: Journal of Management 17 (1991), No. 1, pp. 121 –
154
[Conway 1968] Conway, M. E.: How do Committees Invent? In: Datamation 14
(1968), No. 4, pp. 28 – 31
[Coomer Jr. et al. 1990] Coomer Jr., T. N. ; Comer, J. R. ; Rodjak, D. J.:
Developing Reusable Software for Military Systems - Why it is Needed and Why it
isn’t Working. In: ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes 15 (1990), No. 3,
pp. 33 – 38
[Costello and Gomes-Casseres 1992] Costello, M. C. ; Gomes-Casseres, B.: The
Global Computer Industry. Harvard Business School Case, Ref. 9-792-072. 1992
[Crabtree and Miller 1992] Crabtree, B. F. ; Miller, W. L.: A Template Ap-
proach to Text Analysis: Developing and Using Codebooks. In: Crabtree, B. F.
(Ed.) ; Miller, W. L. (Ed.): Doing Qualitative Research. Newbury Park, USA : Sage
Publications, 1992, pp. 93 – 109
[Creswell 1998] Creswell, J. W.: Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design - Chosing
among Five Traditions. Thousand Oaks, USA : Sage Publications, 1998
304
Bibliography 305
[Curley and Pyburn 1982] Curley, K. F. ; Pyburn, P. J.: ”Intellectual” Tech-
nologies: The Key to Improving White-Collar Productivity. In: Sloan Management
Review 24 (1982), No. 1, pp. 31 – 39
[Currie and Parikh 2006] Currie, W. L. ; Parikh, M. A.: Developing a Sustain-
able Value Proposition in Web Services: Lessons from Strategic Management. In:
Hirschheim, R. (Ed.) ; Heinzl, A. (Ed.) ; Dibbern, J. (Ed.): Information Sys-
tems Outsourcing: Enduring Themes, New Perspectives and Global Challenges. 2nd.
Berlin, GER : Springer Verlag, 2006, pp. 523 – 541
[Cusumano 2004] Cusumano, M. A.: The Business of Software: What Every Man-
ager, Programmer and Entrepreneur Must Know to Succeed in Good Times and Bad.
New York, USA : Simon and Schuster Inc., 2004
[Cyert and March 1992] Cyert, R. M. ; March, J. G.: A Behavioral Theory of the
Firm. 2nd. Cambridge, USA : Blackwell, 1992
[Daft and Weick 1984] Daft, R. l. ; Weick, K. E.: Towards a Model of Organizations
as Interpretation Systems. In: The Academy of Management Review 9 (1984), No. 2,
pp. 284 – 295
[Dahl 1957] Dahl, R. A.: The Concept of Power. In: Behavioral Science (1957)
[Dahmus et al. 2001] Dahmus, J. B. ; Gonzales-Zugasti, J. P. ; Otto, K. N.:
Modular Product Architecture. In: Design Studies 22 (2001), No. 5, pp. 409 – 424
[Das and Teng 2000] Das, T. K. ; Teng, B.-S.: A Resource-Based Theory of Strategic
Alliances. In: Journal of Management 26 (2000), No. 1, pp. 31 – 61
[Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980] Dasgupta, P. ; Stiglitz, J.: Industrial Structure and
the Nature of Innovative Activity. In: The Economic Journal 90 (1980), No. 358,
pp. 266 – 293
[D’Aveni and Ravenscraft 1994] D’Aveni, R. A. ; Ravenscraft, D. J.: Economics
of Integration versus Bureaucracy Costs: Does Vertical Integration Improve Perfor-
mance? In: Academy of Management Journal 37 (1994), No. 5, pp. 1167 – 1206
[Davenport 1998] Davenport, T. H.: Putting the Enterprise into the Enterprise
System. In: Harvard Business Review 76 (1998), No. 4, pp. 121 – 131
[Davis 1995] Davis, A. M.: Two Hundred and One Principles of Software Develop-
ment. New York, USA : McGraw-Hill, 1995
[Dedrick et al. 2003] Dedrick, J. ; Gurbaxani, V. ; Kraemer, K. L.: Information
Technology and Economic Performance: A Critical Review of the Empirical Evidence.
In: ACM Computing Surveys 35 (2003), No. 1, pp. 1 – 28
305
306 Bibliography
[Dehning and Richardson 2002] Dehning, B. ; Richardson, V. J.: Returns on
Investment in Information Technology: A Research Synthesis. In: Journal of Infom-
ration Systems 16 (2002), No. 1, pp. 7 – 30
[DeLone and McLean 1992] DeLone, W. H. ; McLean, E. R.: Information Systems
Success: The Quest for the Dependent Variable. In: Information Systems Reseach 3
(1992), No. 1, pp. 60 – 95
[DeLone and McLean 2003] DeLone, W. H. ; McLean, E. R.: The DeLone and
McLean Model of Infomration Systems Success: A Ten-Year Update. In: Journal of
Management Infomration Systems 19 (2003), No. 4, pp. 9 – 30
[Demsetz 1988] Demsetz, H.: The Theory of the Firm Revisited. In: Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization 4 (1988), No. 1, pp. 141 – 161
[Demsetz 1991] Demsetz, H.: The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and
Development. Chap. The Theory of the Firm Revisited. New York, USA : Oxford
University Press, 1991
[Denning 2004] Denning, P. J.: The Social Life of Innovation. In: Communications
of the ACM 47 (2004), No. 4, pp. 15 – 19
[Denzin and Lincoln 2005] Denzin, N. K. ; Lincoln, Y. S.: The Discipline and
Practice of Qualitative Research. In: Denzin, N. K. (Ed.) ; Lincoln, Y. S. (Ed.):
The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research. 3rd. Sage Publications, 2005, Chap.
Thousand Oaks, USA, pp. 1 – 32
[Dequiedt and Martimort 2004] Dequiedt, V. ; Martimort, D.: Delegated Moni-
toring versus Arm’s-Length Contracting. In: International Journal of Industrial Or-
ganization 22 (2004), No. 7, pp. 951 – 981
[Diamond 1971] Diamond, P.: Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects
and Externalities: Comments. In: Intrilligator, M. (Ed.): Frontiers of Quantita-
tive Economics. Amsterdam, NL : North-Holland Publishing Company, 1971, pp. 29
– 31
[Dibbern et al. 2004] Dibbern, J. ; Goles, T. ; Hirschheim, R. ; Jayatilaka, B.:
Information Systems Outsourcing: A Survey and Analysis of the Literature. In: ACM
SIGMIS Database 35 (2004), No. 4, pp. 6 – 102
[Dibbern et al. 2007] Dibbern, J. ; Winkler, J. ; Heinzl, A.: Explaining Variations
in Client Extra Costs Between Software Projects Offshored to India. In: MIS Quarterly
31 (2007), No. Special Issue on IS Offshoring - forthcoming
[Dierickx and Cool 1989] Dierickx, I. ; Cool, K.: Asset Stock Accumulation and
Sustainability of Competitive Advantage. In: Management Science (1989)
306
Bibliography 307
[DiMaggio and Powell 1983] DiMaggio, P. J. ; Powell, W. W.: The Iron Cage
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational
Fields. In: American Socilogical Review 48 (1983), No. 2, pp. 147 – 160
[Dollinger et al. 1997] Dollinger, M. J. ; Golden, P. A. ; Saxton, T.: The Effect
of Reputation on the Decision to Joint Venture. In: Strategic Management Journal
18 (1997), No. 2, pp. 127 – 140
[Dreiling et al. 2005] Dreiling, A. ; Klaus, H. ; Rosemann, M. ; Wyssusek, B.:
Open Source Enterprise Systems: Towards a Viable Alternative. In: Sprague Jr.,
R. H. (Ed.): Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on Systems
Science. Washington, USA : IEEE Computer Society, 2005
[Drucker 1994] Drucker, P. F.: Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Revised Reprint.
Oxford, UK : Butterworth Heinemann, 1994
[Dube and Pare 2003] Dube, L. ; Pare, G.: Rigor in Information Systems Positivist
Case Study Research: Current Practices, Trends, and Recommendations. In: MIS
Quarterly 27 (2003), No. 4, pp. 597 – 635
[Durand and McGuire 2005] Durand, R. ; McGuire, J.: Legitimating Agencies in
the Face of Selection: The Case of AACSB. In: Organization Studies (2005)
[Duschek 2004] Duschek, S.: Inter-Firm Resources and Sustained Comptitive Ad-
vantage. In: Management Revue 15 (2004), No. 1, pp. 53 – 73
[Dyer 1996] Dyer, J. H.: How Chrysler Created an American Keiretsu. In: Harvard
Business Review 74 (1996), No. 4, pp. 42 – 56
[Dyer 1997] Dyer, J. H.: Effective Interfirm Collaboration: How Firms Minimize
Transaction Costs and Maximize Transaction Value. In: Strategic Management Jour-
nal 18 (1997), No. 7, pp. 535 – 556
[Dyer and Singh 1998] Dyer, J. H. ; Singh, H.: The Relational View: Cooperative
Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage. In: Academy of
Management Review 23 (1998), No. 4, pp. 660 – 679
[Earl 1993] Earl, M. J.: Experiences in Strategic Information Systems Planning. In:
MIS Quarterly 17 (1993), No. 1, pp. 1 – 24
[Eatwell 1987] Eatwell, J. (Ed.): The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics.
London, UK : Macmillan, 1987 (3)
[Eisenhardt 1989a] Eisenhardt, K. M.: Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.
In: Academy of Management Review 14 (1989), No. 1, pp. 57 – 74
307
308 Bibliography
[Eisenhardt 1989b] Eisenhardt, K. M.: Building Theories from Case Study Re-
search. In: Academy of Management Review 14 (1989), No. 4, pp. 532 – 550
[Eisenhardt and Martin 2000] Eisenhardt, K. M. ; Martin, J. A.: Dynamic Capa-
bilities: What are They? In: Strategic Management Journal 21 (2000), No. Special
Issue: The Evolution of Firm Capabilities, pp. 1105 – 1121
[Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996] Eisenhardt, K. M. ; Schoonhoven, C. B.:
Resource-Based View of Strategic Alliance Formation: Strategic and Social Effects in
Entrepreneurial Firms. In: Organization Science 7 (1996), No. 2, pp. 136 – 150
[Elfenbein and Lerner 2003] Elfenbein, D. W. ; Lerner, J.: Ownership and Control
Rights in Internet Portal Alliances, 1995 - 1999. In: RAND Journal of Economics 34
(2003), No. 2, pp. 356 – 369
[Emerson 1962] Emerson, R. M.: Power-Dependence Relations. In: American Soci-
ological Review 27 (1962), No. 1, pp. 31 – 41
[Emery 1969] Emery, J. C.: Organizational Planning and Control Systems. London,
UK : Macmillian, 1969
[Evan 1966] Evan, W. E.: The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganiza-
tional Relations. In: Thompson, J. D. (Ed.): Approaches to Organizational Design.
Pittsgurgh, USA : University of Pittsgurgh Press, 1966, pp. 173 – 192
[von Everdingen et al. 2000] Everdingen, Y. von ; Hillegersberg, J. van ;
Waarts, E.: ERP Adoption by European Midsize Companies. In: Communica-
tion of the ACM (2000), pp. 27 – 31
[Fama and Jensen 1983] Fama, E. F. ; Jensen, M. C.: Agency Problems and Residual
Claims. In: Journal of Law and Economics 26 (1983), No. 2, pp. 327 – 349
[Faraj and Sproull 2000] Faraj, S. ; Sproull, L.: Coordinating Expertise in Software
Development Teams. In: Management Science 46 (2000), No. 12, pp. 1554 – 1568
[Farhoomand 2006] Farhoomand, A. F.: The Global Software Industry in 2006. The
University of Hong Kong : Asia Research Center, 2006
[Farrell et al. 1998] Farrell, J. ; Monroe, H. K. ; Saloner, G.: The Vertical
Organization of Industry: System Competition versus Component Competition. In:
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 7 (1998), No. 2, pp. 143 – 182
[Feller and Fitzgerald 2000] Feller, J. ; Fitzgerald, B.: A Framework Analysis
of the Open Source Software Development Paradigm. In: Proceedings of the Twenty
First International Conference on Information Systems. Brisbane, AUS, 2000, pp. 58
– 69
308
Bibliography 309
[Florida 2004] Florida, R.: America’s Looming Creativity Crisis. In: Harvard
Business Review 82 (2004), No. 10, pp. 122 – 136
[Foss 1999] Foss, N. J.: Networks, Capabilities, and Competitive Advantage. In:
Scandinavian Journal of Management 15 (1999), No. 1, pp. 1 – 15
[Freeman 1991] Freeman, C.: Networks of Innovators: A Synthesis of Research
Issues. In: Research Policy 20 (1991), No. 5, pp. 499 – 514
[Friedland 1993] Friedland, J: Components of Success: Japanese Bicycle-Parts
Maker Eyes China. In: Far Eastern Economic Review 156 (1993), No. 46, pp. 66
[Friedman 1999] Friedman, M.: Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge, UK :
Cambridge University Press, 1999
[Fuggetta 2003] Fuggetta, A.: Open Source Software - An Evaluation. In: The
Journal of Systems and Software 66 (2003), No. 1, pp. 77 – 90
[Gadenne 1997] Gadenne, V.: Wissenschaftstheoretische Grundlagen der Wirt-
schaftsinformatik. In: Gru¨n, O. (Ed.) ; Heinrich, L. J. (Ed.): Wirtschaftsinformatik
- Ergebnisse Empirischer Forschung. Vienna, AT : Springer Verlag, 1997, pp. 7 – 20
[Galbraith 1997] Galbraith, J. K.: American Capitalism: The Concept of Counter-
vailing Power. 2nd print. New Brunswick, USA : Transaction Publishers, 1997
[Galbraith 1971] Galbraith, J. R.: Matrix Organization Design - How to Combine
Functional and Project Forms. In: Business Horizons 14 (1971), No. 1, pp. 29 – 40
[Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001] Galunic, D. C. ; Eisenhardt, K. M.: Architectural
Innovation and Modular Corporate Forms. In: Academy of Management Journal 44
(2001), No. 6, pp. 1229 – 1249
[Galvin and Morkel 2001] Galvin, P. ; Morkel, A.: The Effect of Product Modu-
larity on Industry Structure: The Case of the World Bicycle Industry. In: Industry
and Innovation 8 (2001), No. 1, pp. 31 – 47
[Garcia and Calantone 2002] Garcia, R. ; Calantone, R.: A Critical Look at
Technological Innovation Typology and Innovativeness Terminology: A Literature
Review. In: The Journal of Product Innovation Management 19 (2002), No. 2,
pp. 110 – 132
[Gawer and Cusumano 2002] Gawer, A. ; Cusumano, M. A.: Platform Leadership.
Cambridge, MA : Harvard Business School Press, 2002
309
310 Bibliography
[Gewald and Helbig 2006] Gewald, H. ; Helbig, K.: A Governance Model for
Managing Outsourcing Partnerships. In: Sprague Jr., R. H. (Ed.): Proceedings of
the 39th Hawaii International Conference on Systems Science. Washington, USA :
IEEE Computer Society, 2006
[Geyskens et al. 2006] Geyskens, I. ; Steenkamp, J-B. E. M. ; Kumar, N.: Make,
Buy, or Ally: A Transaction Cost Theory Meta-Analysis. In: Academy of Management
Journal 49 (2006), No. 3, pp. 519 – 543
[Gheihs et al. 2002] Gheihs, K. ; Ko¨nig, W. ; von Westarp, F.: Networks -
Standardization, Infrastructure, and Applications. Heidelberg, GER : Physica Verlag,
2002
[Ghemawat 1985] Ghemawat, P.: Building Strategy on the Experience Curve. In:
Harvard Business Review 63 (1985), No. 2, pp. 143 – 149
[Ghosh and John 2005] Ghosh, M. ; John, G.: Strategic Fit in Industrial Alliances:
An Empirical Test of Governance Value Analysis. In: Journal of Marketing Research
42 (2005), No. 2, pp. 346 – 357
[Gillies 1992] Gillies, A. C.: Software Quality - Theory and Management. London,
UK : Chapman & Hall, 1992
[Glaister and Buckley 1996] Glaister, K. W. ; Buckley, P. J.: Strategic Motives
for International Alliance Formation. In: Journal of Management Studies 33 (1996),
No. 3, pp. 301 – 332
[Glass 1998] Glass, R. L.: Reuse: What’s wrong with this Picture? In: IEEE
Software (1998)
[Glass 2003] Glass, R. L.: Facts and fallacies of software engineering. Boston, USA :
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 2003
[Gopal et al. 2003] Gopal, A. ; Sivaramakrishnan, K. ; Krishnan, M. S. ;
Mukhopadhyay, T.: Contracts in Offshore Software Development: An Empirical
Analysis. In: Management Science 49 (2003), No. 12, pp. 1671 – 1683
[Goshal and Moran 1996] Goshal, S. ; Moran, P.: Bad for Practice: A Critique of
the Transaction Cost Theory. In: Academy of Management Review 21 (1996), No. 1,
pp. 13 – 47
[Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004] Grant, R. M. ; Baden-Fuller, C.: A Knowledge
Accessing Theory of Strategic Alliances. In: Journal of Management Studies 41
(2004), No. 1, pp. 61 – 84
310
Bibliography 311
[Greenbaum 2003] Greenbaum, J.: Build vs. Buy in the 21st Century. In: Intelligent
Enterprise 6 (2003), No. 7, pp. 26 – 31
[Grove 1996] Grove, A. S.: Only the Paranoid Survive. New York, USA : Doubleday,
1996
[Grunwald and Kieser 2007] Grunwald, R. ; Kieser, A.: Learning to Reduce
Interorganizational Learning: An Analysis of Architectural Product Innovation in
Strategic Alliances. In: Journal of Product Innovation Management 24 (2007), No. 4,
pp. 369 – 391
[Gulati 1995] Gulati, R.: Does Familarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Re-
peated Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances. In: Academy of Management Journal
38 (1995), No. 1, pp. 85 – 112
[Gulati 1998] Gulati, R.: Alliances and Networks. In: Strategic Management Journal
19 (1998), No. 4, pp. 293 – 317
[Gulati et al. 2000] Gulati, R. ; Nohria, N. ; Zaheer, A.: Strategic Networks. In:
Strategic Management Journal 21 (2000), No. 3, pp. 203 – 215
[Gulati and Singh 1998] Gulati, R. ; Singh, H.: The Architecture of Cooperation:
Managing Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances. In:
Administrative Science Quarterly 43 (1998), No. 4, pp. 781 – 814
[Hagedoorn 1993] Hagedoorn, J.: Understanding the Rationale of Strategic Technol-
ogy Partnering: Interorganizational Modes of Cooperation and Sectoral Differences.
In: Strategic Management Journal 14 (1993), No. 5, pp. 371 – 385
[Hagedoorn 1995] Hagedoorn, J.: Strategic Technology Partnering During the
1980s: Trends, Networks and Corporate Patterns in Non-Core Technologies. In: Re-
search Policy 24 (1995), No. 2, pp. 207 – 231
[Haigh 2002] Haigh, T.: Software in the 1960s as Concept, Service, and Product. In:
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 24 (2002), No. 1, pp. 5 – 13
[Hall 1993] Hall, R.: A Framework Linking Intangible Resources and Capabiliites
to Sustainable Competitive Advantage. In: Strategic Management Journal 14 (1993),
No. 8, pp. 607 – 618
[Hallstro¨m 2000] Hallstro¨m, K. T.: Organizing the Process of Standardization. In:
Brunsson, N. (Ed.) ; Jacobsson, B. (Ed.): A World of Standards. Oxford, UK :
Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 85 – 99
311
312 Bibliography
[Hamel 1991] Hamel, G.: Competition for Competence and Inter-Partner Learning
within International Strategic Alliances. In: Strategic Management Journal 12 (1991),
No. Special Issue on Global Strategy, pp. 83 – 103
[Hamel et al. 1989] Hamel, G. ; Doz, Y. L. ; Prahalad, C. K.: Collaborate with
Your Competitors - and Win. In: Harvard Business Review 67 (1989), No. 1, pp. 133
– 139
[Hanfling 1981] Hanfling, O.: Logical Positivism. New York, USA : Columbia
University Press, 1981
[Hannan and Freeman 1977] Hannan, M. T. ; Freeman, J.: The Population Ecology
of Organization. In: The American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977), No. 5, pp. 929 –
964
[Harding 2002] Harding, F.: Cross-Selling Success. Avon, USA : Adams Media,
2002
[Harrigan 1984] Harrigan, K. R.: Formulating Vertical Integration Strategies. In:
Academy of Management Review 9 (1984), No. 4, pp. 638 – 652
[Harrigan 1985] Harrigan, K. R.: Vertical Integration and Corporate Strategy. In:
Academy of Management Journal 28 (1985), No. 2, pp. 397 – 425
[Hart 1988] Hart, O. D.: Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. In:
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4 (1988), No. 1, pp. 119 – 139
[Hedlund 1986] Hedlund, G.: The Hypermodern MNC - A Heterachy. In: Human
Resource Management 25 (1986), No. 1, pp. 9 – 35
[Hedlund and Rolander 1990] Hedlund, G. ; Rolander, D.: Action in Heterarchies
- New Approaches to Managing the MNC. In: Barlett, C. A. (Ed.) ; Doz, Y.
(Ed.) ; Hedlund, G. (Ed.): Managing the Global Firm. London, UK : Routledge,
1990, pp. 15 – 46
[Heinrich 1996] Heinrich, L. J.: Systemplanung: Planung und Realisierung von
Informatik-Projekten. Mu¨nchen, GER : R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996
[Heinzl 1996] Heinzl, A. H.: Die Evolution der Betrieblichen DV-Abteilung: Eine
Lebenszyklustheoretische Analyse. Heidelberg, GER : Physica Verlag, 1996
[Helfat and Peteraf 2003] Helfat, C. E. ; Peteraf, M. A.: The Dynamic Resource-
BAsed View: Capabilities Lifecycles. In: Strategic Management Journal 24 (2003),
No. 10, pp. 997 – 1010
312
Bibliography 313
[Henderson and Venkatraman 1993] Henderson, J.C. ; Venkatraman, N.: Strate-
gic Alignment: Leveraging Information Technology for Transforming Organizations.
In: IBM Systems Journal 32 (1993), No. 1, pp. 4 – 16
[Henderson and Clark 1990] Henderson, R. M. ; Clark, K. B.: Architectural
Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of
Established Firms. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (1990), No. 1, Special
Issue: Technology, Organizations, and Innovation, pp. 9 – 30
[Henry and Faller 1995] Henry, E. ; Faller, B.: Large-Scale Industrial Reuse to
Reduce Cost and Cycle Time. In: IEEE Software 12 (1995), No. 5, pp. 47 – 53
[Hevner et al. 2004] Hevner, A. R. ; March, S. T. ; Park, J. ; Ram, S.: Design
Science in Information Systems Research. In: MIS Quarterly 28 (2004), No. 1, pp. 75
– 105
[von Hippel 1990] Hippel, E. von: Task Partitioning: An Innovation Process Variable.
In: Research Policy 19 (1990), No. 5, pp. 407 – 418
[Hirschheim 1985] Hirschheim, R.: Information Systems Epistemology: An Histor-
ical Perspective. In: Mumford, E. (Ed.) ; Hirschheim, R. (Ed.) ; Fitzgerald,
G. (Ed.) ; Wood-Harper, T. (Ed.): Research Methods in IS. Amsterdam, NL :
North-Holland Publishing Company, 1985, pp. 13 – 35
[Hirschheim and Dibbern 2006] Hirschheim, R. ; Dibbern, J.: Information Tech-
nology Outsourcing in the New Economy - An Introduction to the Outsourcing and
Offshoring Landscape. In: Hirschheim, R. (Ed.) ; Heinzl, A. (Ed.) ; Dibbern, J.
(Ed.): Information Systems Outsourcing: Enduring Themes, New Perspectives and
Global Challenges. 2nd. Berlin, GER : Springer Verlag, 2006, pp. 3 – 23
[Hirschmann 1964] Hirschmann, W. B.: Profit from the Learning Curve. In: Harvard
Business Review 41 (1964), No. 1, pp. 125 – 139
[Hoetker 2006] Hoetker, G.: Do Modular Products Lead to Modular Organizations?
In: Strategic Management Journal 27 (2006), No. 6, pp. 501 – 518
[Holland 2002] Holland, P.: Building Web Services From Existing Application. In:
eAI Journal (2002), September, pp. 45 – 47
[Holmstrom and Tirole 1989] Holmstrom, B. R. ; Tirole, J.: Handbooks in Eco-
nomics. Vol. Volume I: The Theory of the Firm. Chap. Chapter 2, pp. 63 – 133. In:
Schmalensee, R. (Ed.) ; Willig, R. D. (Ed.): Handbook of Industrial Organization
Vol. Volume I. Amsterdam, NL : North-Holland, 1989
313
314 Bibliography
[Hong and Lerch 2002] Hong, S. J. ; Lerch, F. J.: A Laboratory Study of Consumers’
Preferences and Purchasing Behavior with Regards to Software Components. In: The
Database for Advances in Information Systems 33 (2002), No. 3, pp. 23 – 37
[Hopkins 2000] Hopkins, J.: Component Primer. In: Communications of the ACM
43 (2000), No. 10, pp. 27 – 30
[Iacovou et al. 1995] Iacovou, C. L. ; Benbasat, I. ; Dexter, A. S.: Electronic
Data Interchange and Small Organizations: Adoption and Impact of Technology. In:
MIS Quarlerly 19 (1995), No. 4, pp. 465 – 485
[Iansiti and Levien 2004] Iansiti, M. ; Levien, R.: Strategy as Ecology. In: Harvard
Buisness Review 82 (2004), No. 3, pp. 68 – 78
[Iivari et al. 2000] Iivari, J. ; Hirschheim, R. ; Klein, H. K.: A Dynamic Framework
for Classifying Information Systems Development Methodologies and Approaches. In:
Journal of Management Information Systems 17 (2000), No. 3, pp. 179 – 218
[Ireland et al. 2002] Ireland, R. D. ; Hitt, M. A. ; Vaidyanath, D.: Alliance
Management as a Source of Competitive Advantage. In: Journal of Management 28
(2002), No. 3, pp. 413 – 446
[Itami 1987] Itami, H.: Mobilizing Invisible Assets. Cambridge, USA : Harvard
University Press, 1987
[Jain et al. 2003] Jain, H. ; Vitharana, P. ; Zahedi, F.: An Assessment Model
for Requirements Identification in Component-Based Software Development. In: The
Database for Advances in Information Systems 34 (2003), No. 4, pp. 48 – 63
[Jarillo 1988] Jarillo, J. C.: On Strategic Networks. In: Strategic Management
Journal 9 (1988), No. 1, pp. 31 – 41
[Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1998] Jarvenpaa, S. L. ; Leidner, D. E.: An Infomration
Company in Mexico: Extending the Resource-Based View of the Firm to a Developing
Country Context. In: Information Systems Research 9 (1998), No. 4, pp. 342 – 361
[Jensen and Meckling 1976] Jensen, M. C. ; Meckling, H.: Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. In: Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 3 (1976), pp. 305 – 360
[Jensen and Meckling 1978] Jensen, M. C. ; Meckling, W. H.: Can the Corporation
Survive? In: Financial Analysts Journal 31 (1978), No. 1, pp. 31 – 37
[Joskow 1988] Joskow, P. L.: Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Rela-
tionships: Empirical Evidence. In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4
(1988), No. 1, pp. 95 – 117
314
Bibliography 315
[Kale et al. 2000] Kale, P. ; Singh, H. ; Perlmutter, H.: Learning and Protection
of Proprietary Assets in Strategic Alliances: Building Relational Capital. In: Strategic
Management Journal 21 (2000), No. 3, pp. 217 – 237
[Kast and Rosenzweig 1972] Kast, F. E. ; Rosenzweig, J. E.: General Systems The-
ory: Applications for Organization and Management. In: Academy of Management
Journal 15 (1972), No. 4, pp. 447 – 465
[Katz 1953] Katz, D.: Field Studies. In: Festinger, L. (Ed.) ; Katz, D. (Ed.):
Research Methods in the Organizational Science. New York, USA : The Dryden Press,
1953, pp. 56 – 97
[Katz and Kahn 1966] Katz, D. ; Kahn, R. L.: The Social Psychology of Organiza-
tions. New York, USA : John Wiley & Sons, 1966
[Keen 1980] Keen, P. G. W.: MIS Research: Reference Disciplines and a Cumula-
tive Tradition. In: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information
Systems. Philadelphia, USA, 1980, pp. 9 – 18
[Keller 2002] Keller, W.: Enterprise Application Integration: Erfahrungen aus der
Praxis. Dpunkt Verlag, 2002
[Kelly et al. 2002] Kelly, M. J. ; Schaan, J.-L. ; Joncas, H.: Managing Alliance
Relationships: Key Challanges in the Early Stages of Collaboration. In: R & D
Management 32 (2002), No. 1, pp. 11 – 22
[Kerlinger and Lee 2000] Kerlinger, F. N. ; Lee, H. B.: Foundations of Behavioral
Research. 4th ed. Fort Worth, TX : Harcourt College Publishers, 2000
[Kerwood 1995] Kerwood, H. A.: Where Do Just-in-Time Manufacturing Networks
Fit? A Typology of Networks and a Framework for Analysis. In: Human Relations
48 (1995), No. 8, pp. 927 – 950
[Kieser 1989] Kieser, A.: Organizational, Institutional, and Societal Evolution: Me-
dieval Craft Guilds and the Genesis of Formal Organizations. In: Administrative
Science Quarterly 34 (1989), No. 4, pp. 540 – 564
[Kieser 1996] Kieser, A.: Business Process Reengineering - Neue Kleider fu¨r den
Kaiser? In: Zeitschrift fu¨r Fu¨hrung und Organisation 65 (1996), No. 3, pp. 179 – 185
[Kingdon 1973] Kingdon, D. R.: Matrix Organization - Managing Information Tech-
nology. London, UK : Tavistock, 1973 (Organizations, People, Society)
[Klein and Myers 1999] Klein, H. K. ; Myers, M. D.: A Set of Principles for
Conducting and Evaluating Interpretative Field Studies in Information Systems. In:
MIS Quarterly 23 (1999), No. 1, pp. 67 – 94
315
316 Bibliography
[Knight 1976] Knight, K.: Matrix Organization: A Review. In: The Journal of
Management Studies 13 (1976), No. 2, pp. 111 – 130
[Knudsen 1995] Knudsen, C.: Theories of the Firm, Strategic Management, and
Leadership. In: Montgomery, C. A. (Ed.): Resource- Based and Evolutionary
Theories of the Firm: Towards a Synthesis. Boston, USA : Kluwer, 1995, pp. 179 –
217
[Kogut 1988] Kogut, B.: Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives.
In: Strategic Management Journal 9 (1988), No. 4, pp. 319 – 332
[Koontz and O’Donnell 1964] Koontz, H. ; O’Donnell, C.: Principles of Manage-
ment. New York, NY : McGraw-Hill, 1964
[Kraut and Streeter 1995] Kraut, R. E. ; Streeter, L. A.: Coordination in Software
Development. In: Communications of the ACM 38 (1995), No. 3, pp. 69 – 81
[Kreger 2003] Kreger, H.: Fulfilling the Web Service Promise. In: Communications
of the ACM 46 (2003), No. 6, pp. 29 – 34
[Kuhn 1970] Kuhn, T.: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, USA :
University of Chicago Press, 1970
[Kumar et al. 1998] Kumar, K. ; Dissel, H. G. van ; Bielli, P.: The Merchant
of Prato - Revisited: Toward a Third Rational of Information Systems. In: MIS
Quarterly 22 (1998), No. 2, pp. 199 – 226
[Kumar and van Hillegersberg 2000] Kumar, K. ; Hillegersberg, J. van: ERP -
Experiences and Evolution. In: Communications of the ACM 43 (2000), No. 4, pp. 22
– 26
[Laffont and Martimort 2002] Laffont, J.-J. ; Martimort, D.: The Theory of
Incentives - The Principal-Agent Model. Princton, USA : Princton University Press,
2002
[Langley 1999] Langley, A.: Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data. In:
Academy of Management Review 24 (1999), No. 4, pp. 691 – 710
[Langlois 2002] Langlois, R.: Modularity in Technology and Organization. In:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 49 (2002), No. 1, pp. 19 – 37
[Langlois and Robertson 1992] Langlois, R. N. ; Robertson, P. L.: Networks
and Innovation in a Modular System: Lessons from the Microcomputer and Stereo
Component Indurstry. In: Research Policy 21 (1992), No. 4, pp. 297 – 313
316
Bibliography 317
[Laubacher et al. 2003] Laubacher, R. ; Malone, T. W. ; the MIT Scenarios
Working Group: Two Scenarios for 21st Century Organizations: Shifting Networks
of Small Firms or All-Encompassing Virtual Countries. In: Malone, T. W. (Ed.) ;
Laubacher, R. (Ed.) ; Morton, M. S. S. (Ed.): Inventing the Organizations of the
21st Century. Cambridge, USA : The MIT Press, 2003, pp. 115 – 132
[Laukkanen et al. 2005] Laukkanen, S. ; Sarpola, S. ; Hallikainen, P.: ERP
System Adoption - Does the Size Matter? In: Sprague Jr., R. H. (Ed.): Proceedings
of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on Systems Science. Washington, USA :
IEEE Computer Society, 2005
[Lavie 2006] Lavie, D.: The Competitive Advantage of Interconnected Firms: An
Extension of the Resource-Based View. In: Academy of Management Review 31
(2006), No. 3, pp. 638 – 658
[Lee 1989] Lee, A. S.: A Scientific Methodology for MIS Case Studies. In: MIS
Quarterly 13 (1989), No. 1, pp. 33 – 50
[Lee 1991] Lee, A. S.: Integrating Positivist and Interpretative Approaches to Orga-
nizational Research. In: Organization Science 2 (1991), No. 4, pp. 342 – 365
[Lee 1999] Lee, A. S.: Researching MIS. In: Currie, W. L. (Ed.) ; Galliers, B.
(Ed.): Rethinking Managment Information Systems. Oxford, UK : Oxford University
Press, 1999
[Lee et al. 2003] Lee, J. ; Siau, K. ; Hong, S.: Enterprise integration with ERP and
EAI. In: Communications of the ACM 46 (2003), No. 2, pp. 54 – 60
[Liang et al. 2004] Liang, H. ; Xue, Y. ; Boulton, W. R. ; Byrd, A.: Why Western
Vendors Don’t Dominate China’s ERP Market. In: Communications of the ACM 47
(2004), No. 7, pp. 69 – 72
[Liebowitz and Margolis 2001] Liebowitz, S. J. ; Margolis, S. E.: Winners, Losers
& Microsoft: Competition and Antitrust in High Technology. revised Ed. Oakland,
USA : Independent Institute, 2001
[Lofland 1971] Lofland, J.: Analyzing Social Settings. Belmont, USA : Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1971
[Lopez-Fernandez et al. 2006] Lopez-Fernandez, L. ; Robles, G. ; Gonzalez-
Barahona, J. M. ; Herraiz, I.: Applying Social Network Analysis Techniques to
Community-Driven Libre Software Projects. In: International Journal of Information
Technology and Web Engineering 2 (2006), No. 1, pp. 27 – 48
317
318 Bibliography
[Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995] Lorenzoni, G. ; Baden-Fuller, C.: Creating
a Strategic Center to Manage a Web of Partners. In: California Management Review
37 (1995), No. 3, pp. 146 – 163
[Lurey and Raisinghani 2001] Lurey, J. S. ; Raisinghani, M. S.: An Empirical
Study of Best Practices in Virtual Teams. In: Infomration and Management 38
(2001), No. 8, pp. 523 – 544
[Machamer 1977] Machamer, P.: Teleology and Selective Processes. In: Colodny,
R. G. (Ed.) ; Savage, L. J. (Ed.): Logic, Laws, and Life: Some Philosophical Com-
plications. Pittburgh, USA : University of Pittburgh Press, 1977, pp. 129 – 142
[Machlup 1967] Machlup, F.: Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Man-
agerial. In: The American Economic Review 57 (1967), No. 1, pp. 1 – 33
[Mahoney and Pandian 1992] Mahoney, J. T. ; Pandian, J. R.: The Resource-Based
View within the Conversation of Startegic Management. In: Startegic Management
Journal (1992)
[Malone and Crowstone 1994] Malone, T. W. ; Crowstone, K.: The Interdici-
plinary Study of Coordiantion. In: ACM Cumputing Surveys 26 (1994), No. 1, pp. 87
– 119
[Malone et al. 1987] Malone, T. W. ; Yates, J. ; Benjamin, R. I.: Electronic
Markets and Electronic Hierarchies. In: Communications of the ACM 30 (1987),
No. 6, pp. 484 – 497
[Manson 1949] Manson, E.: The Current State of the Monopoly Problem in the
United States. In: Harvard Law Review 62 (1949), No. 8, pp. 1265 – 1285
[March and Simon 1958] March, J. G. ; Simon, H. A.: Organizations. New York,
USA : John Wiley and Sons, 1958
[Marchand et al. 2000] Marchand, D. A. ; Kettinger, W. J. ; Rollins, J. D.:
Information Orientation: People, Technology and the Bottom Line. In: Sloan Man-
agement Review 41 (2000), No. 4, pp. 69 – 80
[Marchand et al. 2001] Marchand, D. A. ; Kettinger, W. J. ; Rollins, J. D.:
Information Orientation: The Link to Business Performance. Oxford, UK : Oxford
University Press, 2001
[Markus and Robey 1988] Markus, M. L. ; Robey, D.: Information Technology and
Organizational Change: Causal Structure in Theory and Research. In: Management
Science 34 (1988), No. 5, pp. 583 – 598
318
Bibliography 319
[Martinsons 2004] Martinsons, M. G.: ERP in China: One Package, Two Profiles.
In: Communications of the ACM 47 (2004), No. 7, pp. 65 – 68
[Mata et al. 1995] Mata, F. J. ; Fuerst, W. L. ; Barney, J. B.: Information
Technology and Sustained Competitive Advantage: A Resource-Based Analysis. In:
MIS Quarterly 19 (1995), No. 4, pp. 487 – 505
[Matsumoto 1989] Matsumoto, Y.: Some Experiences in Promoting Software: Pre-
sentation in Higher Abstract Levels. In: Software Reusability, Part 2: Applications
and Experience. New York, USA : ACM Press, 1989, pp. 157 – 185
[Mayer et al. 1995] Mayer, R. C. ; Davis, J. H. ; Schoorman, F. D.: An Integrative
Model of Organizational Trust. In: Academy of Management Review 20 (1995), No. 3,
pp. 709 – 734
[McCann and Ferry 1979] McCann, J. E. ; Ferry, D. L.: An Approach for Assessing
and Managing Inter-Unit Interdependence. In: Academy of Management Review 4
(1979), No. 1, pp. 113 – 119
[McGrath 1982] McGrath, J. E.: Dilemmatics - The Study or Research Choices
and Dilemmas. In: McGrath, J. E. (Ed.) ; Mart, J. (Ed.) ; Kulka, R. A. (Ed.):
Judgment Calls in Research. Bevery Hills, USA : Sage Publications, 1982, pp. 69 –
102
[McIlroy 1969] McIlroy, M. D.: Mass Produced Software Components. In: Naur,
P. (Ed.) ; Randell, B. (Ed.): Software Engineering. Garmisch, GER : NATO Science
Committee, 1969, pp. 138 – 156
[Medcof 2001] Medcof, J. W.: Resource-Based Strategy and Managerial Power in
Networks of Internationally Dispersed Technology Units. In: Strategic Management
Journal 22 (2001), No. 11, pp. 999 – 1012
[Melville et al. 2004] Melville, N. ; Kraemer, K. ; Gurbaxani, V.: Review:
Information Technology and Organizational Performance: An Integrative Model of
IT Business Value. In: MIS Quarterly 28 (2004), No. 2, pp. 283 – 322
[Mertens 2005] Mertens, P.: Integrierte Informationsverarbeitung 1. 15th. Wies-
baden, GER : Gabler, 2005
[Messerschmitt and Szypersik 2000] Messerschmitt, D. G. ; Szypersik, C.: In-
dustrial and Economic Properties of Software -Technology, Processes, and Value /
University of California at Berkeley Computer Science Division. 2000 (UCB//CSD-
01-1130). – Research Paper
319
320 Bibliography
[Messerschmitt and Szyperski 2003] Messerschmitt, D. G. ; Szyperski, C.: Soft-
ware Ecosystem - Understanding an Indispensable Technology and Industry. Cam-
bridge, USA : The MIT Press, 2003
[Miles and Huberman 1994] Miles, M. B. ; Huberman, A. M.: Qualitative Data
Analysis. Thousand Oaks, USA : Sage Publications, 1994
[Miles et al. 2005] Miles, R. E. ; Miles, G. ; Snow, C. C.: Collaborative En-
trepreneurship - How Communities of Networked Firms Use Continuous Innovation
to Create Economic Wealth. Stanford, CA : Stanford Business Books, 2005
[Miles and Snow 1984] Miles, R. E. ; Snow, C. C.: Fit, Failure and the Hall of
Fame. In: California Management Review 26 (1984), No. 3, pp. 10 – 28
[Miles and Snow 1986] Miles, R. E. ; Snow, C. C.: Organizations: New Concepts
for New Forms. In: California Management Review (1986), pp. 62 – 73
[Miller and Shamsie 1996] Miller, D. ; Shamsie, J.: The Resource-Based View of
the Firm in Two Environments: The Hollywood Film Studios from 1936 to 1965. In:
Academy of Management Review 39 (1996), No. 3, pp. 519 – 543
[Miller and Crabtree 1992] Miller, W. L. ; Crabtree, B. F.: Primary Care Re-
search: A Multimethod Typology and Qualitative Road Map. In: Crabtree, B. F.
(Ed.) ; Miller, W. L. (Ed.): Doing Qualitative Research. Newbury Park, USA : Sage
Publications, 1992, pp. 3 – 28
[Milliken 1987] Milliken, F. J.: Three Types of Perceived Uncertainty about the
Environment: State, Effect, and Response Uncertainty. In: Academy of Management
Review 12 (1987), No. 1, pp. 133 – 143
[Mintzberg 1973] Mintzberg, H.: The Nature of Managerial Work. New York, USA :
Harper Row, 1973
[Mintzberg 1979a] Mintzberg, H.: An Emerging Strategy of ”Direct” Research. In:
Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (1979), No. 4, pp. 582 – 589
[Mintzberg 1979b] Mintzberg, H.: The Structuring of Organizations. Englewood
Cliffs, USA : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979
[Mintzberg 1983] Mintzberg, H.: Power in and around Organizations. Englewood
Cliffs, USA : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983
[Mintzberg 2004] Mintzberg, H.: Managers Not MBAs: A Hard Look at the Soft
Practice of Managing and Management Development. London, UK : Prentice Hall,
2004
320
Bibliography 321
[Mohr 1982] Mohr, L. B.: Explaining Organizational Behavior. San Francisco, USA :
Jossey-Bass, 1982
[Morris and Ferguson 1993] Morris, C. R. ; Ferguson, C. H.: How Architecture
Wins Technology Wars. In: Harvard Business Review 71 (1993), No. 2, pp. 86 – 96
[Mpoyi 2003] Mpoyi, R. T.: Vertical Integration: Strategic Characteristics and Com-
petitive Implications. In: Competitiveness Review 13 (2003), No. 1, pp. 44 – 55
[Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1997] Nalebuff, B. ; Brandenburger, A. M.: Co-
opetition. London, UK : HarperCollins Publishers, 1997
[Nelson 1970] Nelson, P.: Information and Consumer Behavior. In: Journal of
Political Economy 78 (1970), No. 2, pp. 311 – 329
[Nelson et al. 1996] Nelson, P. ; Richmaon, W. ; Seidemann, A.: Two Dimensions
of Software Acquisition. In: Communications of the ACM 39 (1996), No. 7, pp. 29 –
35
[North 1991] North, D. C.: Institutions. In: The Journal of Economic Perspectives
5 (1991), No. 1, pp. 97 – 112
[O’Brien and Marakas 2006] O’Brien, J. A. ; Marakas, G. M.: Management Infor-
mation Systems. 7th. New York, USA : McGraw-Hill, 2006
[Ohmae 1989] Ohmae, K.: The Global Logic of Strategic Alliances. In: Harvard
Business Review 67 (1989), No. 2, pp. 143 – 154
[Okhuysen and Eisenhardt 2002] Okhuysen, G. A. ; Eisenhardt, K. M.: Inte-
grating Knowledge into Groups: How Formal Interventions Enable Flexibility. In:
Organization Science 13 (2002), No. 4, pp. 370 – 386
[Oliver 2001] Oliver, A. L.: Strategic Alliances and the Learning Life-Cycle of
Biotechnology Firms. In: Organization Science 22 (2001), No. 3, pp. 467 – 489
[Oliver 1991] Oliver, C.: Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes. In: Academy
of Management Review 16 (1991), No. 1, pp. 145 – 179
[Oliver and Ebers 1998] Oliver, L. O. ; Ebers, M.: Networking Network Stud-
ies: An Analysis of Conceptual Configurations in the Study of Inter-Organizational
Relationships. In: Organization Studies 19 (1998), No. 4, pp. 549 – 583
[Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991] Orlikowski, W. J. ; Baroudi, J. J.: Studying
Information Technology in Organizations: Research Approaches and Assumptions.
In: Information Systems Research 2 (1991), No. 1, pp. 1 – 28
321
322 Bibliography
[Orton and Weick 1990] Orton, J. D. ; Weick, K. E.: Loosely Coupled Systems: A
Reconceptualization. In: Academy of Management Review 15 (1990), No. 2, pp. 203
– 223
[Papazoglou and Georgakopoulos 2003] Papazoglou, M. P. ; Georgakopoulos,
D.: Service-Oriented Computing. In: Communications of the ACM 46 (2003), No. 10,
pp. 25 – 28
[Parise and Casher 2003] Parise, S. ; Casher, A.: Alliance Portfolios: Designing
and Managing Your Network of Business-Partner Relationships. In: Academy of
Management Executive 17 (2003), No. 4, pp. 25 – 39
[Parkhe 1998a] Parkhe, A.: Building Trust in International Alliances. In: Journal
of World Business 33 (1998), No. 4, pp. 417 – 437
[Parkhe 1998b] Parkhe, A.: Understanding Trust in International Alliances. In:
Journal of World Business 33 (1998), No. 3, pp. 219 – 240
[Parnas 1972] Parnas, D. L.: On the Criteria to be Used in Decomposing Systems
into Modules. In: Communications of the ACM 15 (1972), No. 12, pp. 1053 – 1058
[Patton 2002] Patton, M. Q.: Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. 3rd.
Thousand Oaks, USA : Sage Publications, 2002
[Paulk 2001] Paulk, M. C.: Extreme Programming from a CMM Perspective. In:
IEEE Software 18 (2001), No. 6, pp. 19 – 26
[Penrose 1959] Penrose, E. T.: The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. New York,
USA : Blackwell, 1959
[Peteraf 1993] Peteraf, M. A.: The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A
Resource-Based View. In: Strategic Management Journal 14 (1993), No. 3, pp. 179 –
191
[Peters and Waterman 1982] Peters, T. J. ; Waterman, R. H.: In Search of Excel-
lence: Lessons from America’s Best-Run Companies. New York, USA : HarperCollins
Publishers, 1982
[Pettigrew 1975] Pettigrew, A. M.: Towards a Political Theory of Organizational
Intervention. In: Human Relations 28 (1975), No. 3, pp. 191 – 208
[Pettigrew 1990] Pettigrew, A. M.: Longitudinal Field Research on Change: Theory
and Practice. In: Organizational Science 1 (1990), No. 3, pp. 267 – 292
[Pettigrew 1992] Pettigrew, A. M.: The Character and Significance of Strategy
Process Research. In: Strategic Management Journal 13 (1992), No. Special Issue
Winter 1992, pp. 5 – 16
322
Bibliography 323
[Pfeffer 1994] Pfeffer, J.: Competitive Advantage through People - Unleashing the
Power of the Work Force. Boston, USA : Harvard Business School Press, 1994
[Pfeffer and Salancik 1974] Pfeffer, J. ; Salancik, G. R.: Organizational Decision
Making as a Political Process: The Case of a University Budget. In: Administrative
Science Quarterly 19 (1974), No. 2, pp. 135 – 151
[Pfeffer and Salancik 1978] Pfeffer, J. ; Salancik, G. R.: The External Control of
Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. New York, USA : Harper Row,
1978
[Pitts and Daniels 1984] Pitts, R. A. ; Daniels, J. D.: Aftermath of the Matrix
Mania. In: Columbia Journal of World Business 19 (1984), No. 2, pp. 48 – 54
[Piturro 1999] Piturro, M.: How Midsize Companies Are Buying ERP. In: Journal
of Accountancy 188 (1999), No. 3, pp. 41 – 48
[Podolny and Page 1998] Podolny, J. M. ; Page, K. L.: Network Forms of Organi-
zation. In: Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998), No. 1, pp. 57 – 76
[Porter 1980] Porter, M. E.: Competitive Strategy. New York, USA : Free Press,
1980
[Porter 1996] Porter, M. E.: What is Strategy? In: Harvard Business Review 74
(1996), No. 6, pp. 61 – 78
[Porter and Millar 1985] Porter, M. E. ; Millar, V. E.: How Information gives
you Competitive Advantage. In: Harvard Business Review 63 (1985), No. 4
[Poulin et al. 1993] Poulin, J. S. ; Caruso, J. M. ; Hancock, D. R.: The Business
Case for Software Reuse. In: IBM Systems Journal 32 (1993), No. 4, pp. 567 – 594
[Powell 1990] Powell, W. W.: Neither Market nor Hierachy: Network Forms of
Organization. In: Research in Organizational Behavior 12 (1990), pp. 295 – 336
[Powell 1998] Powell, W. W.: Learning from Collaboration: Knowledge and Net-
works in the Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry. In: California Management
Review 40 (1998), No. 3, pp. 228 – 240
[Powell et al. 1996] Powell, W. W. ; Koput, K. W. ; Smith-Doerr, L.: Interor-
ganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in
Biotechnology. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 41 (1996), No. 1, pp. 116 – 145
[Powell and Snellman 2004] Powell, W. W. ; Snellman, K.: The Knowledge
Economy. In: Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004), No. 1, pp. 199 – 220
323
324 Bibliography
[Prahalad and Hamel 1990] Prahalad, C. K. ; Hamel, G.: The Core Competence
of the Cooperation. In: Harvard Business Review 68 (1990), No. 3, pp. 79 – 91
[Priem and Butler 2001] Priem, R. L. ; Butler, J. E.: Is the Resource-Based
”View” a Useful Perspective for Strategic Management Research? In: Academy of
Management Review 26 (2001), No. 1, pp. 22 – 40
[Provan 1983] Provan, K. G.: The Federation as an Interorganizational Linkage
Network. In: Academy of Management Review 8 (1983), No. 1, pp. 79 – 89
[Pulier and Taylor 2006] Pulier, E. ; Taylor, H.: Understanding Enterprise SOA.
Greenwich, USA : Manning Publications, 2006
[Rada 1999] Rada, R.: IT Skills Standards. In: Communications of the ACM 42
(1999), No. 4, pp. 21 – 26
[Ramesh and Dennis 2005] Ramesh, V. ; Dennis, A. R.: The Object-Oriented Team:
Lessons for Virtual Teams from Global Software Development. In: Sprague Jr.,
R. H. (Ed.): Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences. Washington, USA : IEEE Computer Society, 2005, pp. 212 – 221
[Raymond 1999] Raymond, E. S.: The Cathedral and the Bazaar. In: Knowledge,
Technology, and Policy 12 (1999), No. 3, pp. 23 – 49
[Reich and Mankin 1986] Reich, R. B. ; Mankin, E. D.: Joint Ventures with Japan
Give Away Our Future. In: Harvard Business Review 64 (1986), No. 2, pp. 78 – 86
[Rhee and Haunschild 2006] Rhee, M. ; Haunschild, P. R.: The Liability of Good
Reputation: A Study of Product Recalls in the U.S. Automobile Industry. In: Orga-
nization Science 17 (2006), No. 1, pp. 101 – 117
[Richter and Bindseil 1995] Richter, R. ; Bindseil, U.: Neue Institutione-
noekonomik. In: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium 3 (1995), pp. 132 – 140
[Ring and Van de Ven 1992] Ring, P. S. ; Van de Ven, A. H.: Structuring Coop-
erative Relationships Between Organizations. In: Strategic Management Journal 13
(1992), No. 7, pp. 483 – 498
[Robbins 2005] Robbins, J.: Adopting Open Source Software Engineering (OSSE)
Practices by Adopting OSSE Tools. In: Feller, J. (Ed.) ; Fitzgerald, B. (Ed.) ;
Hissam, S. A. (Ed.) ; Lakhani, K. R. (Ed.): Perspectives On Free And Open Soft-
ware. Cambridge, USA : The MIT Press, 2005, pp. 245 – 264
[Rogers 2003] Rogers, E. M.: Diffusion of Innovations. 5th. New York, USA : Free
Press, 2003
324
Bibliography 325
[Ross et al. 1996] Ross, J. W. ; Beath, C. M. ; Goodhue, D. L.: Develop Long-Term
Competitiveness through IT Assets. In: Sloan Management Review 38 (1996), No. 1,
pp. 31 – 42
[Rumelt et al. 1991] Rumelt, R. P. ; Schendel, D. ; Teece, D. J.: Strategic Man-
agement and Economics. In: Strategic Management Journal 12 (1991), No. Special
Issue: Fundamental Research Issues in Strategy and Economics, pp. 5 – 29
[Rutherford 1992] Rutherford, D.: Dictionary of Economics. 1st ed. London :
Routledge, 1992
[Sabel 1993] Sabel, C. F.: Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a
Volatile Economy. In: Human Relations 46 (1993), No. 9, pp. 1133 – 1170
[Samuelson 1954] Samuelson, P. A.: The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures. In:
The Review of Economics and Statistics 36 (1954), November, No. 4, pp. 387 – 389
[Samuelson 1955] Samuelson, P. A.: Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public
Expenditures. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 37 (1955), November,
No. 4, pp. 350 – 356
[Sanchez 1993] Sanchez, R.: Strategic Flexibility, Firm Organization, and Manage-
rial Work in Dynamic Markets: A Strategic Options Perspective. In: Advances in
Strategic Management 9 (1993), No. 1, pp. 251 – 291
[Sanchez 1995] Sanchez, R.: Strategic Flexibility in Product Competition. In:
Strategic Management Journal 16 (1995), No. 5, pp. 135 – 159
[Sanchez and Mahoney 1996] Sanchez, R. ; Mahoney, J. T.: Modularity, Flexibility,
and Knowledge Management in Product and Organizational Design. In: Strategic
Management Journal 17 (1996), No. Special Issue: Knowledge and the Firm, pp. 63
– 76
[Sanchez and Mahoney 2001] Sanchez, R. ; Mahoney, J. T.: Modularity and
Dynamic Capabilities. In: Volberda, H. W. (Ed.) ; Elfring, T. (Ed.): Rethinking
Strategy. London, UK : Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 158 – 171
[Sanders and Boivie 2004] Sanders, W. G. ; Boivie, S.: Sorting Things Out: Val-
uation of New Firms in Uncertain Markets. In: Strategic Management Journal 25
(2004), No. 2, pp. 167 – 186
[Sawyer 1979] Sawyer, M. C.: Theories of the Firm. London, UK : Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979
[Saxenian 1996] Saxenian, A.: Regional Advantage. First Harvard University Press
Paperback Ed. Cambridge, USA : Harvard University Press, 1996
325
326 Bibliography
[Saxton 1997] Saxton, T.: The Effects of Partner and Relationship Characteristics
on Alliance Outcomes. In: Academy of Management Journal 40 (1997), No. 2, pp. 443
– 461
[Scandura and Williams 2000] Scandura, T. A. ; Williams, E. A.: Research
Methodology in Management: Current Practices, Trends, and Implications for Fu-
ture Research. In: Academy of Management Journal 43 (2000), No. 6, pp. 1248 –
1264
[Scherer et al. 2005] Scherer, R. F. ; Javalgi, R. G. ; Bryant, M. ; Tukel, O.:
Challanges of AACSB Accreditation for Business Schools in the United States and
Europe. In: Thunderbird International Business Review 47 (2005), No. 6, pp. 651 –
669
[Schilling 2000] Schilling, M. A.: Towards a General Modular Systems Theory and
its Application to Interfirm Product Modularity. In: Acedemy of Management Review
25 (2000), No. 2, pp. 312 – 334
[Schilling and Steensma 2001] Schilling, M. A. ; Steensma, H. K.: The Use of Mod-
ular Organizational Forms: An Industry-Level Analysis. In: Academy of Management
Journal 44 (2001), No. 6, pp. 1149 – 1168
[Schreyo¨gg and Kliesch 2005] Schreyo¨gg, G. ; Kliesch, M.: Dynamic Capabilities
and the Development of Organizational Competencies. Discussion Paper 25/05 - Frei
Universita¨t Berlin. 2005
[Schumpeter 1926] Schumpeter, J.: Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Unternehmung.
5th. Berlin, GER : Duncker & Humbolt, 1926
[Scott 1961] Scott, W. G.: Organization Theory: An Overview and an Appraisal.
In: The Journal of the Academy of Management 4 (1961), No. 1, pp. 7 – 26
[Seacord et al. 2003] Seacord, R. C. ; Plakosh, D. ; Lewis, G. A.: Modernizing
Legacy Systems. Boston, USA : Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 2003
[Selznick 1957] Selznick, P.: Leadership in Administration - A Sociological Interpre-
tation. New York, USA : Haper and Row, 1957
[Serafeimidis and Smithson 2000] Serafeimidis, V. ; Smithson, S.: Information
Systems Evaluation in Practice: A Case Study of Organizational Change. In: Journal
of Information Technology 15 (2000), No. 2, pp. 93 – 105
[Serain and Craig 2002] Serain, D. ; Craig, I.: Middleware and enterprise applica-
tion integration: The Architecture of E-Business Solutions. Berlin, GER : Springer
Verlag, 2002
326
Bibliography 327
[Seth and Thomas 1994] Seth, A. ; Thomas, H.: Theories of the Firm: Implications
for Strategy Research. In: Journal of Management Studies 31 (1994), No. 2, pp. 165
– 191
[Shapiro and Varian 1999a] Shapiro, C. ; Varian, H. R.: The Art of Standard Wars.
In: California Management Review 41 (1999), No. 2, pp. 8 – 32
[Shapiro and Varian 1999b] Shapiro, C. ; Varian, H. R.: Information Rules - A
Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Boston, MA : Harvard Business School
Press, 1999
[Shaw and Jarvenpaa 1997] Shaw, T. ; Jarvenpaa, S.: Process Models in Infor-
mation Systems. In: Lee, A. (Ed.) ; Liebenau, J. (Ed.) ; DeGross, J. I. (Ed.):
Information Systems and Qualitative Research. London, UK : Chapman and Hall,
1997, pp. 70 – 100
[Sherif et al. 2006] Sherif, K. ; Zmud, R. W. ; Browne, G. J.: Managing Peer-to-
Peer Conflicts in Disruptive Information Technology Innovations: The Case of Soft-
ware Reuse. In: MIS Quarterly 30 (2006), No. 2, pp. 339 – 356
[Siebert 1999] Siebert, H.: O¨konomische Analyse von Unternehmensnetzwerken.
In: Sydow, J. (Ed.): Management von Netzwerkorganisationen. Wiesbaden, GER :
Gabler Verlag, 1999, pp. 7 – 27
[Simatupang et al. 2002] Simatupang, T. M. ; Wright, A. C. ; Sridharan, R.:
The Knowledge of Coordination for Supply Chain Integration. In: Business Process
Management Journal 8 (2002), No. 3, pp. 289 – 308
[Simon 1955] Simon, H. A.: A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. In: The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 69 (1955), No. 1, pp. 99 – 118
[Simon 1957] Simon, H. A.: Administrative Behavior. 2nd Ed. New York, USA : The
MacMillian Company, 1957
[Simon 1962] Simon, H. A.: The Architecture of Complexity. In: Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society 106 (1962), No. 6, pp. 467 – 482
[Simon 1965] Simon, H. A.: Administrative Behavior. New York, USA : The Free
Press, 1965
[Siskos et al. 2007] Siskos, Y. ; Grigoroudis, E. ; Krassadaki, E. ; Matsatsinis,
N.: A Multicriteria Accreditation System for Information Technology Skills and Qual-
ifications. In: European Journal of Operations Research 182 (2007), No. 2, pp. 867 –
885
327
328 Bibliography
[Smith et al. 1995] Smith, K. G. ; Carroll, S. J. ; Ashford, S. J.: Intra- and
Interorganizational Cooperation: Towards a Research Agenda. In: Academy of Man-
agement Journal 38 (1995), No. 1, pp. 7 – 23
[Snow et al. 1992] Snow, C. C. ; Miles, R. E. ; Coleman, H. J.: Managing 21st
Century Network Organizations. In: Organizational Dynamics 20 (1992), No. 3, pp. 4
– 20
[Sobrero and Schrader 1998] Sobrero, M. ; Schrader, S.: Structuring Inter-Firm
Relationships: A Meta-Analytic Approach. In: Organization Studies 19 (1998), No. 4,
pp. 585 – 615
[Soeffner and Hitzler 1994] Soeffner, H.-G. ; Hitzler, R.: Hermeneutik als Haltung
und Handlung. U¨ber methodisch kontrolliertes Verstehen. In: Schro¨er, N. (Ed.):
Interpretative Sozialforschung. Opladen, GER : Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, 1994,
pp. 28 – 55
[Soh et al. 2000] Soh, C. ; Kien, S. S. ; Tay-Yap, J.: Cultural Fits and Misfits: Is
ERP a Universal Solution? In: Communications of the ACM 43 (2000), No. 4, pp. 47
– 51
[Soh and Markus 1995] Soh, C. ; Markus, M. L.: How IT Creates Business Value:
A Process Theory Synthesis. In: Ariav, G. (Ed.) ; Beath, C. (Ed.) ; DeGross,
J. I. (Ed.) ; Hoyer, R. (Ed.) ; Kemerer, C. F. (Ed.): Proceedings of the Sixteenth
International Conference on Information Systems, 1995, pp. 29 – 41
[Somers and Nelson 2004] Somers, T. M. ; Nelson, K. G.: A Taxonomy of Players
and Activities Across the ERP Project Life Cycle. In: Information and Management
41 (2004), No. 3, pp. 257 – 278
[Sommerville 2004] Sommerville, I.: Software Engineering. 7th Ed. Harlow, UK :
Pearson Education Limited, 2004
[Spekman et al. 1998] Spekman, R. E. ; Forbes, III, T. M. ; Isabella, L. A. ;
MacAvoy, T. C.: Alliance Management: A View from the Past and a Look to the
Future. In: Journal of Management Studies 35 (1998), No. 6, pp. 747 – 772
[Sprott 2000] Sprott, D.: Componentizing the Enterprise Application Packages. In:
Communications of the ACM 43 (2000), No. 4, pp. 63 – 69
[Stafford and Wallnau 2001] Stafford, J. ; Wallnau, K.: Is Third Party Certifi-
cation Necessary? In: Proceedings of the 4th ICSE Workshop on Component-Based
Software Engineering, 2001
[Stake 1995] Stake, R. E.: The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, USA :
Sage Publications, 1995
328
Bibliography 329
[Stake 2006] Stake, R. E.: Multiple Case Study Analysis. New York, USA : The
Guilford Press, 2006
[Stal 2002] Stal, M.: Web Services: Beyond Component-Based Computing. In:
Communications of the ACM 45 (2002), No. 10, pp. 71 – 76
[Staudenmayer et al. 2005] Staudenmayer, N. ; Tripsas, M. ; Tucci, C. L.: In-
terfirm Modularity and Its Implications for Product Development. In: Journal of
Product Innovation Management 22 (2005), No. 4, pp. 303 – 321
[Stedman 2000] Stedman, C.: ERP Problems Put Breaks on Volkswagen Parts
Shipment. In: Computerworld 34 (2000), No. 1, pp. 8
[Stein and Vandenbosch 1996] Stein, E. W. ; Vandenbosch, B.: Organizational
Learning during Advanced Stages of System Development. In: Journal of Management
Information Systems 13 (1996), No. 2, pp. 115 – 136
[Stone 1978] Stone, E.: Research Methods in Organizational Behavior. Santa Monica,
USA : Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1978
[Strauss and Corbin 1998] Strauss, A. ; Corbin, J.: Basics of Qualitative Research:
Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. 2nd. Thousand Oaks,
USA : Sage Publications, 1998
[Stuart 2000] Stuart, T. E.: Interorganizational Alliances and the Performance of
Firms: A Study of Growth and Innovation Rates in a High-Technology Industry. In:
Stratigic Management Journal 21 (2000), No. 8, pp. 791 – 811
[Subramani 2004] Subramani, M.: How Do Suppliers Benefit from Information
Technology Use in Supply Chain Relations. In: MIS Quarterly 28 (2004), No. 1,
pp. 45 – 73
[Sufcliffe and Zaheer 1998] Sufcliffe, K. M. ; Zaheer, A.: Uncertainty in the
Transaction Environment: An Empirical Test. In: Strategic Management Journal 19
(1998), No. 1, pp. 1 – 23
[Sugumaran and Storey 2003] Sugumaran, V. ; Storey, V. C.: A Semantic-Based
Approach to Component Retrieval. In: The DATA BASE for Advances in Information
Systems 34 (2003), No. 3, pp. 8 – 24
[Sydow 1999] Sydow, J.: O¨konomische Analyse von Unternehmensnetzwerken. In:
Sydow, J. (Ed.): Management von Netzwerkorganisationen. Wiesbaden, GER :
Gabler Verlag, 1999, pp. 279 – 314
329
330 Bibliography
[Sydow and Windeler 1998] Sydow, J. ; Windeler, A.: Organizing and Evalu-
ating Interfirm Networks: A Structurationist Perspective on Network Processes and
Effectiveness. In: Organization Science 9 (1998), No. 3, pp. 265 – 284
[Szanton 1981] Szanton, P. L.: Not Well Advised. New York, USA : Russell Sage
Foundation: Ford Foundation, 1981
[Szyperski et al. 2002] Szyperski, C. ; Gruntz, D. ; Murer, S.: Component Soft-
ware - Beyond Object-Oriented Programming. Reading, USA : Addison-Wesley Pub-
lishing Company, 2002
[Takeuchi and Nonaka 1986] Takeuchi, H. ; Nonaka, I.: The New New Product
Development Game. In: Harvard Business Review 64 (1986), No. 1, pp. 137 – 146
[Tayntor 2002] Tayntor, C. B.: Six Sigma Software Development. Boca Raton,
USA : Auerbach Publications, 2002
[Teece et al. 1997] Teece, D. J. ; Pisano, G. ; Shuen, A.: Dynamic Capabilities and
Strategic Management. In: Strategic Management Journal 18 (1997), No. 7, pp. 509
– 533
[Teng 2003] Teng, B.-S.: Collaborative Advantage of Strategic Alliances: Value
Creation in the Value Net. In: Journal of General Management 29 (2003), No. 2,
pp. 1 – 22
[Thompson 1967] Thompson, J. D.: Organizations in Action. New York, USA :
McGraw-Hill, 1967
[Thong 2001] Thong, J. Y. L.: Resource Constraints and Information Systems Im-
plementation in Sigaporean Small Businesses. In: Omega 29 (2001), No. 2, pp. 143 –
156
[Thorelli 1986] Thorelli, H. B.: Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies. In:
Strategic Management Journal 7 (1986), No. 1, pp. 37 – 51
[Tirole 1999] Tirole, J.: Incomplete Contracts: Where do we Stand? In: Economet-
rica 67 (1999), No. 4, pp. 741 – 781
[Tiwana and McLean 2005] Tiwana, A. ; McLean, E. R.: Expertise Integration
and Creativity in Information Systems Development. In: Journal of Management
Information Systems 22 (2005), No. 1, pp. 13 – 43
[Trapnell 2007] Trapnell, J. E.: AACSB International Accreditation - The Value
Proposition and a Look to the Future. In: Journal of Management Development 26
(2007), No. 1, pp. 67 – 72
330
Bibliography 331
[Tushman 1977] Tushman, M. L.: A Political Approach to Organizations: A Review
and Rationale. In: Academy of Management Review 2 (1977), No. 2, pp. 206 – 216
[Tushman and Anderson 1986] Tushman, M. L. ; Anderson, P.: Technological Dis-
continuities and Organizational Environments. In: Administrative Science Quarterly
31 (1986), No. 3, pp. 439 – 465
[Ulrich and Barney 1984] Ulrich, D. ; Barney, J. B.: Perspectives in Organiza-
tions: Resource Dependence, Efficiency, and Population. In: Academy of Management
Review 9 (1984), No. 3, pp. 471 – 481
[Ulrich 1995] Ulrich, K.: The Role of Product Architecture in the Manufacturing
Firm. In: Research Policy 24 (1995), No. 3, pp. 419 – 440
[Van de Ven 1976] Van de Ven, A. H.: On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance
of Relations among Organizations. In: The Academy of Management Review 1 (1976),
No. 4, pp. 24 – 36
[Van de Ven 1992] Van de Ven, A. H.: Suggestion for Studying Strategy Process:
A Research Note. In: Strategic Management Journal 13 (1992), No. Special Issue
Summer 1992, pp. 169 – 191
[Van de Ven 2005] Van de Ven, A. H.: Running in Packs to Develop Knowledge-
Intensive Technologies. In: MIS Quarterly 29 (2005), No. 2, pp. 365 – 378
[Van de Ven et al. 1976] Van de Ven, A. H. ; Delbecq, A. L. ; Koenig, R.:
Determinants of Coordination Modes within Organizations. In: American Sociological
Review 41 (1976), No. 2, pp. 322 – 338
[Van de Ven and Huber 1990] Van de Ven, A. H. ; Huber, G. P.: Longitudinal Field
Research Methods for Studying Processes of Organizational Change. In: Organization
Science 1 (1990), No. 3, pp. 213 – 219
[Van de Ven and Poole 1995] Van de Ven, A. H. ; Poole, M. S.: Explaining
Development and Change in Organizations. In: The Academy of Managment Review
20 (1995), No. 3, pp. 510 – 540
[Van de Ven and Walker 1984] Van de Ven, A. H. ; Walker, G.: The Dynamics of
Interorganizational Coordination. In: Adminisatrative Science Quarterly 29 (1984),
No. 4, pp. 598 – 621
[Van de Ven et al. 1979] Ven, A. H. Van de ; Walker, G. ; Liston, J.: Coordination
Patterns Within an Interorganizational Network. In: Human Relations 32 (1979),
No. 1, pp. 19 – 36
331
332 Bibliography
[Vessey et al. 2002] Vessey, I. ; Ramesh, V. ; Glass, R. L.: Research in Information
Systems: An Empirical Study of Diversity in the Discipline and its Journals. In:
Journal of Management Infomration Systems 19 (2002), No. 2, pp. 129 – 174
[Victor and Blackburn 1987] Victor, B. ; Blackburn, R. S.: Interdependence: An
Alternative Conceptualization. In: Academy of Management Review 12 (1987), No. 3,
pp. 486 – 498
[Voas 1998] Voas, J. M.: Certifying Off-the-Shelf Software Components. In: IEEE
Computer 31 (1998), No. 6, pp. 53 – 59
[Wade and Hulland 2004] Wade, M. ; Hulland, J.: Review: The Resource-Based
View and Information Systems Research: Review, Extension, and Suggestions for
Future Research. In: MIS Quarterly 28 (2004), No. 1, pp. 107 – 142
[Wamsley and Zald 1973] Wamsley, G. ; Zald, M.: The Political Economy of Public
Organizations. Lexington, USA : Health Co., 1973
[Wang et al. 2006] Wang, E. T. G. ; Klein, G. ; Jiang, J. J.: ERPMisfits: Country of
Origin and Organizational Factors. In: Journal of Management Information Systems
23 (2006), No. 1, pp. 263 – 292
[Ward and Peppard 2002] Ward, J. ; Peppard, J.: Strategic Planning for Informa-
tion Systems. Chichester, UK : John Wiley & Sons, 2002
[Warren 1999] Warren, I.: The Renaissance of Legacy Systems: Method Support for
Software System Evolution. Berlin, GER : Springer Verlag, 1999
[Weber 1964] Weber, M.: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - Erster Halbband. Cologne,
GER : Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964
[Weick 1976] Weick, K. E.: Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems.
In: Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976), No. 1, pp. 1 – 19
[Weick and Sutcliff 2001] Weick, K. E. ; Sutcliff, K. M.: Managing the Unexpected
- Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity. San Francisco, USA : Jossey-
Bass, 2001
[Weick et al. 1999] Weick, K. E. ; Sutcliff, K. M. ; Obstfeld, D.: Organizing for
High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness. In: Research in Organizational
Behavior 21 (1999), pp. 81 – 123
[Weigelt and Camerer 1988] Weigelt, K. ; Camerer, C.: Reputation and Corporate
Strategy: A Review of Recent Theory and Applications. In: Startegic Management
Journal 9 (1988), No. 5, pp. 443 – 454
332
Bibliography 333
[Weiss 1995] Weiss, A.: Human Capital vs. Signalling. In: Journal of Economic
Perspectives 9 (1995), No. 4, pp. 133 – 154
[Weitzel 2004] Weitzel, T.: Economics of Standards in Information Networks. Hei-
delberg, GER : Physica Verlag, 2004
[Welsh and White 1981] Welsh, J. A. ; White, J. F.: A Small Business is not a
Little Big Business. In: Harvard Business Review 59 (1981), No. 4, pp. 18 – 27
[Wendt 2003] Wendt, A.: Why a World State is Inevitable. In: European Journal
of International Relations 9 (2003), No. 4, pp. 491 – 542
[Wernerfelt 1984] Wernerfelt, B.: A Resource-Based View of the Firm. In: Strate-
gic Management Journal 5 (1984), No. 2, pp. 171 – 180
[Wernerfelt 1995] Wernerfelt, B.: The Resource-Based View of the Firm: Ten
Years After. In: Strategic Management Journal 16 (1995), No. 3, pp. 171 – 174
[Wieczorek and Meyerhoff 2001] Wieczorek, M. (Ed.) ; Meyerhoff, D. (Ed.):
Software Quality - State of the Art in Management, Testing, and Tools. Berlin, GER :
Springer Verlag, 2001
[Wilde and Hess 2007] Wilde, T. ; Hess, T.: Forschungsmethoden in der
Wirtschaftsinformatik - Eine Empirische Untersuchtung. In: Wirtschaftsinformatik
49 (2007), No. 4, pp. 280 – 287
[Williams et al. 2000] Williams, L. ; Kessler, R. R. ; Cunningham, W. ; Jeffries,
R.: Strengthening the Case for Pair Programming. In: IEEE Software 17 (2000),
No. 4, pp. 19 – 25
[Williamson 1975] Williamson, O. E.: Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and An-
titrust Implications. New York, USA : Free Press, 1975
[Williamson 1979] Williamson, O. E.: Transaction-Cost Economics: The Gover-
nance of Contractual Relations. In: Journal of Law and Economics 22 (1979), No. 2,
pp. 233 – 261
[Williamson 1981] Williamson, O. E.: The Economics of Organization: The Trans-
action Cost Approach. In: American Journal of Sociology 87 (1981), No. 3, pp. 548
– 577
[Williamson 1985] Williamson, O. E.: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.
New York, USA : Free Press, 1985
[Williamson 1996] Williamson, O. E.: The Mechanisms of Governance. New York,
USA : Oxford University Press, 1996
333
334 Bibliography
[Winter 2003] Winter, S. G.: Understanding Dynamic Capabilities. In: Strategic
Management Journal 24 (2003), No. 10, pp. 991 – 995
[Womack and Jones 1996] Womack, J. P. ; Jones, D. T.: Lean Thinking: Banish
Waste and Create Wealth in Your Corporation. New York, USA : Simon and Schuster,
1996
[Womack et al. 1990] Womack, J. P. ; Jones, D. T. ; Roos, D.: The Machine that
Changed the World. New York, USA : HarperCollins Publishers, 1990
[Yin 2003] Yin, R. K.: Applied Social Research Methods Series. Vol. 5: Case Study
Research - Design and Methods. 3rd. Thousand Oaks, USA : Sage Publications, 2003
[Yoffie et al. 2004] Yoffie, D. B. ; Casadesus-Masanell, R. ; Mattu, S.: Wintel:
Cooperation or Conflict? Harvard Business School Case, Ref. 9-704-419. 2004
[Zaheer et al. 1998] Zaheer, A. ; McEvily, B. ; Perrone, V.: Does Trust Matter?
Exploring the Effects of Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance.
In: Organization Science 9 (1998), No. 2, pp. 141 – 159
[Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994] Zaheer, A. ; Venkatraman, N.: Determinants of
Electronic Integration in the Insurance Industry: An Empirical Test. In: Management
Science 40 (1994), No. 5, pp. 549 – 566
[Zaheer and Zaheer 1997] Zaheer, A. ; Zaheer, S.: Catching the Wave: Alertness,
Responsiveness, and Market Influence in Global Electronic Networks. In: Management
Science 43 (1997), No. 11, pp. 1493 – 1509
[Zaheer et al. 1999] Zaheer, S. ; Albert, S. ; Zaheer, A.: Time Scales and Orga-
nizational Theory. In: Academy of Management Review 24 (1999), No. 4, pp. 725 –
741
[Zajonc 1968] Zajonc, R. B.: Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure. In: Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 9 (1968), No. 2, pp. 1 – 27
[Zald 1970] Zald, M. N. (Ed.) ; Vanderbilt University (Organizer): Power in Organi-
zations - Proceedings of the First Annual Vanderbilt Sociology Conference. Nashville,
USA : Vanderbilt University Press, 1970
[Ziedonis 2004] Ziedonis, R. H.: Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Tech-
nology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms. In: Management Science 50
(2004), No. 6, pp. 804 – 820
[Zollo and Winter 2002] Zollo, M ; Winter, S. G.: Deliberate Learning and the
Evolution of Dynamic Capabilities. In: Organization Science 13 (2002), No. 3, pp. 339
– 351
334
Lebenslauf
Perso¨nliches
Name Jens-Magnus Arndt
Geburtstag, -ort 22.09.1978, Mannheim
Familienstand ledig
Staatsangeho¨rigkeit deutsch
E-Mail mailto.jens.arndt@googlemail.com
Ausbildung
09/1988 – 07/1997 Ludwig Frank Gymnasium, Mannheim
(Abschluss: Abitur)
10/1998 – 12/2004 Studium, Universita¨t Mannheim
(Abschluss: Diplom Wirtschaftsinformatiker)
05/2002 – 08/2003 Studium, Hawaii Pacific University, Honolulu USA
(Abschluss: Master of Arts)
01/2005 – 12/2007 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Lehrstuhl fu¨r
ABWL und Wirtschaftsinformatik (Prof. Dr.
Armin Heinzl), Universita¨t Mannheim
